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PLATONIS PHÆDO.

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PLATONIS PHÆDO.

THE

**PHÆDO OF PLATO**

EDITED  
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY  
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## P R E F A C E .

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THE text, which has been mainly followed, is that of the Leipsic Edition by K. F. Hermann. In the few cases in which the evidence, internal or external, seemed to require the adoption of a different reading, the grounds of divergence are, in every variation of importance, subjoined in the annotations. Fortunately, however, the Dialogue has come down to us with so few corruptions or complications in the text, that the task which I have had to perform has been literary rather than critical.

In preparing this work—the first Edition, it is believed, of a Platonic Dialogue proceeding from Scotland—the aim which I have chiefly had in view has been to concentrate around this portion of Plato illustrative collateral material drawn from ancient and modern Thought, such as might enable the reader to enter on its study with a sympathetic appreciation both of the intrinsic value and of the historical effects of its speculations.

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN,  
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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE Dialogue of the Phædo is remarkable, even among the Dialogues of Plato, for two things which, taken together, give it a peculiar and unapproached pre-eminence. It combines the perfection of style with the highest dignity of subject, the greatest grace of form with the greatest richness of matter. Whether we look to its features as a work of Art, its noble treatment of a noble historical subject, the masterly grouping of its parts, and the exquisite, yet simple elaboration of harmonious details, or whether we look to its unsurpassed importance in Philosophy as a profound discussion upon the most solemn of all subjects, and an earnest grappling with the most absorbing problems of human destiny, it commands attention as being unquestionably, both from its literary finish and from its philosophical value, the most memorable monument of Thought in the history of Philosophy. A few observations on each of these aspects of the Phædo will form the most appropriate introduction to the study of the Dialogue.

And first, of its features as a work of Art. To some minds the great treatise of the 'Republic' may appear a more imposing literary structure : and it is not to be denied that that work must be regarded as occupying a central position among the Dialogues of Plato ; yet, in human interest and in dramatic power, it must be confessed to yield precedence to the Phædo, in which we have the picture of that noble life from which the speculations of the

august Republic emanated, surrounding itself with double glory in the hour of death. If there be any one of the works of Plato that has a title to be named in conjunction with the *Phædo*, it is only the Dialogue of the 'Banquet,' which, though inferior in matter and in fruitfulness of influence, possesses many kindred features, more especially in respect of the external decoration and the general structure of its parts. The construction of the Dialogue, enclosed in each case within a framework of narrative, the length of time occupied in the action, the number and importance of the actors and interlocutors, a certain rich exuberance and musical flow\* of language marking them out as contemporaneous products of the same authorship, the variety of interesting and impressive incidents interwoven, each with a meaning and purpose helpful to the main design, the evolution of the successive parts, whereby argument is made to rise above argument like Alp over Alp, the convergence of the whole to the glory of the great Protagonist who forms the centre in each case of an admiring circle, are memorable features common to both, such as render each to the other a companion picture. The one is the representation of the sunshine of the life, the other the shadow of the death of Socrates. The one is radiant with smiles over the wine cup: the other glistening with tears over the bowl of death. The design of the Banquet is to draw down the spirit of Love to dwell in the sphere of the Mortal and Perishable, and is therefore the glorification of Life: that of the *Phædo* is to raise the spirit of Knowledge to the sphere of the Immortal out of the dust of Mortality, and is therefore the glorification of Death. These two Dialogues thus stand in manifestly very near relation to each other, but, although they are linked

• What Cicero (*Or. c. 20*) observes of the style of Plato generally, is more especially applicable to the *Phædo*, Banquet, and *Phædrus*: '*Visum est nonnullis Platonis . . . locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen quod incitatus feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum.*'

together as the *L'Allegro* and *Il Penseroso* of Philosophy, it is not doubtful, that with Plato as with Milton, the most powerful effort is that, not of *Thalia*, but of *Melpomene*.\*

The following sketch of the order of progression and of the contents of the Dialogue may serve to convey a general outline of the structure of its parts. It is, however, only the closest study that can enable one fully to appreciate the distribution of lights and shadows, and to enter into the mutual harmony and balance of the respective elements of which it is composed. Each of the great divisions of ancient Philosophy is made to contribute to the structure. The main portions of the building may be said to be reared by the slow and solid masonry of *Dialectics*: the supporting buttresses to each story, as it rises in regular gradation, are hewn from *Ethics*: and the crown of 'cloud capp'd towers' adorning this palace of the Soul, and disclosing glimpses of the vast resources of the Universe 'far into the Unapparent,' is derived from the gorgeous *Physics* of Plato.

\* The view which represents the *Banquet* and the *Phædo* as standing to each other in the relation of a comedy and a tragedy, is only half true. The *Banquet*, though gay as a comedy, is yet more than a comedy; and to call the *Phædo* a tragedy (unless we mean by tragedy that of the type of the *Œdipus Coloneus* rather than of the *Œdipus Tyrannus*), is to give an inadequate representation of it. It is unlike a tragedy in respect of the hero himself, who does not depart like the *ἀνὴρ τραγικός* (115 A.), pouring forth the language of fierce invective, and bewailing the light of the sun; and as for the proper products of the tragedy, Pity and Terror, the latter is subdued, and the former is transferred from the hero to the spectators, who compassionate not him, but themselves, as being now left like orphans in the world (*οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐκείνόν γε ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ τύχην ἀπέκλειον*, 117 D.). The true correlative in the *Phædo* to the sources of interest in a tragedy is to be found, not so much in the personal fortunes of the Protagonist as in the alternations of hope and fear (87 C.) emerging in the various fortunes of the Discussion.

## ANALYSIS OF THE PHÆDO.

		Chapters
Introductory Narrative.	Prologue.—Incidents of the early morning in the Prison . . . . .	I.—IV.
	Conversation on the subject of voluntary escape from the Prison of the Body - - -	V.—VII.
	Episode with Crito, and interruption to free and calm discussion removed - - -	VIII.
	Exposition of the relation in which a Philosopher stands to Death - - - -	IX.—XI.
	First ETHICAL Lesson thence deduced - - -	XII.—XIII.
	Cebes requests Socrates to unfold the grounds of his confidence in a Future State - - -	XIV.
First Dialectic Discussion. Indirect Metaphysical Proof of Immortality.	Argument I.— <i>Cyclical</i> . That the cycle of Life cannot end in Death in the sense of non-existence, and that Death must be only the starting point of a new beginning - - -	XV.—XVII.
	Argument II.— <i>Platonic</i> . That Cognition, being a form of Reminiscence, implies an existence of the Cognoscent principle prior to the present life - - - -	XVIII.—XXIII.
	Episode, exhorting to the study of the subject with help from all quarters -	XXIV.
	Argument III.— <i>Metaphysical</i> . That the Soul is not subject to death, as being, unlike the Body, one and indiscrptible, and as holding close converse with the unchanging element of Being—the Eternal Ideas - - -	XXV.—XXVIII.
	Second ETHICAL Lesson thence deduced -	XXIX.
Lesser Imaginative MYTHUS.	Adaptation of the dogma of Metempsychosis and of certain popular superstitions to enforce the same lesson - - - -	XXX.—XXXI.
	Peroration and practical application -	XXXII.—XXXIV.

Intermediate Narrative.	{	Pause in the discussion. Socrates invites the expression of difficulties. — Allusion to the cheering example of the Dying Swan -	Chapters XXXV.
		The objection of Simmias: that the Soul, being a Harmony, must be regarded as perishing with the Body - - - - -	XXXVI.
		The objection of Cebes: that the Soul may survive the dissolution of the Body, yet is not thereby necessarily exempt perpetually from dissolution	XXXVII.
		First Intermezzo of the Auditor. The narrator relates anecdotes of the collected and playful demeanour of Socrates before he entered on the examination of these objections - -	XXXVIII.
		Prelude, in which Socrates exhorts to courage and patience in the search for Truth - - -	XXXIX.—XL.
		Argument IV.— <i>Psychological</i> . That the Soul is more than a Harmony, and of a divine and therefore immortal nature. Objection of Simmias thereby refuted - - -	XLI.—XLIII.
Second DIALLECTIC Discussion. Direct Metaphysical Proof.	{	Digression, preparatory to answering the second objection, upon the history of the various movements in previous Philosophy on the subject of Causation. Course by which he was conducted to the doctrine of 'Ideas' as the principles of Causation.—Second Intermezzo of the Auditor - - -	XLIV.—XLIX.
		Argument V.— <i>Ideal</i> . That the 'Idea' of Life is inseparable from that of Soul, and that, as Death is excluded by Life, the Soul can never partake of Death. The objection of Cebes thereby refuted - - -	L.—LVI.
		Third ETHICAL Lesson, from the foregoing views, as to the solemnity of Living -	LVII.
		PHYSICAL theory of the world, supernal and infernal, as a vast arena of varied Existence -	LVIII.—LXII.
Greater Imaginative MYTHUS.	{	Peroration and close of the whole exposition -	LXIII.
		Conversation with Crito on matters personal to himself - - - - -	LXIV.
		Incidents of the Evening - - - -	LXV.
		Sunset—Execution—Epilogue - - -	LXVI.
Concluding Narrative.	{		

The subject of the *Phædo*, thus analysed, may be said briefly to be the unfolding of the victory of the philosophic mind over the fear of Death. This end is sought to be attained in two ways, by the exposition of the Ideal in Thought united with the Real in Life—intellectually, by the reasonings advanced in support of confidence in a Future Life, and also practically and historically, by the narration of the manner in which Socrates, under the influence of those reasonings, entered the night of Death. Thus the composed demeanour of the great Actor becomes the appropriate complement of the dialectic discussions of the great Thinker.

Hence the *Phædo* is to be considered, not only as a Dialogue, in which certain intellectual problems are discussed and certain results attained, but also as a Drama, in which the conduct and bearing of the chief actor is a continuous practical commentary illustrative of those results. It represents, indeed, the work of but one day—a summer day from dawn to sunset—but it is the day that is the last of a long and rich life of seventy years, of which life this work is the ripe fruit and crown. The intellectual athlete of Athens is brought before us in habit and manner as he lived, surrounded by a picturesque assemblage of very various friends and followers whom the common sympathy of the hour has reconciled into unity, and with whom he converses naturally and unaffectedly, with ‘large discourse, looking before and after,’ of the relation of the true Philosopher towards Death. Socrates is therefore no longer represented in the part which is so frequently assigned to him in many of the Platonic dialogues, as simply the confuter and demolisher: he appears as the architect of a great edifice of Argument, inviting instead of applying the elenchus of the severest criticism. Hence one of the chief charms of the *Phædo*, that it presents us with a tangible and distinct result, inasmuch as it is a synthetic and, only in part, an analytic dialogue. No doubt there are gleams, appearing at intervals, of the old Socratic humour, but it is no longer the intense and sometimes scorching blaze that was wont

to spread crackling fire among Sophistic thorns ; it is now a mild lambent flame, at once enlightening and enlivening.

Considered as a dramatic work of Art, the *Phædo* presents, both in its larger outlines and in its minuter touches, a striking congruity reigning throughout its parts, and visible in every incident and detail. A few of the undertones in this great harmony, *φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν*, may serve, when pointed out, to convey some insight both into the art of Plato generally, and into the special beauty of the *Phædo*.

In the case of a Dialogue which was at once a narration and a discussion, it is obvious that the choice of a narrator was limited to one who was reputed capable of sustaining, in due measure, both the elements of which it is composed. It was, therefore, no matter of indifference which of the auditors in the prison scene should be selected as the rehearser of the events and disputations. In the hands of one division of the auditors, such as Crito or Apollodorus, the emotions inseparable from the narration would have obscured the judicial calmness necessary for the discussion : in the hands of the other division, consisting of stronger and less emotional spirits, such as Euclid or Antisthenes, the dialectic element would have absorbed the dramatic, and beauty would have been sacrificed to strength. For the due interweaving of the pictorial dramatic and the intense dialectic, there was, however, in that group one to whom the narration might be entrusted with adequate consistency, inasmuch as he was not insensible to the former element, and was, at the same time, able to thread his way through the mazes of the latter. This was *Phædo*,\* whose young and susceptible nature (89 B.—C.) rendered him capable of describing the tender impressions which the spectacle suggested, while the acuteness of his mind, as evidenced by the dialectic subtlety of the school which he afterwards founded, made him a natural and happy exponent of the more recondite mysteries of the Socratic Dialectic.

\* Steinhart, vol. IV., Einleitung, p. 395.

As an Athenian is not chosen as the narrator, so neither is Athens chosen as the scene where the narration is supposed to take place. The significance of this circumstance is heightened by the faithfulness of detail with which the honours bestowed by that city on the memory of Theseus are dwelt upon at the outset with a scarcely necessary fulness, as if to point a bitter contrast between the treatment of the dead hero and that of the living sage. It can hardly fail to be considered more than matter of accident that such prominence should be given in the beginning of the Dialogue to the honourable memories of Athens, if it were not intended to suggest the image of a new Theseus, voyaging into stranger seas and exploring deeper labyrinths\* with no Ariadne but his own Reason to supply the extricating clue.

With yet greater distinctness a purpose may be discerned in the choice of a Pythagorean as the privileged auditor of the rehearsal, and of a city rich in Pythagorean memories as the scene. It is not to be doubted that there was here a complimentary design on the part of Plato towards Pythagoreanism, which was the only system previous to Platonism that found a place among its doctrines for the belief, under a modified form, in a Future Life.

Other touches of significant purpose are seen in the artistic skill with which we are gradually familiarised with the conception giving the key-note to the whole: viz., that Death is not the destruction, but the emancipation of the Soul. This thought is gently infused by the passing reference to the liberating achievements of Theseus (*ἔσωσί τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη*), and still more significantly by the circumstance that the moment when Socrates is introduced to us, is that in which he is undergoing, for the last time, release from the prison chain. The means by which the great emancipation is effected, and the element into which it ushers the delivered soul, are farther indicated in symbol by the frequent

\* Ἀναλαβεῖν . . . ὥσπερ ἀρχὴν κλωστήρου ἐν σκοτεινῷ καὶ πολλοὺς ἐλιγμοὺς καὶ πλάνας ἔχοντι . . . λόγῳ. Plutarch, *Mor.* 558 D.



allusions to the purifying Intellectual Sun-god,\* under whose peculiar protection Socrates departs from the double durance of his body and of the Athenian prison. Since his confinement began, he is described as having become, in a sense more marked than before, a favourite of that deity. The Delian Festival of the god interposes a delay in the execution of his sentence, and this is regarded as a proof of his special favour. The newly-born poetic power, which visits him for the first time when in prison, inspires him to dedicate its first fruits to Apollo. Philosophy itself is brought under the jurisdiction of the same deity, and is therefore spoken of as the 'Highest Music.' In like manner, the clear and bright perceptions of the dying sage, comparable only to vaticination, his claim to be considered a servant of Apollo, like the swan the bird of Apollo, and the last offering to Æsculapius the son of Apollo, are all indications, not less significant although seeming to emerge incidentally from the narrative, that Death was not a closing in of darkness upon the Soul, but an enlargement into a sphere of ampler vision and authentic light. In harmony with this central idea is the remarkable silence regarding the remains of Socrates. There is no reference in the *Phædo* either to the manner in which, or the spot where they were interred, as if to indicate that the prison-house was no longer an object of any interest when once the august prisoner was emancipated.

From the disposition of its parts and the symmetry of its structure, we now pass to consider its speculative aspects, the articulation of its arguments, and the permanent value of its reasonings.

The contrast in colouring presented by the two elements of which the *Phædo* is composed, is apt to produce a first impression in favour of the narrative portion over the dialectic. The reader feels himself naturally drawn to the scenes of Elysian clearness with which it opens and closes, in preference to the dialectic

\* ἀπὸ τοῦ ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν in 65 A., in probable allusion to the name Ἀπὸλλων. Compare the same paronomasia in the *Cratylus*, 405 B.

portions,\* in which there is less of beauty perceptible, and more of insecurity in the path. These dialectic portions are, however, like the mountain tracts intervening between sister valleys: though seemingly pathless and bare, and often gloomy with clouds, they are the source of much of the softness and freshness that attract us in the quiet flow of the rivers through the 'amœna vireta' which they divide; and they serve, at the same time, as the strong granitic ridge *πολυπύχου Οὐλύμποις*, on which the many-zoned landscape, with its bounding Tempe and Pieria, is made to repose.

The peculiar merit of Plato, in respect of the belief in a Future Life, consists in the fact of his having been the first, at all events on the roll of Greek Philosophers, that attempted to establish the doctrine on grounds of Reason independently of Tradition.† The early Ionic philosophers do not appear to have attained to any distinct expression on the subject. Pythagoras rested it on an *αὐτὸς ἔφη* without eliciting anything (*σαφές*, 61 E.) philosophically clear. With regard to Socrates, although there is no reason to doubt that he entertained the belief, it is questionable if it obtained from him any formal elaboration until the day of his death, and even then it may be doubted whether much of the substance, and probably all the form of the argumentation in the *Phædo* are not due to Plato himself. This is borne out by the facts—(1°) that the Socrates of Xenophon, although familiar with certain of the premises, is not represented as deducing the conclusion (*Memor. I. 4, 8—9, com-*

\* The abstruseness, even to the ancients, of some of the parts of the *Phædo* is indicated by an anecdote, which, though of doubtful authority, is in this light curious. When the Dialogue was first composed, Diogenes La. informs us (III. 37) that Plato read it to an audience of his pupils. Unable to follow certain parts of it, they all slipped away one by one; and when Plato looked up at the close, he found himself with none but Aristotle, who alone had been able to listen to the end.

† Cicero (*Tusc. I. 17*) claims for Plato the honour of having first supported the doctrine *ratione*. In *Tusc. I. 21*, he observes that *auctoritas* and *ratio* were united in Plato: 'Ut enim *rationem* Plato nullam afferret (vide, quid homini tribuam), ipsa *auctoritate* me frangeret.'

pared with 13—17, and IV. 3, 14),\* and, what is more remarkable, there is an absence of any reference to it in the Xenophontine account (IV. 8, 4—10) of the final discourses and prison life of his Master; (2<sup>d</sup>) that the Platonic Apology or Defence of Socrates at his trial, which must be regarded as having a more historical character than the Phædo, contains a much less confident expression of the doctrine (Apol. 40 C.) than is attributed to him in the Phædo; (3<sup>d</sup>) that in most of the Socratic schools there is either no place assigned to it, as in the Cyrenaic section, or, at least, no prominence awarded to it, as in the sections of the Cynics and Megarics; (4<sup>th</sup>) that among the arguments advanced in the Phædo one at least is purely Platonic and post-Socratic, namely, that which is designed to be the crowning one, founded on the eternal immanence of the 'Ideas.'

The arguments elaborated by Plato in the Phædo have been variously enumerated. Wytttenbach reckons up seven; Susemihl and Steinhart condense them into four; but the most appropriate and just arrangement is that which assigns five as the number.† They are indicated as follows:—

\* The discourse after the manner of Socrates in the mouth of the dying Cyrus in the *Cyropsædia* (VIII. 7, 19—22) contains a more distinct expression of the doctrine than any of the passages of the *Memorabilia*.

† Susemihl and Steinhart omit D. from the list of arguments; Wytttenbach, on the other hand, obtains his number by reckoning the first ethical corroboration (ch. 12—13) as an argument, and by dividing A. into two, one founded on the relation of Contraries, the other on the necessity of supposing a Cycle with a return as well as a departure. The grounds on which an enumeration different from either has been adopted are these: (1<sup>st</sup>) the analogy of the *free* acts of the Drama (which is supported by the circumstance that, in the dialectic part, the kindred dramatic canon is observed '*non quarta loqui persona laboret*'); (2<sup>nd</sup>) the equality in rank between the objection of Simmias and that of Cebes, each of which has to be met by a separate counter-argument, a fact which Steinhart's enumeration ignores; (3<sup>rd</sup>) the ancient recension of the arguments by the commentator Olympiodorus (p. 13, 13) who speaks of *οἱ περὶ ἀθανασίας πέντε λόγοι*.

- A. The Cyclical, from the notion of a Cycle of being.
- B. The Platonic, from Reminiscence.
- C. The Metaphysical, from the unity and indiscerptibility of the Soul.
- D. The Psychological, from the Divine prerogatives of the Soul.\*
- E. The Ideal, from the immanence of the Eternal Idea of Life in the Soul.†

In judging of the relative force and weight of the arguments in this memorable scale, it is scarcely necessary to remark that, while the principle itself may be good, the reasons assigned for it

\* This argument, though fully expounded in the second branch of the dialectic discussion, belongs also partly to the first branch, where it is briefly indicated in ch. 28, in which the opening words *ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῇ δέ* mark a transition to what may be called an independent argument. The argument D. is thus the link between the two branches of the discussion.—There is considerable ingenuity in Steinhart's view that the order of development of the arguments follows the order of development of the chief forms of Greek Philosophy. Accordingly, A. is a weapon drawn from the physical Philosophy of the Ionians, B. is an adaptation of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis, C. is a development from the *Noûs* of Anaxagoras, and E., the climax, is the fruit of the Idealism of Plato. The argument entitled D. would, in this way, not be without its historical counterpart also, viz., in the Socratic principle of the sovereignty of the Soul (*Xen. Mem. I. 4, 13*).

† With this fivefold enumeration compare the scale in the hands of Smith, the Cambridge Platonist (anno 1660; *Discourses*, No. IV.), who adopts the merits and supplies the defects of the original Platonic scale. 1°. Immateriality of the Soul. 2°. *αὐτεξούσιον*, or its power of Volition and 'self-potent life.' 3°. Its power of abstraction, whereby it possesses supersensuous mathematical conceptions. 4°. Its possession of Immutable moral and metaphysical Ideas. 5°. The faithfulness and goodness of God, who will not and cannot infuse aspirations after Himself for which no fulfilment is designed.—In Addison's beautiful paper in the *Spectator* (No. 111), they are thus enumerated: 1°. The nature of the Soul, and particularly its immateriality. 2°. Its passions and sentiments, such as the love of virtue and its shrinking from annihilation. 3°. The nature of the Supreme Being as a God of justice, wisdom, goodness, and veracity. 4°. The nature of the Soul as designed for perpetual progression, as an asymptote of Deity.

may be, if not all incorrect, yet not all conclusive. This is the case with those presented in the *Phædo*, for they are certainly not all of equal force, nor have they all found an equal place of honour or acceptance in the history of Thought.

The first proves only that there is a Fountain of being out of which the Living proceeds and into which the Dead returns, but establishes nothing concerning the individual existence of the Soul after Death. On the contrary, it seems rather to point to the Pantheistic notion of refusion into an *Anima Mundi* as the destiny of the individual human soul.

The second argument rests on Reminiscence, which, if understood to imply a pre-existence or a past eternity of the Soul, proves more than has the warrant of the Soul's own consciousness.

The fifth argument, on which Plato has bestowed the greatest elaboration and evidently reposed the greatest confidence, is an endeavour to prove the essential vitality of the Soul. It implies the independent existence of such ideas as that of Life, and the whole process of reasoning, though valid in regard to the necessary connection of Life with the Divine Mind, must be confessed to fail regarding the human mind, unless the human is assumed to be not only akin to, but also a part of the Divine.\*

The other two arguments are of a different character, and have

\* Compare St. Augustine's imitation of the Ideal argument: '*Omne quod in subjecto est, si semper manet, ipsum etiam subjectum maneat necesse est. Et omnis in subjecto est animo disciplina. Necesse est igitur semper animus maneat, si semper maneat disciplina. Est autem disciplina veritas, et veritas semper manet. Semper igitur animus manet, nec animus mortuus dicitur.*' Solil. II. 13.—In his '*Retractationes*' (I. 1, 5), where he withdraws any over-praise of Plato, he confesses regarding his own syllogisms (in his '*Liber de Immortalitate*') of a kind cognate with the above, that they are so obscure and subtle that he can scarcely follow them himself.—A similar verdict must be passed on the transcript of the Ideal argument by St. Ambrose (*de Bono Mortis*, § 406), which may be thus abridged: '*Anima non potest mori quia est vita ac per hoc contraria morti. Anima est vita corporis et sua, nec mortem suscipere potest, sicut calor nivem, lux tenebras non recipit.*'

met with much larger acceptance than the three which have been mentioned. They rest on firmer and more widely trusted foundations, involve less and fewer difficulties, and have obtained a permanent place in the armoury of Thought. That derived from the unity and indiscerptibility of the Soul has been often borrowed: Cicero employed it largely (*Tusc.* I. 29 ; *de Senect.* 21), and it is the chief weapon in the school of Cudworth, Clarke and Butler. The psychological, or that founded on the dignity of the Soul as being in the microcosm of the Body what the Deity is in the macrocosm of the World, is the germ of the kindred modern argument\* derived from the dignity of Man's powers and his unexhausted capacity both of Knowledge and of Goodness.

Side by side with these dialectic Arguments, there are found what may be called three Ethical homilies, which present corroborative considerations of scarcely inferior interest and value.

The first of these is found in Chapters XII.—XIII., where the relation of the Philosopher toward Death is unfolded at length, and the conclusion is reached that true happiness and true virtue are not attainable in connection with the present Life of sense, because true Knowledge is not possible in the prison of the Body. Therefore the Philosopher aspires after release, and, instead of repining, rejoices at the breaking down of the walls of his prison house. In these considerations there is latent an argument of great weight and depth, the development of which, however, belongs for the most part only to Christian Thought,—what may be called the Aspiration Argument, which, when combined with the doctrine of the Providence of a Personal God, forms one of the most important among the natural evidences of Immortality.† That Nature does

\* This may be called, from one of its earliest and most powerful exponents, the Pascal argument. Cf. remarks on pp. 212, 256.

† The well-known passage in the *Cato* of Addison, from which many in modern times have been content to take their knowledge of Platonic speculation—

not gravitate toward nothing, either in physics or in ethics, and that the desires both of Life and of Knowledge, which find scanty fulfilment here, and are strongest in the best and most noble spirits, must be regarded as vanity unless they point to another and ampler scene—this vein of thought Antiquity divined but was unable to explore, for want of a firm hold upon the only instrument adequate to the task, the doctrine, namely, of the Personality and Moral Perfections of God.

In the second Ethical Lesson, chiefly contained in Chapter XXIX.,\* the contrast between the Corporeal and the Intellectual is now carried forward to a distinctly positive result, and a direct affinity is claimed between the Intellectual and the Eternal. The intimate union of Knowledge with Existence, so that the knowing principle, from its capacity of conceiving the unchangeable and immortal, must be regarded as kindred with the unchangeable, becomes in this way the main buttress of the Platonic Immortality.†

\*It must be so—Plato: thou reason'st well.

Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,

This longing after Immortality?—

is apt to convey a more or less grave misimpression. If it is understood as a transcript of the contents of the *Phædo*, it is a mistake on the part of Addison himself, for none of these reasonings finds a place in the *Phædo*, and although it may be said that they are put into the mouth of Cato, not as reflections quoted from the *Phædo*, but as thoughts suggested by its perusal, they must yet be regarded as an antedating of what is a modern, or at least Christian feeling.—The same argument occupies a very prominent place in the once famous version of the *Phædo* by Moses Mendelssohn, whose attempt (anno 1767) to modernise its reasonings, while retaining the dramatic framework, excited considerable attention in Germany in the end of last century.

\* Particularly in 81 A., where τὸ ἀειδές is spoken of as ὁμοιον τῇ ψυχῇ, and is afterwards described as τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον.

† Schleiermacher has stated well the intimate connection between Plato's view of Knowledge and his teaching on Immortality: 'The possibility

The third Ethical corroboration, though very slightly touched upon, is perhaps to the modern mind the most important of all, inasmuch as it is founded on the belief in the Moral Government of the world. It is briefly hinted in these words in Chapter LVII., *εἰ μὲν ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἐρμαῖον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι, τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς.* 'If indeed Death were annihilation, then it would be positive gain to the wicked at death, to be relieved at once of their fleshly frame and *of their own wickedness* together with their souls.' There is manifestly latent here the germ of what is known as the Moral argument for Immortality, founded on the reality and obligation of Virtue and the consequent necessity that a life in conformity with its laws cannot be in vain. The thought that righteousness and wickedness should go out of the present life to the same gulf of nothingness, neither of them even to be known, is one from which the instincts of men have in all ages recoiled, and which the sense

and truth of Knowledge are continually and repeatedly interwoven with the allegations of proof respecting Immortality, and as regards our author, the two are in fact most intimately combined. For the endeavour after Knowledge could not exist at all under the form of a wish to die, not even in a philosopher, if it were necessarily at the same time a wish for annihilation. And if the Soul is to apprehend the essentially existent which is not subjected to origination and destruction and to all the conditions of imperfect existence, it can only do so (according to the old principle, which in this argument must be always borne in mind, that like is apprehended by like) as existing similarly and in the same manner with that essential existence. Thus, then, the immortality of the Soul is the condition of all true Knowledge as regards men, and conversely the reality of Knowledge is the ground upon which the immortality of the Soul is more certainly and easily understood. Hence, in the former dialogues also, in which Knowledge was investigated, Immortality was always presupposed and investigated simultaneously; and one may say that, from the Gorgias and Theætetus downwards, the two subjects are continually approximating in their progress, until they are at last in the Phædo most closely combined.' Schleiermacher's Introduction, Eng. Tr., p. 293.



of Justice has not known how to digest or to entertain.\* In modern times this argument has been one of the main pillars of the belief in a Future State, and hence arises a marked contrast between the ancient and modern standpoints, the belief of the ancient mind, as seen in the speculations of Plato, resting on the Idea of Knowledge, and that of the modern mind finding its main support in the Idea of Duty, which is the correlative of Justice.

Although the *Phædo* is the main fountain of Plato's opinions regarding the destiny of the Soul, there are intimations more or less pronounced in other dialogues pointing in the same direction, the chief of which it may not be out of place to enumerate. In the *Meno*, which is devoted to the establishment of his principle of Reminiscence, reference is made (81 B.) to the tradition in favour of Immortality, which he says is to be found partly in the oracles of priests and the vaticinations of the nobler poets, especially of the poet Pindar. In the *Phædrus* (245 C.) is found unfolded the famous argument of the *αὐτοκίνησις*, which may be expressed in the following syllogistic form :—

Whatever is self-moving, is immortal :

The Soul is self-moving :

Therefore, the Soul is immortal.

\* The mystery of the inequality of retribution was undoubtedly felt more deeply by the Hebrews than by any other nation, for which reason the highest utterances of the old complaining—'cur bonis male et malis bene'—occur in certain of the Psalms, yet there appear occasional traces of the feeling, more sparingly in the Literature of the science-loving Greeks, more fully in that of the rough but justice-loving Romans. Compare the illustrations quoted in note on page 213 ; such questions as that of Cotta in Cicero (*Nat. Deor.* III. 32), 'cur omnium perfidiosissimus C. Marius Q. Catulum præstantissimum virum dignitate mori potuit jubere?' the appeal in Silius (VI. 87),

'Estis ubi, en, iterum, Superi? dat pectora ferro  
Regulus!'

also the epigram of Varro Atacinus (*Meyer's Anthol. Lat.* I. 77),

'Marmoreo Licinus tumulo jacet, et Cato parvo,  
Pompilius nullo! Credimus esse Deos?'

A †

This argument, which Cicero (*Tusc.* I. 23; *Somn. Scip.* 8) re expressed, is not embodied in the *Phædo*, possibly because the limits of the occasion imposed a certain restraint on indefinite expansion of the subject, and because Plato was not accustomed to quote from or to repeat himself.\* It is virtually, however, superseded by the last or Ideal argument, which claims for the Soul the inherent possession of Life, which is equivalent to saying that it is inherently the possessor of Motion.

The most remarkable Platonic passage on this subject not contained in the *Phædo* is the original and subtle argument in the *Republic* (*Pol.* X. 610 D.—E.) which may be thus represented: 'The Body has its evils, by which it is attacked and destroyed. The Soul also has its evils—Injustice, Intemperance, Cowardice, Folly, and the like; by these it is attacked, but it is certainly not destroyed. If the Soul live in spite of these its own diseases, unaffected by them in respect of its vitality, much more will it survive the evils under which the Body succumbs, and be immortal.' †

Although Plato has had many successors in the same walk, ‡

\* Wytenbach (*Opusc.* II. p. 105) supposes that Plato did not embrace this argument in the *Phædo* because a feeling had come over his mind that that argument, as put in the *Phædrus*, proved only the Immortality of the Divine Mind. According to this view, however, several of the arguments that find a place in the *Phædo* ought to have been discarded also for the same reason.

† The argument of Julius Müller, *Stud. u. Kritik.* p. 768, 1835, deserves to be quoted as a modern parallel: 'God has bestowed—and this is the fundamental condition of the Christian Doctrine of Immortality—on all beings that He has formed after His own image, and raised to Personality, an inexhaustible power of existence . . . nay, so indestructible is the Personal Individual, that it is able to place itself through that which is wicked in the most enduring contradiction with itself, without at the same time compromising its existence. That the human creature (*Mensch*) can surrender itself to that which is wicked with full determination, without annihilating itself, is in fact one of the most powerful and most tremendous witnesses for the Indestructibility of all Personal Existence.'

‡ The chief supplements, that have been added in aftertime, to the arguments in the *Phædo*, may be grouped under two heads. 1°. The

he has had no second. His discussion continues, and probably will continue, unsurpassed, as intrinsically the greatest contribution

argument from Tradition, and from the fact that the instinctive belief in a Future State has, in some form or other, been in a manner co-extensive with the race. To this branch of evidence, though slightly hinted at in the *Meno*, there is scarcely an allusion in the *Phædo*: an approximation in that direction is the reference at the outset of the First Argument (70 C.), but it is rather a collateral incidental illustration, not a corner-stone of the Argument. The reason of this conspicuous absence arises partly from the circumstance that Plato wished to establish the doctrine on *a priori* considerations, partly because the knowledge of the world beyond the circle of the Hellenes was too vague to allow conclusions to be drawn from it as to the hopes and fears of humanity as a whole, and it is therefore not till a later period, when the great conquests of Alexander (cf. 63 C., note) had widened the horizon, that this source of evidence began to attract attention. It is developed with considerable fulness by Cicero (*Tusc.* I. 12—16, where the traces of its unconscious influence in human life, such as in the desire of Posthumous Fame, and other instinctive feelings of the same kind, are largely evolved); compare also Senec. *Ep.* 117, 5.

2°. The Theological Arguments, both the Moral and the Teleological, the former resting on the attribute of Divine Justice, the latter on that of the Divine Wisdom. These must be confessed to be absent in the formal discussions of the *Phædo*, for, although Socrates at the outset (82 B.) expresses his belief that the care and protection of the gods follow men into another world, no endeavour is made to connect the Immortality of the Soul with the will and the purposes of God. Rather, may we not say—and it is the great defect of all pre-Christian speculation on the question—that Socrates is regarded as entering the unseen world with an inherent right to Immortality, not as a creature, but as an Immortal among fellow Immortals?—The forms in which the Theological argument has been put have been very many; among the more interesting, though less known, branches of the same, is the Hartley argument, founded on the enigma presented by the pains of Death, since, if Death is the extinction of Man's being, it is accompanied with what, in that case, are gratuitous and unnecessary inflictions. All other pains are seen to be remedial, and to have a salutary purpose; Death alone, on such a supposition, would be a purposeless pain, unless it is the departure from what is a probationary state.—With regard to the analogies that have sometimes been dignified with the name of the Poetical or Natural Argument, such as the return of the day after darkness

drawn from philosophical speculation upon the question, and is emphatically the noblest single offering that human Reason has yet laid on the altar of human hope. This honour remains, after all the deductions necessary in consequence of the questionableness of some of his positions, the obscurity of others, and the tendency more or less manifest, which he shared in common with ancient philosophers generally, to attribute to the human Soul, not an affinity only, but an identity with the Divine.

Yet notwithstanding this great measure of success intellectually, and the vast influence which they exerted through the literary power with which they were set forth, it is not doubtful that the Platonic speculations failed, as all purely anthropological speculations must fail, to compass a complete demonstration. That this was felt to be the case may be evidenced in two ways, partly by the incidental misgivings in certain parts of the *Phædo* itself, showing that the hope was after all 'one that scarce could know itself from fear,'

and of spring after winter, the identity of the Morning with the Evening Star, and especially the transformation observable in certain insects, such as the butterfly, passing through several totally distinct stages of development, egg, worm, chrysalis, into its perfect and winged form—these, with the exception of the analogy of Death to Sleep (71 C.), are not present in the speculations of Plato. Several of these natural analogies had impressed the fancy of mystic minds (see p. 237) before the time of Plato, but there is ground for believing that he would have regarded them as simply illustrations, and not of any direct bearing on the question. Moreover, although some of these were largely employed by the Christian Fathers (Clemens, *Rom.* I. 24; Tertullian, *de Anim.* c. 43; *de Resurr.* c. 12), in imitation of St. Paul's analogical reasoning regarding the Resurrection of the Body (1 Cor. XV. 36—7), it is manifest that Plato could not, in consistency with his views regarding the human Body, have resorted to an argument resting on the fortunes and properties of corporeal existence. The stronghold of Plato and of all who maintain, on grounds of Reason alone, the Immortality of the Soul, consists, as Lord Brougham justly remarks (*Nat. Theol.* p. 86) in the essential difference between Mind and Matter, and therefore Plato, in employing an argument derived from *material* transformations, would have been sacrificing the greatest of his reasonings.

partly also by the insufficiency of their power to obtain more than a divided dominion even in the schools, much less to subdue the world by the establishment of the hope in the hearts and consciences of the nations. Socrates himself confesses, after his quiver has been half exhausted, that there were still (*πολλὰ ὑποψία καὶ ἀντιλαβὰ*, 84 C.) 'many suspicions and handles to objection to be removed'; and Simmias at the close expresses himself despondingly over what he calls (*ἀνθρωπίνη ἀσθένεια*) 'the weakness of humanity,' and says that, after all, the feeling of 'distrust' (*ἀπιστία*, 107 B.) returns, which feeling Socrates exhorts him to conquer by deeper and more prolonged investigation. That the demonstration was not absolute is farther evinced by the testimony of Cicero (*Tusc. I. 11*), who, describing by the mouth of another feelings which, we know from passages in which he gives free expression to his despondency, were certainly his own, contrasts the delight with which one is carried along in the perusal of the *Phædo*, with the misgiving that creeps in when it is laid down and the spell of Plato's persuasion is withdrawn. But perhaps the strongest proof that something more was yet wanting which Philosophy could not do, ere the stone could be said to be removed from the door of the sepulchre, is derived from the cardinal fact, that in the great system of the greatest of his successors—Aristotle—no prominent or even distinct place is accorded to the doctrine, if indeed, as many competent to judge have believed, it was not rather, by implication at least, rejected and denied.\*

Therefore it may be said, regarding the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul—what has been frequently affirmed regarding the kindred doctrine of the Unity and Personality of God—that it has

\* In illustration of this statement an important statement of Origen is worth quoting. The position of Aristotle differs in his estimation but little from that of Epicurus: while Epicurus destroys the belief in Providence altogether, Aristotle invalidates it relatively to man (*ἀναιρεῖ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρόνοιαν καὶ τὴν σχίσιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τοῦ θείου*, Origen, c. Cel. III. 75).

become the property and the conviction of the intelligence of the race, not through the teachings of Philosophy, but through the Divine authority of Him who was the Resurrection and the Life. As 'gods many and lords many' not only survived, but seemed only to multiply under the strongest assaults of Philosophy or Polytheism, so it may be affirmed that, apart from the same power, the Immortality of the Soul would have descended to aftertime little else than a speculation, on which the schools might find no end of matter for the energies of divided debate, not a doctrine that has been as the breath of life to humanity and the salt of civilisation.\* Yet there is no chapter in the history of the human mind to which men will ever turn with more eager interest than to the speculations of the Phædo, where the greatest intellectual power of the ancient world is seen to 'go sounding on its dim and perilous way,' taking a chart of the depths of Death, and striving to find it a strait, and not a shoreless sea. As a testimony both to what man can do, and what he cannot do, the Phædo stands alone the mightiest of the pyramids of men by the banks of the great river of Time, so that when we contemplate, under the pathos of its weakness, the greatness of its power, the question will not fail to suggest itself whether, after all, the strongest argument in the Phædo is not the Phædo itself, which in its aspirations and aims is greater than all its Arguments.

\* The words of Coleridge, describing the relation of Philosophy to the Gospel in the general, are specially applicable in this particular: 'Across the night of Paganism, Philosophy flitted on like the lantern-fly of the tropics, a light to itself and an ornament—but, alas, no more than an ornament—of the surrounding darkness. Christianity reversed the order.' *Aids to Reflection*, I. p. 146.—Compare the similar observation of Jean Paul Richter on the rise in the 'moral temperature' of the world since ancient times: *Selina*, 'über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele,' p. 241.

\*. THE historical value of the *Phædo*, as a narrative of facts regarding the Death of Socrates, has never been seriously questioned. Athenæus, indeed, with his wonted appetite for literary scandal (XI. 505), says that *Phædo*, when he read the discussion with which his name was associated, expressed surprise at being reported to have said and heard such things as he found ascribed to him in the Dialogue. It is quite possible to suppose a large liberty employed by Plato in the evolution of the Arguments attributed to Socrates (cf. page xviii.), while at the same time the matters of fact contained in the Dialogue may be accepted as substantially correct.

Neither has the genuineness of the *Phædo* been for a moment doubted or disputed. The only shadow of doubt ever cast upon it arises from an anonymous Epigram, in which Panætius is reported to have spoken of the *Phædo* as *νόθος* or spurious (Gr. Anthol. IX. 358). It is certain, however, that the author of the Epigram was in one or other of the following mistakes. Either he mistook the denial of the validity of the arguments for a denial of the genuineness of the work in which they were contained, Panætius being known to have criticised severely its argumentative value (Cic. Tusc. I. 32); or perhaps the Epigrammatist was misled by a dictum of Panætius preserved by Diogenes La. (II. 64) regarding those Socratic Dialogues, which bore the name of *Phædo* as their author. These Panætius is reported to have considered spurious, and the author of the Epigram may have confounded the Dialogue inscribed with the title of *Phædo* with those purporting to be the compositions of *Phædo*. At all events, as Whowell justly observes, if the author of the *Phædo* were not the same as the author of the *Republic* and the other Dialogues, we should feel as much curiosity about the author of the *Phædo* as about Plato, the son of Aristo. It is difficult to suppose two Homers, even in a pre-historic time; but it is impossible to suppose, in a historic age, two Platos, one of whom has thus engrossed the entire attention of history, while the other has left no trace or influence of his name.

With respect to the title of the Dialogue, the name *Φαίδων* was no doubt prefixed to it by Plato himself, and this is the title in the oldest citations, as those in Aristotle (*Metaph.* I. 9, 14; *Meteor.* II. 2, 19). As distance of time increased, the interest connected with the personal name naturally diminished, and hence the Dialogue began to be referred to by the subject which it discussed, and came to be familiarly known as the Dialogue *περὶ ψυχῆς*. An early example of such reference occurs in the Epigram of Callimachus, No. 24, in which it is styled *τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς γράμμα*. In Greek literature after Aristotle the citations alternate between these two titles. In Latin literature that derived from the subject is the predominant one: e.g. '*Liber de Animo*' (Cic. Tusc. I. 11), or still more definitely, '*Liber de Immortalitate Animæ*.' (Gellius II. 15; Macrobi. Sat. I. 11; St. August. de Civ. Dei, I. 22).

## CODICES AND EDITIONS.

THE MSS. of greatest importance containing the *Phædo*, are the following:—

Bodleianus or Clarkianus, collated by Gaisford, <b>A</b>	of Bekker.
Coislin.	<b>Γ</b> „
Vatican.	<b>Δ</b> „
Venot.	<b>Λ</b> <b>Ξ</b> <b>Π</b> „
Vindob.	<b>Υ</b> <b>Φ</b> „
Parisiens.	<b>CEGHIL</b> „
Ambros.	<b>S</b> „

Besides these fifteen Codices of Bekker, Stallbaum adds Florent. a. b. c. d. i. m.; Zittaviensis, Tubingensis and Augustanus. The readings in the last two were derived from Fischer's collation. Of all these the most important authority is the Codex Bodleianus.

The Editions are generally classed in two divisions, as the Old and the New. The old Editions are the Aldine, Basle I. and II., and that of Stephens, all of which appeared in the XVI<sup>th</sup> century. The last of these became the Vulgate for Plato, and remained the received text until toward the end of the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century, when a new era in Platonic scholarship was introduced by the critical labours of Fischer, Wytttenbach, Heindorf, and Bekker, followed by Ast, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, H. Schmidt, and others.

N.B.—The Annotations in the following Edition are arranged according to the pages in the Stephens or Vulgate Text. Each of these pages is divided into five sections, indicated by the first five letters of the alphabet. The Arabic numerals in the Annotations indicate the *line* of the particular section where the subject of annotation is to be found.



PHÆDŌ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

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ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΚΕΒΗΣ.

ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ.

## PLATONIS PHÆDO.

Steph. I  
p. 57.

A

I. ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου  
Σωκράτει ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ  
δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας ;  
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.

Echecrates  
requests  
Phædo to  
relate the  
last discourse  
and death of  
Socrates.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θά-  
νάτου ; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα ; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι.  
καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπι-  
χωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκεται χρόνου

Two distinct groups are brought before us in the Phædo. The first is the group at Phlius, consisting of Echecrates and probably some Phliasians (cf. 58 D. n.), before whom the rehearsal by Phædo of the last sayings and doings of Socrates is supposed to take place. The second is the group of Socrates and the Socratici in the Athenian prison ; in which group there is, what may be called, an inner circle of Interlocutors (viz. Simmias and Cebes, who carry on the philosophic discourse with Socrates, and Crito, who is the interlocutor in matters not philosophic,) and another or outer circle of sympathising Spectators, who are mentioned as simply present, but do not join in the discussion. By this artistic distribution of parts and persons, not only is the facility for the interweaving of pictorial incident greatly increased, but the effect of the whole is enhanced by the increased solemnity of perspective through which the subject is approached. Regarding Phlius, and the Dramatis Personæ generally, see Note A.

57 A. (1.) Αὐτός] Hermogenes (de Methodo, c. 1, p. 618) remarks on the employment of αὐτός in the question and the reply, as involving the sense of *hominum*. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤρετο ὡς θανμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων . . . ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο σεμννόμενος. This, however, is mere fancy ; αὐτός is simply opposed to ἄλλου του. Comp. the imitation of this opening sentence in Athen. I. 2 ; also the similar use of αὐτός in 58 D. Blomfield (Æsch. Pers. 271) has collected a number of instances in which αὐτός specifies *personal* cognisance as opposed to *hearsay*. Cf. αὐτόμαρτυς Æsch. Agam. 988 ; Soph. Œd. Rex. 7. Instead of ἄλλος after αὐτός, a negative is also found, as in Conv. 172, B. : σὺν αὐτός

συχνου̐ ἐκεῖθεν, ὅστις ἂν ἡμῶν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἶός τ' B  
 ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι  
 τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχε φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὦν 58  
 τρόπον ἐγένετο ;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῶν ἡγγεῖλέ τις, καὶ ἐθανμά-  
 ζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶ ὕστερον  
 φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων ;

παρεγένου τῇ συνουσίᾳ ταύτῃ ἢ οὐ ; in which interrogation πότερον is omitted, as is the case here. (5.) Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα] Τί for plural τίνα inquires regarding the subject as a whole, while ἅττα refers to it in details. Contrast the more usual form in 58 C., 102 A. τίνα δὲ ἦν τὰ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Terence Hecyr. I. 2. 22, 'Sed quid hoc negoti est, modo quæ narravit mihi Bacchis P—(7.) Φλιασίων] Its position after πολιτῶν without an article, offended Wolf, who proposed to insert τῶν. The article, it is true, might have been absorbed by the ending of πολιτῶν, but its insertion is not necessary : cf. Apol. 32 B. ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντισχίς.—(8.) τὰ νῦν] The intercourse between Athens and Phlius is spoken of as being from some cause or other broken up, but the circumstance of time and manner Plato has left undefined. Although we find occasional traces of connection between these cities (cf. Xen. Anab. VII. 8, 1—4), it is probable that the intercourse was at best restricted by the generally strong Spartan sympathies of Phlius. Stallbaum considers the reference in τὰ νῦν to apply to the Corinthian war, B.C. 394, which divided Greece into two camps, one Spartan, in which Phlius was included, the other anti-Spartan, containing Athens and Corinth. The tone of the passage, however, suggests a doubt whether there is not a quiet innuendo intended by way of rebuke for the death of Socrates, as if the Athenians had recently committed some grievous act, rendering residence at Athens generally less desirable. Moreover, the spirit of interest expressed in the passage, rather implies that the event was comparatively recent, and instead of bringing down the time of the meeting of Phædo and Echecrates at Phlius to B.C. 394, five years after the death of Socrates, Plato seems to indicate the occasion as happening within the lapse of not an indefinite number of months after that event. On this supposition it is easy to perceive, what none of the Commentators has pointed out, that nothing could be more appropriate as an occasion for the discourse, than a visit paid by Phædo at Phlius, when half-way on his homeward route from Athens toward his native city Elis, after the dispersion of the members of the Socratic group.

58 A. (1) οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης] The accusative is more common after the simple article, as in 58 C., τὰ περὶ τὸν θάνατον. The presence of the verb ἐπύθεσθε exerts an influence attracting περὶ τῆς δίκης into the genitive as in Xen. Cyr. V. 3, 28. Cf. φιλοσοφίας πέρι in 68 D.—(4) πολλῶ ὕστερον] The exact interval was Thirty days, as we learn from Xen. Mem.

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

Archæological explanation of the delay in the execution of the sentence.

EX. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ὦν ὤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐξάντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἣν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλον ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ

IV. 8, 2—(6.) τύχη τις—συνέβη· ἔτυχε γάρ] A similar combination is found in Achill. Tat. I. 16 : ἔτυχε τύχη τινὶ συμβάν κ.τ.λ.—(7.) ἢ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη] στέμματα indicated the protection of the gods, especially of Apollo, as in Homer II. I. 14. Compare, regarding an altar, Æsch. Suppl. 344, πρύμνα πόλεως ἐστεμμένη—(8.) πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον] This sacred vessel called *θεωρίς*, was famous in the history of Greek philosophy for two things: 1° that its voyage on this occasion gave Socrates a month's reprieve: 2° that it was a fertile subject of debate in the Schools of Athens, supplying a text to discuss the question of philosophical identity, whether, after its frequent repairs, it could be said to be still the same vessel that bore Theseus on his victorious voyage. The annual ceremony of this *θεωρία* was a votive remembrance on the part of the Athenians of their deliverance from subjection to Crete, one feature of which, the tribute, namely, of seven youths and maidens, was probably a Moloch offering to a god of Phœnician origin in Crete.\*

B. (1.) ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη] These two achievements were rarely combined: cf. Hom. Od. I. 5.—(4.) κατ' ἐνιαυτόν.] This annual ceremony is not to be confounded with the greater *Delia*, held at Delos once every four years, which Thucydides (III. 104) regards as a restoration of that festival of the whole Ionic race, which was anciently celebrated at Delos, according to the so called Homeric hymn to Apollo. Both the annual and the quadriennial festivals seem to have fallen on the 6th and 7th of Thargelion (i.e. 20th and 21st of May.) The 6th of Thargelion was reckoned the birthday of the one Delian deity, Artemis, and the 7th that of the other, Apollo. It

\* In connection with this Cretan legend, the remote cause of the reprieve to Socrates, we may refer to the mythical descent of Socrates, as sprung from the Cretan Dædalus, who, according to Cildemus in Plat. Thea. c. 19, was an ally of the Athenian patriot.

πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχῳσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τίνα ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

is a tradition that Socrates had for his birthday, the 6th of Thargelion, and Plato the 7th, (Diog. La. III. 2, and Plutarch Sympos. VIII. 1, 1.)—(6.) καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν.] καθαριεύειν, the reading in Stephens, is not appropriate, as it refers to *nicety* (mundities) rather than *purity*. The superstitious feeling of the Athenians against executions during this festival expressed itself apparently by positive law (Xenophon Mem. IV. 8, 2, also speaks of it as a νόμος). It connected itself with the general aversion to violence during festivals,\* a feeling which we find as old as Homer, (cf. Od. XXI. 269), but there was a special propriety in refraining from the taking away of life during the Delian festival, inasmuch as the Island of Delos was so sacred that Death was not allowed to set his foot upon it, and all traces of death had to be removed from it by solemn purgation. (cf. Thuc. III. 104, and Callim. Hym. Del. 277). A kindred feeling showed itself in the postponement of executions until night-fall.† Parallel in some measure was the spirit of the Jews (St. John XIX. 31) in wishing the Sabbath not to be defiled by the sight of the dead bodies on the cross.—(9.) ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες] With this use of ἀπολαμβάνω regarding winds, cf. Hor. Od. II. 16, 2.—“*Prensus Ægeæ*.”

C. (3.) ὥσπερ λέγω] The Present is here used for the Present Perfect, which tense is wanting in this verb in this sense: cf. Protag. 316 E., and Apol. 21 A.—(9.) οἱ ἄρχοντες] The magistrates having charge of criminals were the Eleven, chosen by lot every year, one from each of the ten tribes, the eleventh being their recorder or γραμματεὺς. They corresponded to the *Triumviri Capitales* at Rome.

\* Cf. Xen. Hell. IV. 4, 2, where it is an aggravation of a massacre, that it occurred ἐν ἱερῇ. So the execution of Phocion was more heinous during a festival: (Plat. Phoc. c. 37). Achilles Tat. (VII. 12.) refers to τιμωρίας ἱκεχειρία at Ephesus, as following the appearance of the Priest of Artemis in public δάφνην ἱστεμίνος.

† The natural tendency to associate disease with sunset and night, is seen in such expressions as ἑσπερος θεός, i.e. Pluto, in Soph. Œd. Tyr. 175. Compare the illustrations of *δυσαί* as a poetical expression for old age, in Blomf. Æsch. Pers. 237. So the heroes entered Walhalla by the western gate.

D ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρηῃσάν τινες καὶ πολλοί γε.

Peculiarity of feeling in the breasts of the spectators in the prison scene.

EX. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἄλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγῆσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

EX. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιοῦτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διελθεῖν πάντα.

E ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θανμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆι· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκείνον παρίστασθαι μῆδ’

D. (4.) εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία] The polite phraseology of this passage is imitated in Theag. 121 A., and Cebes Tab. c. 1.—(6.) τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους] Compare the parallel passage in Xen. Mem. IV. 1, 1, regarding the charm of simply thinking of Socrates.—(9.) τοιοῦτους ἐτέρους] ἐταίρους, appears in a few MSS., but renders τοιοῦτους unnecessary. The language implies that Echecrates was not the only auditor of Phædo (cf. 102 A., ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν). Among them may have been the Phliasian Pythagoreans mentioned by Diog. La. VIII. 46, in connection with Echecrates, viz., Phanto, Diocles, and Polymnestus.

E. (3.) εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ] The MSS. have ἀνὴρ, as part of the predicate. Recent editors, except K. F. Hermann, thinking it more natural that it should be the subject, read ἀνὴρ, but cf. 57 A., ὁ ἀνὴρ.—(5.) παρίστασθαι] This is to be taken impersonally: cf. Thuc. VI. 34, καὶ παραστήτω παντί, τὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The verb expresses generally a sudden presentation to the mind of a new image or thought: cf. 66 B.; also Eur. Rhes. 780, καὶ μοι καθ’ ἵπνον δόξα τις παρίσταται.—(6.) μῆδ’ . . . . ἀνευ θείας μοίρας] So Xen. Apol. 32, θεοφίλους μοίρας τετύχηκε Σωκράτης. In Menex. 247 C. μοῖρα retains more of the old mythological meaning as *fetching* men away (κομίζειν), not simply accompanying. Compare as to the impression left by the death of Socrates, Plutarch Mor. 499 B., ἀποθνήσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν ἐμακάριζον οἱ ζῶντες, ὡς οὐδ’ ἐν ᾧδον θείας ἀνευ μοίρας ἐσόμενον. Cic. Tusc. I. 29, ‘Non ad mortem trudi sed in coelum videbatur (Socrates) ascendere.’

εἰς Ἰδίου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ κάκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος· διὰ 59 δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεων ἐισήγει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπὸν τί μοι πάθος παρήν καὶ τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκείνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

B

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

EX. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρήν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων· Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἦσθένει.

EX. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν;

C

59 A. (3.) παρόντι πένθει] παρόντι depends on εἰκὸς and governs πένθει: cf. ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα in 58 E. εἰκὸς natural, as in Eur. Hippol. 1433, ἀνθρώποισι δέ, Θεῶν διδόντων, εἰκὸς ἑξαμαρτάνειν.—(6.) ἀήθης κρᾶσις] Compare similar illustrations of 'mixed emotion' collected in Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures, Metaph. II. 482. Kindred is the 'quædam divina Voluptas atque Horror' of Lucretius III. 28.—(10.) Ἀπολλόδωρος] On the history of this and the following persons, see Note A.

C. (3.) Φαίδωνδης] Some MSS. have Φαίδωνιδης, and Bodl. has ἰδης in first-hand, corrected into ὠνδης, which is the reading of the majority. Editors, except K. F. Hermann, adopt the form in the text. The same name occurs in Xen. Mem. I. 2, 48, where the majority of MSS. is in favour of Φαίδωνδης, as here. A writer in Mus. Crit. I. 259, proposes Φαίδωνδας on the analogy of Χαριώνδας, in Pol. 599 E., but this is rash against all the MSS.



ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δῆ; τίνες, φῆς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι Incidents of the early morning of the Latest Day.  
D διηγῆσασθαι. αἰὲ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεώγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῶ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσήμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον E  
ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωϊαῖτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός· καὶ ἤκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν ἐπιμέ-

D. (4.) *δεσμωτηρίου*] The prison, said here to be near the court of justice, was close to the Agora, which lay in the hollow between the four eminences, Areopagus N., Pnyx W., Museum S., Acropolis E.—(5.) *διατρίβοντες*] *conversing*, literally, spending the time. This word is interesting from the light it throws on the character of the Athenians generally, according to the picture of a later day, in Acts XVII. 21. The *ἀγορά* was the favourite place for talk and disputation: Demosth. Phil. I. 43; Acts XVII. 17. Stallbaum complains in note on Conv. 177 C., that there was no word in Latin expressing what the Greeks meant by *διατρίβῃ*; which was on the whole, perhaps, a fortunate thing for the Romans.

E. (7.) *ὅπως αὖ—τελευτήσῃ*] The old Editions have *τελευτᾷ*, against the best MSS., and against the sense, which, as Heindorf remarks, requires a tense expressive of an *act*, not of a *state* or *condition*. The English translators render the clause “*inform him that he must die*,” wrongly, instead of “*give directions for his execution to-day*.” The officer of the Eleven is said *παραγγέλλειν πίνειν*, in 116 C., because he conveys their order *direct* to Socrates;

νειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρίεναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ-  
 λούσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν  
 ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν  
 χρόνον ἐπισχῶν ἦκε καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσιόν-  
 τεσ οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, 60  
 τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην, γινώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ  
 παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὥς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ  
 Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαύτ' ἅττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ  
 εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε  
 προσερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σω-

but here the use of ὅπως implies that the παράγγελμα, though concerning Socrates, was given to the ὑπηρέτης; for there is no reason to depart from the ordinary interpretation of ὅπως ἂν as expressive of *means* towards an end. Even in Gorg. 523 D. the meaning of ὅπως ἂν is properly, *ita ut*, as here.

60 A. (1.) τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι] Some of the MSS. (not the Bodleian) give Σωκράτην, probably, in this passage, to avoid hiatus; Σωκράτην is the form of the accusative current in Xenophon, Σωκράτη, in Plato.—(2.) Ξανθίππην] This famous person, the subject of many unauthenticated stories in later times, is mentioned here with respect by Plato, and also by Xenophon in Mem. II. 2, where Socrates is represented as reasoning his son into a dutiful obedience towards her. It is highly probable that she was naturally the most ill-tempered of women, (τῶν οὐσῶν χαλεπωτάτη) as Antisthenes, who was a good judge, pronounces her, (Xen. Conv. II. 10), and that Socrates was not so successful in dealing with her, as he was with his own disposition, which he himself said was also naturally very unpromising. At all events, the impression left by the scene as described by Plato (and this is the only occasion in which he mentions her by name) is to the honour of Xanthippe, as a tender and affectionate wife. It is worthy of remark, that the sending away of Xanthippe is highly characteristic of the time and condition of the world. It was one of the weaknesses of the Greek mind, to consider women as in general incapable of being addressed by the teachings of Philosophy.\*—(4.) ἀνευφήμησε] Compare the more full expression in Soph. Trach. 783, ἅπας δ' ἀνευφήμησεν οἰμωγῇ λεώς, and Eurip. Orest. 1336, ἀνευφημεῖ δόμος, explained by the Scholiast as δυσφημεῖ.—(8.) τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος] Crito was a rich man, as is shown by the circumstance that he had attendants or ἀκόλουθοι in waiting. Compare Meno, 82 A. The extremes of Athenian social rank are marked out by the possession or non-possession of such attendants: Arist. Eccl. 593, ἀνδραπόδοις τὸν μὲν χρῆσθαι πολλοῖς, τὸν δ' οὐδ' ἀκολουθῶν.

\* The *hetærae*, such as Aspasia, were indeed an exception, but such an exception as strikingly proves the rule; for their position as auditors of philosophical discussions involved virtual separation from their sex.

- κράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω  
 τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπήγγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ  
 B Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης  
 ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος  
 καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἄμα, ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη,  
 ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰσὶν οἱ εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι  
 ἡδὺν ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶ-  
 ναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἄμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνε-  
 σθαι τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμ-  
 βάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον,  
 ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δὺ ὄντε. καὶ μοι δο-  
 C κεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἰσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι,  
 ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα,

Socrates re-  
marks on the  
relation of  
Pleasure and  
Pain.

B. (2.) ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην] The old reading was εἰς, which is inferior, as being opposed to all the MSS. except the Bodl., and as implying *motion* to reach something *at a distance*, just as καθίσκειν εἰς signifies to take refuge as a suppliant: cf. Valcken. on Herod. VIII. 71.—(9.) ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς] As if united at one end, and yet two distinct things, i.e., twin and yet twin. This quaint representation of the relation between pain and pleasure (ἔρπει παραλλάξ ταῦτα, Soph. Aj. 1060, of the same) was often referred to, as by Julian Or. VIII., p. 240, εἴκειν ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη τῆς αὐτῆς κορυφῆς ἐξήφθαι. cf. Isocr. ad Dem. c. 5; Di. Chrys. p. 303; A. Gell. VI. 1. Similarly Menander speaks of ἀγασθόν and κακόν as ἐνὶ ἑνὶ ἐκ ῥίζης μιᾶς. Compare Livy V. 4, 'Labor voluptasque, dissimillima natura, societate quadam inter se naturali sunt juncta.' The first words of Socrates, though seemingly casual, are, in a manner, the key-note to the whole. By a subtle and beautiful instinct both in regard to dramatic propriety and poetic suggestiveness, Plato introduces the great Thinker as just undergoing release from his chain, whereby more is suggested than meets the ear. 'How closely knit are things that seem most asunder—pain and pleasure! How near is pain to pleasure, and pleasure oftentimes to pain! In the midst of pleasure we are in pain: in the midst of pain straight comes pleasure. May it not be—the heart whispers to itself—that in the midst of death's pain we may be not far from a new life's pleasure, that in the unbinding of the prison cord I may see the unbinding of my earthly chain, and I can flee like a bird away?' Compare Greg. Naz. Ep. 32, p. 29. B. Σωκράτης . . . οἰκᾶν ὡς οἶσθα τὸ ἐσμεωτήριον, τέως μὲν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἄλλου ἐσμεωτηρίου τοῦ σώματος τοῖς μαθηταῖς διελέγετο. Cf. Timæus 81. E. regarding death: ἡ ψυχὴ λυθεῖσα κατὰ φύσιν μισθὸν ἡδονῆς ἐξέπτατο· πάν γάρ τοι μὲν παρὰ φύσιν ἀλγεῖνόν, τὸ δ' ἡ πέφυκε γιγνόμενον ἡδὺν.

C. (1.) Αἰσωπος] See Note B.

C

ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἡδύνατο, ξυνῆψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται, ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

IV. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νῆ τὸν Δία, ᾧ Σωκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἦδη ἤρνοντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐηνὸς πρῶην, ὃ τι ποτὲ διανο-

D. (1.) ἐντείνας] sc. εἰς μέτρον, putting prose into metrical form. It is also used of setting poetry to music, cf. Protag. 326 A., ποιήματα εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες. Cf. *intendo* in Latin, as in Pers. VI. 4. The word itself is interesting as a relic (like our *strain*) of the times of the harping minstrels, and symbolical in all times of the kindred arts of archery and song, the bow and the harp being twin instruments *strung* by the poet-archer Apollo.—(2.) προοίμιον] The προοίμιον was the name originally for a short initial hymn, introductory either to an epic recitation by a Rhapsode, or to a festal ode by a Lyrist, in honour of some god. From the frequency with which the singer or reciter would appeal to the God of song for aid, it came to be appropriated chiefly to a prelude in honour of Apollo. (Mure's Hist. of Gr. Lit., II., p. 323.) Diog. La., II. 42, calls the hymn referred to as composed by Socrates, by a name still more closely associated with Apollo, παιάν, and quotes the opening line, alleged to be the composition of Socrates:—

Δῆλι' Ἀπολλὸν χαῖρε, καὶ Ἄρτεμι, παῖδε κλεινῷ.\*

The προοίμιον to the Delian God, through whose festival he obtained the reprieve of thirty days, would probably be both a thanksgiving for that boon and a prayer for aid in the hour of death. The allusions in various parts of the Dialogue to the relation of Socrates to Apollo his liege lord (δεσπότης, 85 A.), are both frequent and beautiful, such as the reference in 61 A. to Philosophy as μεγίστη μουσική, that in 85 B. to himself as a servant of Apollo—singing his last strain like the dying swan—the bird of Apollo, and also the last word (118 A.) regarding the offering to the son of Apollo. All these links of connection with Apollo† are worthy of observation, as

\* If we may judge from this line, it is probable, that the verses of Socrates, if they had been preserved, would have been found not more successful than those of Cicero. Diogenes La. (II. 42) confesses that his Æsopic versifications, of which he quotes what passed for a couplet, were not done very artistically (οὐ πάνυ ἐπιτετυγμένως).

† They are important also critically, as one of the objections to the genuineness of the Apology has been drawn from the prominence there given to the oracle of Apollo, pronouncing Socrates the wisest of men, but the interweaving of similar links of connection in the Phædo does away with the force of this objection against the Platonic origin of the Apology.

ηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐνηῶ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὐθις ἐρωτᾷ, εὐ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τί χρή με λέγειν. Λέγε τοῖνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τὰληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα.

Cebes inquires regarding the reason of his having composed verses during his imprisonment.

Ε ἦδεν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον εἶη· ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τιμῶν ἀποπειρώμενος, τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, 61 τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ τε

pointing to an instinctive feeling in the minds of the audience silently associating the death of Socrates with the setting of the God of Day, as if that sunset was to bring with it a double darkness.—(3.) ὅ τι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖν] Formed on the analogy of the more usual expression, ὅ τι μαθῶν. Regarding Euanus, see Note B.

E. (2.) εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις] πολλάκις after εἰ, μή, and the like, is often to be rendered *perhaps*, and expresses a rough generalisation from *many* particulars. Compare *vielleicht* in German, and *sæpe* in Virg. *Æn.* I., 148, 'Ac veluti magno in populo quum sæpe coorta est seditio.'—(6.) μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου] *Compose music and cultivate it.* ἐργάζου is more than ποίει, and implies labour and devotedness. This command is not to be reckoned a voice of the *δαμόνιον*, which, according to Plato, was not hortatory, but simply negative or prohibitive. ἐνύπνια are spoken of as visiting Socrates, *Apolog.* 33 C., *Crit.* 44 A. (cf. *Diog. La.*, III. 5), but merely as part of what all men enjoyed, or might use if they chose. Cf. Grote, VIII., 565-6. Xenophon gives a representation of the *δαμόνιον* different from that of Plato in two respects, 1° that it gave positive as well as negative guidance (*Mem.* I. 1, 4 and IV. 8, 1); 2° that it was analogous to the ordinary divination (I. 1, 3). On the command itself compare the similar oracle (*Plut. Mor.* 245 D.) to Telesilla, the poetess of Argos, who, when sick, was ordered to seek *health* by cult of the Muses (*Μούσας θεραπεύειν*.)

δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διεκώλυνέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημῶδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πειθόμενον B τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα,

61 A. (2.) ἐπικελεύειν] = (Facientem) incitare, παρακελεύομαι = hortari (ut faciat), whereas ἐιακελεύομαι = alii alios hortari, of rival parties, each having a special favourite among the contending racers.—(4.) ὡς φιλοσοφίας μεγίστης μουσικῆς] On this important maxim, see Note C.

B. (3.) μετὰ τὸν θεόν] Abbreviated expression for, *after celebrating the god*.—(4.) ποιεῖν μῦθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους] When λόγος is opposed to μῦθος, it signifies the *moral*, or *reasoning*, as opposed to the *apologue*, or *fable*, by which it is conveyed. Hence λόγος, being founded on fact and reason, is presumed to be real: not necessarily so a μῦθος. Gorg. 523 A., Ἄκουε μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω. As the inner sense or λόγον proper was the most valuable part of the μῦθος, λόγος is often used as equivalent to μῦθος, as it is in 60 D. Æsop, who was properly μυθοποιός, is also called λογοποιός in Herod. II. 134, and his fables have the name of λόγοι in Aristoph. Pac. 129, Av. 651; Aristot. Rhet. II., 20, 2. The antique name for the Æsopic style of fable was αἶνον: cf. Hesiod, Oper. 200. On the relation of μῦθος to λόγος generally, see Philol., Mus. I. 280; Creuzer's Symbolik IV. 517—524; Grote I. 480. Compare Plutarch, Mor. 348 A., ὅτι μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ περὶ μυθοποιῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ Πλάτων εἴρηκεν. Ὁ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὲς ἢ εἰσικῶς ἀληθινῶ· κ.τ.λ.—(5.) καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ᾔ] This parenthetical clause is in the indicative, as a thing well-known, but the reflection is in the optative, ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἔχοι.—(7.) ἐποίησα] Here, simply rendered into verse. Its usual sense is that of *original composition*.—(9.) ὡς τάχιστα] These words, though found in the MSS., were omitted in the early editions, as being thought to contradict the views afterwards given regarding the unlawfulness of suicide. There is probably a double meaning in the exhortation, to follow Socrates. Natural death seems referred to in the immediately following words, and so Simmias understands it, but the general context implies a reference also to death in its philosophic sense, as a deliver-

\* The only writers before Plato who used ποιεῖν of composition in verse are Herodotus and Aristophanes. The period, therefore, when the word ποιητής superseded the old ἀοιδός, was the century that witnessed the rise of the Athenian Drama and Athenian Art. Perhaps the originality of the Greek mind appears nowhere more patent, than in the history of this word. The Romans made no use of their native family of words in this sense (facio, factor), but borrowed from the Greek, poeta, poesis, etc. Even in modern tongues attempts at the native word have not taken living root, as in Spenser's Shep. Calend. April, 'And hath he skill to make so excellent, yet hath so little skill to bridle love?' Compare the bold word of Tasso, 'Non merita nome di creatore, se non fiddio ed il Poeta.'

οὐ ἦν ἡ παρούσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἶπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὖς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσωπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐνήν φράζε, καὶ ἐρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. ἀπειμι C δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Συμίας, Οἶον παρακελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐνήν; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾗσθημαι οὐδ' ὅπως οἶσθαι σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαί; ἦ δ' ὅς· οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐνήν; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Συμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν, ἔφη, καὶ Εὐνήν καὶ πᾶς ὅτ' ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι γ' ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη [ἀπὸ D τῆς κλίνης] ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τοῦτο

Convers-  
ation turns  
on the willing-  
ness of all  
true Philo-  
sophers to  
part with  
life. Yet  
Suicide is  
condemned.

ance from the power of outward sense. This, Socrates hints, cannot be effected too soon; and then natural death will be easy to encounter: cf. Theæt. 176 B. εἰὸ καὶ πειράσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα· φωνή ἐδὲ ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

C. (7.) τούτου τοῦ πράγματος] viz., the profession of Philosophy. Compare the expression in Acts IX. 21., οὐκ ἔστι σοι μερὶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ.—(9.) ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης] These words are not found in the Bodl. MS.

D. (1.) καθεζόμενος οὕτως κ.τ.λ.] οὕτως is frequently introduced after a participle to give emphasis to the situation expressed by the participle. Whewell translates, as if οὕτως qualified καθεζόμενος, instead of expressing more definitely the simple circumstance that he sat during the rest of the discourse. The playful attitude, as Olympiodorus (p. 6) remarks, is thrown aside, when he begins to address himself to more serious discussion:—συντονώτερον σχῆμα ἀνέλαβε καὶ σεμνότερον, ὡς περὶ προβλήματος σεμνοτέρου μέλλων διαλέγεσθαι. On οὕτως after a participle, see example in 83 B., and compare St. John IV. 6, where thus ought to have been rendered accordingly.—(6.) Φιλολάμ] See Note B.—Οὐδέν γε σαφές] The difficulty here is not so much in the circumstance that the Pythagorean doctrines were not fully mastered by the Theban scholars of Philolaus, which was not strange, as they were proverbially obscure, (εἶθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις εἶ-

λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπessθαι; Τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε E ἀποδημῶν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινα αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

VI. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐ-

αἰνιγματῶν λέγειν, Olympiod. ad loc.), but that Socrates is represented as knowing better than these Pythagoreans present the doctrines of Philolaus. It is not improbable that Plato here attributes to his master a knowledge of principles which he himself afterwards attained only when he met in with the works of Philolaus in his travels. The hypothesis of such an antedating on the part of Plato, explains certain important differences distinguishing the Socrates of Plato from the Socrates of Xenophon, with whom the peculiar heaven of Pythagoras scarcely finds a place.

E. (1.) ἐκείσε ἀποδημῶν] The use of ἐκεῖ and ἐκείσε with reference to the other world, and ἐνθάδε of the present, is frequent. Aristoph. Ran. 82, regarding Sophocles, ὁ δ' εὐκόλος μὲν ἐνθάδ', εὐκόλος δ' ἐκεῖ. Cf. Blomf. Choeph. Gl. 353. With ἀποδημῶν as used to signify death, compare such expressions as μεταίκησις, Apolog. 40 C., βέβηκε, Soph. Philoct. 492, also, οἱ μεθεστώτες (Plut. Solon. 21), οἴχεσθαι, μεταλλάσσειν.\* Also, in N. T., ἐξοδος St. Luke IX. 31, μεταβαίνω St. John XIII. 1, ἐκδημῶν 2 Cor. V. 6, 'Abiit, non obiit' Jerome.—(2.) διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν] It is probable that in this pair of terms there is a reference to the division of the Dialogue into its two parts—διασκοπεῖν referring to the dialectic discussion, and μυθολογεῖν (as in Xenoph. Conv. 8, 28), to the mythic representation, such as we find in the last portion of the Phædo. (In 70 B., however, διαμυθολογεῖν seems rather to have the dialectic sense). The expression is interesting as implying a feeling of obscurity and insecurity in approaching the great subject of a Future Life. In this point of view it is proper to remark, that Plato is fond of introducing a myth at the close of his discussion of a difficult question, as if Philosophy was unequal to every task. Compare Brandis Gesch. Gr. Röm. Phil. I. p. 40.—(4.) ἡλίου δυσμῶν] Executions at Lacedæmon were not allowed to take place by day, Herodot. IV. 146; a similar law seems to have existed at Athens.—(9.) σαφὲς ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν] περὶ αὐτῶν refers

\* Plutarch (Mor. 1104 C.) remarks on these expressions as natural indications of what he there calls the strongest of instincts, (πόθος τοῦ εἶναι), the 'longing after immortality.'



τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτινύναι, ὃ Σώκρατες ; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, Grounds unfolded of the unlawfulness of suicide.  
 ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τιγῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκή-  
 62 κοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμείσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανέται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα ἐστὶν ὅτε, καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν· οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστόν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται, εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὁσιόν ἐστὶν αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἡρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν,  
 B ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ'

back to τοιούτων in 61 D. *σαφές*, i.e. susceptible of dialectic expression, and stripped of the mythical garb. Cf. Gorg. 493 A., where there is an implied innuendo against the Pythagoreans, that they did not keep separate the mythical and dialectic parts of their philosophy.

62 A. (2.) *τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων*] The discussion of the difficulties in this sentence exceeds the limits of an annotation, and will be found in Note D.—(5.) *οἷς ἔε βέλτιον τεθνάναι*] On the views of the ancients regarding the relative desirableness of Life and Death, see Note E.—(8.) *Ἰττω Ζεὺς*] Cebes is startled by the apparent paradox, and forgetting that he is in Athens, lets fall from him a Theban exclamation. From Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 875, it seems to have been a favourite Boeotian phrase. The Leipsic translator renders it in Low German, '*Det wet Gott*,' as much as to say, 'That is an enigma for Jove to explain.' With *φωνή* = *dialect*, comp. Xen. *Anab.* III. 1, 26.

B. (1.) *οὔτω γ'*] *If put in that form, at least.*—(2.) *ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος*] According to some commentators, following Proclus and Olympiodorus, the *ἀπορρήτα* referred to are the doctrines usually ascribed to the name of Orpheus. Others, as Stallbaum, consider the *ἀπορρήτα* referred to as belonging to philosophy rather than ritualism, and hold the allusion to be to the esoteric teaching of Pythagoras,\* more especially as Cicero (de Senec. 20) ascribes directly to Pythagoras the particular doctrine about to be specified. Either view leads to the same result, for the connection between Orphicism and Pythagoreanism is admitted to have been very intimate. As regards

\* τὰ ἀπορρήτα is used by Diog. La VIII. 4, 6, of the philosophy of Pythagoras. Eupapius (Porphyrus vita) speaks of the ἀπορρήτα as a machinery among philosophers parallel to myths among the poets. The Pythagorising Numenius wrote a treatise (now lost) *περὶ τῶν παρὰ Πλάτωνα ἀπορρήτων*.

ἴσως ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἑσμέν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥάδιος διδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως ; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν στυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι, μὴ στήμνηαντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνεις ἂν αὐτῇ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν ; Πάνυ γ'.

the Eleusinian mysteries, it is doubtful if Plato would have spoken so openly regarding them, and though it is possible that these mysteries contained a similar symbolism, which would have been equally available for Plato's purpose, it is not likely that he would have professed to draw from a source looked on with such jealousy.—(3.) ἐν φρουρᾷ] Regarding the exact sense of this symbolical expression two views may be entertained, one of which is more poetical, but the other more probably the special sense intended by Plato. 1°. It may mean *on guard* (so Mendelssohn), as if Man was a sentinel set to watch on an outpost for a certain space of time called Life. This is favoured by Cicero's interpretation (de Senec. 20), 'Vetat Pythagoras in jussu Imperatoris, id est, Dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere.' 2°. The more probable but less beautiful sense is founded on the favourite view of the mystic schools, that the body\* was to the soul a *prison*, or even a *sepulchre*. Σῆμα τὸ σῶμα was an oracular text in the Orphic brotherhood (οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα) cf. Cratyl. 400 C.; Philolaus in Clem. Al. Str. III., 3, 17, where the imprisonment in a frame of flesh is regarded as a retributive punishment. The author of the *Axiochus* (365 E.) describes Man as ζῶν ἀθάνατον ἐν θνητῇ καθειργμένον φρουρίῳ. Cf. Cic. Tusc. I. 30, Somn. Scip. 14; Virg. Aen. VI. 733.—(5.) μέγας τίς τίς μοι φαίνεται] *Profound, and not easy to fathom*. The difficulty to Socrates was probably the circumstance that the φρουρά was represented as a punishment for sins in a prior state. On μέγας = *difficult*, cf. Hipp. Maj. 287 B., οὐ μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγὼ σε εἰδέξαιμι.—(8.) ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς] This second consideration that men are not only the prisoners, but the property of the gods, is a favourite view of Plato, cf. Legg. X. 906 A. ἡμεῖς κτήματα θεῶν καὶ ἐαιμόνων. Compare Legg. X. 902 B., Cic. Tusc. I. 30. In Critias 109 B., the simile is carried out more fully, under the image of a shepherd and his sheep:—κτήματα (cf. κτήνη)

\* In conformity with this view, Themistius (cf. Stob. 120, 28) is fanatical enough to derive δέμας from δέω (bind), and βίος from βία (constraint).

ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτανῆναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν.

VII. Ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔοικε τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπων, D εἴπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεὸν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς

is especially appropriate regarding *living* property, as *cattle, slaves*, (in which last sense it is used in 62 C.); cf. Eur. Med. 49, παλαιὸν οἴκων κτήμα, addressed to an aged slave. χρήματα is property in *money*. Valckenær, on Eur. Hippol. 88, asserts—'Græci ne Deos quidem suos libenter δεσπότης appellabant:' but in the case of Plato this passage shows that the assertion is not true, and although δεσπότης does not occur in Homer, such expressions as θεῶν ἀέκῃτι ἀνάκτων (Od. XII. 290), show that the idea was not unknown to the early as well as to the middle period of Greek literature.

C. (2.) μὴ σημύναντός σου] Compare the beautiful expression of Arrian on Epictetus (III., p. 350), regarding Death: Θεὸς, ὡς ἀγαθὸς στρατηγός, σημαίνει τὸ ἀνακλητικόν—'After life's battle, God sounds the recall.'—(6.) πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ] Heindorf supposed that ἂν, usual after πρὶν with the conjunctive in such sentences in prose, had been absorbed by the initial syllable of ἀνάγκην, and Bekker inserted ἂν in his text. Stallbaum, on the other hand, follows the MSS., and holds rightly, that although it is chiefly a poetic construction to omit ἂν after πρὶν, ἕως, and the like, with the conjunctive, traces of the liberty appear in prose, as in Theæt. 169 B., and Legg. IX. 873 A., where the MSS. are unanimous in dispensing with ἂν. The solemn gravity of the whole expression may give this passage a title to the liberty of the construction of verse. On the doctrine of the whole passage regarding Suicide, see Note F.

D. (3.) τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν] Here Cebes is represented as making a subtle use of the argument of Socrates, that, if we are the servants of the gods, it would be wrong not to grieve at the prospect of death, which involves separation from such masters. This brings us in view of the great subject of the Phædo: Socrates is called upon, in answer to this, to show that death, although a departure from certain conditions of life, is not a departure from the care and protection of the gods. The doctrine of a pervading Providence is found more fully expounded in Legg. X. 900 C., and 905 D., and in Pol. X. 613 A. there is a very remarkable statement of belief that pain, and poverty, and disease, will end in good to the just man, whether living or dead. —(5.) αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ] Transition from the plural (φρονιμωτάτους) to the individual, as the reasoning becomes more vivid.

Cebes suggests that the Philosopher who rejoices at death, may be like a runaway slave—not wise but foolish, as having left a good master.

θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἀριστοὶ εἰσι τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ οἶται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, Εἰ ἀλλ' ὅ τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοὶ που ἂν αἰεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ' ἀφρονas χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναι τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψασαίς ἡμᾶς, 'Αεὶ τοι, ἔφη, 63 ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινας ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάννυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς δεσπότηas ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττουτο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σέ τείνειν τὸν λό-

E. (3.) ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ] Cebes assumes as indubitable, [that obedience is consistent with right reason; of which idea, in a larger sense, the following may be taken as an illustration. 'I hardly think it possible for any kind of obedience to be more painful than an unrestrained liberty.—Adam, when he was freed from the bliss at once, and the restraint of paradise, was sure greater slave in the wilderness than in the enclosure.'—Hammond.—(4.) τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι] Compare Hor. Ep. I. 1, 48, 'Discere et audire et meliori credere non vis?' Also Ep. I. 2, 68. Cf. Apol. 29 B., τὸ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ κακόν.

63 A. (1.) 'Αεὶ τοι] A Homeric formula, (Il. V. 873.) αἰεὶ τοι ῥίγιστα θεοὶ τετληότες εἰμεν. There is a playfulness in the expression, as if Socrates wished to say, 'There is Cebes at his old device again, of hunting up arguments, and not accepting readily the statements of another.' Cebes is described (77 A.) as καρτερώτατος πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.—(4.) δοκεῖ τι—λέγειν] τί λέγειν, to say something to the purpose, like *aliquid dicere* in Cic. Tusc. I. 10; the opposite of οὐδὲν λέγειν: cf. 76 D. (In 84 C., however, οὐδὲν λέγω has a different sense.)—(7.) τείνειν τὸν λόγον] The image of a bow furnished with *ἔπεα πτερόεντα*. Compare the words of Pindar, Ol. II. 90. φρενὸς εὐκλείας ὀιστοῦν ἐέντες.

γον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρ-  
 B χοντας ἀγαθούς, ὥς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. Δίκαια, ἔφη,  
 λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπο-  
 λογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ  
 Σιμμίας.

Socrates  
 having com-  
 plimented  
 Cebes on his  
 subtilty, ad-  
 vances the  
 proposition  
 that Death  
 is not a re-  
 moval from  
 the protec-  
 tion of the  
 Gods.

VIII. Φέρε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς  
 ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ,  
 ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾧμην ἦξιν πρῶ-  
 τον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα  
 καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐν-  
 θάδε, ἡδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ  
 C εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἀνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς·  
 καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι  
 παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθούς ἦξιν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι,  
 εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.  
 ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι  
 εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καὶ, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγε-  
 ται, πολὺ ἀμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν,

B. (8.) *παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους*] The same expression occurs in Legg. XII. 959 B. Compare Æsch. Supp. 230, *κακεὶ δικάζει τὰμπλακῆμαθ', ὡς λόγος, Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦσιν ὑστάτας εἰκας*.—(10.) *οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν*] Olympiodorus quotes it, *μὴ ἀγαν*, which puts it hypothetically, *if so be that I were not sad*, instead of, *in being, as I am, not sad*.

C. (2.) *οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δισχυρισαίμην*] A similar expression in Legg. I. 641 D. This seems to be said, not from doubt as to a future state, but as to his own lot there, lest he should not be found worthy to mingle with the *ἀγαθοὶ* as an *ἐταῖρος*. (Cf. 69 E.)—(3.) *ἦξιν*] The infinitive probably results from the continued influence of *ἐλπίζω*.—(5.) *οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ*] i.e., not in the same manner as if I were without hope.—(6.) *εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι*] *τί*, something positive; *an existence*: cf. *τι* in 63 A.—(6.) *ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται*] This is perhaps the most distinct, though indirect, allusion to *Tradition* (cf. also 68 A., 107 D.) in regard to the Doctrine of a Future State. The knowledge of the Barbarian world was as yet too limited to allow general conclusions to be drawn as to the prevalence of the Belief beyond the region of Hellenic thought.—(8.) *Αὐτὸς ἔχων*] *Keeping to yourself alone*. In the older editions *πότερον* is inserted before *αὐτὸς*, but most of the MSS. omit it. As *αὐτὸς* of itself implies opposition, it seems unnecessary to insert *πότερον* along with it: hence its omission in 57 A., and in the parallel passage there quoted from the Symposium.

ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες ; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης ; κοινὸν D γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, εἰ ἂν ἄπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν

D. (4.) Κρίτωνα τόνδε] Crito is the member of the Socratic group through whom anything is done or said bearing on the personal comfort of Socrates.—(5.) Τί δέ—ἄλλο γε ἢ] Sc. γίγνεται ἢ ὅτι. So ποιούσαι is to be supplied in 76 A., οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμνησκονται.—(7.) ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον] Heindorf refers to the story in Plutarch (Phocion, c. 36), when the δημόσιον or executioner, on the occasion of the supply of poison falling short before the bowl reaches Phocion, refuses to prepare more, unless he received twelve drachmas for the extra trouble. Phocion, according to the tale, asks one of his friends to be bail for the money, adding, it was hard that a man could not die at Athens without having to pay for it. Accordingly, Heindorf suspects this executioner here of a similar mercenary motive, with a view to save himself trouble. If the person who is called ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης is the same as the man who here speaks to Crito, Heindorf's suspicion is unjust, because the motive must have been one of kindness in one so much affected as he is represented to be in 116 C. D. The ὑπηρεταί of the Eleven (Xen. Hellen. II. 3, 54) were certainly many, and probably of many grades: we read of ὁ ὑπηρέτης, ὁ θυρωρός (59 E.), and in the orators ὁ ἐήμιος. These were different individuals, the last being ἄτιμος in a degree beyond the others. ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, which occurs here and in 117 A. (and again ὁ δόνς τὸ φάρμακον, in 117 E.), seem a periphrasis to avoid the repulsive term ἐήμιος, just as from a similar feeling Plato does not speak of κύνειον, but uses the *vox media*, φάρμακον. It is therefore probable that a different official, subordinate to the principal ὑπηρέτης, is here referred to. But, even in the case of the ἐήμιος being, as we believe, a different person from the ὑπηρέτης, it is probable the motive was no other, even in the breast of the ἐήμιος, than one of kindness towards Socrates, so as to deliver him from the pain of drinking a larger potion than was necessary to produce death. The incident is mentioned by Plato, partly for the sake of dramatic effect, partly to bring out more strongly the resignation or cheerfulness of Socrates.—(8.) οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν] *Not to bring any such influence to bear* (by way of counteraction) *on the working of the poison.* The use of οὐδὲν in a prohibition is noteworthy. μάλλον, i.e., τοῦ ζέοντος, qualifying θερμαίνεσθαι. According to Galen (XI. 596. Ed. Kühn.), the effect of such excitement would have been in favour of the more rapid and easy death: for he says of the hemlock or narcotic (ψυχρά) class of poisons: θαῦτόν τε καὶ μάλλον ἐν ταῖς θερμαῖς φύσσειν ἐνεργεῖ.

ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον  
 διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ  
 Ε φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς  
 πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἔα,  
 ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευα-  
 ζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δώσων, ἂν δὲ δέη, καὶ τρίς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν  
 μὲν τι ἦδειν, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι πάσαι πράγματα  
 παρέχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς  
 βούλομαι ἦδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται  
 εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον  
 64 θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέ-  
 γιστα οἶσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ· πῶς ἂν οὖν  
 δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειρά-  
 σομαι φράσαι.

The Execu-  
 tioner enter-  
 poses a moni-  
 tion against  
 disputation,  
 as likely to  
 render death  
 more painful.  
 Socrates  
 hears it with  
 fearless re-  
 spect, and  
 enters on the  
 discussion.

IX. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς  
 ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν  
 ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.

E. (4.) Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἦδειν] τι is attached, not to ἦδειν, but to  
 σχεδόν, like ἔγνω τι in 65 A. The reading ἦδειν has been altered to ἦδη  
 by the recent editors, except K. F. Hermann, in obedience to an observation in  
 Photii Lex., p. 50, where this passage is quoted with the reading ἦδη, but  
 little weight is due to it, as in other respects the passage is misquoted, and  
 the MSS. are in this place unanimous. Cobet (Nov. Lect., p. 214) pronounces  
 despotically in favour of ἦδη. This answer of Crito alludes to his painful ex-  
 perience, gained a few days before, that Socrates was immovable.

64 A. (5.) Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ] 'There is a danger, methinks, that the  
 true aspirants after Philosophy are misunderstood by the rest of the world,  
 which does not comprehend that their sole spontaneous study is simply Dying  
 and Death.' ἀποθνήσκειν differs from τεθνάναι as the transition differs from  
 the resulting condition, the former being the act of Emancipation, the latter  
 the consequent Freedom. Cicero's well-known version of the maxim (Tusc.  
 I. 36; 'Tota enim vita philosophorum, ut ait Socrates, commentatio mortis  
 est') gives the sense without the subtlety of the original, ἐπιτηδεύω being  
 more than commentatio, inasmuch as it combines both aspiration and practice,  
 and the distinction between ἀποθνήσκειν and τεθνάναι being overlooked.  
 With the expression ἐπιτηδεύω ἀποθνήσκειν, compare 81 A., μελέτη θανάτου;  
 also Shaksp., Macbeth I. 4, 'He died as one that had been studied in his death.'  
 Farther illustrations of the maxim in Note G.

Philosophy  
described as  
a study of  
Death, for it  
is a longing  
for Freedom.

εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι  
μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἤκοντος δὲ δὴ  
αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ πάλαι προεθυμούντο τε καὶ ἐπετή-  
δουν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-  
κρατες, οὐ πάνν γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασεῖντα ἐποίησας γελά- B  
σαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαν-

B. (4.) τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους] The natural view of this passage is to understand Simmias as speaking mainly of his countrymen at Thebes as a prominent type of the vulgar mind, unable to regard the life of a Thinker as other than a kind of death.\* Most commentators accept this view, which is that of Olympiodorus, who refers to the proverb, Βουωτῖα ὤς, in evidence of the inaptitude of the Theban† mind, as compared with the Athenian, for philosophic pursuits. Schleiermacher, however, pronounces in favour of another view: that Simmias is speaking as an Athenian, and that the sense is:—'Well, albeit far from the laughing mood, I can hardly refrain from a laugh, for if such is the ideal of philosophy, you, at least, lying under sentence of death, have been signally successful in your endeavours. Moreover, some people seem to think, from their point of view, that it is well deserved on the part of such philosophers.' The truth lies between these extremes. On the one hand, it is difficult to suppose τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους to be other than the Thebans; and, on the other hand, ἀξιοὶ τοῦτο πάσχειν must, in the mouth of Simmias, find its meaning in the sentence passed by the Athenians. The clause καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν is to be regarded as thrown in parenthetically, and the real meaning is directed against the Athenians under the disguise of οἱ πολλοί. By σφᾶς, as is shown by the sequel (where the ceasing of the 'indirect speech' allows αὐτοὺς to be substituted for it) is meant not the φιλόσοφοι, but the rest of the world, who take philosophers at their word, and give them their hearts' desire—death. The use of δοκεῖν in the sense of *think*, and that of λελήθασιν in personal form, instead of λέληθε, which occurs afterwards, need no elucidation.— (9.) καὶ οἷον θάνατον] These words, omitted in the old editions, were restored by Heindorf from the Mss., and from quotations in Olympiodorus and Jamblichus. Wolf and Schmidt think them spurious, but they are necessary in order to show that Socrates is using θάνατος in a sense different from that in common use. 'It is, I affirm, a mystery to them, on what principle the true philosophers both desire death and deserve death, and what sort of death (i.e., deliverance) they deserve.'

\* A similar estimate of a life of a Thinker, according to the vulgar mind, is found in 65 A., Pol. I. 329 A., Xen. Mem. I. 6, 4. The picture of the pale-faced students in the φροντιστήριον of the Clouds, is the best commentary on this popular impression. Cf. Soph. Antig. 1145.

† Compare Plutarch (de Gen. Socr. 575 E), confessing ἀρχαῖον εἰς μισολογίαν ὄνειδος as attaching to his countrymen, although he asserts that it was wiped away in the time of Socrates, alluding to the important part borne by the two Thebans in the discussions of the Phædo



τας δοκεῖν εἶ πάνν εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας, καί, ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνν, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἀξιοὶ εἰσι τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθὴ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἥ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἥ ἀξιοὶ εἰσι θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἰπῶμεν C γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνν γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγενῆναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὦ γαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐμσί. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων D μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται

Definition of Death as the separation of the soul from the body. This, however, is the life-aim of the Philosopher.

C. (3.) τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς . . . ἀπαλλαγὴν] This definition of what is meant by death is given also in Gorgias, 524 B., cf. Cic. Tusc. I. 9, 'Discessus animi a corpore.' In Pseud. Plutarch Plac. Phil. V. 25, 4., ψυχῆς διαχωρισμόν is a definition of death attributed to Anaxagoras.—(7.) ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ] Bekker and Stallbaum omit ἦ on the authority of only two MSS. The text, however, is sufficiently defended by such examples as Xen. Œc. IV. 4, ἄρα μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν κ.τ.λ. (Is it possible that we can be ashamed?), and the introduction of an interrogative *Conjunctivus Deliberativus*, adds to the emphasis, as excluding any other possibility.—(9) ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοί] The Greeks are fond of reiterating καὶ in both members of a comparison, in cases where in other languages it would be superfluous, cf. 76 E., ὥσπερ καὶ—οὕτω καὶ.

D. (7.) ἱματίων διαφερόντων] The mention of fine garments and shoes is full of interest, as found in the mouth of Socrates, who wore the same τρίβων summer and winter (Xen. Mem. I. 6, 2), and went barefooted among a people peculiarly finical in the matter of sandals. The Platonic scholar finds delight in the incidental touches interspersed in the Platonic dialogues, revealing the homeliness of the man, more especially the humorous passage in Conv. 174 A., where one of Agathon's guests, who has made his appearance early, says, that in coming to the banquet he had descried an extraordinary phenomenon by the way, which turned out to be Socrates, washed and wearing sandals (λελουμένον τε καὶ

The pleasures of the Body passed in review, and pronounced not to be the aim of the true Philosopher.

σοι φιλοσόφον ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπονδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιαύσδε, οἷον σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν ; Ἕκιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίης. Τί δέ ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος ; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν ; Ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιοῦτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι ; Ἐμοιγε. Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δηλὸς ἐστὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὃ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ 65

τὰς βλαίτας ὑποδεδεμένον, ἃ ἐκείνος ὀλιγάκις ἐποίει.) For a graphic picture of the life, dress, and food of the Athenian poor, compared with those of the rich, consult Aristophanes, *Plut.* 535—546.—(8.) Τοῖς ἄλλοις καλλωπισμοῖς] The braveries and fopperies of dress. Compare the tasteful maxim in *Isocr. ad Demonic.* 6, εἶναι βούλον τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα φιλόκαλος ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλωπιστής. Olympiodorus remarks on the gradation in the order in which these pleasures are here introduced ; 1° these which are both natural and necessary, food and drink ; 2° those which are natural but not necessary—sensual delights : 3° those which are neither natural nor necessary—fineries about the person. (Epicurus made a similar division, cf. *Cic. Fin.* I. 13.)

E. (1.) ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ] The germ of asceticism is here discernible in the presence of the word ἀτιμάζειν : the principle of Independence (as enunciated in this passage, and in *Xen. Mem.* I. 6, 10, ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω, τὸ μὲν μῆτερὸς εἶσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου) has in it a tincture of scorn that easily deepened into the lividness of Cynicism, casting an unloving eye on the rich bounties of creation, and chilling the outflow of human affection (compare the tradition respecting Apollodorus, *Note A.*, with the treatment of the ministrations of affection by the Divine Teacher, *St. John XII.* 1—8). These reasonings of Socrates regarding attachment to external things, have been adduced as parallel in purpose, though far from breathing the same lovingness of spirit, with the words of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount (*St. Matth.* VI. 25—32). 'Tis by comparison an easy task, Earth to despise, but to converse with heaven—This is not easy.'

65 A. (4.) τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Cf. note on 80 D.—(4.) μηδὲ μετέχει] *Scil. ὅς.* Cf. note on 81 B.—(5.) ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι] To be in a manner as good as dead. Forster compares the sentiment in *Soph.*

τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὃ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

X. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, ἔάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζῆ-  
B τήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοή τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῶν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι

Antig. 1146, τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς Ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημι ἐγὼ Ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν. On the other hand, Socrates in Philebus 21 C. retaliates by speaking of the man of pleasure (λογισμοῦ στερόμενος) as living only the life of the mollusca: ζῆν δ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον ἀλλὰ τινος πλεῦμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετ' ὀστρεῶνων ἐμψυχὰ ἐστί σωμάτων.

—(6.) ἡδοναὶ αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν] Compare the expression, ἵνα κομίσῃται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, 2 Cor. V. 10.—(8.) φρονήσεως κτῆσιν] The word φρόνησις, so important in the Platonic philosophy, has no exact correlative in English. In most Greek writers it denotes *practical sense*, as in Arist. Eth. VI. 5, and belongs especially to the domain of Ethics: hence Cicero (Offic. I. 43) expresses it by *prudentia*, defining it as *rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia*, i.e., a knowledge of what is desirable or otherwise in a moral point of view, while σοφία has a far wider sense, embracing *rerum divinarum atque humanarum scientia*. In the philosophy of Plato where nothing was either intellectually valid or ethically valuable that did not rest on the absolute basis, denominated by him the Eternal Ideas, *prudence* is unequal to the task of representing it: *Wisdom* is perhaps the nearest approach to the notion which it conveys of having one's being and soul, so to speak, *intellectualised*, purified so as to become Pure Spirit or Intelligence.

B. (2.) ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοή] On the value assigned to the Senses in the Platonic philosophy, see Note G.—(3.) οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῶν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν] By οἱ ποιηταὶ here are meant the early philosophers, who philosophised in verse, such as Parmenides, Empedocles, Epicarmus,\* and the direct allusion is to a much-repeated line (πολυθρύλητον) of the latter: Νοῦς ὄρα καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.† 'Tis Mind that sees and Mind that hears: all else is deaf and blind.' Com-

\* On the remarkable elements in the poetry of Epicarmus, see Grote, I. 507 note.

† This line of Epicarmus seems an echo of that of Xenophanes regarding the Deity, as 'All eye, all ear, all thought,' without material instrument: οὐλος ὄρα, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.

The influences of the External World are hindrances to the true Philosopher.

οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρώμεν ; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶ μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἶ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φανλότερα εἰσιν· ἥ σοι οὐ δοκοῦσιν ; Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἄπτεται ; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κατὰ δῆλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων ; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε C κάλλιστα, ὅταν μηδὲν τούτων αὐτὴν παραλνπῇ, μήτε ἀκοῇ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγῶν μηδὲ τις ἥδονῃ, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἕως αὖτε χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὁρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι ; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σιμμία ; φαμέν τι D

pare Pliny: H.N. XI. 54, 'Animo videmus, animo cernimus,' etc.—(4.) καίτοι εἰ αὐταί] The argument is drawn from the dignity of the Ear and Eye. If these, the organs of the most spiritual senses, convey to us only what Plato considered inferior knowledge, much less (σχολῇ) will the others, which concern only the tangible and corporeal, and are narrow in their sphere of operation, convey to us reality. Yet, as men instinctively close the organs even of these noblest senses, when they wish to think deeply or aspire nobly, it is manifest, according to Plato, that the Senses, and all the machinery of the Body, are hindrances rather than helps to the philosopher who aspires to the contemplation of the Eternal Ideas.\*

D. (2.) εἰκαὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ] The idea of Justice in the absolute, which, Plato says, is a reality, an existence, not derived through the senses, for there is no adequate correlative to it in the world of Sense, but one of the unchangeable essences of Thought, which Plato termed Ideas, regarding which, see Note H.—(9.) τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάντων τῆς οὐσίας] 'I speak regarding the essence, in brief, of all the other Ideas, whatsoever the essence of each may be.' The appended clause is an epexegetical explanatory of οὐσία, which was probably a term newly introduced into philosophy, and therefore needing explanation. Cf. Meno. 72 B., μελέτης περὶ οὐσίας ὅ,τι ποτ' ἐστι.

\* On the extraordinary power of Abstraction possessed by Socrates, compare the story in Conv. 230; also, Plat. de Gen. Soc. 568 D. E.

εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν ; Φαμὲν μέντοι νῆ Δία. Καὶ  
καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν ; Πῶς δ' οὐ ; Ἦδη οὖν πρότε  
τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς.  
Ἄλλ' ἄλλη τινὲ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω  
αὐτῶν ; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας,  
ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ

The outward senses are not the sources of those Eternal Ideas which are the contemplation of the Philosopher.

Ε τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὃν ἄρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τάλη-  
θέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδ' ἔχει· ὅς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ  
ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι  
περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γινῶναι ἕκα-  
στον ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσῃ  
καθαρῶτατα, ὅστις ὃ τι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ'  
ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι  
66 μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ  
λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ  
χρῶμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ  
θηρεῦναι τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὃ τι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν  
τε καὶ ὥτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος,  
ὡς ταραττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἑῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι  
ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἄρ' οὐχ οὗτος

E. (8.) *μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην . . . μηδεμίαν*] This insertion of *μηδεῖν* along with *τις*, is parallel to Soph. 227 B., *σεμνότερον δέ τι . . . οὐδὲν νερόμικεν* ; also Eur. Alc. 79, *ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλων τις πέλας οὐδέ τις*, in which last passage *τις* has been unnecessarily disturbed.

66 A. (2.) *εἰλικρινεῖ*] Probably derived from *εἴλη*, *sunlight*, as if, *tested by sunlight*, i.e., pure (cf. *lumen sicum* of Bacon). Stallbaum writes it without the aspirate, and derives it, with Valckenaer, from *εἴλω*, *to roll*, connecting it with the notion of a *sieve* separating refuse by rolling.—(4.) *θηρεῦναι*] Cf. 66 C., *θῆρα*, and 115 B., *ὥσπερ κατ' ἔχνη*. On the insight that this word gives into the purpose of Philosophy generally, as a lofty aspiration, see Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaph. I. p. 12. Life, according to Plato, was to be one long chase after Truth (cf. 78 A.), and at the end man was only *φιλόσοφος*, the hunter, not *σοφός*, the possessor, until the partition wall dividing the worlds of sense and spirit was broken down by death. Frequent allusions derived from the art of hunting occur in Plato : the most important are, *Lysis*, 218 C., *Parmen.* 128 C., and *Pol.* IV. 432 B. Cf. Stallbaum on *Phileb.* 32 E. Compare *διώκω εἰ καὶ καταλάβω*, Ep. Philipp. III. 12.

ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XI. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρί- B  
στασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις,  
ᾧστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαυτὰ ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι Κινδυ-

B. (1.) *παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ*] *δόξα* is not here used in the special sense it bears so often in Plato (as in 99 A.), viz., *impression*, mere opinion resting on appearances presented to the Senses, opposed to *ἐπιστήμη*, which rests on the deeper ground of a knowledge of the Ideas. (Hence *ἐπιστήμη* in 84 B., is characterised as dealing with τὸ ἀδόξαστον.) Yet, in default of *ἐπιστήμη*, where that higher knowledge was not yet realised, or perhaps, in the present life, was unattainable, (*ἀδύνατον ἢ παγχάλεπὸν τι*, 85 C.), Plato admits *δόξα ἀληθῆ* to be of a certain value: cf. also *δοξάζειν* in 67 B., and *Tim.* 37 B., Legg. II. 653 A., 688 B. Hence Olympiodorus describes *δόξα* in this passage, οὐ τὴν κατάθεν ἐρχομένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν διανοίας οὖσαν ἀποτελεῦτησιν· εἰ τι γὰρ ἡ δόξα. (Compare the combination in 61 E., *διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν*.)—  
(3.) *κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις*] There has been considerable variety of opinion as to the exact purport of *ἀτραπὸς*. Most commentators, following Olympiodorus, accept it as an allusion to an allegorical command attributed to Pythagoras, *φεύγε τὰς λεωφόρους*. Wytenbach, Heusde, and Ast, relying on those passages in which *reasoning* is compared to a *journey* on a *road*, enclosed by logical hedges and boundaries (cf. Stallb. Politic. 258 C.), consider *ἀτραπὸς* to refer to the investigation in the sequel of the Dialogue. This signification, however, is too narrow, for Socrates has in view not merely a clue to guide him to the end of the investigation on which he had entered, but one that might lead all true Thinkers, as well as himself, out of the weary labyrinth of Sense. Schleiermacher considers Death to be this *ἀτραπὸς*, or path of escape: but natural Death is rather the gate at the end of the *ἀτραπὸς* than the *ἀτραπὸς* itself, which seems to be most naturally explained by Death in the philosophic sense. Two paths are therefore indicated, one a Broad Highway, or *λεωφόρος*,\* where *αἰσθηαῖς* or outward sense leads the way; the other a Narrow Way or *ἀτραπὸς*, where *λόγος* is the guide, leading out (*ἐκφέρει*) into the spacious 'Champaign of Truth,' or *πεδῖον ἀληθείας* (Phaedr. 248 B.). Regarding *ἐν τῇ σκέψει*, K. F. Hermann takes it proleptically, as if *ἐκφέρει εἰς τὴν σκέψιν*, followed by an objective *ὅτι*, explaining the result of this *σκέψις*. It seems preferable, however, to regard *ἐν τῇ σκέψει* as simply defining the *manner* in which the *λόγος* operates, and to consider *ὅτι* as indicating the *cause* why Philosophers must betake themselves to the *ἀτραπὸς* referred to.

\* Commentators have adverted to similar injunctions with similar imagery, as in Exod. XXIII. 2; St. Matth. VII. 13, 14. Compare Juven. X. 364, on 'semita vitae.'

- νεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις ἡμᾶς ἐκφέρειν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ ξυμπεφυρμένη ᾗ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ἡμῖν γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ παραπίπτει· θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τὰληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ

Death is not to be met with repining, since it delivers from servitude to the body. The features of this servitude portrayed.

C. (4.) τὸ λεγόμενον] This phrase generally introduces a proverb or quotation; here, an iteration of a cardinal principle.—(6.) καὶ γὰρ πολέμους] Compare Cic. Fin. I. 13, 'Ex cupiditatibus, odia, dissidia, discordiæ, seditiones, bella nascuntur.' St. James IV. 1.

E. (2.) ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν—φρονήσεως] The attraction exerted by the clause οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν intervening between the verb and its nominative, draws φρονήσεως into the genitive, when it should naturally be in the nominative. Similar instance in Apol. 41 A., εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ., where Μίνως is attracted by οἵπερ.—(6.) δυοῖν θάτερον] The dilemma is 'Either it is not possible for men, under any circumstances, to acquire true knowledge,' (in which case man's high faculties are a vain thing,) 'or, if possible anywhere (cf. εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι in 67 B.), it will be so only after the present life.' In the whole

The expansion of knowledge, and therefore of happiness, at death, depends on the measure of Purity attained to in the present life.

πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμού-  
 μέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τε-  
 λευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσι δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ  
 οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γινῶναι, δυοῖν  
 θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευ-  
 τήσασσι· τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς  
 τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὐ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, 57  
 ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὁ τι μάλιστα  
 μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὁ τι μὴ  
 πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως,  
 ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπο-  
 λύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς  
 τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἶκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε  
 ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές·  
 τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές. μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαρῷ B

of this discussion of the evils and trammels of the present life, there is latent the belief, that it is a postulate of Reason that there must be another scene where the faculties of man receive a fuller development.

67. A. (4.) ὁ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη] Cf. 64 E., καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.—(5.) ἀναπιμπλώμεθα] Cf. 83 D., ἀναπλέα τοῦ σώματος. In *Timæi* Lex. Plat., ἀνύπλεως is explained by μεμολυσμένος. Cf. Arnold's note on ἀναπιμπλάμενοι in Thucyd. II. 51. Compare, regarding pestilence, Plut. Mor. 558 F., ἀνεπλήσθησαν αἱ Ἀθῆναι: also Livy IV. 30, 'Urbs deinde impletur.'—(8.) εἰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν] An incidental testimony that Plato considered the soul to be the man.—(9.) τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἴσως] The introduction of ἴσως (cf. 61 C.) is a trait of Attic politeness, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism. Olympiodorus says it indicates εὐλάβεια, or the cautious reserve which was a prominent characteristic of the *Academica*, (cf. Plut. Mor. 549 E.) a feature inherited originally from Socrates, although, in the speculations of the New Academy, it was carried to such an excess that it ended in scepticism or nihilism.

B. (1.) μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαρῷ] μὴ οὐ introduces a negation in a milder form, under the image of a fear, *δέδοικα* being understood. This Platonic maxim\* is often quoted in later writers, as Plutarch (Mor. 352 D.), καθαρῷ γὰρ, ἣ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, οὐ θεμιτὸν ἅπτεσθαι μὴ καθαρῷ.—(5.) παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὧ Σώκρατες] ἀντὶ τοῦ Πάντως, Suidas. Compare ἀκριβέστερον τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας, Hipp. Maj. 295 A.—(8.) κτή-

\* The principle of 'Like to Like,' on which the maxim is founded, appears in the Homeric (Od. XVII. 218), ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀγχι θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον.



ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ. τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, C ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρί, ὅς ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν κατ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκῆν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ D νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνῃν κατ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασί γ', ἢ δ' ὅς. Λύειν δέ γε αὐτὴν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμούνται αἰεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφούντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἢ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ

Death is, therefore, but the deliverance desired by the true Philosopher.

σασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἔνεκα] On the Aorist instead of the Future Inf., which is more common after ἐλπίζω, ὑπισχνούμαι, etc., Bremi remarks (Schief. Appar. Demosth. I. p. 205), 'Si aoristus ponitur, res quamvis futura, cum fiducia certi ponitur, ut, qui ita loquatur, significet, sibi tam certo persuasum esse, ut si vel hoc ipso tempore fiat vel facta jam sit.' It is doubtful, however, if such a distinction can always be discerned: compare the three constructions of ἐλπίς in 68 A.

C. (4.) Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει] Contrast 74 A., where ξυμβαίνει is used purely impersonally.—(7.) συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι] Here Olympiodorus (p. 35) gives way to mysticism, and finds, very unnecessarily, in this expression, an allusion to the Orphic doctrine regarding the disorption of Dionysus by the Titans and his restoration by Apollo.

By the power of human Love, many, not philosophers, have overcome the fear of Death: much more ought Philosophers, by the divine desire of Perfect Knowledge.

ἐλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὃ τι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, καὶ E  
πειθ' ἡκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; οὐ γελοῖον; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τᾷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκων μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἡκιστ' αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκέιστε ἴοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένους ἐλπίς ἐστίν οὐ διὰ βίου ἥρων τυχεῖν· ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, 68  
τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱῶν ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ

E. (5.) εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται—τῷ σώματι] *If they are once at enmity with the body.* διαβάλλω has here its original meaning to *put asunder*, *put at enmity with*: hence its ordinary meaning, to *accuse*.—(7.) τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο] τούτου refers to the whole preceding clause. Heindorf remarks on the three occurrences of εἰ, the first being an assumption admitted = *quandoquidem*; the second (εἰ φοβοῦντο), an ordinary instance of hypothesis = *si*; the third a farther explanation of this hypothesis, repeated under a new form, for the sake of increased impressiveness. Cobet (Nov. Lect. p. 102) would expunge the second εἰ as an interpolation, but the difference of moods necessitates the repetition.

68. A. (3.) ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν] 'Objects of affection that were merely human,' opposed to Θεῖα παιδικά, i.e., Philosophy. (Heindorf illustrates by Gorgias 482 A., φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά.) Such traditions are referred to as the group of legends spoken of in Conv. 179 D., viz., the love of Alcestis for Admetus, Orpheus for Eurydice, and Achilles for Patroclus, all of whom were willing, from the power of affection, to descend to Hades. It is worthy of note that, while the traditions of victory over death by the power of Love\* are thus alluded to, there is no reference to the numerous class of similar traditions regarding the power of Patriotism, resulting in self-sacrifice, such as that of Codrus and Menæceus in the Phœnissæ of Euripides. Of the more noble and constraining class of testimonies, namely, that of self-sacrifice for the sake of Truth, there is no mention in this enumeration, inasmuch as the first example of the same was only now being given to the world in the Athenian prison by the speaker of these words.

\* The greatness of this power of natural affection is acknowledged in Ep. Rom. V. 7. ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τάχα τις καὶ τολμᾷ ἀποθανεῖν.

δὴ ἐκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἱλιδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγο-  
μενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν  
καὶ ξυνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ  
λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι  
ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἱλιδου, ἀγανακτήσει  
B τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἰσιν αὐτόσε; οἶεσθαι γε  
χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γ' ἦ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ  
αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι  
φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι  
ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον  
ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀν-  
δρὸς ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι,  
ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς  
C δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὧν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλό-  
τιμος, ἥτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. Πάνυ, ἔφη,  
ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὄνο-

B. (4.) ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον] This refers not to the preceding clause, but to τοὺ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, repeated from 67 E.—(7.) τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς] ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς is the explanation of τοῦτο, and is to be translated as if ἐὰν ἀνδρὰ ἴδῃς.—(9.) οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος] ἄρ' ἦν, as Heindorf shows, is often used to express, not a condition or state necessarily *past*, but a present condition, with which one has come, through some *past experience*, to be displeased. Compare Theogn. 700., Πλήθει δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴ μία γίγνεται ἥδε Ἠλουτεῖν· τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν ὄφελος. The pretended philosopher (cf. φιλόδοξος, Pol. V. 480 A.) shows himself to be no philosopher, if he is afraid of that which is the philosopher's study and desire—Death: he is proved not to be led by Reason, but by the lower nature (τὸ σῶμα), whether that subjection show itself in the more reputable pursuit of honour (φιλότιμος) or in the more debasing pursuit of money (φιλοχρήματος), both of which classes rank under the name of φιλοσώματος. In 82 C. will be found a similar classification of character, grounded on the Platonic view of the elements of the constitution of Man, regarding which see Note I.

C. (2.) ἥτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα] i.e., 'Either under one or other of these passions, and exempt from the other, or under the power of both together.' The argument then goes on to show, that the philosopher is not to cultivate one virtue at the expense of another, that he is not to be a man made up of shreds and patches, but to possess the full panoply of virtue

The virtue of the mass of men contrasted with that which is the desire of the Philosophers.

μαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἅρ' οὐτούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσί τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ D ἐβελήσεις, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοὶ εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἄτοπόν γε δέει τινα καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. E Τί δέ; οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν—ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσι; καίτοι φαμέν γέ που ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην· φοβού-

in all its forms.—(5.) οὐκοῦν] From the length of the explanation of what is meant by σωφροσύνη, οὐκοῦν is resumed in the formula ἅρ' οὐ.—(7.) μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι] The verb πτοεῖσθαι usually implies trembling from fear, here it is used of the *tremulousness* of Impatient Desire, cf. 108 B., where ἐπτοῆσθαι is the result of ἐπιθυμία. The kindred Latin word *trepidare* is used also of *joy*, the excess of which performs the effect of fear: cf. Lāv. XXIII. 7.

D. (5.) τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν] The reading of Stephens is *μεγίστων*, but this is not confirmed by the best MSS., and is against the citations of the passage in Olympiodorus, Stobæus, and Jamblichus. It was common to speak of Death as itself *μέγιστον κακόν* (cf. Apol. 29 A., 40 A.), but to have done so here would scarcely have suited the argument that follows regarding *μεῖζονα κακά*.—(8.) δέει ἀνδρεῖοι] Plutarch (Romul. 37 D.) alludes to this paradoxical expression, ὁ δὲ, ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ἀτεχνῶς ὑπὸ δέους ἀνδρείους γενόμενος. Socrates is arguing that the courage of the mass of men is not a principle grounded on right reason (cf. Thucyd. II. 40, on courage co-existing with ignorance), but a compromise or choice in order to avoid certain evils, just as the temperance of many is not from a love of temperance itself, but from a stronger love of one's good name, and of other advantages flowing from temperance, as well as a salutary fear of the evils of intemperance.

μενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες  
ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι  
69 καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι· ἀλλ'  
ὁμῶς ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν  
ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ  
τρόπον τινα δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι. Ἔοικε  
γάρ. ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς  
ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας

The common  
views of Cou-  
rage and  
Temperance  
shown to be  
hollow, and  
resting on  
compromise.

69 A. (5.) ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία] An expression of more than usual earnestness, as introducing a weighty utterance. The elliptical use of *μὴ γάρ* adds intensity, being equivalent to *Ἄκουε, δεῖ γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ κ.τ.λ.* Compare the same use of *μὴ* in *Crito*, 48 C. There is some doubt as to the reading in the first clause. The Vulgate takes no notice of *ἀλλαγὴ*, and supposes *ὁδός* to be understood. In certain MSS., however, *ἀλλαγὴ* has been discovered, and *ἀλλὰ ἢ* in Bodl. points in the same direction. It must be confessed, however, that *ἀλλαγὴ* does not suit *πρὸς ἀρετὴν* as *ὁδός* does, and the use of *πρὸς* in next clause is not in point. The true reading is probably one that preserves *ἀλλαγὴ* in the text, without combining it with *πρὸς ἀρετὴν*, viz.: *μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀλλαγὴ ἡδονὰς κ.τ.λ., ἢ ὀρθὴ* being equivalent to *ἡ εὐθεία*, the allusion being to the simile of the Two Paths, with which this portion of the Discussion opened (66 B., *ἀτραπὸς τίς*). The conjunction of *ἀλλαγὴ* with its verb is kindred with that in *Conv.* 195 B., *φεύγων φυγῇ*. Cf. 75 D., *ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι*. The following meaning thus results:—‘I fear that this is not the right road towards virtue—by a kind of mercantile trafficking to barter one kind of selfish pleasures in exchange for another class of selfish pleasures, and greater considerations for smaller, as one deals with coins; but (I suspect) that this alone is the sterling coin, to obtain which we must exchange all things else—Wisdom; and that whatever is procured or parted with, for this as the end, and with this as the standard, is truly a realisation at once of Courage, and Self-Control, and Justice, and in one comprehensive word, True Virtue, as co-existing with Wisdom, independently of the presence or absence of Pleasures and Fears, and the whole Army of the Passions.’ The comparison represents *φρόνησις* as the sole coin current\* of value in the eye of the soul, other considerations, such as Pleasures, not being worthy of being treated as valid in its currency. Though the simile suits in the main, it is not to be pressed in detail: *πιπρασκόμενα* applies well to whatever is parted with in order to obtain *φρόνησις*, but the analogy fails in the case of *ἰκνούμενα*, inasmuch as *φρόνησις* does not need to be given away in the same manner as money requires to be given away in purchasing. On the chief points in the Platonic theory of Virtue, see Note K.

\* With the one ὁρθὸν νόμισμα of the passage compare the similar metaphor εἰς πολὺ-  
τιμος μαργαρίτης in St. Matth. XIII. 46.

καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκέينو μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, Φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά B τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωρι-

B. (5.) *χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως*] 'But where these emotions (pleasure, etc.) are severed from Wisdom, and played off like counters against each other, then I fear such virtue is but a sham, and is in reality slavish and sordid.' *τοιούτη* is a condensed repetition of the description given at length in *χωριζόμενα* κ.τ.λ. Cf. *τοιούτη* similarly used in apposition to a principle, in *Soph.* 263 D. As to the construction of *χωριζόμενα*, it appears to be in the nominative, being in explanatory apposition to *ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή*: cf. *ἀνούμενα* above. The explanation of *ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων* is found at length in 68 D. E., where the mass of men who act on temporary interest, not on everduring principle, are able to vanquish one *ἡέονή* only by thinking another *ἡέονή* greater, and thus their temperance has its root in a love of *ἡέονή*, that is, in a kind of intemperance, not in the discernment (*φρόνησις*) of what is truly desirable. *σκιαγραφία* is a favourite phrase with Plato\* to express incompleteness and sketchiness. Cf. *Pol.* IX. 583 B., *ἄθρει, ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπαναληθὴς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡέονή πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονιμοῦ, οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις.* *σκιαγραφία* is often mentioned in connection with scene-painting (cf. *Photii Lex.*, *σκιαγράφος· ὁ νῦν σκηνογράφος*), and seems to have been a kind of perspective, employed to produce an effect at a distance which was not confirmed on a nearer view. (Compare Müller's *Ancient Art*, § 136, 2.) Hence Aristotle (*Rhet.* III. 12) compares the effect of popular oratory to that of *σκιαγραφία*, where the point of view is remote, and where *τὰ ἀκριβή* would therefore be wasted. Compare Cicero's allusion to *σκιαγραφία* (*Tusc.* III. 2), '*Consecratur nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis sed adumbratam imaginem gloriæ.*' A kindred simile, as contrasting reality with appearance, is that in *Meno.* 100 A., regarding *Tiresias*, *οἷος πέπνυται, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀύσσουσι*, κ.τ.λ. Regarding *ἀντραποειδέης*, an apt illustration of its force may be drawn from Bion's allegory (*Plut. Mor.* 7 C.), whereby pretenders to philosophy were likened to the suitors in the *Odyssey*, who, while they professed to aspire to the hand of the queen, became content with the menial company of the slaves, who were but the hand-maids of Penelope.

\* It is amusing to find the anti-theoretical Aristophanes repaying the reproaches of the philosophers in their own coin; in *Ran.* 1423, he avers that the Socratic school anatomised virtue to a mere *σκαριψισμός*, which, according to the instructive note of the Schollast on the passage, is another name for *σκιαγραφία*.

ζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ  
 σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώ-  
 δης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχουσα, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ  
 C ὄντι ἢ καθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφρο-  
 σύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις  
 μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς  
 ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ  
 ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς

Intelligent  
 Perception a  
 necessary  
 constituent  
 of true Virtue  
 in all its  
 forms.

C. (3.) καθαρμός τις] καθαρμός differs from the foregoing καθαρός,  
 as the result from the process. Regarding philosophy as a purification, cf.  
 Xen. Conv. I. 4, *ἀνδρες ἐκκαθαρμένοι τὰς ψυχάς*, i.e., philosophers: also,  
 as a definition of καθαρμός, Soph. 227 D., *τὸ λιπεῖν μὲν θάτερον* (i.e., πο-  
 νηρίαν), *ἐκβαλεῖν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἢ που φλαῦρον*.—(4.) οἱ τὰς τελετὰς  
 . . . . . καταστήσαντες] The mention of καθαρμός suggests that of the  
 Mysteries, which professed to convey καθαρμός, and secure purity in another  
 world. This belief is apparent in the so-called Homeric hymn to Demeter  
 (l. 485), where the *ζόφος εὐρώης* is the germ of the notion in the Platonic  
 period, that the uninitiated or unpurified would be condemned to dwell  
*ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῇ τινι* (Pol. VII. 533 C., also Pol. II. 363 D., Arist.  
 Ran. 145). In the peculiar expression *οὐ φαῦλοί τινες* (cf. Hor. I. 28, 14,  
*non parvulus auctor naturæ verique*), there is probably an appeal against the  
 disrepute into which the subject of oracles and the mysteries had been brought  
 by the base forgeries of Onomacritus (Herod. VII. 6). It is worthy of re-  
 mark, as an illustration of the maxim in 64 A., that in later times τελετή and  
 τελευτή were regarded as kindred processes: Themistius (in Stobæ. 120, 28)  
 speaks of death as a πάθος, οἷον οἱ τελεταῖς μεγάλαις κατορμιζόμενοι.  
 Διὸ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῷ ῥήματι . . . . . τοῦ τελευτῶν καὶ τελεῖσθαι  
 προσέεικε.—(8.) *ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι ἐξ τε παῦροι*] According to Olympiodorus an Orphic line, metrically Πολλοὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ.  
 The proverb was applied to the frequency of profession and the rarity of  
 reality. Clemens Al. refers to it twice (Strom. I. § 92, V. § 17) as a Gentile  
 maxim parallel to Πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσι κλητοὶ ὀλέγοι ἐδ' ἐκλεκτοί. (St. Matth.  
 XX. 16.) Compare Plutarch (Mor. 352 C.), οὔτε γὰρ φιλοσόφους πωγωνο-  
 τροφίαι καὶ τριβυνοφορίαι ποιοῦσιν, οὔτε Ἰσιακοὺς αἱ λιντοστολῖαι καὶ  
 ξύρησις· ἀλλὰ Ἰσιακός ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ τὰ ἐκικνύμενα καὶ ἐρώμενα  
 περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς . . . . . λόγῳ ζητῶν. It is remarkable that βάκχος was  
 the name both for the worshipper and for the god: cf. Schol. Arist. Eq. 406.  
 Whatever views may be entertained regarding the inner sense of these  
 Bacchic mysteries, or whether, as Lobeck doubts, there was any inner sense  
 at all, the contrast\* they presented to ordinary life was sufficient to suggest

\* There is reason to believe that the fantastic strangeness of the Bacchic rites had its  
 roots in the passion for romance, which is only a perverted form of that Aspiration, the philo-  
 sophic form of which Plato was the first to develope. The dress of the goat-footed Satyrs, the

Illustration of the whole subject drawn from the Mysteries, as to the rarity of Purity, or Spirituality, notwithstanding its needfulness. Socrates concludes with a renewed expression of his hope in death.

"Αιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκέισε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ δῆ, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, νερθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν D  
δοξάν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προϋθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ ὀρθῶς προϋθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡνύσαμεν, ἐκέισε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσό-  
μεθα, εἴαν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταυτ' οὖν ἐγὼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὥς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χα-  
λεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος καὶ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ E  
ἐνθάδε δεσπότηαι τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις· [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει·] εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῶν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

XIV. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν 70  
παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται, ἢ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ—εὐθὺς

to Plato imagery capable of representing and illustrating the relation in which, according to his view, true philosophy stood to the life of the common mass of men.

D. (5.) καὶ τι ἡνύσαμεν] The transition to the plural number in a part of the protasis seems introductory to its insertion in the apodosis. Heindorf reads ἡνυσάμην, but almost all the MSS., and the quotation in Clemens Al. (Str. I. § 92), are in favour of the other reading.

E. (3.) [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει] Scil. τοῦτο or τὸ πρᾶγμα. It must be confessed that this clause has an awkward effect in the peroration, and recent editors, Hermann excepted, generally consider it an interpolation from 70 A.

fawnskin, garlands, and thyrsus, the practice of painting themselves with vermillion—in fact, the whole paraphernalia of Bacchic costume originated in an enthusiastic desire to burst the bonds of the exhausted present, and frame a new creation on what imagination deemed more marvellous conditions. 'Unus non sufficit orbis: Aestuat infelix angusto limite mundi.'



- ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἷχεται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἤ. ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ξυνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νῦν δὴ διήλθες, πολλὰ ἂν ἐλπίς εἴη καὶ καλὴ, ὦ Σώ-  
 B κρατες, ὡς ἀληθὴ ἔστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύνάμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμύθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μὴ; Ἐγὼγ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι, ἥτινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐκ οὖν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης,  
 C εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδιοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμεαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.
- XV. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῆδέ πη, εἴτε ἄρα ἐν Ἀιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ.

Cebes requests him to unfold the grounds of his hope of intelligent existence after death. Socrates consents, with the remark that even his friends the comic poets would consider the discussion not inappropriate in his present circumstances.

70 A. (5.) ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνός] Compare Hom. II. XXIII. 100, ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἢ ὅτε καπνὸς ἤχεται τετριγνία. This image of a breath or vapour to signify the soul, was afterwards a favourite with the Epicureans, as in Lucr. III. 437, 456; Sext. Empir. IX. p. 568, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, καπνοῦ δίκην σκίδναιται.

B. (2.) παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως] In Legg. IV. 720 A., παραμυθία and πειθώ are similarly combined. 'παραμυθία non solum est consolatio animi, sed etiam iudicii confirmatio, qua sententia difficilis et incredibilis ad probabilitatem explicatur.'—Wytténbach. παραμυθία, as distinguished from πίστις, or full persuasion, seems to refer to considerations derived from the μυθολογία, and πίστις to those derived from the dialectics of the Phædo: see above in 61 E.

C. (1.) οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδιοποιὸς εἴη] This meek allusion to the injury he had received at the hands of the comic poets, shows that, in Plato's judgment, the effect of the misrepresentations of Aristophanes and his compeers must have been more serious than Schlegel and other apologists of Aristophanes are willing to admit. It is in favour of this view that a portion of the Apology is occupied with an attempt to do away with prejudices against him created by the comic poets. Besides Aristophanes, Amipsias brought Socrates on the stage, in threadbare garment (ἐν τριβωνί), in the same year as that in which

The first formal Argument expounded, which rests on the necessity that there is a Cycle of Existence.

παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνούν-  
ται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως  
ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας,  
ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που πά- D  
λιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὔσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ  
ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερόν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν  
ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ  
μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν τοῦ δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

the Nubes was brought out; and Eupolis, who, according to the Scholiast (on Nubes 97), handled him more roughly than even Aristophanes, satirised him thus: Μισῶ γε ἐγὼ ἐκείνον τὸν πτωχὸν Ἄδολέσχη·\* ὥς τὰλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, ὑπόθεν δὲ καταφαιγεῖν ἔχοι, τούτου κατημέληκεν. With reference to these satires, Diogenes La. (II. 27) says, with unwonted cleverness, λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς, εἰ ὧν σκώπτουσιν, ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν. —(4.) σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πῆ] αὐτὸ refers to the subject generally, εἴτε introduces the point of view under which he proposes to consider it, viz., as to whether (εἴτε being here equivalent to *utrum*) existence can be affirmed of the souls in Hades. (In 107 A., the answer is given in the affirmative.) —(6.) παλαιὸν . . . λόγον] The probable reference is to the Orphic, and afterwards Pythagorean notion of a Cycle of existence, on which notion was founded the widely-spread and deeply-rooted doctrine of Metempsychosis. Some points in the history of this doctrine will be found in Note L.

D. (2.) τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι] *A proof that such is the case.* Heindorf proposed to accept Forster's conjecture, αὐτὰς (i.e., ψυχὰς), but this is unnecessary: cf. ταῦτ' in 62 D., where it is equivalent to τοῦτο.—(8.) κατὰ ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ φυτῶν] Olympiodorus observes that Plato, in what we may call the Cyclical argument, does not touch the question of individual immortality. The scope of it may be thus expressed. As Birth is the gate of Life, Dying must be a corresponding transition, not into nothingness, but into another form of existence, out of which Birth is again the transition. The whole process of Existence implies a reciprocating Polarity, all change being a movement from one extreme towards its opposite—e.g., when a thing is said to *become* just, this implies a state of injustice previously, or when a thing is said to *become* unjust, this implies necessarily a previous state of justice. This is illustrated by the important analogy of Sleep, as affording a parallel image to Death. As the transition

\* Ἀδολεσχία is included among the accusations of the 'Nubes' (l. 1485), no doubt from the seemingly vain repetitions in the Socratic discussions. It deserves to be remarked that Aristophanes continued in the same attitude towards Socrates to the end; cf. Aves (1282, 1563) exhibited in B.C. 414, and Itans (1482—99) exhibited in B.C. 405. It would be interesting to know what were the real feelings of Aristophanes during this month of Thargelion, B.C. 399.

- ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἣ δ' ὅς, σκό- Argument  
I.  
πει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ  
ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γέ-  
νεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἰδωμεν, ἄρ' οὕτωςί γίγνεται πάντα,  
Ε οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχά- The relation  
expounded of  
Contraries  
reproducing  
each other.  
νει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που  
καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο  
οὖν σκεψάμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μὴ-  
δαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου.  
οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος  
ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν  
71 καὶ ἐλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστε-  
ρον ἐλαττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτω. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ  
ἰσχυροτέρου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάτ-  
τον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν τι χειρόν γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμεί-  
νονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
'Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται,  
ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὖ;  
ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων  
πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν

called *falling asleep* is opposite to, and implies the other transition called *waking*, so *dying* is but a transition, answering not to the extended period we call life, but to the entrance upon life, or Birth. The circle, or rather semi-circle, of the living, springs from the circle or semicircle of the unseen: as the unseen is reinforced from the living, so the system of the living is reinforced from the realm of the unseen—that is, Hades. —It is obvious that this Argument proves merely the existence of certain *Processes*, called Life and Death, in which nothing *is*, but in which all *becomes* (*γίγνεται*), and does not imply the individual existence after death of the human soul. The conception of Being here unfolded is that of a vast Sea, out of which, by one transition, souls are sublimed, like the particles of water, into a region where they are for a time invisible, until, by a new transition, they descend, and reappear in the sphere of the visible, without, however, necessarily preserving a trace of their individuality.

71 A. (6.) *ἰκανῶς . . . ἔχομεν*] In 100 D., more fully, *ἔχω παρ' ἐμᾶντι*.—(9.) *δύο γενέσεις*] *i.e.*, wherever we can predicate states that are contrary to each other, then we can predicate transitions from one to the other reciprocally.

Argument

I.

τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν ; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γενέσιν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἐκατέρων εἰς ἄλληλα ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Parallel of  
Life and  
Waking,  
Death and  
Sleep.

XVI. Τί οὖν ; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί ; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστί, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντων ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἦ οὐ ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τε-

B. (6.) κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα] i.e., 'it is no objection that these transitions are, in some cases, not designated by special terms.' Such verbal nouns might not be common, but they are claimed as legitimate. — (8.) ἐξ ἐκατέρων] ἐκατέρων is plural, probably as referring to more than one pair of contraries grouped together before, viz., διακρίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., ψύχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

C. (4.) μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν] Compare a similar collocation of words in Phileb. 60 C., χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρω θέντες. Cf. also 93 D., ἐτέραν ἐπ' ἑκαστὴν ψυχὴν ψυχῆν. Socrates then proceeds to treat dialectically the relations of one pair of correlative contraries, Sleeping and Waking, as an example to Cebes how to handle those of the other pair, Death and Life.

E. (3.) τοῖν γενέσιν] The tendency of the Attic dialect was towards an absorption of the feminine gender under the masculine, as is seen [in

θνάναι εἶναι; Ἐγώ γε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δέ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἄιδου. Ἐοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἡ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὔσα τυγχάνει· τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἡ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χολῇ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὅμοιογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζῶντων· τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

XVII. Ἴδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ'

adjectives in -ιος, and in the dual of demonstrative pronouns. On Death regarded as a *γένεσις* or nativity, compare Seneca Ep. 102, 'Dies isto, quem tanquam extremum reformidas, æternus natalis est.' This thought is admirably treated by Baldo (Lyr. II. 23, 21.), 'Te morbus ævo parturit alteri,' etc.—(5.) οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν] This verb is here transitive—assign as corresponding: in 72 B. intransitive, to correspond.

72 A. (6.) ὅθεν ἐν πάλιν γίγνεσθαι] A relative clause is found in the infinitive in indirect speech, especially where it is an important part of the statement, not a subsidiary appendage. Heindorf, in order to get rid of the infinitive, proposed either to change ἐν into εἰ, or to read γίγνονται. Schneider (Pol. I. p. 247) supposes a latent ἔφαμεν implied in the previous ἐδόκει. It is simpler to consider it as an instance of a relative clause attracted into the mood of the verb to which it is subjoined: cf. 109 B., εἰς ἃ ξυνεργηκέναι. In ἐδόκει, the reference is to the reasoning in 70 D., regarding ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον.

Argument

I.

The succession of Life is not a Line, but a Cycle; otherwise the world would go to sleep, or to chaos.

ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰεὶ ἀνταποδιδόη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα ὥσπερ εἰ κύκλῳ περιούonta, ἀλλ' εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἴσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἶον εἰ τὸ καταδραβάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδόη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντα λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίνοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ταῦτον ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ ξυγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μὴ, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη,

B. (1.) ὥσπερ εἰ κύκλῳ] Socrates, to strengthen his argument, attempts a *reductio ad absurdum* of the negative hypothesis: viz., that if it was to a gulf of nothingness to which all the procession of the Living was moving *without return*, that procession, however long and beautiful, would come to an end, and be succeeded by Nothing. In illustration he uses the simile of the Race-course, with its *καμπή* and *ἀνακαμπή* forming the circuit or *δίαυλος* of Being, Life being the visible side of this Race-course, and the state of Death being the invisible side of the same, while these sides meet at the points of appearance and disappearance (*ἀναβιώσκεσθαι* and *ἀποθνήσκειν*). This argument is kindred with the notion formally stated in Pol. X. 611 A., that there was a certain quantum of animation, or a specific number of souls, incapable of either increase or diminution, contained in the system of the Universe. It is worthy of remark that Epicurus followed a similar strain of argument regarding the vitality of Nature (Diog. La. X. 39), *εἰ ἐφθείρετο τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγματα*. Similarly Aristotle proceeds on the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit* (de Gener. et Corr. I.] 3, 1), *εἰ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἔσται γένεσις, ἀπλῶς ἂν γίνοιτο ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὥστ' ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τιτὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν*. Compare the similar reasoning of Lucretius (I. 983) regarding the infinity of space.

C. (1.) λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε] 'The cessation of all things would render the sleep of Endymion an absurdity, and that hero would no longer be thought singular in the world.' Bekker and Stallbaum insert *ἂν* after *πάντα*. Though not found in the MSS., its presence is necessary. Such instances as Xen. Mem. I. 3, 16 are not in point, as the omission of *ἂν* in the second of two clauses under its influence (cf. *παύσαιτο* without *ἂν*, after *ἂν πάθοι* in B., above,) is different from its absence in the *first* of two clauses,

ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκειτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα  
D πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασι ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατῶμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς μὲν γ'  
E ἀγαθαῖς ἀμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.

especially when, as here, each clause has a separate subject. The older translations make *πάντα* the subject of both clauses: the more recent ones take *Ἐνδυμίων*, as the subject of the second: which is necessary, in order to effect a proper connection with the clause *διὰ τό κ.τ.λ.* Regarding the legend of Endymion, it was an apt illustration of the *cessation* that would issue without an *ἀνακαμπή* from the Unseen. Cf. Theocr. Id. III. 49, *ἄτροπον ὕπνον ἰάων*, i.e., the sleeper on Mount Latmus.\* Aristotle (Eth. X. 8) employs the legend of Endymion to indicate what he considered *not* to be the mode of living of the gods: *οὐ γὰρ ἐὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ Ἐνδυμίωνα*.—(δ.) *ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα*] Some remarks on the important doctrine of Anaxagoras will be found in Note M.—(ε.) *ὡσαύτως δέ*] Answering to *οἶον* in B., as being the application of the comparison then introduced. In less lengthened sentences, the pair of correlatives is usually *ὥσπερ* followed by *οὕτω δέ*.

D. (1.) *εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων*] Dacier thought that *μὴ* was necessary before *γίγνοιτο*, understanding *τῶν ἄλλων* to signify *οἱ τεθνεῶτες*. Heindorf showed that *τῶν ἄλλων* signifies *any other source than οἱ τεθνεῶτες*, and that *μὴ* is therefore not necessary.

E. (4.) *ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις*] Here begins the Second Formal Argument, and one that is peculiarly Platonic, founded on his fa-

\* Whatever may be the exact import of this legend, whether we hold with Max. Müller (Oxf. Essays, 1869), that Endymion is the image of the Setting Sun going down into the baths of ocean, or with others, that he is the genius of Sleep personified as *stealing over the frame* (*ἐνδύνασι*), it is probable that it is a mythological parallel to the legends of the similar though less protracted sleep of Epimenides, and the abstraction of Aristeas, which latter legends, according to Max. Tyrinus (Diss. XVI. 3), were forms of teaching Metempsychosis.

## Argument

## II.

Exposition of  
Second for-  
mal Argu-  
ment de-  
rived from  
Knowledge  
considered as  
Reminiscence.

XVIII. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνων γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμνησκομεθα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε 73 καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι. 'Αλλ', ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. 'Ενὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτῶμενοι οἱ ἀνθρώποι, ἂν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ἣ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη

vourit principle of Reminiscence. It is suggested by Cebes as an inference from a principle well known. From the intuitive instantaneousness of the recognition of Truth when presented to the Mind, Plato inferred that all higher knowledge was gleams of a vanished or obscured Intelligence, and therefore that the Soul had once dwelt in a prior and loftier condition. A great step was thought to be gained towards the doctrine of an After State, if it could be shown that the Soul had existed in a prior state.\*

73 A. (5.) ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ] Sc. ἐπομνήσω σε. If it had been according to Plato's manner to quote from himself, he would have referred to the Dialogue of Meno, where the formal development of the principle is found. Socrates is there represented as proving to Meno that knowledge is innate, which he does by putting a series of questions conversationally to a young slave in Meno's train, on the properties of the square, and eliciting from him such answers as show that he has an unconscious acquaintance with Geometry—a science which the boy, more especially being a slave, never learned formally, nor had any opportunity of learning. Socrates concludes that knowledge is innate, and the calling up of an obscured Reminiscence.†—(8.) οὐκ ἂν οἶοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσειν] The common text has ποιεῖν. Stallbaum was the first to read ποιῆσειν with the Bodl. and other MSS. οἶόν τε εἰμι may have

\* Lactant. III. 18, 'Non putaverant aliter fieri posse ut supersint animæ post mortem, nisi videantur fuisse ante corpora.'

† Olympiodorus' comment on καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ is naive:—τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὁρθῶς καὶ Πλατωνικῶς καὶ μὴ Περιπατητικῶς καὶ μὴ βωμολόχως, ἀλλὰ χεῖρα ὀρέγῃ τοῖς ἀλυσθῆναι τῶν προσδιαλεγόμενων. The Platonic scholar does not need to be reminded of the homely simile used by Socrates to describe his method of awakening Thought, viz., μαινετική, a means of enabling to bring forth, the conceptions that wait to be delivered.



- ἐνούσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἶοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιή-  
 B σειν. ἔπειτα εἰάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι  
 τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο  
 οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτη γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία,  
 ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι, ἂν τῇδέ πῃ σοι σκοπούμενω συνδόξη.  
 ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις  
 ἐστίν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ  
 τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθή-  
 ναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἡδὲ μέ-  
 μνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μέντ' ἂν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν,  
 C σὺ πῇ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇδε ἔγωγε, ἡ δ' ὅς. ὁμολο-  
 γοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ πον· εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν  
 τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν

after it the Futuro Infinitive, like μέλλω and κινδυνεύω, cf. Pol. V. 459 C. ἔπειτα, in next sentence, Stallbaum thinks corrupt, but the MSS. are uniform. It is opposed to ἐνὶ μέν λόγῳ, which introduces a general statement regarding knowledge, followed up by a special illustration from mathematical knowledgo. Comparo ἔπειτα answering to μὲν in Protag. 310 C.

B. (2.) ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ] This verb may have personal subject understood, such as ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, or which is perhaps preferable, it may be treated impersonally, like ἐηλοῖ = patet.—(7.) ἐέομαι παθεῖν] The MSS. have μαθεῖν. παθεῖν is the probable conjecture of Heindorf, followed by all the recent editors. H. Schmidt supports μαθεῖν, and translates, 'I wish to learn what it is to have reminiscence.' The other reading, however, infuses a kind of humour or Attic salt into the conversation. 'I wish to be subjected to the operation you speak of, viz., to be reminded (of the principle of reminiscence).' With ἀναμνησθῆναι in apposition without the article, compare 74 A., τότε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν. Cf. also 78 C. Compare the asyndeton after πᾶσχουσι τοῦτο in 73 D.

C. (5.) λέγω ἐέ τινα τρόπον τόνδε] Hermann reads λέγω ἐέ τινα τρόπον; τόνδε. The introduction of a side soliloquy is not suitable. The reading of the Zurich editors is given above, which is preferable after τοιούτῳ preceding.—(6.) εἰάν τις τι πρότερον] The MSS. and Olympiodorus acknowledge πρότερον, the editions down to Bekker inclusive read ἕτερον, which is explained by Schmidt and its defenders as necessary to distinguish it from the second ἕτερον. In the very similar sentence in 76 A. there is only one ἕτερον. πρότερον, however, is not without its difficulty, if it implies an interval between the observation and the reminiscence called up by the observation, which are seemingly coincident in time (see D.), but it may be explained as referring to the first observation or acquaintance, which

Argument

II.

Illustration  
drawn from  
the com-  
mon meaning  
of Reminis-  
cence in com-  
mon life.

καὶ τότε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρό-  
πῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δέ τινα τρόπον τόνδε·  
ἐάν τις τι πρότερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰ-  
σθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐν-  
νοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἄρ' οὐχὶ τοῦτο  
δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔλαβεν;  
Πῶς λέγεις; Οἶον τὰ τοιαῦδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώ- D  
που καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρα-  
σταί, ὅταν ἰδῶσι λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ  
αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν  
λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὐ  
ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμ-  
μίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που  
μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νῆ Δι', ἔφη ὁ Σιμ-  
μίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τις ἐστι; E  
μάλιστα μέντοι, ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ  
χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν  
οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· ἐστὶν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα  
καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ  
Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι;

is antecedent to the second observation, suggesting the memory of the first. Hermann would expel both ἕτερον and πρότερον.—The whole of the passage is interesting, as containing in embryo the doctrine of the Association of Ideas.

D. (4.) *πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἐγνωσαν*] *τοῦτο* here is prospective, and the emphasis is increased by the asyndeton before *ἐγνωσαν*. *ἐγνωσαν* is an example of the Aorist of *indefinite frequency*, differing from the imperfect of frequency, which has its place in a *narrative*, or series of mutually dependent sequences. The aorist in this sense expresses repetition, without reference to any parallel series of events, and is therefore absolute while the imperfect is relative. Such an aorist may have *πολλάκις* attached to it, as in the instance of *ἀνεμνήσθη* following.

E. (2.) *μάλιστα μέντοι*] The force of *μέντοι* seems to be, 'This is what is commonly called reminiscence. It receives this name however, in the special case, when it is most striking,' etc.

Πάνν γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ  
74 Σιμμίον ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

XIX. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν  
ἐνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπ' ἀνο-  
μοίων; Ξυμβαίνει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμι-  
μνήσκηται τίς τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπιάσχειν,  
ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ  
'κείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἦ δ'  
ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύ-  
λον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιού-  
των οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ  
B ἴσον—φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἡ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί, ἔφη  
ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δ  
ἔστω; Πόνν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπι-

Dialectic  
treatment of  
the Idea of  
Equality.

74 A. (8.) φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον] In order to judge or compare—that is, to exercise the notion of equality—there must be an antecedent standard in the mind beyond and above all the mere outward things upon which the power of comparison may chance to be exemplified, and constituting the thread of connection binding together multifarious phenomena. This Platonic view may receive illustration from a kindred enunciation by Coleridge (*Table Talk*, p. 111): 'One told me the other day, that facts gave birth to, and were the absolute ground of principles, to which I said that, *unless he had a principle of selection, he would not have taken notice of those facts, on which he grounded his principles.* You must have a lantern in your hand to give light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot find them, and if you could, you could not arrange them.' In *παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα*, i.e., transcending all phenomena, *ταῦτα* expresses, as frequently, the outward world, as opposed to the ideal. Cf. 75 E., note.

B. (3.) πόθεν λαβόντες] 'Whence have we acquired this knowledge? Is it not the case that it was through the medium of such objects as we lately referred to (compare, in D. below, ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν ὁ ἡ ἐλέγχομεν τοῖς ἴσοις, a repetition of the same), after seeing a pair of trees, or stones, or the like, as equal, that we thereby become conscious of That Other (the Idea), which is different from these objects? or perhaps it does not appear to you different? If so, look at it from this point of view.' The next passage is perplexed by the discrepancy of the MSS., the majority of which read *τοτέ μὲν*—*τοτέ ἐέ*, while the best as the Bodl. reads *τῇ μὲν*, and Ven. II. *τῇ μὲν*—*τῇ ἐέ*, both MSS., however, with *τοτέ* written above. The argument seems to be that the Actual is always falling short of the Ideal, as is shown by the different conceptions of outward equality that *one* mind

Argument  
II.

This Idea  
may be sug-  
gested from  
without, but  
is not prima-  
rily derived  
from the  
external.

στήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ξύλα ἡ λίθους  
ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκείνο ἐνενοήσαμεν,  
ἕτερον ὃν τούτων; ἡ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ  
καὶ τῇδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ὄντα  
τοτὲ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τοτὲ δ' οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ;  
αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἡ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισό- C  
της; Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταῦτόν ἄρ' ἐστίν,  
ἡ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι  
φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν  
ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν  
ἐπιστήμην ἐννεονόηκας τε καὶ εἰληφας; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη,  
λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἡ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ  
γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ὁπὸ  
ταύτης τῆς ὁψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὁμοιον εἴτε ὀνό- D

will form at different times. Some have supposed the argument to rest on the variation of opinion between one mind and another, but this is false: for Plato is not reasoning from the variety of judgments among men generally: his argumentation proceeds as if there was but one soul in the universe to hold converse with the outer world. The applications of the Idea to outward things are variable in their result, appearing to attain better realisation at one time than another, but this does not affect the invariableness of the Idea, or inner standard, looked at in itself. The preferable reading is therefore *τοτὲ μὲν—τοτὲ δέ*, and the passage will run—'Is it not the case that stones which are equal, and trees which are so also, even while (so far as we know) they continue unchanged, yet at one time are considered (*φαίνεται*, more than *δοκεῖ* seems) equal, and at another not?' The first judgment regarding them by which the property of equality was affirmed, may be overturned on a new examination, while nothing can affect *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον* in the mind, which is invariable, and independent of *ταῦτα τὰ ἴσα*, or what is supposed to be so in the outer world. (A similar combination, *τοτὲ μὲν, ὅτε—τοτὲ δέ* occurs in Legg. X. 893 D.)—(9.) *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα*] This expression is remarkable, inasmuch as one would expect *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*, as in 65 D., *δίκαιον αὐτό*. Critics differ in the explanation of the peculiarity. Ast thinks it explicable, on the principle that pronominal expressions are used loosely in plural (*ταῦτα* in 70 D., for *τοῦτο*). Heindorf suggests that the plurality arises from the fact of comparison implying at least *two* objects compared. The explanation of Olympiodorus, with an alteration, is the one most satisfactory: that it expresses the varying results of the application of the Idea *in the case of different men*. In this case *τῶ μὲν—τῶ δέ*— would be the preferable reading, but this seems precluded by *σοί* in next clause, which implies that Plato is dealing

μοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνν  
 μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἡ δ' ὅς· ἡ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ  
 ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις· ἄρα  
 φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν ἴσον,  
 ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἡ οὐ-  
 δέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν  
 τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ  
 ὀρώ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύνα-  
 ται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκείνο, ἀλλ' ἔστι φανυλότε-  
 ρον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα  
 ἐκείνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρας δὲ  
 ἔχειν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ  
 ἡμεῖς, ἡ οὐ, περὶ τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασί  
 γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου

with a single mind. It is probable that αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα is plural, as referring to more than one application of the one standard of comparison, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον.

C. (3.) ταῦτα τὰ ἴσα] ταῦτα is here used δεικτικῶς, of the external world. ταῦτα τὰ ἴσα. 'These so-called equal objects.'—(7.) οὐκοῦν ἡ ὁμοίου ὄντος] 'Must not that be from its being either like or unlike? Assuredly. But it is all the same in either case: so long as this happens, that, etc., then Reminiscence must be produced.' ἕως αὖν, which is usually donec, as in 77 E., expresses here a preliminary condition = dummodo, as in Crat. 389 E., 393 D. H. Schmidt, in his Krit. Comment. I. p. 60—65, has advanced sundry reasons against the genuineness of the portion Οὐκοῦν ἡ ὁμοίου—Πάνν μὲν οὖν. The argument is certainly not affected by the omission.

D. (6.) ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τὸ μὴ] 'Is there any falling away from that, so that they are not such as the Idea of equality is absolutely, or shall we say that there is no falling off?' i.e., Shall we say that the Phenomenal always represents fully the Ideal, or that it is merely suggestive, and possessed of the power of Reminiscence—for example, of calling up the idea of Equality? The Bodleian reads τῷ for τό and omits μὴ. For the reading τὸ εἶναι after ἐνδεῖ, Hermann compares Epist. VIII. 363 D., μικροῦ ἐπιτεῖν τὸ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν πράττειν.—(8.) βούλεται] This verb is used, as in 75 A., with an inanimate subject. Cf. 'Quid sibi *cult* hæc oratio.' Compare προθυμείται, 75 A.

E. (1.) τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον]] ἴσον of the MSS. is left out by the more recent editors, as a gloss. Heindorf denies τοιοῦτον ἴσον to be Greek, in the sense of οὕτως ἴσον.—(2.) ἀναγκαῖόν που] Scil. εἶναι. Cf. 111 B., note.

Argument  
II.

τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, 75  
ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ' εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ  
ἐνδεεστέρας. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦ-  
μεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι  
ἐννοῆσαι ἄλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης  
τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταῦτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταῦτὸν  
γὰρ ἔστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὁ  
λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι  
ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ B  
ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἐστιν ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;  
Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν  
καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει πον εἰληφότας ἐπι-  
στήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὃ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν  
αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκείσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάν-  
τα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκείνο, ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.  
Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὃ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γε-

75 A. (2.) ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα] The phenomenal is never more than an approximation (*ὁρεξις*) towards the ideal. The ability to perceive defect implies, according to Plato, the ability to conceive the perfect.—(3.) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν] This passage is important, as indicating the kind of function Plato conceded to the Senses: viz., a suggestive or reminding function. Compare Note G.—(6.) πάντα ταῦτα] 'I affirm the same of all such perceptions,' ταῦτα referring to the Senses and the information thereby supplied. The salient points of the reasoning may be thus condensed: as the picture of Cebes suggests Cebes himself, of whom the picture is at best but an imperfect *likeness*, or perhaps suggests the thought of the friend of Cebes, Simmias, to whom it cannot be said to be a likeness at all, so the Senses bring before us pictures which call up Ideals, of some of which they may be said to bear the impress, while of others not at all (*ἀνάμνησις* possible both from *ὁμοία* and from *ἀνόμοια*, in 74 A., cf. 76 A.). Now, (α) Reminiscence is when one sees one thing and represents to himself a second thing suggested thereby. But (β) Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) is when one sees outward things, and then represents to himself the Ideas which, whether like or unlike, are suggested by them, and are distinct from them. Therefore, (γ) Knowledge is a mode of Reminiscence.

C. (1.) πρὸ τούτων] A condensed expression for 'previous to the exercise of these powers of Sense.' Cf. μετὰ τὸν θεόν in 61 B.—(10.) καὶ ἑκαίῳ] For a similar non-repetition of the article, in a group of notions kindred to each other, cf. 94 D.

νόμῃνοι εὐθὺς ἐωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἡκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
C αἰσθήσεις εἶχομεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἐδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τού-  
των τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γε-  
νέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς εἴκεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.  
Ἔοικεν.

XX. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέ- Similarly,  
σθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι other Ideas,  
καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ such as that  
τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ of the Good,  
τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ the Beautiful, etc., are  
καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, antecedent to  
D ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὁ Experience,  
ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπο- and brought  
κρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν εἶναι τού- out of a prior  
των ἀπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. state.  
Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλε-

D. (1.) οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα] ἐπισφραγιζεσθαι is not uncommon as a metaphorical expression for attaching a definition, as in Phileb. 26 D., Polit. 258 C.—(2.) καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν] ‘As well in our questions when we question, as in our answers when we answer.’ Both members (cf. 78 D.) may be condensed into one expression, διαλεγόμενοι. The ‘Socraticus sermo’ is admitted to have been the perfection of this catechetical method, and was, as Grote says (VIII. p. 474), ‘conversation systematised,’ and made to flow into a certain logical channel, with no extravagant discursion.—(5.) ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα] ‘If, having once received such knowledge, we have on no occasion lost it.’ Heindorf, finding γινόμενοι in the antithetical clause in E., thought that it had slipped out in this, and ought to be inserted after ἐκάστοτε, qualified by that adverb. This, however, is to mistake the argument, which runs thus: ‘We receive the knowledge of these Ideas before we are launched into the world of the phenomenal. If we have, in all the crises of our history, retained this Knowledge, then we must have it at our birth, and all through Life. If, however (which is really the case), we lost it at our birth, and have it revived by our Senses, then this revived knowledge must be styled Reminiscence.’ These alternative propositions Simmias is asked to consider, and make his choice (76 A.) accordingly.—(6.) ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι] ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ is to be supplied from the preceding sentence, to govern γίνεσθαι.—(9.) ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν] Cf. Phileb. 33 E., λήθη μνήμης ἐξοδος. Conv. 208 A., λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐξοδος.

Argument  
II.

λήσμεθα, εἰδότας αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ αἰεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι·  
τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἔστι, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν  
καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὧ Σιμ-  
μία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρα-  
τες. Εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι  
ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ  
ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἄς ποτε καὶ  
πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπι-  
στήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμνησ-  
σκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν  
γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκού-  
σαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἑτερόν τι ἀπὸ τού-  
του ἐννοῆσαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ὧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον  
ὄν ἢ ὧ ὁμοιον ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἥτοι  
ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου  
πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὓς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ  
ἀναμνησκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.  
Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὧ Σώκρατες.

XXI. Πότερον οὖν αἰρεῖ, ὧ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμένους  
ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμνησσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὢν πρότερον  
ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἡμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ

E. (3.) *χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα*] This use of *ταῦτα* is not unfrequent, to signify the 'outward world,' or 'things of Sense.' Cf. *ταῦτα* in 74 A., 109 C., 111 E., so *I'hileb.* 58 E. (In 76 E. there is a specific reference in the context, whereby it signifies the *above-mentioned* supersensuous Ideas.) In *Phædr.* 249 D., *ἐκείνα* is used of the ideal world, in contrast with *τὸ τῆς καλλος*. In *Parmen.* 129 A., *ἄλλα* denotes the phenomenal, *αὐτὰ* the ideal.

76 A. (4.) *ἥτοι ἐπιστάμενοι—ἢ*] The opposition of *ἥτοι—ἢ* is still more marked by the emphatic position of *πάντες* as opposed to *οὗτοι*, which again is emphasised by its location *after* its relative clause. *ὕστερον* belongs to *ἀναμνησκονται*.

B. (3.) *τί ἐέ; τότε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι*] *τότε*, a conjecture of Heindorf's, proves to be correct, being found in several MSS., though it has slipped out in some others, as standing after *τί ἐέ*.—(8.) *αὔριον τηνικάδε*] Compare as to the form of expression, 2 *Kings* VII. 1, *ὡς ἡ ὥρα αἴτη, αὔριον*. The



παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ ᾗ σοι  
δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται  
ἔχει ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-  
κρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον  
περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μὲν ταῖν,  
ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὐριον  
τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο  
C ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι γε, ἔφη, ὦ  
Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα  
ἃ ποτε ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν  
τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἀνθρωποι  
γεγόναμεν. Οὐδῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ  
Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ  
εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα  
ἅμα γιγνώμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς  
D ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἶπεν, ὦ  
ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ  
δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνώμεθα, ὥς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν.  
ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις  
ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ'  
ἔλαθον ἐμαντὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

Conclusion  
deduced as  
to the prior  
existence of  
the Soul.

sigh of Simmias does not move Socrates to an immediate reply, which is properly to be found in the exhortation in 78 A.

C. (1.) οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι—αὐτά] By αὐτά are meant the *prænatal* ideas of Beauty, Goodness, and the like, which a man may think he knows in a practical way, without being able (*εἰδόναι λόγον*) to explain how he has come by them; but this is not knowledge in the Socratic sense, any more than empirical land-measuring implies a knowledge of Geometry.—(7.) εἰ μὴ ἄρα] = *nisi forte*, introducing a new hypothesis.

D. (6.) ἔλαθον ἐμαντὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών] Simmias is transfixed on the horns of a dilemma. He had admitted with a νῆ Δία and θαυμαστῶς (65 D., 74 B.), the possession by the mind of supersensuous Ideas, and now he ventures to put forth the notion that they are received at birth. But, my good friend, rejoins Socrates, that must be the date of their obscuration, because we were born without having them in their full brightness, unless you mean to say that we receive and lose them at one and the same time—whereupon

Argument  
II.

Resume of  
the argument  
from Remi-  
niscence, and  
appeal to  
Cebes and  
Simmias re-  
garding its  
validity.

XXII. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῶν, ὦ Σιμμία ;  
εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἡ θρυλούμενη αἰεί, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ  
πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθή-  
σεων πάντα ἀναφέρονται, ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνευ- E  
ρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάζο-  
μεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ  
τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ  
μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἄρ'  
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταυτὰ τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέ-  
ρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ  
τάδε ; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι  
ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος  
εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι 77  
ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε  
οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὅν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα  
εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα  
πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδει-  
κται. Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέ-  
βητα πείθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι·  
καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν

Simmias says, 'I have unwittingly been talking nonsense.' On οὐδὲν εἰπών, cf. 63 A., note.

E. (3.) ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν] Most of the translators render 'as this is the case.' Cousin translates correctly, 'comme toutes ces choses-là existent,' giving ἔστιν the sense of *exist*, as in the opening clause, εἰ μὲν ἔστιν, and referring ταῦτα to the *a priori* Ideas. It is remarkable that ταῦτα is used twice in such proximity, first of τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων; secondly of the Ideas, καλὸν and the rest. Observe καί inserted in both members of the comparison after ὥσπερ.—(6.) ἄλλως] i.e., *Off the mark*, to no result.—(9.) εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος] Like a ship arriving at port after a satisfactory voyage. Cf. Plut. Mor. 550 C., ὁ λόγος, οἶον εἰς λιμένα καὶ καταφυγὴν ἀποβλέπων, κ.τ.λ.

77 A. (8.) καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων] καρτερός and μαλακός, as Stallbaum remarks, are employed by Plato to express the extremes of character in disputation. Compare the remark on the character of Cebes, in 63 A.

τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι ἀν-  
B τόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή.

XXIII. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται,  
οὐδ' αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδείχθαι,  
ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν,  
ὅπως μὴ ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυνται ἡ  
ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾗ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γί-  
γνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι ἀμόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶ-  
ναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ  
ἀφίκεται καὶ ἀπαλλάττεται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευ-  
C τᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Εὐ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέ-  
βης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμῖν ἀποδεδείχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι  
πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεί-  
ξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἡ  
πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν. Ἀποδέ-  
δεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης,  
καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταῦ-  
τόν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν  
τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρό-

Cebes sug-  
gests that  
pre-existence  
is only half  
of the proof  
desired. So-  
crates replies  
that Argu-  
ments I. and  
II. are to be  
taken in  
combination.

B. (4.) ἐνέστηκεν τὸ τῶν πολλῶν] *There still recurs to trouble me that common fear.* ἐνέστηκεν = *instat*, much in the sense of *obstat*.—(5.) διασκεδάννυνται] This form is remarkable, as being either an Indicative coupled with a Conjunctive ᾗ, or a Conjunctive of a peculiar form. The latter supposition is the more natural, as a similar absorption of the modal vowel occurs in *πήγνυτο* in 118 A., and the treatment of the accent may be explained by the peculiarity attaching in Attic to the conjunctive middle in verbs in *μι*.—(7.) ἀμόθεν ποθὲν] The MSS. have ἀλλοθεν, *aliunde*. Bekker proposed ἀμόθεν, *alicunde*, in which he is followed by Hermann. Stallbaum adheres to the MSS., although in Gorg. 492 D., he reads ἀμόθεν against ἀλλοθεν of the MSS. ΛΛ and Μ were often confounded.—(8.) ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκεται] Some translators make ἀφίκεται synonymous with ἀπαλλάττεται, and refer both to *departure* at Death. ἀφίκεται, however, is in another tense, and, moreover, must have the sense of ἀφικέσθαι before, so that it refers to the *arrival* of the stranger-soul in its earthly tabernacle. Cf. Eur. Suppl. 533, ὅθεν εἰ ἐκαστον εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκετο, ἐνταῦθα ἀπὸ ἡλθε, πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, τὸ σῶμα δ' εἰς γῆν.

Socrates playfully rebukes their childish fear of death, and enlarges on the importance of the subject, exhorting them to seek light from all quarters, whether in Greece or beyond.

τερον, ἀνάγκη δ' αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένη D  
μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τεθνάναι  
γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ  
εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδεδεικται  
μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.

XXIV. "Ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως  
ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον,  
καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐ-  
τὴν ἐκβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάν-  
νυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν E

C. (1.) Εὐ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης] Compare similar separations of ἔφη from its Nomin. in 78 A., C., 82 C., 83 E.—(5.) τέλος] Nüsselin compares Hom. II. IX. 66, οὐ τέλος ἴκκο μύθων, and XX. 369, οὐδ' Ἀχιλεὺς πάντεσσι τέλος μύθοις ἐπιθήσει, κ.τ.λ.—(7.) συνθεῖναι τοῦτον τε τὸν λόγον] To conjoin together this argument with the one that we previously accepted; i.e., the argument from Reminiscence with what has been called the Cyclical Argument. Some remarks on the Platonic doctrines of Reminiscence and Pre-existence will be found in Note N.

D. (8.) δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν] To fear as children would. Compare τὸ τῶν πολλῶν in B.—(9.) διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν] Hirschig reads διασκεδάννυ'η, thinking that a Conjunctive is necessary, and that -σι in that mood is only a poetic ending. The case of διασκεδάννυσιν in B. is entirely different, as it is coupled with an undoubted conjunctive ἦ, whereas ὡς ἀληθῶς joined to μὴ implies here that the fact is too true, and therefore the Indicative is the appropriate mood.

E. (3.) ὡς δεδιότων] The connection of ἀναπείθω with this clause would lead us to expect δεδιότας, but there is a subtlety in the use of the Genitive, inasmuch as it leaves it undecided whether the apprehension is real, or only assumed for the sake of argumentation. Compare Thuc. V. 66, ὡς ἐρήμου οὔσης βία (τὴν πόλιν) αἰρήσοντες, where ὡς ἐρήμου οὔσαν would have implied that it was more deserted than it proved to be.—(4.) ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς] Not among us, with reference to such of their number as the faint-hearted Apollodorus, but within us, an inferior nature. From this passage παῖς became a proverbial expression for 'our weaker nature.' Compare the definition of education as a putting away of childish things: Simplic. in Epict. X. 1.64, παιδεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κυρίως ἡ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν Παιδὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν Παιδαγωγοῦ ἐπανόρθωσις. The παῖς of the Greeks became *avia* among the Latins: Persius V. 91, 'Disce, sed ira cadat naso rugosaque sanna, Dum veteres avias tibi de pulmone revello.'—(6.) μορμολύκεια] A continuation of the simile τὸ τῶν παιδῶν. Timæus explains it as τὰ φοβερά τοῖς παῖσι προσωπεῖα. Seneca de

μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελά-  
σας ὧς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν  
μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὥς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν  
ἡμῶν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρώ-  
μεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύ-  
κεια. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης  
ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάσῃτε. Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρα-  
78 τες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδὼν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ,  
ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέ-  
βης, ἐν ᾗ ἔνεσις που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν

Const. Sap. 4, 'doloris opinione vexari, more puerorum, quibus metus incutit umbra, et personarum deformitas, et depravata facies.'—(7.) ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ —(ὥς ἂν ἐξεπάσῃτε) Cf. ἐπάδειν in 114 D., where it is softened by the addition of ὥσπερ. The common reading was ἐξιάσῃται, until Heindorf, who, from a comparison of the blunders of some of the MSS., divined the true reading to have been ἐξεπάσῃτε, which is now found in Vind. Y. The mention of soothing charms naturally follows that of μορμολύκεια, from which children were delivered by a lullaby in song. Cf. Zonar. Lex., βαυκαλῶν· τὸ τιθηνεῖσθαι μετ' ὑδῆς τὰ παιδία. Heindorf compares Soph. Œd. Col. 1193,—εἰσὶ χιτῆροις γοναὶ κακαὶ καὶ θυμὸς ὀξύς, ἀλλὰ νουθετοῦμενοι φῶλων ἐπὶ ὕδατι ἐξεπάρδονται φύσιν.

78 A. (1.) ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη] This repetition of ἔφη increases the emphasis on the pronoun indicating Socrates.—(2.) πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς] Greece is a wide word, and within its bounds surely are good men. Stallbaum considers πολλὴ as including not only the notion of extent, but of populousness also. Compare Theocr. Id. XXII. 156, Πολλὰ τοι Σπάρτα πολλὰ δ' ἰππῆλατος Ἄλις—Ἐνθα κόραι τοκέσσιν ὑπὸ σφετέροισι τρέφονται Μυρίαί.—(3.) πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη.] This expression of liberality towards the Barbarians, so rare among Greek writers generally, at least before the time of Alexander, is the more remarkable, as put into the mouth of Socrates, who was not only little acquainted with the Barbarian world, but knew personally little of Greece itself, as he never willingly went beyond the walls of Athens. As Whewell well observes, these words are very memorable to us, who know that such Teachers as Socrates longed for have proceeded from a nation,\* whom Plato would perhaps have reckoned among the least cultivated and most hopeless of Barbarians. Notwithstanding this gleam of generosity towards the non-

\* Compare the admission of Porphyry in Euseb. Præp. Ev. 741 B., χαλκόδετος γὰρ ἡ πρὸς Θεοὺς οὐδὲς αἰπινὴ τε καὶ τραχὺία, ἥς πολλὰς ἀτραποὺς βάρβαροι μὲν ἱξίμερον, Ἕλληνες δὲ ἐπλανήθησαν, among which βάρβαροι are enumerated Ἑβραῖοι.

Argument  
III.

After this digression, Socrates enters on a new argument, founded on the contrast between Body and Soul.

βαρβάρων γένει, οὓς πάντας χρή διερευνᾶσθαι ζητούντας τοιοῦτον ἐπιδόον, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πό-  
νων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε  
χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρή καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἴσως  
γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ραδίως εὔροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους  
τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης·  
ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἔστιν. B  
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη,  
λέγεις.

XXV. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ  
ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο  
τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ  
ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ·

Hellenic nations, there is at the same time a feeling that there is from them small hope, and that the truth will either be found at Athens, or not at all.\* Compare the passage in Pol. IV. 435, where Plato characterises the three nationalities around the east of the Mediterranean, pronouncing τὸ φιλοκρήματον the characteristic of the Phœnicians and Egyptians, and τὸ θυμοειδές that of the Thracians and Scythians, while τὸ φιλομαθές is regarded as the property of the Greeks. Moreover, as Zeller (Gesch. d. Philos. p. 23) observes, when Plato does happen to refer anything to a source beyond Greece itself, it will be found to be invariably some technicality of legislation or ritualism—some *μυστήριον*, like the *mythe*, in the end of the Republic, of the Armenian who returned from the other world—and not a doctrine of philosophy properly so called. The normal feeling towards the Barbarians is that expressed in Pol. V. 470 C., *φημὶ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον—φῆσομεν πολέμειους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἐχθρὰν ταύτην κλητέον*. Compare Liv. XXXI. 29, 'Cum alienigenis, cum barbaris æternum omnibus Græcis bellum est eritque.'—(7.) *ζητεῖν δὲ χρή*] Sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα, *investigate the subject*, not *ζητεῖν ἐπιδόον*, which would require εἰν ἀλλήλοις.—(9.) *ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει*] Heindorf compares the use of *ταῦτα* as an affirmative reply, in Arist. Vesp. 142, *Σὺ δὲ τῇ θύρᾳ πρόσκεισο*. Σ. *ταῦτ', ὧ δέσποτα*. (*ὑπάρξει* = *non deerit*.)

\* Similar in spirit is the view of Celsus in Origen I. c.32, that it was true non-Greeks were *ἱκανοὶ εὐρεῖν δόγματα*, but the Greeks were *ἀμείνονες κρίναι καὶ βεβαιώσασθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὰ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων εὐρεθέντα*. Clem. Alex. Str. I. § 67, after quoting this passage of the Phædo, says that Epicurus looked with less hopefulness even than Plato to the non-Greek world. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἱμῶν ὑπολαμβάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι.

καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ξυντεθέντι τε καὶ ξυνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διασπαρασσέσθαι ταύτῃ ἢ περὶ ξυντεθέν; εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἰωμεν δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ ἔχει

B. (5.) τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει] i.e., ποῖόν τι ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, ᾧ προσήκει, the interrogative clause having absorbed the secondary and relative clause: cf. 79 B., ποτέρῳ οὖν τῷ εἶδει κ.τ.λ.; also 89 C., τὸ ποῖον; Socrates in advancing a new argument, proceeds first to examine the *μορμολύκειον*, viz., the possibility of dispersion, and inquires whether such a thing as dispersion is predicable of the Soul.—(7.) καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὗ] οὗ had slipped out of the MSS., but was restored by Heindorf, as necessary to the sense.—(8.) πότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ] *To which of these two classes the soul belongs, whether to the separable or the inseparable?*—(10.) *ξυντεθέντι τε καὶ ξυνθέτῳ*] *ξύνθετος* (*composite*) expresses the resulting condition of the process implied in *ξυντεθεῖς*. The question here discussed is that of the Unity of the Soul. 'Is it one and indivisible, or is it like the body, composed of parts? In the latter case dispersion may be predicated of it, in the former not.' It followed from this argument that while he succeeded in showing the probable independence of the Unity called Consciousness, he gave up the connection between the *λόγος*, which was the region of the Consciousness of Ideas, and the other parts of the sentient existence, *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*, which being seated in the physical frame, were supposed to be dissolved along with it. Hence, in the speculations of Plato, it was the *λόγος* only that was reckoned the Immortal part of man.

C. (3.) εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ] Heindorf remarks that ἄλλος is often joined to *τις*, simply for the sake of a greater fulness of sound.—(7.) *ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα*] A similar emphatic repetition of *οὗτος*, with *δὲ* attached in the apodosis as well as in the protasis, occurs in 81 B., τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὁμμασι σκοτῶδες . . . τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν. Cf. 80 D., note. *ἔχοντα* is to be supplied to τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως from the previous *ἔχει*.

Argument  
III.

Dissolution is predicable only of what is compounded or made up of parts. The Soul is One and indivisible, and beyond the reach of Dissolution.

κατὰ ταυτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντι- οὖν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; 'Ὡσαύ- τως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὃ Κέβης, κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρα- τες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ κα- E λῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἄρα κατὰ ταυτά ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταυτά ἐστίν; Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὃ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύ- τως ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἀψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν 79 ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχόν-

D. (1.) ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι] *Of which we give this account (or explanation) that it absolutely is.* The double genitive depends on λόγον. In 76 B., περί is inserted after λόγον διδόναι.—(5.) μονοειδὲς ὄν] Like the Latin *simplex*, 'quod nil copulatum, nil coagmentatum, nihil duplex habet,' (Cic. Tusc. I. 29); the *uniform* and *invariable*, opposed to the *multiform* πολλαειδὲς, which is therefore ἐιαλυτόν. The cluster of negatives following is remarkable. With οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς, compare πάντη πάντως. (Wytttenbach says the Greeks were fond of accumulating ὁ in negations, and π in affirmations. Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. 195 A., οὐδένος αὐτοὶ εἰκὴν δοῦναι εἰκαίοι, also in same, οὐ ἐννηθύντων ἐημοσίᾳ ἐιαλύσασθαι ταῦτα. Of π in affirmations, Æsch. Prom. 641, πᾶν ὅπερ προσχρήζετε πεύσασθε. So Cic. Tusc. I. 49, 'Portum potius paratum nobis ut perfugium putemus.') Plato's emphatic accumulation of epithets denoting the 'Invariable' seems to have awakened the mirth of the Comic Poets: cf. Alexis in Athenæ. VIII. 354 D., τό θ' ἡρὲν πάντως ἡρὲν, κάκει κἂνθάδε.—(9.) τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν] 'But what shall we say of the many objects of beauty.' περί, understood here, is often expressed, as in Parmen. 154 A., τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι; Heindorf on Gorg. 509 D., remarks that in this elliptical expression (*But what of?*) the nominative, genitive, and accusative are in Greek all admissible. Regarding the scope of the passage, Epicharmus gave similar expression to this changefulness of the phenomenal world (l. 188)—

ὥδε νῦν ὄρη  
καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπους· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὖξεν, ὃ δὲ γὰ μὲν φθίνει  
ἐν μεταλλαγῇ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον. . . .  
καὶ τὴν δὲ κήγῳ χθές ἄλλοι καὶ νῦν ἄλλοι τελέθομεν. κ.τ.λ.



των οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς δια-  
νοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰδιῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρα-  
τά; Παντάπασι, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

XXVI. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄν-  
των, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ αἰδέες; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν  
αἰδέες αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ  
ταῦτα; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο  
B τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ; Οὐδὲν  
ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἶδει φαίμεν ἂν  
εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε  
δηλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ; ὁρατὸν ἢ αἰδέες; Οὐχ  
ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ  
ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν ἢ ἄλλη  
τινὶ οἶει; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγο-

79 A. (6.) Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει] The position of βούλει after Θῶμεν is very unusual. Heindorf wished to insert εἰ before βούλει, following several MSS. and a correction in Bodl.—(7.) τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ αἰδέες] Stallbaum, Heindorf, and others give αἰδέες the sense of *formless*, instead of *invisible*, which is required by the whole context, as H. Schmidt has clearly shown, who refers to οὐχ ὁρατόν as evidently equivalent. This antagonism between the visible and invisible, and between the temporal and eternal, is a principle pervading every part of Platonism, and is the chief source of what has been called 'the Christian Element' in Plato.

B. (1.) ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ] Heindorf and Stallbaum consider ἄλλο τι to be the common expression = *nonne*, and ἡμῶν to be governed by τὸ μὲν. H. Schmidt, following Ast, proposes, with more probability, to consider ἄλλο τι as governing ἡμῶν, with the following sense: *Is there ought else in our constitution than on the one hand Body, and on the other Soul?* The reply, οὐδὲν ἄλλο, shows that the question is intended to be an exhaustive one, and that ἄλλο τι is more than *nonne*. In ποτέρῳ τῷ εἶδει, the absorbed relative clause is represented by the article: 'To which of the species that we have mentioned.'—(5.) Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ—λέγομεν] Well, I suppose we are speaking of what is visible or not, with reference simply to the nature of man. Equivalent to λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν. Cf. λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεῆα, in 94 D. Herodotus (VIII. 83) speaks of ἀνθρώπου φύσις καὶ κατὰστασις.

C. (9.) ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα] Olympiodorus thus comments: καλῶς τὸ ἰλιγγιᾷ: ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι διὰ τὴν ἐνδοθεν αὐτοῖς δίνην καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοιαῦτα νομίζουσιν, οἷτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὁρᾶν, πάντα νομίζει μυστὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι. Compare the simile of

μεν; ὁρατὸν εἶναι ἢ οὐχ ὁρατόν; Οὐχ ὁρατόν. 'Αειδὲς ἄρα; Ναί. 'Ομοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῇ σώματός ἐστι τῷ αἰεideί, C  
τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Moral lesson reiterated regarding the relation of the Philosopher to the changeable; and dissolving External world.

XXVII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάσαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχῇ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρήται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταραττέται καὶ ἱλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκο- D  
πῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὔσα αὐτοῦ

the flux of the Euripus in 90 C., and Demosth. in Schol. Arist. Rhet. III. 4, 3, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ὄντες, ὑπὸ τοῦ σάλου καὶ τῶν κυμάτων ταρασσόμενοι ναυτιῶσι, . . . οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἔημος ναυτιᾷ καὶ ἱλιγγιᾷ ἀφορῶν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. Max. Tyr. Diss. XVI. 9, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἀσαφείως ἐμπέπληστοι (ἡ ψυχῇ) καὶ κερηβαρεῖ, αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τῶν μεθυόντων πάθος.—(9.) ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη] The principle that men become, and ultimately are, what they associate with and love, is found everywhere in Plato. It is the foundation of all his Puritanism in Education: Legg. II. 656 B., V. 728 B., X. 904 C. Compare Demosth. Olynth. III. 37, ἐστι δ' οὐδέποτε, οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φθῦλα πράττοντας· ὅ ποί' ἅττα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸ φρόνημα ἔχειν.

D. (6.) περὶ ἐκεῖνα αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά] H. Schmidt proposes a specious change—to transpose περὶ ἐκεῖνα before καί, and refer it to the things of sense; but this leaves τοιούτων following without a reference (κατὰ ταῦτά being (as in 78 C.) a mere adverbial expression). The difficulty regarding the change of number from ἐκείνοι, is less than that of supposing Plato to use the same pronoun so suddenly in two different senses.—(7.) τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις] Olympiodorus puzzles himself how φρόνησις can be called πάθημα, and one of the reasons at which he arrives is that, while the purified soul is (αὐτοκίνητος) impassive to all beyond it, it is yet passive to itself—ὡς μὲν κινούσα πάσχει, ὡς δὲ κινουμένη πάσχει. Wyttenbach suggests a more natural solution, that it refers to the influence (though liberating, still an influence) expressed in πέπνυται κ.τ.λ. So εἰπαθεῖν is used of the soul when in the full enjoyment of φρόνησις, Phædr. 247 D.—(8.) καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις] 'A statement as beautiful as it is true,' referring to the aptness of the simile to convey the meaning. Regard-

αὐὲ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν  
 γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπανταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ  
 ἐκείνα αὐὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφα-  
 πτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκλη-  
 ται; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμ-  
 Ε προσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶ-  
 ναι καὶ συγγενέστερον; Πᾶς ἂν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἡ δ' ὅς, συγ-  
 χωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ  
 δυνσμάθεστάτος, ὅτι ὄλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ  
 τῷ αὐὲ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;  
 Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

XXVIII. Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ  
 80 ὥσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύ-  
 σις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν καὶ κατὰ  
 ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον τῷ θειάφειναι, καὶ πό-

ing the combination of adverb with adjective, compare Terence Adolph. IV. 3, 18, 'Et recto et verum dicis.'

E. (4.) ὄλῳ καὶ παντί] Both in the general and in the particular. (Compare the legal phrase 'all and whole.') It occurs also in Pol. V. 469 C., VII. 527 C. The occurrence of μᾶλλον after ὁμοιότερον is occasioned by the distance at which the comparative is placed.

80 A. (1.) τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν] The same statement of the relation of body and soul, the former as the subject and servant, the latter as the sovereign, is found in Timæus, 34 C., etc.; Legg. V. 726, etc. As the macrocosm of the world has God for its governor, so the microcosm of man is ruled by that which is likest to God, the Soul. Compare the strong words of Cic. Somn. Scip. 8, 'Deum te igitur scito esse; siquidem Deus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui præpositus est, quam hunc mundum ille Princeps Deus.'—(4.) τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν] πεφυκέναι, which has οἶον attached to it here, frequently takes the Infinitive without it, as in Phædr. 265 C., and as often in the Tragedians.—(9.) τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει] Wytttenbach remarks that συμβαίνει is here used for a logical conclusion arrived at dialectically, as in 92 B. There is a difficulty as to the construction, as the most and best MSS. have ψυχὴ afterwards, while the Editors, except Stallbaum, read ψυχῇ. In the former case there is an anacoluthon, as if συμβαίνει had been treated above as a personal verb (cf. 67 C.). Compare διαγούσα in 81 A. But the anacoluthon is here harsh.

Subsidiary argument from the superiority of the Soul as governing the Body, and thereby exercising a prerogative arguing a divine and thence undying nature.

τερον τῷ θνητῷ ; ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν ; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν ; Δῆλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θεῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰὲ B ὡσανύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχὴν, τῷ δ' ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ὡς οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

XXIX. Τί οὖν ; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ οὐχὶ σῶ-

B. (1.) νοητῷ] Olympiodorus understood this as 'gifted with intellectual power,' as if νοητικῇ, but there seems no reason to depart from its natural sense. This latter sense it undoubtedly bears in 81 B., where it is explained by φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν.

C. (5.) [καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι] Hermann brackets, as not being found in Ven. II., and only in margin in Bodl.—(7.) καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ] ὥρα here has been the subject of great torture among the interpreters. Dacier translates it absurdly 'at such a season,'\* arguing from it against the historical fact, that it was in winter that Socrates died, and not in summer, when decomposition is more rapid. Stallbaum renders 'siquidem quis et corpore florente mortuus fuerit et florente ætate,' which looks like tautology. H. Schmidt comes nearest to a satisfactory meaning, by restoring Heindorf's punctuation, so as to disjoin καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ from τελευτήσῃ, and attach it to the apodosis καὶ πάννύ μάλᾳ. ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ is thus made the equivalent of χαριέντως ἔχων repeated as the predicate, and the meaning then is:—Even if one dies with his frame fresh and beautiful, the body will remain in the same fresh condition (cf. ἐρσέεις, Hom. II. XXIV. 757) for even a very considerable time. The presence of μὲν indicates that the apodosis to εἶναι is yet to come. Compare the effect of μὲν in Protag. 361 E., ὦν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἡγαμαί σε, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων, καὶ πάνν. Regarding εἰάν μὲν τις καί in the sense of etiamsi, Schmidt compares Protag. 323 B., εἰάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικόν ἐστι. The transition in γάρ of the next sentence,

\* A plausible interpretation (which Donaldson (Antigone, p. 25) seems to accept), is to understand it of climate (cf. διὰ λαμπροτάτου βαινοντες ἀβρῶς Αἰθέρος, in Eur. Med., 630, in praise of the dryness and clearness of the Attic sky), but it is in the plural that ὥρα bears such a sense.

- ματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παρά-  
 C παν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἐν-  
 νοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ  
 μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ  
 νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν  
 [καὶ διαπνέεσθαι], οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν,  
 ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συγχρὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ  
 χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ, καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ  
 καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὼν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν,  
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει  
 D ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν  
 σαπῇ, ὅσῳ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὥς  
 ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα,

Even the  
 Body, though  
 inferior, does  
 not perish  
 immediately;  
 and under  
 certain treat-  
 ment be-  
 comes well  
 nigh impe-  
 rishable.

requires us to suppose a latent reference to the case of bodies which are not full, but spare. If a full and plump body, which decays more rapidly, remains unaffected comparatively long, a spare muscular one will remain so much longer. For, a body when it is reduced to muscle (*συμπεσὼν*) and embalmed, etc. The argument, as Schmidt shows, contemplates three stages of continuance. 1st, That of the body which is in full bloom, on which, though the fingers of decay operate most rapidly, they do not operate immediately. (Compare 2 Sam. XXI. 9, 10.) 2nd, That of the body reduced to muscle by age (compare the Sexton's account in *Hamlet* V. 1), or preserved by the art of embalming, which will remain for a very long time. 3rd, Particular parts of the body, which will remain almost (*ἀθάνατα*) beyond the reach of decay, such as bones, teeth, etc. Wherefore, the reasoning proceeds, if such is the case with the compounded, soluble, and fragmentary body, how much greater ought to be the privilege of the higher principle, which is not compound, nor capable of division into parts?—Cf. Lactantius VII. 12, 'Non enim simul interit (corpus), sed anima discedente integrum per multos dies manet, et plerumque medicatum, diutissime durat.'

D. (1.) καὶ ἂν σαπῇ] Scil. τὸ σῶμα.—(3.) ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα] ἄρα frequent in an appeal involving a *reductio ad absurdum*. The completion of the sentence is carried forward by αὕτη δὲ ἐστίν. Cf. 78 C. note.—(5.) ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἀΐδου ὡς ἀληθῶς] The same derivation of Ἀΐδης connecting it with ἀειδῆς, 'the unseen,' is alluded to in *Cratyl.* 403 A. as the popular derivation, but a new and fanciful one is there proposed to supersede it, ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα καλά ἐῖδ' ἐναί, 'because Hades knows all that is fair,' in which case ἀ- is intensive, not negative. So here, the true Hades, or spirit-world, is spoken of as opposed to the vulgar view of Hades (*οἰκία εὐρέντα*), while Plato had far other views of it. With Ἀΐδης . . . φρόνιμον θεός, compare Tennyson's

The true security for the Soul in death is purity from the influences of the perishing Body.

τὸ αἰδέες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ εἰδῆ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται καὶ ἀπόλῳεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῇ Ἐμᾶλλον ὧδε ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κωνωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκούσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτῇ εἰς αὐτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα αἰεὶ τοῦτο—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τᾷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδίως· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη 81 θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ αἰεδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

'There must be wisdom with great Death; The Dead shall look me thro' and thro'.' In Memor. L.—(9.) οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι] Generally without ἄνθρωποι, as in 64 B.; yet cf. 65 A., 92 D.

E. (2.) ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ κ.τ.λ.] The apodosis to this protasis does not occur until οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα . . . ἀπέρχεται in 81 A.

81 A. (7.) λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμ.] In general κατὰ after a verb of statement has a hostile meaning, against, here, simply, concerning. Compare 70 D., σκόπει κατὰ ζώων.—(8.) μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαίγουσα] Heindorf would substitute διαγούση against all the MSS., to avoid the anacoluthon, ὑπάρχει being impersonal, but such a variation has a tendency to occur in the case of participles. Cf. Phædr. 241 D., ψῆμν αὐτὸν ἐρεῖν . . . λέγων for λέγοντα, as if ἐδόκει μοι ἐκεῖνος had preceded. So here, the preceding clause is assumed to have run, οἷ ἀφικομένη εὐδαίμων ἔσται. Compare the remark on the reading ψυχῇ in 80 B.

B. (5.) μηδὲν ἄλλο . . . ἀλλ' ἢ] In this combination ἀλλὰ is properly dependent on μηδὲν, and ἢ on ἄλλο. Cf. οὐδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ. in 97 D.

- B XXX. Οὕτω νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνούσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μὴδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν,
- C οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσιν οἱ ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ διειλημμένην γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ὁμιλία τε καὶ ξυνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον; Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἶεσθαι χρή εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἰδίου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ
- D μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλιδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὦφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἰδῶλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι

Illustration of the danger of imbrating the Soul drawn from the popular superstition of ghosts about tombs.

—(7.) οὗ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι] One relative suffices, though the verbs require different cases. Other examples in 65 A., 82 D. Compare ἐρώσα above: so. τοῦτου.—(9.) τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη] On ἐε attached to the emphatic and iterative τοῦτο, cf. note on 78 C.

C. (2.) Ἀλλὰ διειλημμένην γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς] . 'λαμβάνω est occupare locum per intervalla disponendis præsidiis, ædificiis, arboribus.' Morus ad Isocr. Paneg. c. 2, fin. Hence it signifies to break up the unity of the soul by the introduction of corrupting and clouding elements, rendering its transparency opaque, i.e., *engross*, *embroiled*. Compare the noble reproduction of this Platonic passage regarding the carnalising of the Soul in the Comus of Milton (460—480).

D. (1.) κυλιδουμένη] *Prowling*. This was an expression for *haunting*, that became hackneyed with later writers: e.g., Lucian Nigrin. § 30, on legacy-hunters, οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν νεκρίαν τε καὶ διαθήκην καλινδούμενοι. —(2.) ἅττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα] Bekker reads σκοτοειδῆ from two MSS., against all the better MSS., and against citations in Proclus

ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὀρώνται. Εἰκὸς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης. καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωμα- E  
τοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα.

and Origen. The preferable reading is *σκοιειδῆ*, *σκιαί* being the familiar word for the *shades*. It was a widely-spread popular opinion that the ghosts of the deceased still hovered about 'the charnel vaults and sepulchres;' and, from the confusion of thought associating the unseen spirit with the visible comfortlessness of the grave, arose the superstition of offering, not only meats and drinks at the tombs, but also garments, as if the bodily wants survived the body. (Compare Arnold's Note on Thuc. III. 58.) This popular notion Plato accepts, so far as it could be made available for his philosophic teaching. Reference has been made to a kindred, yet a diverse, Rabbinical superstition mentioned by Lightfoot on *τετραταῖον* (St. John XI. 39), 'Tribus diebus anima vagatur circa sepulchrum, expectans ut redeat in corpus. Cum vero videt quod immutatur aspectus faciei, recedit et relinquit corpus.' (Grimm (Deutsch. Myth. p. 788) mentions a superstition of the pagan Bohemians, that the Soul perched as a bird on neighbouring trees, watching until the body was burned.)—(3.) *εἶδωλα*] The *εἶδωλον* of Plato is very different from that of Homer. The *εἶδωλον* of the Odyssey is in the noisome Shades, the counterpart of the once living man; that of Plato is among the vanities of the Phenomenal world, the degraded form of that Soul which might have had its dwelling in the true Hades, which is not gloomy (*πυρὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ φρονίμῳ θεῷ*, 80 D.). Both *εἶδωλα* are alike in being regarded as unsubstantial and degenerate, the Homeric as being removed from the tumultuous world of flesh and blood, where Existence alone was worth having: the Platonic as fallen from its Ideal birthright, and excluded from the world of realities, to wander in a wilderness of shadows. Thus Plato could not but find himself at war with Homer, not only in regard to the character and attributes of the gods, but also in regard to the fundamental meaning of Life, and the view to be entertained of Death.—(5.) *οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν . . . ἀλλὰ*] The Editions have *οὐτε*, corrected by Fischer from the MSS. The Platonic view of apparitions, as exhibited here, differs widely from the notions of modern superstition in one respect. With Plato\* the apparition is possible only in the case of an evil and corrupted soul, and this corruption is the fruit

\* The singular passage in Legg. IX. 885 E., is not unlike the idea of modern superstition, and speaks not indeed of an apparition, but of anger on the part of the victim of an evil deed, rendering it necessary for the murderer to go into banishment, thereby to avoid the haunts of his enemy. So in Xen. Cyr. VIII. 7, 18, mention is made of the *παλαμναῖοι* or *αἰσχροί*, sent against a murderer by his victim.



XXXI. Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθῃ  
 ὅποῖ ἅττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ  
 ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκратες; Οἶον τοὺς μὲν γασ- Theory of  
 τριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας Retributive  
 καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένῃ καὶ τῶν τοι- Metempsy-  
 82 ούτων θηρίων εἰκός ἐνδύεσθαι ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Πάνν μὲν chosis.

of an evil life. The superstition, on the other hand, on which Hamlet is founded, is based on the idea of Justice speaking from the tomb by the apparition of the Injured and Innocent, and calling for vengeance on some evil deed.—(8.) τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς] τροφή, nurture, all with which the spirit converses, is here used for ἔξις, way of life, as is frequent, especially in Sophocles, who uses τρέφω so often in the sense of ἔχω. The same representation of the destiny of inferior souls is found in Timæus 42 B., etc.; and Phædr. 249 B. Compare Ovid, Metam. XV. 457, 'Volucres animas sumus, inque ferinas Possumus ire domos, pecudumque in pectora condī.'

E. (3.) εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθῃ] Abridged expression for εἰς ζῶα τοιοῦτοις ἦθεσι χρώμενα, ὅποια κ.τ.λ. The Homeric usage of ἦθῃ is worthy of remark in this connection, as it is used only of animals, and regards their haunts rather than habits. The illustrations that follow of transmigration into the bodies of animals have been understood both literally and allegorically. In Neo-Platonic times, when there was a disposition to allegorise and explain away the more crude portions of mythology and mythological philosophy, an attempt was made to show that Plato meant, by the brutes of which he speaks, only brutish men. Nemesius, c. 2, Μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος περὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο ἐξηγέθησαν . . . οἱ μὲν κυρίως (literally) ἤκουσαν τοὺς λύκους καὶ τοὺς λέοντας . . . οἱ δὲ τροπικῶς (figuratively) αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διέγνωσαν, τὰ ἦθῃ διὰ τῶν ζώων παρεμφαίνοντα. Plotinus belonged to the literal interpreters: Jamblichus was the chief of the allegorical.\* It seems clear, not only from Phædr. 249 B., but also from 82 B., where ants and men are spoken of as alternative tabernacles, that Plato himself, like Homer in regard to Circe's haunt, Od. X. 212, intended veritable animals.† Compare Arist. Nub. 349.—(6.) ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας] The old editions read φιλοποσίας, 'health-drinkings,' which is against the MSS., and indicates too venial a fault to be coupled with crimes (ὕβρεις κ.τ.λ.) On γαστριμαργίαι, cf. Eur. Cyclops, 334, (θύω) μεγίστη γαστρὶ τῇδε δαίμονων, and the picture of Menenius, Hor. Ep. I. 15, 26.

\* There seems also to have been a third or middle theory (that of Proclus and Syrianus, favoured by Olympiodorus), that the doctrine of Metempsychosis was to be understood as condemning the corrupt soul simply to the company of brutes, in the same way as it was supposed to hover around the grave, stress being laid on περὶ (not ἐν) in the Platonic text.

† Augustine (de Civ. Dei X. 30) has a chapter on Porphyry's doctrine on this matter, in which he commends him for rejecting the transmigration of souls into animal forms, and thereby 'preferring truth to Plato.'

Transmigra-  
tion exempli-  
fied in certain  
types of hu-  
man charac-  
ter passing  
into corre-  
sponding ani-  
mal forms.

οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἰεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, δηλαδὴ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύ- B νην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Ὅτι τούτους εἰκὸς ἐστὶν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιτῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετρίους. Εἰκός.

82 A. (8.) οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι] Though all do not attain to the dignity of the *ὄντως σοφοί*, yet there are supposed to be different degrees of happiness in the fate of those who fall short, or οἱ φαῦλοι, 81 D.—(9.) τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν] *Social and public virtue*, which is still beneath the highest place, because it may exist without the *φρόνησις* indispensable to constitute the highest virtue, and may be a mere instinctive fulfilling of the 'beaver intentions':—in Pol. X. 619 C., ἔδει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῇ. Cicero, as was natural for a Roman, ranked statesmanship and public virtue higher than the Greek did, and gave it the first rank in the scale of honour in a future life (Somn. Scip. 9): whereas, according to Plato, the political and industrial spirits were still among the *φαῦλοι*, though they might be εὐδαιμονέστατοι τῶν φαύλων.

B. (4.) εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν] This is explained by πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἡμερον thrown in, as it were, parenthetically. Cf. 90 D.—(5.) μελιτῶν ἢ σφηκῶν] Next to the Fourth Georgic of Virgil as a eulogium on the social instinct here typified in the Bee, stands the remarkable picture of the Hive as a community in Shakspeare's Henry V. 1, 2.—(7.) ἀνδρας μετρίους] It is doubtful whether the expression indicates blame or faint praise. If the former, *middling*; if the latter, as is more probable, *good honest people*, like *frugi*, probably, in Latin. Demosth. de Cor. § 10, speaks of οἱ μέτριοι, 'the respectable citizens,' as the class from which he sprung, though there is still a touch of inferiority attaching to the word, for he adds, *ἵνα μηδὲν ἐπαχθεῖς*

XXXII. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ Reiteration of the contrast between the Virtues and the aims of the Philosopher and those of the mass of men.  
 C παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπιώντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ᾧ ἐταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παρὰ διδῶσιν αὐταῖς αὐτούς, οὗ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πένιν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέν-  
 D τοι μὰ Δί', ἢ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἀπασιν, ἔφη, ᾧ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι, οἷς τι μέλει τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὥς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ

λέγω, affecting modesty. The principles of a Divine Morality, giving more value to the unconscious and self-denying affections, teach greater reverence than is accorded by Plato, for the 'Glad hearts, without reproach or blot, Who do Thy work, and *know it not*.' Wordsworth (Ode to Duty).

C. (1.) οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ] Stallbaum reads ἀλλῃ ἢ, as a natural epexegetical of μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι. The Bodleian, and several of the best MSS., have ἀλλ' ἢ. Although this second defining of the class seems superfluous, the dignity of 'Philosophy' is thereby brought out more emphatically. On φιλομαθής, compare Pol. II. 376 B., τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταυτόν.—(3.) οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες] Horace, Sat. II. 7, 83, 'Sapiens, sibi qui imperiosus, Quem neque pauperies, neque mors, neque vincula terrent, Responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores Fortis, et in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus, *Externi nequid valeat*,' etc. Cf. Cic. Epist. ad Div. V. 13, 'Laus sapientie maxima, non aliunde pendere, *ne extrinsecus aut bene aut male vivendi suspensas habere rationes*.' On the classification of the φαῦλοι into a higher grade, φίλαρχοι, and a lower and more numerous grade, φιλοχρήματοι, cf. note on 68 B.,

D. (3.) ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες ζῶσι] On one relative being made to serve two different verbs, cf. 81 B. n. πλάττω is used of culture, both of the body and of the soul: cf. Pol. II. 377 C., of the Ideal nurses, πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς μύθοις μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν.—(9.) παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν] παραλαμβάνειν is the expression for a master receiving a pupil from the hands of his parent or παιδαγωγός for

ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι, ἢ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.

XXXIII. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἔρῳ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ δι' εἴργμου διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἴργμου τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ξυλλήπτωρ εἴῃ τῷ δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύνει ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστή ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὥτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ

Philosophy finds the Soul not only a prisoner, but also in love with its prison.

training. Apol. 18 B., ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθον.

E. (4.) ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην] Compare, for the similarity of metaphor, II. Ep. Peter II. 22, ὅς τις λουσμένη εἰς κύλισμα βορβόρου. —(5.) κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν] Various interpretations have been given of this passage. 1°. Heindorf takes δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶ passively, as equivalent to ἐπιθυμεῖται, 'perceiving that the horror of its prison is an object of desire.' 2°. Stallbaum takes the idiom actively, = ἐπιθυμεῖ, and considers εἴργμος as virtually supplying the subject, 'feeling the terrible power of its prison, in that its gaoler eagerly desires (to find a way) whereby the Reason bound prisoner might become an abettor of its own captivity.' 3°. Hermann considers the clause after ὅτι not to be a circumlocution either for ἐπιθυμεῖ or ἐπιθυμεῖται, and takes ἐστὶ in the sense of γίγνεται: 'that its imprisonment (εἴργμος) arises from desire, how the prisoner might become,' etc. Of these views, the last is harsh, and the first has analogy against it, such expressions as διὰ φόβου εἶναι being applied to the subject *feeling*, not to the object *felt*. Stallbaum's interpretation presents fewest difficulties, and has the advantage of being in accordance with the tendency of Platonic thought, to speak of the body as seducing the soul, and endeavouring to imprison it. An illustrative parallel in the Christian consciousness is that of the Law in the members warring against the Law of the mind. —(7.) τῇ ἐδέσθαι] Hermann deserts the MSS., and

ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδεὶν  
 B ἄλλω ἄλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν  
 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅτι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ  
 ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγείσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ  
 μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοη-  
 τόν τε καὶ αἰδέες. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν  
 ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ οὕτως  
 ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ  
 φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν τις  
 σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν  
 τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὅσον ἂν τις οἰηθείη,  
 C οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ  
 πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει  
 καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέ-  
 βης. Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε

The emanci-  
 pation of the  
 prisoner must  
 not be fol-  
 lowed by a  
 return to  
 thralldom.

reads with Heindorf, τοῦ δεδέσθαι. The text may be explained as a dative defining *wherein*: as in Legg. I. 645 A., τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τοῦ νόμου αἰεὶ ἐνλλαυβάνειν.

83 B. (2.) ὅτι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων] δι' ἄλλων is opposed to αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν, the Senses being reckoned instrumental, that is, external to the mind itself. ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, i.e., the *variable* phenomenal, opposed to αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. (In the previous clause τῶν ὄντων is governed by ὅτι, as a genitive of *part.*)—(9.) οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν] τοσοῦτον, i.e., *not of the same* (small) *extent*, the standard in the one case being very different from that in the other; the common mind dwelling on the *effects* of lust, the philosophic mind piercing through beyond symptoms to the *causes*. τοσοῦτον had been pronounced with peculiar emphasis, so as to have the force of *τοσοῦτον μόνον*. Compare the Latin *tantum* in sense of *only*. Pol. X. 608 C., οἷε ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτου δεῖν χρόνον ἐσπουδακέναι; i.e., for so *short* a time. ἀπ' αὐτῶν refers to the substantives implied in the verbs preceding. πάσχειν ἀπό is worth remarking, as different from ὑπό, and implying an *occasional* influence from which one might and ought to get free. οἷον = *for example*.

C. (4.) ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου] The Editions have ἡ ψυχὴ, the MSS. ψυχῇ. *σύμα* and *ψυχῇ*, when used absolutely, may dispense with the article, as in 83 C. fin., cf. 84 A. When one has the article, the other has it also, as in 84 E. fin. Compare Pol. I. 354 A., οὐδέποτε ἄμα

ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι, περὶ  
 ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι  
 καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ  
 ὀρατά· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δῆ; Ὅτι ἐκά-  
 στη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν  
 πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δο-  
 ξάζουσιν αὐτὰ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ  
 γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγ-  
 κάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι  
 καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ  
 τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίεναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν  
 εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ  
 τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ E

λυσιτελίστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης, and immediately after, λυσιτελίστερον ἢ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης; Stephens reads ἐπὶ τῇ καὶ ἡγείσθαι, which renders τε in ἅμα τε unmeaning.—(7.) μάλιστα τὰ ὀρατά] τὰ, which had slipped out after the *homocoteleuton* of μάλιστα, was restored by Heindorf.

D. (2.) ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα] This picture suggests the Tragic image of 'Strength and Force' nailing Prometheus to the Caucasian rock. Hor. Sat. II. 2, 79, 'Quin corpus onustum Hesternis vitilis, animum quoque praegravat una, Atque affigit humo, divinae particulam auræ.' (Compare the same figure regarding good influences in LXX. Eccles. XII. 11, λόγοι σοφῶν ὡς ἦλοι πεφντευμένοι.) Wytttenbach has collected, in his Note on Plut. Mor. 567 F., the many repetitions of this figure (ἦλος) by the imitators of Plato.—(6.) ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος] A similar *paronomasia* of sound in Laches 188 B., οὐδὲν ἄηθες οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἀηχέες. οἷα = τοιαύτη ὥστε, as in 94 E.—(8.) τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα] Cf. 67 A. n.—(9.) ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι] Cf. Timæus 42 A., ὅποτε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτεῦσθαι ἐν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, sc. αἱ ψυχαί.

E. (4.) τοῦτων τοῖνων ἔνεκα] i.e., From considerations drawn from the nature and destinies of the Soul. Hermann reads φαίνονται for φασιν of MSS.

84 A. (1.) οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ'] Compare the idiom in Acts XVI. 37, Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ ἐθέλοντες αὐτοὶ ἡμῶς ἐξαγαγέτωσαν.—(6.) Πηνελόπεια . . . . . ἰστὸν μεταχειριζομένη] Hermann, following the majority of the MSS., reads μεταχειριζομένης, considering this appended clause as a variation equivalent to λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης. The other reading, which is defended by Schmidt, is preferable, (1<sup>st</sup>) as being more difficult to account for, if a mis-

μονοειδούς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXXIV. Τούτων τοῖνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ  
 84 ἕνεκα [φαίνονται] ἥ σὺ οἶε; Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γάρ ἄλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζομένην· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῇ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰὲν ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ  
 B τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἶεται οὕτω δεῖν, ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς

A soul freed from captivity to outward sense, rejoicing in its liberty, and conversant with Pure Perceptions, need not be alarmed at the Deliverance called Death.

take, than μεταχειριζομένης, which last is easily accounted for by the proximity of Πηνελόπης, (2<sup>d</sup>) as not requiring the presence of τινός or ὥσπερ with Πηνελόπης, which one would expect on the other hypothesis, (3<sup>d</sup>) as educing a more satisfactory sense. Πηνελόπης may depend either upon ἰστὸν or upon ἐναντίως (cf. 112 B., τούτου . . . ἐναντίως ῥέων).—The latter construction, which seems preferable, yields this sense: 'The Soul, liberated by Philosophy, but surrendering itself to the Passions, so as to be again entangled in bonds, condemns itself to endless labour, handling, so to speak, its web in the very opposite way from the example of Penelope.' Such a soul does the reverse of what Penelope did, who, though she wove during the day (in which, as being woman's work, there was nothing strange), yet at night did what was strange, unwove the work of the day, for the sake of preserving her honour and chastity; whereas this Soul, set free in the still εὐφρονή by the visitings of philosophy, weaves around herself in the garish day the old web of thralldom, and becomes the instrument, not of her own purity, but of her degradation. The legend of Penelope is usually employed simply as a proverb for 'inanis opera,' as in Cic. Acad. II. 29, 'Quid? quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telum retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.' Here it is used in a deeper and more pregnant sense.—(7.) γαλήνην τούτων] i.e., From these disturbing influences.—(9.) τὸ ἀδόξαστον] i.e., Not what rests on the shifting sands of εἶδός, mere seeming, but on the rock of ἐπιστήμη, grounded knowledge, founded on the Unchangeable Ideas forming the basis of Things. Cf. 66 B. n.

B. (4.) τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν] These are κακά not so much in the sense of infortunia as of vitia. Cf. 81 A., where they are enumerated.—(5.)

τὸ ξυγγενές καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφνυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ.

Pause in the discussion. Simmias and Cebes talk aside for a little, and Socrates asks them to state any farther doubts.

XXXV. Σιγῇ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σω- C  
κράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρη-  
μένῳ λόγῳ ᾗν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν  
οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ  
διελεγέσθην καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῶ ἤρετο· Τί; ἔφη,  
ὕμιν τὰ λεχθέντα μὴν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς  
γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ

ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα] The MSS. have δέ for γε, which was corrected by Stephens, who also read ἐπιτηδεύουσα, a reading preferred by H. Schmidt. The clause ὅπως μὴ has been understood by some, such as Serranus, as the explanation of ταῦτά γε, but this would yield a weak conclusion: 'there is no reason to fear dispersion, if the soul has striven so that the feared dispersion may not take place.' The majority of critics, therefore, regard ὅπως μὴ as immediately dependent on μὴ φοβηθῇ, with ταῦτά γε ἐπιτηδεύσασα as a condition necessary to the freedom from fear. Although more frequently introducing an object to be avoided, ὅπως μὴ is found also introducing a thing to be feared, as in 77 B. Cf. Conv. 193 A., φόβος οὖν ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ κόσμοι ᾤμεν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ διασχισθήσεται, where ἐὰν μὴ introduces a conditional clause exactly similar to ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα.—(6.) ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος] For ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.—(7.) διαπτομένη κ.τ.λ. The combination of words following occurred also in 70 A., in the objection led by Cebes, which has now met with a refutation by Socrates, who ends with a direct negation in terms of the objection.

C. (2.) πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ᾗν] This use of πρὸς with Dat. signifies to be absorbed in a subject. Illustrations of the idiom are given by Shilleto, Demosth. de Falsa. Leg. 380, and in late Greek by Wyttenbach, Plut. Mor. 549 D. Compare the Horatian 'Totus in illis;' 'omnis in hoc sum.'—(3.) ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο] Fischer wrongly interpreted ἰδεῖν as equivalent to βλέπειν, to have a (certain) look. It is a kind of gerundive usage of the Infinitive: 'as he looked, when one observed him.' The same pleonasm, and almost the same construction, in Timæus 52 E., παντοδαπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι. Heindorf compares Xen. Cyr. V. 4, 11, Aristoph. Av. 1710, where, however, ὅποιος and οἶος occur, which have the infinitive more easily attached to them than has the modal particle ὥς. A more pertinent



μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκρίσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ ξυμπαλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάληθ' ἔσσι μοι ἐρῶ. πάλα γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὁκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀγῶδες ἢ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ξυμφορὰν. καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας ἐγ' ἑλπίσας τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησι, Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι ὥς οὐ ξυμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν

Simmias says he is loath to cause what he fears is trouble. So- crates pro- claims asto- nishment at the little im- pression his words have made, in con- vincing them of his happi- ness and hopes.

example is Eur. Herc. Fur., 1002, εἰκῶν, ὡς ὄραν ἐφαίνετο, Παλλὰς.—(5.) Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα] Heindorf would place a break after λεχ-θέντα, on the analogy of Soph. Elect. 766, ὦ Ζεῦ, τί ταῦτα; πότερον εὐτυχῇ λέγω; i.e., τί ταῦτα λέγω; 'What shall I say of these things,' supplying δοκεῖ to both clauses. Stallbaum and Hermann follow the old punctuation, and regard the peculiar position of ὑμῖν and μῶν μὴ as de- signed to call more decided attention.—(9.) οὐδὲν λέγω] I have nothing to say, make no objection. Regarding οὐδὲν λέγω in another sense, cf. 63 A., note.

D. (1.) καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν] αὐτοί opposed to the other alternative, καὶ αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ κ.τ.λ.—(2.) φαίνεται λεχθῆναι] λεχθῆναι Heindorf translates as if αὐν were joined to it, dici posse. Rather, dici opus esse. Verbs of thinking (like φαίνεται) often take a bare Infinitive to express duty. Protag. 346 B, ἡγήσατο ἐπαινέσαι, 'judicavit se laudare debere.'

E. (3.) μὴ . . . διάκειμαι] Cf. Isocr. Ægin., 389 D., εἰ δυσκολώτερον διὰ τὴν νόσον διέκειτο. According to Heindorf and Buttmann, this is a real Conjunction; but, if so, why should the special inflection of that mood present in συγκέται in 93 A., and in other Platonic passages, be absent here? Stallbaum considers it an instance of μὴ interrogative = 'num,' and instances Hipp. Maj. 296 A., φοβοῦμαι τί ποτ' αὐτὸν λέγομεν, as an interro- gative after a verb of fearing. It is better to consider the indicative\* as used

\* The Perfect tense, as expressive of recent and fresh certainty, is placed in the Indicative after verbs of fearing. Besides Thucyd. III. 68, cf. Lysis. 218 D., φοβοῦμαι μὴ λόγοις . . . ψευδεῖσιν ἐντετυγῆκαμεν. In Demosth. de Falsa Leg., 342, 8, Isocr. ad Phil. p. 85 E., and Soph. Philoct. 493, the proper readings are ἐμπεποίηκε, ἐξίστηκα, and βίβηκε. Κεῖμαι (and here διάκειμαι), seems to follow the analogy of Perfects: cf. Eur. Troad. 179, τρομερά . . . μὴ με κτείνειν δόξ' Ἀργείων κείται μέλειαν. (In Demosth. de Falsa Leg., 411, 3, an instance occurs of the composite conjunctive of a Perfect, δίδωκα μὴ τότε μὲν τούτοις συνεισπιάσθησθί με . . . νῦν δ' ἀναπνεύωτές ἦτε).

In lofty  
strain he  
chides them  
by the exam-  
ple of the  
lying Swan  
singing its  
last song joy-  
fully through  
a foresight of  
coming glad-  
ness.

διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῇ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φανυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οἱ ἐπειδὴν αἰσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῇ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, 85 γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ὀπιεῖναι, οὐπερ εἰσὶ θεράποντες. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογιζόμενοι ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ἄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγοῖ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπηῖται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' αἶτε, οἶμαι, τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ B προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῇ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ.

to indicate that the apprehension as to Socrates being discomposed amounted to *certainly* in the minds of his friends that he was so.—(4.) τῶν κύκνων] On some notices of this bird in ancient Literature, see Note O.

85 A. (1.) τότε ἐὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι] Blomfield (Gloss. *Æsch. Ag.* 1419) would change μάλιστα into κάλλιστα (after Porson, *Phœn.* 878) to avoid a seeming tautology. It was, however, the *fulness* and *strength*, rather than the *beauty*, of the song, that would be relied upon as indicative of a happy state.—(5.) ἐξάδειν] Heindorf explains: *cantando vocem emittere*, or better, *cantando animam efflare* (breathe the last breath in song). Plutarch (*Sympos.* 161 C.) applies ἐξάειν to Arion when about to plunge overboard.—(7.) ἢ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ ἃ] In the majority of MSS., one article suffices for the first two nouns, which are of the same gender, as if to indicate their connection as sisters mythologically. (Cf. 94 D., where a number of MSS. omit the second τὴν.) ἃ is to be explained by reference to ὄρνεον preceding. On this group of 'Attic Birds,' see Note O.

B. (1.) μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι] Compare Oppian *Cyneg.* II. 548, κύκνοι μαντιπόλοι, γοόν ὑστάτον αἰέδοντες. *Cygnus*, in Lycophron 426, is another name for 'Calchas the seer.' Cf. *Dircaeus Cynus* in Horace, *Od.* IV. 2, 26. The white swan and the dark raven were equally sacred to Apollo, who was the god of Light, and also the Destroyer. Philo de Propr. *Animilium* 10, has some interesting lines on the swan, ending with the counsel: Ἀνθρώπε φιλόψυχε, τὸν κύκνον βλέπων, Πρὸς τὴν τελευτήν, εἰ φρονεῖς, μὴ στυγνάσῃς.—(5.) οὐ χεῖρῳ ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν] The clear vision, or power of presentiment, sometimes imparted in the hour

ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως [ἂν οἱ] Ἀθηναίων ἐῷσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ C Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ ἀπορῶ; καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ἥ οὐκ Simmias then takes courage to state his doubt, but expresses his fear of the difficulty of discovering the truth, in the present life. ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ, τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν, ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον

of death, was by the ancients regarded as divination, and of divine origin, and not to be explained by the principle that 'Old Experience doth attain To something like prophetic strain.' Patroclus, when dying, prophesies the fate of Hector, who in turn prophesies that of Achilles (Il. XVI. 864, and XXII. 358: cf. Heyne, Vol. VII. p. 278.) So, in Apol. 39 C., Socrates says: καὶ γὰρ εἰμι ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησιμεύουσιν, ὅ τ' αὖ μὲλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι.—(8.) ἕως ἂν οἱ Ἀθηναίων] The over-ingenuity of Cobet (Nov. Lect. p. 230) finds fault with the expression—'Ἀθηναίων ἄνδρες, and would metamorphose the whole clause into ἕως ἂν οἱ ἕνδεκα ἐῷσιν. The connection of Ἀθηναίων with ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα, (which is to be regarded as one expression), is sufficiently justified by τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικάσταῖς in 69 E. Cf. οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν in Thucyd. III. 22. The words ἂν οἱ are wanting in the early editions, and in the majority of MSS., including the Bodleian.

C. (2.) οὐκ ἀποδέχεται] ἀποδέχομαι, accept as proved; ἀποδεῖκνυμι, prove. Both meanings meet in the Latin *probo*.—(4.) ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ] Olympiodorus gives the gratuitous explanation: ἀδύνατον μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς, παγχάλεπον δὲ τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις.—(5.) μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν] μὴ οὐ (= *quin* in Latin) has, in πάνυ μαλθακός, which is equal to *ἀνανδρός*, a virtual negative on which it is dependent.—(6.) μὴ προαφίστασθαι] This is to be regarded as one notion (= *προσκαρτερεῖν*) and as an expansion of the duty expressed in ἐλέγχειν, so that the proposal of Stephens and Forster to omit μὴ before προαφ. is unnecessary.—(8.) ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν] μαθεῖν, to learn by the teaching of another; εὐρεῖν, by

The search for Truth represented as a Voyage in which the mariner should cling to the most stable human teaching, unless he can procure a firmer vessel—some Divine Word.

τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, D ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἔμαντὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἔμαντὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.

XXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἐταῖρε, E ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅπη δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς. Ταύτη ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἦ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἂν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἶποι, ὥς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι

one's own efforts; cf. Legg. XII. 968 D. Compare, in 99 D., παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν and αὐτὸν εὐρεῖν, which are specified as different ways of reaching ἐπιστήμη, sailing which a δεύτερος πλοῦς is proposed for adoption, as here. The following fragment of Sophocles is remarkable as a kind of parallel to this passage, ending in a similar climax:—

τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετὰ  
ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἤτησά μην.

D. (2.) ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον] Alluding to the proverbial expression, ἐπ' ἐλπίδου ὀχεῖσθαι: cf. Porson on Orestes 68; Blomf. Gloss. Æsch. Ag. 488.—(4.) ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου] The criticism of this important and much-quoted passage exceeds the limits of a common note: some remarks upon it will be found in Note P.—(8.) πρὸς ἔμαντὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε] Explained by 84 C., πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην, i.e., Simmias and Cebes.

86 A. (1.) αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα] Adverting to the principle, familiar to him as a Pythagorean, that 'the Soul is a Harmony,' which, moreover, is represented as a widespread opinion (cf. 88 D., 92 D.), Simmias asks Socrates to consider the objection that there is danger lest it be with the soul on the dissolution of the body, as it is with the music on the breaking of a lyre. This is an instance in which Socrates has to contend against the disadvantage entailed by a semi-poetic metaphor, which, though serviceable as an illustration, is infelicitous as a definition.—(3.) ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡ κατάξῃ] The protasis thus introduced has no direct apodosis, the argument being permitted, as often happens in conversation, to weave itself into a complication

86 καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμოსμένῃ λύρα, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ζύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγγενῇ. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡ κατὰ τὴν λύραν ἡ διατέμνη καὶ διαρρήξη τὰς χορδὰς, εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι—οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν εἶναι διερρωγυῖων τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὐσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀθανάτου Β ὁμοφυῇ τε καὶ ξυγγενῇ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην· ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη εἶναι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπῆσθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν,—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι,

Exposition of the objection of Simmias, founded on the notion that the Soul is a harmony, and is therefore in the body as the music in the Lyre.

(cf. 80 D., 88 A.), in which the grammatical sequence may be obscure, while the purpose is plain. The apodosis, properly speaking, does not occur till 86 D., where the resumptive οὖν marks the consummation.—(6.) οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη] Bekker expels ἂν, on the ground that it is not needed in indirect speech proceeding from the supposed reasoner (εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο). All the MSS. support it, and, moreover, it is necessary, as contingency is implied.

B. (2.) ἀλλὰ φαίη] This optative resumes the construction and connection of δισχυρίζοιτο.—(7.) ξυνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ] This particular manner of elucidating the principle that 'the Soul is a Harmony,' savours more of the school of the Eleatics than of the Pythagoreans, whose machinery was properly that of Numbers. It was a maxim of Parmenides, 'Ὅτι γὰρ ἐκάστῃ ἔχει κρᾶσις μελίων πολυκάπτων, τῷ νόῳ ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν.\* Zeno followed Parmenides with a more developed theory: cf. Diog. La. (IX. 29), γεγενῆσθαι τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ—καὶ ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ μῆδενός τούτων ἐπικράτησιν. In later times this hypothesis was revived by the musician Aristoxenus (Cic. Tusc. I. 10), although his master Aristotle expressed his opinion of it in these trenchant words (de Anima, I. 4, 1): καὶ ἄλλη δὲ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς

\* Parmenides seems to have had in view a contradiction to the theistic principle of Homer: Od. XVIII. 136, τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἀγγοῖ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ ξυνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὕσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκαστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἕως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ. ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, D εἰάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὕσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῇ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρῶτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

XXXVII. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λό-

. . . ἀρμονίαν γὰρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι . . . τὸ δὲ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρμονίας, ψυχῇ δὲ πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν. ὑμῶς δὲ ὑμᾶς καθ' ὑμεῖς λέγειν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. Lucretius gives an exposition, and also a refutation, of this hypothesis in Lib. III. 98—140.

D. (4.) Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης] 'Looking through the company (cf. 89 A., ὁξέως ἦσθετο) to see the effect of the discussion.' Cf. Plut. Mor. 548 B., ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τι θαυμάσαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ἀτοπίαν . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαβλέψαντες. The old Editions have διαβλεψάμενος against the MSS., probably from remembering περιβλεψάμενος, frequent in the New Testament.—(5.) δίκαια μέντοι.] In rapid and decided replies, μέντοι has a confirmative force like Latin *vero*. Cf. 68 B., 73 D., 81 D.—(7.) ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου] ἀπτομαι, as explained by ἐγκλημα beneath, is here used in the sense of *attack*, for which stands ordinarily *κατάπτομαι*. Cf. Herod. V. 92, 3. The ordinary use of ἀπτομαι is that exemplified in 64 A., 65 B., *lay hold of* as a guide.

E. (3.) εἰάν τι ἐοικῶσι προσάδειν] A musical term, as the discussion turns upon an image derived from music. A similar metaphor in 92 C.

γον. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρό-  
 Ε τερὸν Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὁδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα  
 χρόνον ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα  
 δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ ξυγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἂν τι δοκῶσι προσά-  
 δειν, ἂν δὲ μὴ, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ'  
 ἄγε, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σέ αὖ θράπττον  
 [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]. Λέγω δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ  
 φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς  
 87 ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταῦτόν ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ  
 ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρῶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ  
 ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάννυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές  
 ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, πάννυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι· ὥς δὲ καὶ ἀπο-  
 θανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔσται, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε. ὥς μὲν  
 οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ  
 ξυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πᾶσι τού-  
 τοις πάννυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἂν φαίῃ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι  
 ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ γε ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό  
 Β γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ

Exposition of the objection of Cebes, who concedes that the Soul may survive several of its tabernacles, but denies that the Soul is thereby necessarily immortal throughout all duration.

Observe the change of construction, ἡ—ἐὰν δὲ μὴ for the ordinary ἡ—ἡ. ὑπερδικεῖν the Scholiast explains as *συνηγορεῖν*.—(5.) τί ἦν τὸ σέ αὖ θράπττον] Stallbaum reads from Par. L., Aug. and Ven. II., ὁ for τὸ, which introduces ἀπιστίαν παρέχει to a place in the sentence. Hermann brackets these last words as a gloss.

87 A. (2.) οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι] The MSS. have all ἀντιτίθεμαι. Olympiodorus has the right reading. The origin of the expression is seen in Hipparch. 229 E., ὥσπερ πεττεῦσαν ἐθέλω ἀναθέσθαι (to take back a move at draughts). εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος, i.e., ἀνθρώπου, as expressed in 76 C. —(5.) οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε] Scil. ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι.—(7.) Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει] Cebes says he does not agree with Simmias in his objection which would lead to a conclusion which he considers wrong, viz., the inferiority of the soul both in strength and in duration. Regarding μὲν, in ὥς μὲν, H. Schmidt observes that the natural sequence with δέ is interrupted by the digression: δοκεῖ γάρ.—(8.) ἂν φαίῃ ὁ λόγος] Compare the similar personification: Crito 51 C., φαίεν ἂν ἴσων οἱ νόμοι. Cf. φησὶν ὁ λόγος, in Sophist. 238 B.

B. (5.) ὥσπερ ἂν τις] Heindorf proposes to read ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, as in 98 C. This is unnecessary, as in this passage one verb is common to the two

Objection of  
Cebes contin-  
ued.

σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σώζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκειναι, εἰ τί λέγω· εἰκόνας γάρ τινος, ὡς εἴκοι, καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλῳλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἡμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἔστι σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλῳλε, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοίῃ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῶν πότερον πολυχρονιώτερον ἔστι τὸ γένος C ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρεῖα τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δέ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἶοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλῳλε. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὃ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἂ λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὐθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλῳλε πολ-

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 πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη  
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θις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις  
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συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι  
καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἐν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν  
ἀπόλλυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διά-  
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XXXVIII. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν  
ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, C

109 A.) Obscurity is avoided by the re-appearance of *ψυχῇ* in next clause. The argument of Cebes is that the soul cannot but suffer in every new birth, or, as some would phrase it, every new shipwreck on new shores. The doctrine of Metempsychosis is thus manifestly implied.—(7.) *ἐοὺς ἐπὶ ταῦτα*] A *caviet* is here introduced, defining what was *not* included in the previous concession. This clause is therefore still a part of the *protasis* after *εἰ*, as is shown by *μηκέτι* (not *οὐκέτι*). *μηκέτι* here = *non item*.

B. (4.) *οὐδενὶ προσήκει*] 'No one, in facing death boldly, can pretend that he is free from foolishness in so doing, unless he is able to demonstrate the soul's *perpetual* imperishableness.'—(7.) *ἀνάγκη εἶναι*] Scil. *εἰκός ἐστι*, contained in previous *προσήκει*. Cf. 91 D., note.—(10.) *πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες*] It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the dramatic effect of this Pause in the great Discussion, when both Socrates and the narrator hold their breath for a time in the view of the Doubts suggested by the Two Friends. These Doubts have drifted like icebergs into the path of the voyagers: the helmsman alone views the *monstra natantia* without alarm.

C. (4.) *τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις*] The dative is accounted for by the verbal notion latent in *ἀπιστίαν*. The construction is varied by *εἰς*

ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ \*μπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἰπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ἦ.

Phædo pauses to describe the effect produced by the statement of these two objections on the Socratic group.

His auditor Echecrates expresses the intensity of his interest in the varying fortunes of the discussion.

EX. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται, Τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὥς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἄπιστίαν καταπέπτωκε. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέ με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προὔδεδόκτο· καὶ πάννυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὃς με πείσει ὥς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; E καὶ πότερον κἀκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῆς, ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρᾶως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῶν διέλθε ὥς δύνασθαι ἀκριβέστατα.

(= *quod attinet ad*) in next clause.—(6.) ἄπιστα ἦ] Heindorf, followed by Bekker and Stallbaum, changed ἦ into εἰη against the MSS. The introduction of the conjunctive seems to express the universal importance of the subject itself compared with the accident whether or not the present audience might be able to appreciate it.

D. (1.) λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν] πρὸς ἑμ. is to be connected with λέγειν, ἐπέρχεται governing αὐτόν με.—(2.) ὃν ./. ἔλεγε λόγον] Instead of λόγον. Compare similar attraction in 66 E.—(4.) ἀντιλαμβάνεται] Heindorf translates, *capit et delectat*; Stallbaum gives force to ἀντί, *ita capit ut ab altera illa sententia abstrahat*. ὥσπερ, shortly after, is to be taken adverbially = *quodammodo*.—(9.) μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον] Perhaps an allusion from the chase, cf. 66 A.

E. (1.) ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος] τι belongs to ἀχθόμενος. Cf. Soph. 218 A., ἀν δ' ἄρα τι τῷ μήκει πόνων ἄχθῃ.

89 A. (1.) τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος] For ἐκεῖνον, *hnt* attracted by the nearer verb, by which means an unpleasant rhyme is

Phaedo's testimony as to the calmness and even playfulness of his Master

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενομένου. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκείνος ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ πονῶν· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾗσθητο ὃ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφηνγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὔτρεψε πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ ξυσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ B

avoided.—(3.) ὡς ἡδέως] Cf. ὡς in 68 E.—(4.) ἀπεδέξατο] here, simply, *to listen to*, not, as in 85 C., *to accept*. As illustrating ἀγαμένως, compare the compliment in 78 A., ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εἴροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους κ.τ.λ.—(5.) ἰάσατο] Referring to the medical term, πεπόνθειμεν. The metaphor changes then to scenes of military life, rallying (ἀνακαλεῖσθαι) those retreating. On the order of the observations, ἀπεδέξατο . . . ᾗσθητο . . . ἰάσατο, Olympiodorus (p. 144) fancifully remarks, τρία ἀντὶ ἑμαρτύρησεν, ἃ δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν ἀριστον ἰατρόν, πρῶτον προθυμίαν εἰννοικῆν, δεύτερον διάγνωσιν τοῦ πάθους, τρίτον τὴν ἴασιν.

B. (1.) ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός] Scil. δῖφρον, which Plutarch, in his imitation of this passage (Sympos. 150 A.), supplies.—(2.) καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφ.] Compare Chremes in Terent. Heaut. IV. 5, 14, 'Non possum pati Quin tibi caput demulceam: accede huc, Syre.'—(5.) κόμας ἀποκερεῖ] The Greeks, always remarkable for their pride in their hair (cf. καρηκομῶντες Ἀχαιοί), showed their grief in mourning by cutting off their locks. Notwithstanding some variety of tradition regarding the Spartans (Müller's Dor. II. 287), this was the general practice, as is shown by the familiar way in which Socrates refers to it above: cf. Hom. Od. IV. 198; Eur. Suppl. 972, πένθιμοι κουραί: Id. Helen. 367; Alcest. 429, where the Thessalian steeds are shorn of their manes. (Lycophron 976, regarding the Trojans letting the hair grow, is not evidence regarding the custom of the Greeks.)—(8.)

\* The Romans, whose culture of beauty was less intense than that of the Greeks, and whose active habits made it more convenient that the hair should be worn short, showed sorrow by letting the hair grow (*capillum promittere*, cf. Sueton. Jul. 57). (Plutarch's statement (Mor. 287 B.) shows that the Greeks of his day commonly adopted the Roman practice.) Kindred to the Greek custom was the semi-religious rite of cutting off a lock and placing it at

πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγὼ. καταλήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν  
καὶ ξυμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ,  
ὅποτε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Λύριον δὴ,  
ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκε-  
ρεῖ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ  
πείθῃ. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, καγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς  
καὶ σὺ ταύτας, εἴνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ  
C δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἴην  
καὶ με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην, ὥσπερ  
Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμα-  
χόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ'  
ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' Ἡρακλῆς οἰός τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ  
καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν.

εἴνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ] *If our doctrine is mortally stricken* (Whewell). ἀναβιώσασθαι is not from ἀναβιών, but from ἀναβιώσκομαι, which is transitive in Crito 48 C., as it is also here.

C. (2.) ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι] The story of the death of the Argives, in consequence of the loss (B.C. 546) of the debatable land of Thyrea, lying between their country and Laconia, is found in Herodotus I. 82. The struggle to which Socrates here alludes forms the frequent subject of epigrams in honour of the combatants: cf. Anthol. VII. 244, 431—2, 720—1.—(5.) πρὸς δύο . . . οὐδ' Ἡρακλῆς] *Even Hercules is not a match for two.* The proverb arose from the legend of the fight of Hercules with the Hydra, on which occasion Heræ sent a crab to assail the hero in flank, so that he was compelled to call in the help of his friend Iolaus. Cf. Eur. Ion., 200: Ἀσπιστὰς Ἰόλαος, ὃς Κοινοῖς αἰρούμενος πόνους, Δίῳ παιδὶ συναντλεῖ. A similar use of the Proverb, with fuller explanation, occurs in Euthydem. 297 C. Cf. Legg. XI. 919 B., πρὸς δύο μάχεσθαι . . . χαλεπόν. (Compare the elegant epigram of Rufinus, on the difficulty of resisting Eros in league with Bacchus (Anthol. V. 93), τί μόνος πρὸς οὐ ἐγὼ δύναμαι.) Phædo afterwards modestly protests against the notion of his assuming the part of the chief champion in fighting what we may call the new monsters from the deep (the Hydra and Crab) conjured up by Simmias and Cebes.—The Homeric illustration of the advantage of co-operation, even to the strongest, is that of Diomed, who is a gainer by having Ulysses to help him, Il. X. 224—6.

the tomb of a relation, Æsch. Choeph. 7, πλόκαμος πενθητήριος, Soph. Elect. 451: cf. Hom. Il. XXIII. 185, 182, where it is thrown on the body while still on the funeral pile. Among the Orientals the Greek mode of mourning is sometimes spoken of as prevailing, as LXX. Job I. 20 (cf. Herod. II. 66 fin.): at other times the Roman, as Il. Sam. XIX. 24, cf. Genes. XLJ. 14.

Παρακαλῶ τοῖνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.

XXXIX. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὐκ Δ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὃ τι ἂν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ E τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦ οὐκ ἥσθησαι σὺ τούτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέ-

Socrates rallies them to the discussion by showing them that Misology, or distrust in Argument, is a kind of sister to Misanthropy, or distrust in Men.

—(6.) *ἔως ἔτι ῥῶς ἔστιν*] The mention of this sounds like the knell of a minute bell, reminding us that the remaining hours are few.

D. (1.) *μισόλογοι*] Socrates prepares the way for a rallying to the attack by a slight diversion, the ease and collectedness of which mark the Master. He takes occasion to enlarge on the danger of impatience in Reasoning, arguing that, as precipitation in trusting men without trial produces Misanthropy, so impatience at failures or at difficulties in Reasoning has a tendency to produce Misology, or distrust in the possibility of attaining Truth. The strain of Socratic thought is echoed by Minucius Felix (in Octavio XIV. 4): ‘*Assidue temeritate decepti, culpam iudicii transferunt ad incerti querelam, ut damnatis omnibus malint universa suspendere quam de fallacibus judicare. Igitur nobis providendum est, ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus; ita ut in execrationem et odium hominum plerique simpliciores efferantur.*’—(2.) *οὐ . . . μεῖζον τούτου κακόν*] As *φρόνησις* is the greatest good, aversion to the means of procuring *φρόνησις* must be the greatest evil. *τούτου*, which is pleonastic, finds its explanation in *ἢ λόγους μισήσας*. An *Infinitive* with *ἦ* is more common in such instances. Cf. *Crito* 44 C., *καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχιῶν εἴη ταύτης ἐδῶκα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιῆσθαι κ.τ.λ.*; also *Eur. Med.* 563, *τί τοῦδ' ἂν εὐρημ' εὐρον εὐτυχέστερον ἢ παῖδα γῆμαι βασιλέως, φυχὰς γεγώς*. The use of the participle *μισήσας* however, is similar to that of *οἶον ἢ νοσήσας* in 83 C.



χνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ  
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτο, ὥσπερ  
 ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ ποιηροὺς  
 90 σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλεί-  
 στους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ. Ὡσπερ, ἡ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν  
 σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων οἶε τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι  
 ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ  
 κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἡ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδύν, ἡ αἰσchrὸν ἢ  
 καλόν, ἡ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἡ οὐκ ἦσθαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν  
 τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ  
 δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκ-  
 B οὖν οἶε, ἔφη, εἰ ποιηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν  
 ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκός γε,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι  
 οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ  
 ἐφεσπόμεν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη ἦ, ἐπειδὴν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ  
 ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπειτα

E. (4.) ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπειαν] Compare Lucian's account of the cause of Timon's misanthropy (Tim. c. 8), *χρηστότης ἐπέτριψεν αὐτὸν . . . . ὥς δὲ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ ἄνοια καὶ εὐήθεια καὶ ἀκρι- σία περὶ τῶν φέλων; ὅς οὐ συνίει κόραξι καὶ λύκοις χαριζόμενος.*— (6.) ὥσπερ ἔχει] οὕτως finds its explanation in ὥσπερ ἔχει. Regarding the connection of *σφόδρα* in next clause, critics differ: it seems, however, more naturally joined to the preceding adjectives than to *ὀλίγους*, as it is necessary to mark out, not the classes, but the *extremes* of the classes, in contrast with τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ.

90 B. (3.) ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι] 'That, however, is not the analogy I would draw between arguments and men (viz., that the extremely bad and the extremely good ones are very rare, and the majority is neither very bad nor very good, an observation which I meant to apply only to men), though I was led to follow out that illustration in answer to your request for explanation, (in 90 A., πῶς λέγεις;) but it is the analogy founded on this case, namely, when one believes a certain argument to be true, without the proper acquaintance with arguments, and then soon after, etc., comes at last to think there is no truth.' The apodosis, to be introduced by ἦ, is lost like a stream in the sand, but the main current of the apodosis re-appears in *τελευτῶντες οἴονται κ.τ.λ.* One feature of the anacoluthon consists in departing from the singular number (*τις*) to the plural.

ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' C ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ᾧ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνε- D σθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν τις αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λειδορῶν [τοὺς λόγους] διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθεῖ; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

XL. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει E οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὕτω ὑγι-

Contrast between himself and certain disputants of the time, whose reasonings were as unstable as the tides of the Euripus.

C. (1.) οἱ περὶ τοῖς ἀντιλογικοῖς λόγοις] Certain disputers, generally supposed to be 'the Sophists,' are referred to as being prone to contend on any side, 'confute, change hands, and still confute.' Cf. 91 A., where these disputers are represented as striving only for effect; and 101 E., where they are described as succeeding in pleasing themselves. Hence the necessity that Socrates felt himself under of tackling these Protean disputers to strict definitions of terms, so that they might not, so to speak, thimble-riq with words.—(5.) ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ] Proverb of instability. The action of the currents in this channel was a puzzle to antiquity: Liv. XXVIII. 6; Cic. de Nat. Deor. III. 10. Cf. Æsch. Agam. 183, Ἀλκίδος παλὶ ῥροθοῖ τόποι, where see Blomfield.

D. (1.) ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι] In Stephen's edition, after ἔπειτα stand the words τοῦτου ἐκπεσὼν ἀπορῇ, resting on the authority of Serranus, but they are judged to be an interpolation into the Greek text, drawn only from the Latin version of Ficinus. They are now rejected by critics as a

ὥς ἔχομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς  
 91 ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου· ὥς κινδυνεύω  
 ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως  
 ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαιδευτοὶ φιλονείκως. καὶ  
 γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπη μὲν ἔχει  
 περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ  
 ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσι, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται.  
 καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων  
 διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει  
 ἀληθὴ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον, ἀλλ'  
 ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογιζο-  
 B μαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε· θεᾶσαι ὥς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν  
 τυγχάνει ἀληθὴ ὄντα ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πει-  
 σθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μὴδὲν ἔστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν  
 γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς παρ-  
 οῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἡ δὲ ἀγνοιά μοι αὕτη  
 οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ᾔην, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον  
 ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ  
 C ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ

Socrates, in farther depicting his personal position, claims to be unlike those persons, inasmuch as he cared less for the power of producing an impression than for attaining Truth.

disturbance to the sense and construction, and as not having MS. authority.  
 —(6.) [τοὺς λόγους] Hermann brackets these words, as not being found in Bodl. Ven. II. and Tub. MSS.

91 A. (3.) οἱ πάνυ ἀπαιδευτοὶ] i.e., ἀνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης.—(9.) εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον] 'Except in so far as it may be a secondary result.' The MSS. have εἴη, the H of which might easily have arisen out of the following Π, and Hermann is right in reading εἰ after εἰ μὴ, as necessary to the sense. Compare Politic. 286 D., οὐδὲν προσδεησόμεθα, πλὴν εἰ μὴ πάρεργόν τι, where πλὴν answers to εἰ μὴ of the text, and is fortified by εἰ. (The insertion of a superfluous μὴ after πλὴν εἰ makes no essential difference between the constructions.) Socrates here says, with radiant cheerfulness, 'Personally I have now very little interest in being able to produce impressions, like those disputers: I have no anxiety to gain victories, or to astonish an audience like them. I have, however, a very strong interest in convincing myself what is true in this great subject: my eagerness to convince you can be to me now only a secondary matter.'

ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ξυνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβοῦμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἑαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

XLI. 'ΑΛΛ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἂ ἐλέγετε, εἰ μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θεϊότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν D ἁρμονίας εἶδει οὖσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ ξυγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολ- λάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα κατα-

Brief Recapitulation of the Two Counter Arguments.

C. (1.) *σικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους*] Compare the similar sentiment in Pol. X. 595 C., ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ: also that of Aristotle, when he pronounces against the Platonic doctrine of Ideas (Eth. Nic. I. 4, 1), ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Cf. Augustine (de Civ. Dei, X. 30) regarding Porphyry (see note on 81 E.), 'Homini (i.e., Platoni) praeponit veritatem.'—(4.) *ἑαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς*] Bekker follows Ven. Z., and reads *ἑαυτόν*, which Heindorf would also prefer, as appearing to be more necessary when opposed to *ὑμᾶς*. Bernhardy (Synt. p. 272) would limit this use of *ἑαυτοῦ* in the place of the other reflexives to the plural number, *ἑαυτοῦ* and *σεαυτοῦ* having otherwise no plural formed by a single word. This is wrong, as is shown by Soph. Trach. 451, εἰ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ὥς παιδεύεις, where *σαντόν* would be intolerable.—(5.) *ὥσπερ μέλιττα*] Alluding to the lines of Eupolis on the eloquence of Pericles: Eupolis, Dem. fr. 6, Ταχὺν λέγεις μὲν, πρὸς δὲ γ' αὐτοῦ τῇ τάχει Πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν· Οὐτως ἐκήλει, καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων Τὸ κέντρον ἐγκάτελειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις. Cf. *aculeos quosdam relinquere*, in Cic. de Orat. III. 34, regarding Pericles. Forster observes that the application of the comparison is but too appropriate here—Socrates being so much like one of the creatures of which the poet says: 'spicula caeca relinquunt Affixæ venis, animasque in vulnere ponunt.'—(9.) *οὕτως καὶ θεϊότερον*] The position of *οὕτως* before the participial clause, to which it introduces the contrast, is peculiar. Similar examples are in Phileb. 12 B.; Xen. Cyr. V. 1, 26. Heindorf compares Torrent. Eun. I. 2, 90, 'Tamen contentus abs te, hæc habui in memoria.'

D. (2.) *ἐν ἁρμονίας εἶδει οὖσα*] Equivalent to *εἰ τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις* in 86 C., of which statement by Simmias this is a recapitulation by Socrates.—(4.) *ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί*] Scil. φάναι, to be supplied out of *ξυγχωρεῖν* above.

ληποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἡ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γ' αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἀλλ' ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης,

Ε ἂ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Ἐννωμολογεῖτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πόντας τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθί που πρό-

92 τερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπέισθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνν ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἴ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἄλλ' ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὧ ξένη Θηβαίε, ἄλλα δόξαι, εἴανπερ μένῃ ἦδε ἡ οὔησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι ξύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινα ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει

Β γε σαντοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκεκμηνη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν ξυντεθῆναι· ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν

*Argument*  
*IV.*  
*Refutation of the hypothesis that the Soul is a (corporeal) Harmony, and demonstration that it is a Principle, not a result of organisation.*  
*1<sup>o</sup>. Because the hypothesis of the Soul as a Harmony would be inconsistent with the admitted doctrine of Reminiscence, which involved Pre-existence.*

92 A. (3.) ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ] Scil. ἀλλῳ. 'I adhere to it as I do to no other argument.'

B. (4.) ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν] 'That is the logical result of your reasoning,' viz., what Simmias had confessed to be false, that harmony was prior to the elements out of which it was constituted, that is, existed before it existed, which is absurd. The old Editions read οὐ ταῦτα, to which H. Schmidt proposed to return, so as to read οὐ ταῦτά, with the sense: 'Do you perceive that you advance contradictory propositions, when you say, etc.' There is no reason for departing from the reading of the MSS., the insertion of οὐ being the consequence of a misunderstanding on the part of the early Editors.—(6.) ἐκ τῶν οὐδὲπῶ ὄντων] i.e., From the elements of the body not yet organised.—(7.) τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἀπεικάζεις] The common reading is ἡ, but several MSS., and among these the Bodl. (in first hand), gives ὁ, which Ast prefers, with the sense, 'For in that case harmony is not

Argument  
IV.

ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδος τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέ-  
σθαι, εἶναι δ' αὐτὴν ξυγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων ;  
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἀπεικάζεις,  
ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι  
ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων C  
ξυνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν  
σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμ-  
μίας. Καὶ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ  
ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ  
Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνωδός, ὅλλ' ὅρα·  
πότερον αἰρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι  
ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκείνῳ, ὦ Σώ-  
κρατες. ὁδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ  
εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ D  
ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις  
ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσι, καὶ ἂν τις αὐ-  
τοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμε-  
τρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως

such as you represent it; ' for then it would be *a priori*, but harmony is confessedly a *posteriori*, ' for the lyre, and the strings, and the tones first exist, being as yet unharmonised, and as the last result of all arises Harmony, which again is the first to perish.' A similar use of ἀπεικάζειν occurs in Conv. 221 C., οἷος γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν.

C. (3.) πῶς ξυνάσεται] Compare a similar play of words in προσά-  
δειν, 86 E. ἐκείνῳ, viz., the accepted conclusion regarding Pre-existence.

D. (1.) μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας] A similar combination oc-  
curs in Euthydem. 305 E. τὸ εἶκος is used, much like δόξα, in Theæt. 162 E.,  
Phædr. 267 A., 272 E. εὐπρέπεια is similarly used in Thucyd. III. 11, 38. In  
Galen, vol. V. p. 290, πῖθ' αὖ ἀπ' ἐπιχειρήματα, the weapons of σοφισταὶ and  
ρήτορες, are opposed to ἐπιστημονικὰ καὶ ἀποδεικτικά, the weapons  
of φιλόσοφοι.—(3.) ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλάξουσιν] ἀλάξων is one who pro-  
fesses more than he ought, the opposite of εἴρων, one who professes less than  
he might. (Cf. Xen. Cyr. II. 2, 12.) Hence ἀλαζονεία is the special  
characteristic of the Sophists; εἰρωνεία of Socrates as their exposé. Observe  
ξύνοιδα, not, here, of consciousness regarding one's self, but, as in Conv. 193  
E., of familiar acquaintance regarding others.

καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία  
 E ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὁ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἑμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε ἑμαυτοῦ μῆτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἁρμονία.

XLII. Τί δέ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρ- 20. Because  
 μονία ἡ ἄλλη τῶν συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν Harmony ad-  
 93 ἡ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ζυγκέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ mits of de-  
 μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν every Soul is  
 ἐκεῖνα ἡ ποιῇ ἡ πάσχει; Ξυνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε as much a  
 προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν ζυντεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἐπε- Soul as an-  
 σθαι. Ξυνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία other.  
 κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς.  
 αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως  
 ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἁρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ;  
 B Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. \*H οὐχί, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρ-

E. (5.) τί δέ, ὦ Σιμμία, τῆδε;] τῆδε is here nearly equivalent to τόδε,  
 'What shall we say in regard to this point?' Cf. ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.  
 in 79 E.

93 A. (3.) οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε] 'Harmony, in your definition of it,  
 is only a result conditioned by certain constituent antecedents: this will not  
 answer the requirements of the case, for the soul in this case would be not the  
 leader, but the follower.'

B. (1.) ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ] 'If the adjustment is occasionally  
 to a greater extent than in other instances, then, on the understanding that  
 it is possible that such is the case, would not the harmony be also to a greater  
 extent, and in fuller measure also? In short, does not harmony in that case  
 admit of degrees? But this will not suit, because we cannot say that one  
 soul is more a soul than another.' εἴπερ = *siquidem*, as in 61 B., 94 A.,  
 107 C. The coupling of μᾶλλον καὶ πλείων in the apodosis is explained by  
 the circumstance that it is possible to say *separately*, μᾶλλον ἐστὶ, and again,  
 πλείων ἐστί. Cf. Phileb. 41 E., τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδρότερα  
 (ἡέονή);—(6.) μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας] Heindorf would eject the first  
 μᾶλλον, but in these sorried logical wrestlings the language of Plato is strained  
 to great intensity, cf. 78 D. Regarding the reasoning, compare Origen c.

Argument  
IV.

Moreover,  
If the Soul  
were simply  
a harmony,  
vice could  
not be pre-  
dicated re-  
garding it,  
seeing that  
harmony  
could not be-  
come dishar-  
mony, and  
all souls  
would be  
equally har-  
monious.

μοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ' ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχὴν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλεόν καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχὴν; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθὴν, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακὴν; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀλη- C θῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, τί τις φήσκει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὐτὰν τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὐσιν ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρ- μοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίαις, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τοιαυτ' αἶτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκείνο ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγη- D ται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλεόν μηδὲ ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι· ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἁρμονίαν οὐσαν μήτε μᾶλλον

Cels. II 7, οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦσμα ψεύσματος μᾶλλον ψεῦσμα.—(8.) πρὸς Διός] This appeal indicates the importance of the view which is about to be introduced, regarding the absurdity of considering Virtue and Vice as the harmony and disharmony of the soul, if every soul is by its native unchangeable essence definable as a harmony. Every soul, being a harmony, can never admit ἀναρμοστία, or vice, to be predicated concerning it (94 A.), which, however, is against experience, and absurd. (Harmony may therefore be a quality, but it cannot be the essence of the soul.)

C. (3.) τί τις φήσκει] 'What account will any one of those who define soul as a harmony give of these existences in the soul, namely, Virtue and Vice?' ὄντα is to be taken in connection with ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

D. (2.) ἐτέραν ἐτέρας] Similar collocation of antagonistic words in 71 C.—(3.) τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα] 'That concession amounts to this.' In the clause which follows, Socrates substitutes the word ἁρμονία,



μήτε ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε  
 μᾶλλον μήθ' ἦττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὃ τι πλεόν ἢ ἔλαττον  
 ἀρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ ἴσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ  
 E ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο,  
 ψυχὴ, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἡρμοσται; Οὐ-  
 τως. Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλεόν ἀναρμοστίας  
 οὐδὲ ἀρμονίας μετέχει ἄν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πε-  
 πονθυῖα ἄρ' ἂν τι πλεόν κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχει ἐτέρα  
 ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία  
 εἶη; Οὐδὲν πλεόν. Μᾶλλον δέ γέ πον, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ  
 94 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἀρ-  
 μονία ἐστίν· ἀρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο  
 οὔσα, ἀρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέν-  
 τοι. Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχὴ, οὔσα παντελῶς ψυχὴ, κακίας.  
 Πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ  
 λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ  
 ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί,  
 εἶναι. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ καλῶς  
 B δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ  
 λόγος, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι;  
 Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

XLIII. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων

which Simmias said was the logical equivalent of *ψυχὴ*, and thereby involves him in a contradiction.—(7.) *ἢ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον*] i.e., 'Can there be degrees of more and less, or must there be uniformity?' *ἔστιν ὅστις* is in interrogations (cf. Pol. VI. 502 B.) what *ἔστιν ὅς* is in affirmations, so that *ἔστιν ὃ τι* is to be translated as *Numquid?*

94 A. (6.) *ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων*] The consequence of the hypothesis of Simmias would be not only the obliteration of the distinction between the virtuous and the vicious, but also between man and the lower animals.—(7.) *εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαί*] 'If, that is to say, souls are all alike possessed of this by their very nature, viz., that they are souls.' *εἴπερ* = *siquidem*, as in 93 B., note.

B. (1.) *καὶ πᾶσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος*] 'The argument would land in such an untenable position as this, that one soul is as much a harmony, or as good, in regard to virtue, as another.' The reasoning of Socrates then

*Argument*  
IV.

3<sup>o</sup>. Because the hypothesis is insufficient to explain the facts of the case; inasmuch as the Soul is the controller of its instrument the Body, and is therefore more than a Harmony.

ἔσθ' ὃ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Πότερον ξυγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἶον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης, ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐ; Πάνν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὔσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνει οὔσα ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαὶ ἐκείνοις καὶ οὐποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν

advances to another point of attack, that harmony is essentially a passive thing, a mere result arising from adaptations and subjections of part to part, and cannot exhaust the meaning of *ψυχή*, which he proceeds to represent as a *POWER*, not controlled but controlling.—(5.) *ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον*] This addition is characteristic of the philosophy which attributed such importance to *φρόνησις*.—(8.) *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἔλκειν*] The subject is *ψυχὴν*, the clause being under the influence of the previous *λέγω*.

C. (4.) *ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο*] Equivalent to *ἐναντία ταῖς ἐπιτάσεσι καὶ ταῖς χαλάσεσιν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ.* Compare *ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς ἐτιμᾶσθε*, in Demosth. de Falsa Leg. 415, where Shilleto characterises the idiom as a 'tendency to absorb the substantive in the verb.' 'If the soul is, as you say, a harmony, then it can never sound a note otherwise than according to the tensions, relaxations, vibrations, and other modifications of the parts of the instrument where it resides.' A similar statement is found in 93 A., that it is impossible, *ἀρμονίαν ἄλλως πῶς ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχη*, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυγκέηται. The harmony of the lyre is thus a passive thing, conditioned by the instrument, and incapable of exerting an active and independent energy. Is this the case with the soul? Can that principle be simply a modulation, or has it a voice distinct from and independent of the instrument with which it is conjoined? (The reasoning here is partially anticipated in 80 A. B.)

D. (1.) *ὀλίγον πάντα*] *In well nigh every respect.* ὀλίγον, i.e., ὥστε δεῖν ὀλίγον μόνον. Cf. ὀλίγον ὅλον in 80 C.—(8.) *οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεά*] i.e., *περὶ Ὀδυσσεώς*: cf. 79 B., note.—(9.) *στήθος δὲ πλήξας*] This poetic appeal to the instinct of humanity speaking by the voice of Homer, is introduced like a charge of horse in the evening of a battle, with such effect that it would be difficult to find a more telling quotation from a

D φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένην ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ  
 παιτὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν  
 χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ  
 τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ  
 τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ  
 ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῃ πράγματι διαλε-  
 γομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ πεποιήκεν,  
 οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεά,

Appeal to  
 Homer re-  
 garding the  
 prerogative  
 of the Soul as  
 a Principle  
 distinct from  
 and possess-  
 ing dominion  
 over the  
 Body.

Στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ.  
 E Τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

ἄρ' οἶε αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας  
 αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἷας ὄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος πα-

Poet in the annals of Philosophy. Socrates wishes to show that if the Soul is  
 a harmony, resulting from the bodily organisation, it must be a great deal  
 more: it is not only the music, but has power over the discoursing of the  
 music, so that it can even control the instrument in which it dwells, and  
 address it as an inferior as well as separate existence. This he illustrates  
 by the example of Ulysses calming his spirit when writhing under the sight  
 of the indignities in his own palace, and holding his anger under curb like  
 a greyhound in the leash. The aptness of the illustration is more fully  
 apparent in the Homeric passage\* (Odys. XX. 17) in such expressions as  
 κραδίη δέ οἱ ἐνδον ὑλάκτει, and τῷ δὲ μάλ' ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη  
 μένε τετληνία. Thus κραδίη in Homer, controlled by the mind of Ulysses,  
 corresponds to the θυμός of Plato, controlled by the λόγος, or Reason.  
 (Compare Galen's elaborate discussion (de Hippocr. et Plat. Placitis, Vol. V.  
 p. 292—303) of the dictum of Chrysippus placing the intellect in the heart.  
 Among other observations he affirms: ἐν Σκύθαις τε καὶ Γαλάταις καὶ  
 πολλοῖς ἄλλοις βαρβάροις ἔθνεσιν, ὁ θυμὸς κρείττων τοῦ λογισμοῦ,  
 παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ ἐν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις ἀνθρώποις. Ὅμηρον δὲ  
 τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπιδείξαι βουλόμενος, Ἔκτορα μὲν καὶ Ἀχιλλέα . . . .  
 θυμῷ δουλεύοντες ὑποτίθεται νεανίσκου· Ὀδυσσεά δὲ καὶ Πο-  
 λυδάμαντα καὶ Νέστορα τῷ λογισμῷ κρατοῦντας τοῦ θυμοῦ.)  
 Farther illustration of the subject must be reserved for Note R.

\* This Homeric passage is interesting as being, on other two occasions, quoted by Plato:  
 Pol. III. 390 D., and IV. 441 B, in which last he enlarges: ἐναυθα γὰρ δὴ σφῶς ὡς  
 ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ (compare above, ἄλλη . . . , ἄλλῃ) ἐπιπλήττον πεποίηκεν  
 Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον . . . τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ. (The Hesiodic  
 favourite was the passage in Op. et Dl. 227, regarding the difficulty of Virtue, referred to four  
 times: Protag. 340 D., Phædr. 272 C., Pol. II. 364 C., and Legg. IV. 718 E. It is also made  
 a text by Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. II. 1, 20.)

Simmias  
gives up the  
hypothesis of  
Harmony as  
inadequate to  
explain the  
divine nature  
of the Soul.

θῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν; Νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῶν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὀμήρῳ θείῳ ποιη- 95 τῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἐχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

XLIV. Εἰεν δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἡμῶν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἱλαίᾳ πῶς, ὡς ἔοικε, μετριῶς γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρῆσειν. τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίῳ γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἡπόρει, πάνν ἐθαύμαζον, εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ 100 λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τῇν

95 A. (3.) Εἰεν δὴ] A playful appeal to Simmias whether his formidable objection has not been removed, or, in mythological guise, whether his favourite Harmonia, worshipped in his native city of Thebes, has not been propitiated and disarmed of her terrors. This naturally suggests the mention of the kindred, but more *subtle* argument of Cebes, under the name of Cadmus, husband of Harmonia, as the *stronger* member of the pair. Dacier Forster, and even Wyttenbach, find profound meanings in this mythological phraseology, such as this, that, as the dragon's teeth sown by Cadmus sprung up into armed men, that fell a fighting with each other, so the arguments of Cebes would be found at war with each other. This is purely fanciful. τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας, much as if simply Ἀρμονία. Cf. τὰ ὑμέτερα for ὑμεῖς in Legg. I. 643 A.

B. (1.) χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ] Here, to *dispose* of another's argument, i.e., to refute it.—(δ.) μὴ μέγα λέγε] 'Use no proud word, lest some fascination falling on us put the reasoning to rout.' Cebes had said that he suspected that what he calls the Cadmus argument would share the same fate as that named after his wife Harmonia. Socrates declines this flattering unction, as if he felt that adulation\* was essentially a weakening thing, especially in the mouth of

\* *βασκανία* has been derived from *φάσει καίνειν* (slaying with the evil eye), but the early usages (e.g. in Aristophanes) connect it with the *evil tongue*, like that of a serpent lubricating its prey, and therefore the derivation from *βάσσω* (i.e., *βάζω*, to use *spells*) seems preferable. Among the curious traces of this superstition in ancient literature, may be mentioned the passage in Pliny (Hist. Nat. VII. 2) regarding certain families in Libya: 'quarum laudatione intercant probata, arescant arbores, emoriantur infantes.' So Servius in

πρώτην ἐφοδον οὐδέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγον. ταῦτά δὴ οὐκ  
 ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὡς  
 ἀγαθὲ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῶν βα-  
 σκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα λέγεσθαι.  
 ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς  
 ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ  
 κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιούς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν  
 C ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὔσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ  
 μέλλον ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθα-  
 νῶν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ὅλλῳ βίῳ βίους  
 ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει·  
 τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεο-  
 εἰδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι,  
 οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν  
 μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστὶ ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν πρὶν πρότερον

Socrates  
 then proceeds  
 to prepare  
 the way for  
 dealing with  
 the objection  
 of Cebes.

an antagonist. Important occurrences of μέγα λέγειν in a similar sense are found in Hom. Od. XXII. 287; Eur. Herc. Fur. 1244; cf. also Aristoph. Ran. 835. According to Pol. V. 451 A., the nemesis of such words, whether used regarding one's self, or accepted from another, was in the hands of Adrastea: cf. Legg. IV. 717 D.—(7.) Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες] As Homer's heroes do, drawing boldly nigh; i.e., not as ἰοῦμφοι, skirting from a distance, but grappling, like ἐγχεσίμφοι. The allusion is to such passages as Il. IV, 496, V. 611., VI. 143. Compare Pol. X. 610 C., ὁμοσε τῷ λόγῳ ἰέναι: Legg. VIII. 830 B., ἐγγύτατα ἰόντες. Ὀμηρικῶς is more than according to Homer; it is equivalent to according to the Homeric. The imagery is largely drawn from a battle or siege: cf. ἔφοδος, περιτρέψῃ, ἐγγὺς ἰόντες.

C. (3.) ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βίους] i.e., Other than the Philosophic, which admitted into the presence of the gods: beneath which kind of life there were various grades ushering into very various Futurities described in 82 B. —(4.) μὴ ἀνόητον] i.e., σοφόν, μὴ being closely connected with the succeeding adjectives.—(5.) τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν] 'As for my proving, etc., this, you, O Cebes, say, does not hinder all these proofs of the soul's prerogative from indicating, not indeed immortality, but simply the long endurance

Virg. Ecl. VII. 27: 'Quicquid ultra meritum laudatur, dicitur fascinari.' Hence in Plautus (Asin. II. 4, 84), Praefascinus, as a preface of modesty to diastem Nemesis. It is remarkable that no trace of the word βασκαίνω occurs in the Epic period, neither is any to be found in the Lyric period, for the Epigram where it occurs, ascribed to Eriinna, is undoubtedly spurious.

ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἤδει τε καὶ ἔπραττε πόλλ' ἔττα, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ D εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶη καὶ τελευτῶσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. δια- φέρειν δὲ δὴ φῆς οὐδὲν, εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσή- κειν γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδοτί μὴδ' ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἐσ- E τίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, 'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ὅστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

XLV. 'Ο οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ

of the soul.' Cobes admits that these evidences of the dignity of the soul prove somewhat of that which is claimed for it, but not all.

D. (1.) ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον] 'It was not, however, thereby a whit more immortal: nay, the very act of leaving that state of pre-existence was perhaps only a first step towards its destruction, like a disease.'—(3.) ζῶη] An example of the tendency of the Optative to appear in the 'oratio obliqua,' as in 87 E., Charm. 156 E., Pol. IV. 420 C.—(6.) πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι] So far as our individual apprehensions are concerned, because, sooner or later, the bourne of being will be reached by each of us, whether the present life be to each of us the last cycle or not.

E. (7.) οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα] 'No commonplace subject is that which you seek to investigate: it involves the whole question of the principle of Development and Decay.' Suidas quotes the passage, but inaccurately omits οὐ before φαῦλον. Diogenes La. (III. 63) mentions it as noteworthy, that Plato used φαῦλος in the sense of ἀπλοῦς, i.e., not recondite.

96 A. (5.) ἐγὼ γάρ, . . . νέος ὢν] It has been doubted whether Plato is here speaking *historically* of what was the experience of Socrates, or expressing *dramatically* by the mouth of Socrates his own individual experience. K. F. Hermann pronounces for the latter view, Grote (VIII. p. 574) for the first. The balance of evidence is in favour of the historical view.\*

\* The pre-eminence assigned by Socrates to Ethics is not inconsistent with the representation here given of his having first made a voyage of investigation among the Physical systems, all of which he found wanting. Moreover, the representation of Socrates in the

πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς  
 96 τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεῦσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίδεμι περὶ  
 αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τὰ γ' ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρή-  
 σιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὧν λέ-  
 γεις χρήσει. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε.  
 Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος  
 ὦν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ  
 καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι  
 ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίνεται  
 ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολ-  
 B λάκις ἐμαντὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ  
 τοιάδε, ἄρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα  
 τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρέφεται;  
 καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ, ἢ τὸ

Socrates  
 confesses the  
 difficulty of  
 dealing with  
 it, inasmuch  
 as it involves  
 the question  
 of Causation  
 in those  
 changes  
 called Gene-  
 ration and  
 Destruction.

—(7.) περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν] 'Inquiry into Nature;' i.e., a search for  
 a Universal Physical Principle. Xenophon gives a similar account of the  
 position at which Socrates arrived (Mem. I. 1, 11): οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς  
 τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγετο,  
 σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν Κόσμος ἔφθ . . .  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυν.\*—

—(7.) ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι] Scilicet αἰτὴ ἡ σοφία, farther explained by  
 εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου. Compare Lucian's experiences in search of  
 Truth (Icaromen. 5), described, however, from a sceptical point of view.

B. (2.) σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ] σηπεδῶν signifies here *fermentation* or  
*decomposition*, out of which new forms of Life proceed. Compare the medical

'Nubes,' as early as B.C. 423, is mainly that of a Physicist, and is in that respect probably  
 founded on truth. On the other hand, the description here given does not seem applicable to  
 Plato, as it does not harmonise with what we know from trustworthy sources regarding  
 Plato's early studies, which were first in the region of poetry, rather than philosophy. Farther,  
 Aristotle (Metaph. I. 6) speaks of no philosophic influence except that of the Heraclitean  
 Philosophy, as having affected the mental growth of Plato, previously to his coming under the  
 spell of Socrates.

\* Each of the great streams of Greek Thought antecedent to Socrates tended towards  
 Physics as the main object of inquiry. The Ionic school sought for a Universal Principle in some  
 Material or Mechanical mode, such as Water, or the like; the Italic school, in some Formal  
 mode, such as Number; so that, although proceeding simply theoretically, they bore some resem-  
 blance to the Alchemists in their search for a transmuting Power. The position of Socrates in  
 Ancient Philosophy is thus remarkably analogous to that of Bacon in Modern Philosophy,  
 both having put an arrest on the vain wanderings of previous Speculation, and directed the  
 tide of Thought into a new and more profitable, though more circumscribed, channel.

Rapid review  
of the vari-  
ous theories  
as to the  
Origin of  
Things pro-  
pounded by  
previous  
Thinkers.

πῦρ, ἣ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁσφραίνεισθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἑμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυγῆς εἶναι, ὥς οὐδὲν χρήμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ

maxim in Athenæus, VII. 276, κατὰ σῆψιν ἢ πέψιν.—(3.) ὥς τινες ἔλεγον] i.e., The Ionic Philosophers, such as ANACHELAUS (represented as the teacher of Socrates), who taught ἐνὸς αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσεως, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν (Diog. La. II. 16). ANAXAGORAS is said to have held a similar doctrine: τὰ ζῶα γενέσθαι ἐξ ἰγνροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ γεώδους (Diog. La. II. 9).—(4.) πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν] The dictum of EMPEDOCLES is referred to, αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρειόν ἐστι νόημα. Cic. Tusc. I. 9, 'Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem.' To this Empedoclean theory Virgil alludes (Georg. II. 484) in his 'Frigidus obstiterit circum præcordia sanguis.'—(4.) ὁ ἀήρ] The theory of ANAXIMENES of Miletus, and DIOGENES of Apollonia, that the All was air more or less condensed. Arist. de Anim. I. 2, 18, Διογένης δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθείς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον καὶ ἀρχήν. Cf. Cic. de Nat. Deor. I. 12.—(4.) τὸ πῦρ] The doctrine of HERACLITUS,\* from whom it afterwards passed to the Stoics.—(5.) ὁ ἐν ἐγκέφαλος] HIPPOCRATES (de Morbo Sacro c. 17) thus expresses himself regarding the function of the brain as the Interpreter of things without, and the Transmitter to the Intelligence within: κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον πλείστην ἐνάμιν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπὸ ἡέρος γενομένων ἐρμηνεύς—ἐν δὲ τὴν σὺνισιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὁ διαγγέλλων. According to Diogenes La. (VIII. 30) Pythagoras placed Intellect (νοῦς) in the brain, and Passion or Spirit in the heart, a localisation borrowed afterwards by Plato.—(8.) κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι] Heindorf proposed κατὰ ταῖτά, wrongly. κατὰ ταῦτα is an adverbial expression = accordingly, like οὕτως after a participle, cf. 61 D., note. It is difficult to trace up to any special philosophic sect the sensational hypothesis here described, which derives ἐπιστήμη from a very different source from that which Plato allowed: Professor Thompson (Arch.

\* Hence his maxim, αἶψα ψυχὴ ἀρίστη. 'A dry soul is best,' as being likeliest to his primal element—Fire. The same view he seems to have carried into Physical Geography, holding that 'dry countries were best for men.' The peculiar eminence so widely attributed to Fire, both in Oriental and in Greek Thought, is accounted for by the acute observation of Aristotle (de Anim. II. 4, 12), that it is the only element visibly possessed of a power of assimilation and self-expansion. Compare the ecstatic passage in the Hippocratic treatise, περὶ Διαιτης, c 10, on the power and spirituality of Fire.



καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαντῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ὥμην εἰδέειν, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ὥμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, D ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτιῶν ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσγέωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὅστοις ὅστᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

Butler's Lectures, vol. II., p. 103) considers it 'a specimen of popular metaphysic.'—In the moods of this sentence, there is a remarkable variety : ἐστίν . . . γίγνιτο . . . γίγνεσθαι, a gradual transition from the direct to the most pronounced form of the indirect speech.

C. (2.) ἀφύης εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρήμα] *Helpless, like as no creature could be; i.e., as helpless as it is possible to be.* Some explain it as if it were ὡς πρὸς οὐδὲν χρήμα (Viger. p. 168) wrongly, as is shown by Legg. I. 640 C., ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τούτοις ἄρχοντος δεῖ; Κλ. τί μὴν; ὡς οὐδενί γε πράγματι. In the *Memorabilia*, the aversion of Socrates to such physical studies is founded chiefly upon a pious fear of intruding into the secrets of the gods (IV. 7, 6). This is a point of difference naturally to be expected in the practical and pious Xenophon from the more theoretical Plato, who, by his Pythagorean studies, had become imbued with a more just and enlarged notion of the capabilities of astronomical and physical studies generally, than, as Grote (VIII. p. 578) remarks, either Socrates or Xenophon possessed.

D. (4.) τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστοις προσγένηται] The physiological principle here described is drawn from Anaxagoras, who held that, as cosmos was the union of the *homogeneous* Primaries (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ) and chaos their separation, so all bodies were produced by the congregation of similar particles; that bone was formed by a number of bony particles, or small bones, and that every organic aggregate consisted of a combination of minor types of itself.\* Arist. de Gener. Animal. I. 18, 16, ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ λόγος εἰκεν εἶναι οὗτος τῷ Ἀναξαγόρου, τῷ μὴθὲν γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν . . . Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν γὰρ εὐλόγως φησὶ σάρκας ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς προσιέναι ταῖς σαρκίν. Compare Lucr. I. 830, 'Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur Homœomeriam . . . Ossa videlicet e paucillis atque minutis Ossibu', sic et de paucillis atque minutis Visceribus viscus gigni.' Cf. also Cic. Acad. II. 37.—(7.) οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;] *μετρίως* is equivalent to *ικανῶς*

\* The modern doctrine of assimilation, propounded by Goethe, as the basis of physiology, whereby the same type is regarded as traceable in every part, for example, of a vegetable organism, in stalk, and leaf, and flower, bears a close resemblance to the *Homœomeria* of Anaxagoras. Cf. Goethe's *Morphologie*, p. 193, where Goethe refers directly to the analogy of his principle to that of Anaxagoras.

Unsatisfac-  
toriness of  
these Theo-  
ries.

τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν· οὕτω τότε ὦμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἐμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ὦμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι Εγε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτῶ πλείονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυν τοῦ πηχυαίου μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νῆ Δί' ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἶσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαντοῦ οὐδὲ ὥς, ἐπειδὴν ἐνὶ τις προσθῇ ἓν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο. 97

in next clause; i.e., with sufficient reason. Socrates says, I was in those days perfectly satisfied with observing phenomena without attaining to the cause; but the phenomena yielded no higher result than such as this, that one man is a head taller than another; that ten is larger than eight by the addition of two, and so forth. These were phenomena, but he was not, by the observation of them, nearer to the constituting cause. (In *μείζων αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ*, there probably lies an allusion to *μείων μὲν κεφαλῇ Ἀγαμέμνονος* in Homer, II. III. 193.)

E. (6.) Πόρρω που] *That I am far, indeed, from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things.*—(7.) ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαντοῦ] The purport of this may be thus expressed. 'When it is said that one added to one (i.e.,  $A + B$ ) becomes two, I cannot bring myself to accept as an explanation, either that A has become two by the addition of B, or that B, the one added, and A, the original to which it was added, become two by addition. Neither of the ones was two; how can they be called two by being put together? If, again, we look at the effect of division, we speak of two as resulting from the division of one: how comes it that two may be thus produced by such opposite processes as addition and division?' As Olympiodorus expresses it,—*εἰ τάναντία εἶδη αἰτία τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, πῶς ἢ τε σύνθεσις καὶ ἡ σχίσις, ἐναντίας οὔσαι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν*; The comic poet Theopompus (Fragm. p. 306 Ed. Didot) laughed at these subtleties regarding one and two, and it must be confessed that these inquiries after

θανμάζω γὰρ εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ᾧ ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὥς, εἴαν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὥς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι.

B τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ξυνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὃ τι ἐν γίγνεται ὥς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἐμαντόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὃ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.

XLVI. Ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὥς C ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος, ὥς ἄρα

'the why even of the why,' are chiefly valuable as exercises in metaphysical discussion. Socrates employs them here to show that even the Pythagorean theory of *γένεσις* and *φθορά* as resolvable into addition and subtraction (*i.e.*, numerical operations) was, after all, merely mechanical, substituting mere juxtaposition for essential inherence, or Essence.

97 A. (5.) ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον κ.τ.λ.] τοῦ πλησίον τεθῆναι is an appended explanation of what is meant by ἡ ξύνοδος. In the next sentence, by a freedom natural to conversation, ὥς is repeated twice in dependence on πείθεσθαι, owing to the intervention of a clause.

B. (3.) οὐδέ γε δι' ὃ τι ἐν γίγνεται] 'Nor yet can I persuade myself that I understand why one itself is produced (or, *is one*, not, as Serranus, *why one becomes two*, which would have required *δύο*, and caused a vain repetition); nor, in a word, do I understand regarding aught else, why it is produced, or perishes, or exists, if I follow that kind of method (*i.e.*, attention to the merely physical and external), but it so chances that I form to myself another method, that which I have just described being nowise admissible.' The singular expression (εἰκῇ φύρω) refers probably to the enthusiasm with which the young student committed himself to the ray of light struck out by Anaxagoras, and began to *work up* a system by its means for himself. That *φύρω* signifies properly to *work up* a subject, as one works up meal mingled with water to make bread, is shown by the passage of Aristoph. Av. 462, *προπεφύραται λόγος εἰς μοι, ὃν διαμάττειν οὐ κωλύει*. εἰκῇ seems to

Rapture  
with which  
Socrates re-  
ceived the  
principle pro-  
pounded by  
Anaxagoras,  
that Mind is  
the source of  
Causation.

νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος, ταύτη  
δὴ τῇ αἰτία ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινα εἶ ἔχειν  
τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἷτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ'  
οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα [κοσμεῖν] καὶ  
ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη· εἰ οὖν τις  
βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ  
ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλ-  
τιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν·  
ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν D  
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων,  
ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι  
τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ  
εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμε-  
νος εὐρηκέναι ὥμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄν-  
των κατὰ νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν

indicate nothing more than the accidental origin of the light thrown into his mind by the treatise of Anaxagoras afterwards referred to.—(8.) ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου] *Well, having heard one reading from a treatise, composed, as that reader informed me, by Anaxagoras.* The title of this treatise was τὰ Φυσικά, cf. Athenæus II. 57 D. It is important to observe, in regard to the originality of Socrates, that the tone of this passage is against the notion that the acquaintance of Socrates with Anaxagoras was one of direct personal intercourse. (Cf. Brandis Gr. Röm. Philos. II. p. 11).

C. (2.) νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν] διακοσμεῖν is the original word used by Anaxagoras in the memorable dictum inscribed by him on the corner-stone of Philosophy. Cf. Note M.—(5.) πάντα κοσμεῖν] Hermann brackets κοσμεῖν as unnecessary, and proposes to translate καὶ as *etiam*. It is in favour of his view that there seems a transition from πάντα to ἕκαστον, from the general principle to its special application.—(7.) αἰτίαν περὶ ἑκάστου] = αἰτίαν ἑκάστου. Cf. 95 E., περὶ γενέσεως τὴν αἰτίαν. Aristotle indicates the ideal desired by Socrates in another, but similar, way: Magn. Mor. I. 1, 24, ἐκείνον γὰρ (Σωκράτην) οὐδὲν ἕτερο δεῖν μάτην εἶναι.

D. (7.) κατὰ νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ] *A teacher according to my mind*, alluding playfully to the importance of the word (νοῦς) in the system of Anaxagoras. The charm for Socrates in such a principle, is seen in his remarkable statement in the Phædrus 230 D., that the sights of External Nature will not teach man, unless he first studies his own nature. Hence his own devotion to the study of men in the City, beyond the walls of which he seldom

πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῇ πλατεῖα ἔστω ἢ στρογγύλη,  
 Εἰ ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν  
 ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν  
 τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκ-  
 διηγῆσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ  
 98 μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμεν ὡς οὐκέτι ποθε-  
 σόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω  
 παρεσκευάσμεν, ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ  
 τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τρο-  
 πῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν  
 ἔστω ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ  
 ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ὦμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσ-  
 μῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινα αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλ-  
 τιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἔστω ὥσπερ ἔχει· ἐκάστω οὖν  
 Β αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστω

appeared.—(8.) πλατεῖα . . ἢ στρογγύλη] The former has been taken as indicating generally the position of the Ionic school; the latter that of the Italic. There was, however, such a variety of opinion within each of these two great sections of Philosophers, that it is difficult to affirm that this opinion belongs exclusively to the one school, and that other to the other.\*

Ε. (3.) εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν] This question was answered in the affirmative by almost all the schools of antiquity. Still, the manner in which it is spoken of here, would lead one, even without other evidence, to believe that it was a question regarding which there was a difference of opinion: and the Pythagoreans, we know from other sources, as Arist. de Cælo II. 13, were the leading dissentients, holding the Earth not to be in the centre, but to have a planetary motion.

98 A. (1.) ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενον] Most of the MSS. have ὑποθέμενον, the early Editions have ὑποθησόμενον. The right reading was felicitously restored by Heindorf, from a quotation of the passage by Eustathius (p. 1450, 26), who refers to it (memoriter) as an example in Attic of the short vowel formation of the future of ποθεῖν. ποθεσόμενος has since been discovered in Ven. A. and Par. E.—(6.) καὶ ποιεῖν] Supply ἢ ποιεῖ. Compare the omission of the relative in 81 B., to which this is an analogous idiom.

\* Aristotle (de Cælo II. 13, 13) says Thales spoke of the earth as floating in its primal element, water, ὥσπερ ξύλον. Anaximenes believed the earth to be flat (τραπεζοειδής) like a table floating on air, precisely as the sun and moon seemed to him flat metallic plates; while Anaximander regarded it as round (σφαιροειδής, according to Diog. Laert. II. 1, 2, but probably for κυλινδροειδής, like τὸ ξύλον of Thales.) It is among the Pythagoreans that we find the first real traces of a knowledge of the sphericity of the Earth.

βέλτιστον ὦμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦν ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

Socrates goes on to express his disappointment at finding, on further inquiry, that Anaxagoras neglected the principle he had himself propounded.

XLVII. Ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ὥχόμεν φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖον καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι ξύγκεταιί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅσῃ ἐστὶ στερεὰ καὶ διαφνῶς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἄλ-

B. (7.) ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος] ἀπὸ is here highly emphatic, *dashed down from*, like Icarus. Similar modes of expressing disappointment are Euthyphro 15 E., καταβάλλεσθαι ἀπ' ἐλπίδος: Phædr. 228 E., ἐκκρούειν τινὰ ἐλπίδος: also beneath in 100 D., τούτου ἐχόμενος, οὐκ ἂν πεσεῖν. (The image here is analogous to that in Pindar Ol. XII. 6, *Hope* being an ὄχημα (cf. 85 D., n.) for the voyage of Life.) Regarding the subject itself, the same fault is found with Anaxagoras in more severe terms in Legg. XII. 967 B., where he is spoken of as having not made proper use of his great Intellectual Principle (Νοῦς),\* and as having, by the neglect of it, left the door open to atheistic doctrines (ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξειρησμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητας). Cf. also Legg. X. 886 D. It is still more remarkable that the less spiritual Aristotle expresses himself similarly (Metaph. I. 4, 5) regarding Anaxagoras, viz., that his principle of Mind was little more than a magnificent μηχανή introduced, like the *Deus ex machina*, for a temporary end. Compare Plutarch's remarks on the failure of Anaxagoras (Mor. 435 E.).

C. (8.) διαφνῶς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἄλλ.] *These bones have ligaments, by which they are mutually attached and detached.* The term διαφνή is probably the same as

\* It is worthy of remark, that the whole of this section of the Phædo drew forth the admiration of Leibnitz, on account of the clearness with which Socrates perceived that a science of Physics pre-supposed a deeper source whence its laws should proceed than a merely physical cause. 'C'est Dieu qui est la dernière raison de choses, et la connaissance de Dieu n'est pas moins le principe des Sciences, que son essence et sa volonté sont les principes des Etres.' (Leibnitz, Op. Philos. Ed. Erdmann, p. 106.)

- D λήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι, περι-  
 ἀμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ  
 ξυνέχει αὐτὰ· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν  
 ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ ξυντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι  
 που ποιεῖ οἷον τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην  
 τὴν αἰτίαν ξυγκαμφθεῖς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ  
 τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φω-  
 νάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτι-  
 E ὤμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ  
 Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι,  
 διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθή-  
 σθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν  
 ἂν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πάλαι ἂν  
 99 ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρά ἢ Βοιωτοὺς  
 ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον  
 ὦμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδι-

διάφυσις in Hippocrates, *περὶ ἀγμῶν*, c. 12, where it is explained by Galen as being a *ligamento-cartilaginous* (*νευρο-χονδρώδης*) bond, uniting one limb to another. Cf. Cicero's expression (*de Nat. Deor.* II. 66), '*mirabiles commissuræ ossium*.' (In Botany, *εἰσφυή* was applied to the section of a plant intervening between the joints as well as to the joint itself. Cf. Longus, *Pastoral.* p. 9, (Ed. Villoison), in describing the making of a syrinx, *καλάμους ἐκτεμὼν λεπτοῦς, καὶ τρήσας τὰς τῶν γονάτων διαφύας*.)

D. (1.) *τὰ δὲ νεῦρα*] 'The muscles and nerves are the means, but not the cause, which must be sought for in a deeper source.' The irony of the whole passage lies in the substitution of the mere description of effects for the desiderated explanation of the cause, reminding one of Hamlet's description of the method of music to a man who has no skill to play.—It is interesting to turn to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (IV. 3), and to find Socrates there represented as endeavouring to supply the defect he felt in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, and trying to trace the presence of a Power in the world infusing τὸ βέλτιστον into all arrangements. These first gleanings in the great field of Teleology are very memorable, being the earliest attempt at the *logical* development of the Theistic Argument from 'Design.'

E. (5.) *νῆ τὸν κύνα*] Some remarks on this peculiar expression will be found in Note 8.

99 A. (1.) *Μέγαρά ἢ Βοιωτοὺς*] Specified as being the nearest countries out of Attica. Cf. *Crito* 53 B., where Socrates is advised to escape, *cic τῶν*

Illustrations  
whereby he  
elucidates  
the need  
of a deeper  
notion of  
Cause than  
that of mere  
physical Cir-  
cumstance.

δράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἦντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὅστ' αὖ καὶ νῦν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὥς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ καὶ ταῦτα νῦν πράττω, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῇ ἂν καὶ Β μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷον

ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων . . . ἡ Θήβαζε ἡ Μέγαράδε. (In the play of the Acharnians, the first foreign visitors to Dicaeopolis are a Megarian and a Boeotian.)—(2.) *ὑπὸ ἐόξης φερόμενα*] The proof that it was a *δόξα*, not *ἐπιστήμη*, that could persuade to flight, is found at large in the dialogue of Crito.—(3.) *κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν*] *πρὸ* is inserted pleonastically after a comparative. The two forms of flight—one more open, the other more cowardly—are represented by *φεύγειν καὶ ἀποδιεῖράσκειν*.—(8.) *ὥς μὲντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ*] 'To assert, however, that because of these things I do what I do, and that I therefore act with Intelligence (as if the use of bones and muscles constituted all that is meant by Intelligence), and not from the choice of what is absolutely best—this were deep and wide laxity of speech.' Mechanical circumstances are not causes, but must be subservient to some great Intelligence, which alone is the moving power in the world of men, the only world with which, according to Socrates, we have, in the first place, to concern ourselves.

B. (2.) *τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι*] Socrates speaks here of the danger of inability to discern what is a primary cause, and what is merely a secondary or accompanying cause; or, as it is expressed in the remarkable passage of the *Timæus* 46 D., we must not confound the cause with the subsidiary cause or instrument (*αἷτιον* with *ξυναίτιον*), as is the *δόξα* of the many. The clause is incomplete without *φασὶν ἂν εἶη* or the like supplied: in the actual conversation this could be done by a look or a gesture. A similar use of the Infinitive is found in *Conv.* 177 C., where Stallbaum introduces a point of Exclamation (!), which he would introduce also here.—(5.) *ψηλαφῶντες*] According to Heindorf, *ὁ* is object both to *ψηλαφῶντες* and to *προσαγορεύειν*. It is preferable to consider *ψηλαφῶντες* as used absolutely, because *ὁ* refers simply to the *ξυναίτιον* or secondary cause, and this was not what the common people had in view in their gropings, although it was what they found and felt satisfied with. *ψηλαφῶντες* \*-(from *ψάλλω* and *ἄψάω*), properly signifies *feeling*, or

\* The use of *ψηλαφῶντες* here naturally suggests the solemn application of it in *Acts* XVII. 27, where it is applied to the *groping* of the Heathen after God. The passages, however, are in one view not parallel, since in the one the act of *groping* is spoken of with encouragement and as desirable, whereas in the other it is spoken of with discouragement, and as undesirable. At the same time, the reasonings of Plato in the whole passage, when carried



τ' εἶναι, ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνο, ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον· ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκοτει, ἄλλο-τρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἷτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶον

fumbling among the strings in search of the right note. Compare Aristoph. Pac. 691, Ἐψήλαφῶμεν ἐν σκοτει τὰ πράγματα, Νυνὶ δ' ἅπαντα πρὸς λύχρον βουλευόμεν.—(6.) ἄλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι] The early Editions have ὁμματι, which is plausible after σκοτει, and was recommended by Reisig, (Ed. Col. 142, but it does not suit with προσαγορεύω, and is not found in the majority of MSS.—(7.) ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς] Empedocles is referred to, who tried to account for the fixity of the earth, by supposing it to be involved in a vortex, and to remain fixed under the revolving heavens. (ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, is taken by Wyttenbach in close connection with δίνην; but this is much less natural than Hermann's view, which connects it with μένειν, in the sense of *sustineri*.) \* Cf. Arist. de Caelo II. 13, 21, οἱ δὲ, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, (φασί) τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιέουσιν καὶ θάττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν καλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κνέθοις ὕδωρ (i.e., like water at rest within a cup, when the cup is swung rapidly round). This hypothesis of a vortex, which reappears in the physical philosophy of the Epicureans, attained so early currency as to form the subject of the wit of Aristophanes in the Nubes (379), Δίους being introduced as now King of the Universe (ἀντὶ Διὸς) in room of Jove. An elegant outline of these debates in the Grecian schools is found in Claudian, Mall. Theod. Cons. 60—83.—(8.) ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ] The rival hypothesis to that of Empedocles was that of Anaximenes, who represented the Earth as floating on a sea of air, which it could not displace, precisely as a *κάρδοπος*,\* or flat trough, floats on a tub of water. Compare Arist. de Caelo II. 13, 16, where this hypothesis is expounded.—(9.) τὴν δὲ τοῦ κ.τ.λ.] οὕτω and ὡς are correlated, and the order is thus: τὴν ἐνναμιν τοῦ αὐτὰ νῦν οὕτω κείσθαι, ὡς οἶον τε (ἐστὶν αὐτὰ) τεθῆναι βέλτιστα. αὐτὰ, i.e., the elements of things.

out to their legitimate results, are remarkably in harmony with the doctrine of St. Paul on the hill of Mars, inasmuch as they strike at the root of Polytheism and Fetichism, which are the worship, the former of secondary, the latter of fictitious causes (cf. Empedocl. 239, ὁλίγον τοῦ παντός ἰδόντων), instead of the Primary Cause.

\* It is worthy of remark that Aristophanes, in the Nubes (870), extracts a considerable amount of absurdity from this very word *κάρδοπος*, which would appear to have been a favourite with Socrates, more especially when dealing with the Sophists. These persons were apt to be scandalised by the illustrations drawn by Socrates, from sources considered by them not to be genteel. Cf. Hipplias protesting against Socrates talking of a pot (*χέρτρα*), as a *φαῦλον ὄνομα ἐν σμυνῇ πράγματι*. (Hipp. Maj. 298 D.)

Socrates, finding all previous hypotheses superficial, is thrown back on his own resources for a solution of the problem of Causation.

τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι, C ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἰονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα ξυνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἰονται· ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητῆς ὅτουοῦν ἡδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

C. (3.) Ἄτλαντα] 'They think they will find an Atlas (or supporting cause) stronger than this, which is the true Atlas.' In vain, argues Socrates, for the Atlas they think they discover will be an effect, and not an Efficient Cause.—(5.) δέον ξυνδεῖν] ξυνδεῖν is dependent on εἶον, not, as has been sometimes thought, on οἰονται. 'They make no account at all (οὐδὲν οἰονται) of that which is truly Good and needful, so as to bind and hold together the frame of things.' Compare the Stoic principle in Diog. Laert. VII. 99, where πᾶν ἀγαθόν is characterised as δέον, ὅτι συνέχει ἐν οἷς χρή, the verb of duty (δεῖ) being philologically the same as the verb of binding (δέω).

D. (1.) τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν] Taking the second best course, as the saying is. The explanation of this usually given identifies the sense of δεύτερος πλοῦς\* with δεύτεραι φροντίδες in Eur. Hippol. 436 (cf. Legg. IV. 723 E.), which 'second thoughts,' though second in order of time, are best and ought to be first. This view of δεύτερος πλοῦς is incorrect, the true explanation being that it signifies a 'second resource in default of a better,' and is applied, not to what is absolutely, but what is relatively best. The proverb is one from seafaring life, the ancient mariner having often, on the failure of the breeze, to resort to the laborious oar. Cf. Eustath. p. 1453, 20, δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται, ὅτε ἀποτυχὼν τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέει. So Eustath.

\* Plato makes a similar application of δεύτερος πλοῦς in Phileb. 19 C., καλὸν μὲν, τὸ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκων τῷ σώφρονι· δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ, μὴ λανθάνων αὐτὸν αὐτόν. Familiar γ in Arist. Pol. III. 13. 23, βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, περᾶσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὶ ἐνορθώματι διορθοῦν. Aristotle employs it similarly in Eth. Nic. II. 9, 4. Compare the illustrations of the proverb collected by Gataker on M. Antoninus IX. 2; also Cic. Tusc. IV. 6, where 'pandere res orationis' is opposed to the slower mode of proceeding, 'rit.', 'dialecticorum remiss', (i.e., δεύτερος πλοῦς).

XLVIII. Ἐδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἥ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῶν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, εἰ μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα  
 Ε αὐτοῦ. τοιούτον τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενσήθην, καὶ ἔδαισα μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.  
 100 οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ ξυγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον

This solution he attains by the study of Intellectual Principles, which are nearer to him than external Physical Principles, and thereby he finds himself conducted to the doctrine of Ideas.

p. 661, 43, ὁ τῶν κωπηλατούντων πλοῦς δεύτερον λέγεται πλοῦς, ὡς πρώτου ὄντος τοῦ πλέειν πρὸς ἄνεμον. Having failed in his first voyage, under the guidance of the Physicists, Socrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid Basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of Matter, but by meditating on the inner world of Thought.—(2.) βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν] There is a touch of irony in ἐπίδειξιν, which was the expression for the pretentious display of demonstrative power made by the so-called Sophists. By the introduction of βούλει, the sentence which had proceeded so far affirmatively, becomes suddenly interrogative.

E. (6.) ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω] Socrates had stated that the study of the external world by the senses simply, would not conduct to knowledge of Causation, and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of the sun with the naked eye; viz., dizziness under the dazzling maze of Phenomena (cf. ἰλιγγία in 79 C., ταραττομαι in 100 D.). Therefore, he goes on to say, as one uses a medium in looking at an eclipse, such as the reflection in water or the like, so must we proceed regarding the external world, by studying phenomena through media or Images, which Images can be nothing else than οἱ λόγοι, i.e., Principles or Reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile, however, has the disadvantage of representing the Intellectual world as the shadow, and not the reality; and therefore Socrates at once anticipates and corrects a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. Perhaps, however, the process I refer to (viz., τὸ ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν) is in a certain respect not parallel with that to which I compare it. For I do not at all admit that the man who looks at things in their Principles, sees things a whit more by images than one who looks at them in their external effects. 'Although it is true, says Socrates, that those who look at the sun's reflection in water, see a reflection and nothing more, I do not admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through the medium of the Principles

τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

XLIX. 'Αλλ', ἡ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' B  
ἅπερ αἰεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἃ εἰ μοι δίδως τε καὶ ξυγχαρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τήν τε αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων. C  
Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἐάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ

in the Intellect (*οἱ λόγοι*), perceive mere reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have used is simply an illustration indicating that transition, in which I turned from the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the Physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of *οἱ λόγοι*, or the Intellectual Principles of Things.

100 B. (1.) οὐδὲν καινόν] The doctrine of Ideas, or supersensuous Principles, to which Plato recurs so often, as his chief *καταφυγή*, or stronghold. Cf. 76 D.—(3.) ἐρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐπιχειρῶν] ἐπιχειρήσεων would have been more according to common usage, but the verb ἐπιχειρέω has a semi-future meaning in itself.

C. (1.) ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων] 'Assuming that I grant you the premises, proceed at once to work out your conclusion.'—(2.) τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις] 'The conclusion from those premises.' ἐξῆς governs the dative more frequently than the genitive, although it is derived from ἔχομαι, which takes the genitive.—(7.) αἰτίας τὰν σοφῶν] Those subtle and would-be wise causes advanced by the Physical Philosophers.

- τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει  
 ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. τῇ τοιαύτῃ  
 αἰτία ξυγχωρεῖς; Ξυγχωρῶ, ἔφη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐτι  
 μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύ-  
 τας γινώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐόν τις μοι λέγῃ δι' ὃ τι καλόν  
 D ἐστὶν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο  
 ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῷ, ταραττομαι  
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως  
 καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ  
 αὐτὸ καλόν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε  
 κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ  
 ἐτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ  
 γίγνεται καλὰ. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι  
 καὶ ἑμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος  
 E ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ  
 καὶ ὁπωσὺν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ  
 γίγνεται καλὰ· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει  
 ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρό-  
 τητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο,  
 εἰ τις τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ

Elucidation  
 of the prin-  
 ciple that the  
 'Idea' is the  
 basis of Phæ-  
 nomena.

D. (1.) ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον] *i.e.*, Such a one describes mere phenomena. The common reading has ὅτι inserted after the first ἢ, which necessitates resort to the supply of ἐστὶ along with the participle, in this instance a clumsy resource. The above is the reading of Tub., Ven. II. and (in first hand) Bodl., ἔχον being equivalent to ὅτι ἔχει.—(3.) ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως] There is a gradation of modesty as he approaches the mention of ἑμαυτῷ. ἀτέχνως is here *artlessly*, not *artelessly* (*omnino*).—(5.) παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία] From this passage, as well as from the Parmenides 130 E.—132, 133 D., Stallbaum observes, that it is plain that Plato had a difficulty in finding a term to denote the connection between the Idea and the concrete Phenomenon, or the link\* of subsistence whereby, for example, Beauty, which is one and indivisible, can be found inhabiting

\* The connection between the Ideal 'One' and the Phenomenal 'Many' finds an easy exemplification (according to Parmenides 131 A.), in Day, which, while it is one and the same, yet exists in many places, and to many persons, at once, without thereby being divided from itself; so also with the Idea.

τὸν ἐλάττω τῇ αὐτῇ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο <sup>101</sup>  
 ἂν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν μείζον πᾶν  
 ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζον ἐστὶν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ  
 διὰ τοῦτο μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ  
 ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ  
 τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος, οἶμαι, μὴ τίς σοι ἐναντίος  
 λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὼν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῆς εἶναι  
 καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μείζον εἶναι  
 καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρῇ οὔσῃ  
 τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ B  
 τινι μέγαν τινὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; καὶ ὁ Κέ-  
 βης γελάσας, Ἐγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν  
 ὀκτῶ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερ-  
 βάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ

Beautiful Things, which are many and divisible. The next clause labours under a difficulty in the reading. Wytttenbach proposed *προσαγορευομένη*, which does not remove the difficulty arising from the third εἴτε requiring a third *substantive* after it. The probability is that εἴτε is an unconscious repetition of the foregoing, and that *προσγενομένη* is made, by a kind of hyperbaton, to agree with *κοινωνία*, instead of τοῦ καλοῦ.—(6.) οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο εἰσχυρίζομαι] Socrates says he does not mean to define farther or more minutely that point (viz., the nature of the connection) but simply to insist on this, that it is by Beauty all the beautiful things become what they are. (Hence the censure of Aristotle (Metaph. I. 6, 4) on Plato and the Pythagoreans, as neglecting to face the problem of explaining this connection between the Phenomenal Effects and those *a priori* Laws, to which the name of *Numbers* was given by the Pythagoreans, and *Ideas* by Plato: τὴν μέντοι γε μίθεξιν ἢ μίμησιν, ἣτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφείσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.)

101 A. (1.) *διαμαρτύροιο ἂν*] Socrates finds fault with the common phraseology as being unphilosophical, whereby qualities and properties are attributed by means of outward appearances, and not by the actual possession of the qualities and properties. The means, he argues, is put for the cause; the manifestation for the Essence. 'Thus, in regard to stature, a man is said to be taller than another by the head, but the head cannot be the cause or principle, it is only the means of reckoning or reaching an estimate, and you would protest against being supposed to regard the head itself as the principle, because you would have a salutary fear of being met with the objection that, if three men were compared together, one would be found intermediate between the other two, and this intermediate man would be said to be larger

- πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυν τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοώης, ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πῶς ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινα αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφ' ἃν χαίρειν, παρεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς D σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιῶς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἐαυτοῦ σκίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ

Continuation of the exposition of the same principle, which is illustrated by a variety of examples.

than the one, but smaller than the other, by the head; which is absurd, because the head cannot be supposed to be the cause of one being both smaller and greater at the same time: and secondly, because the head being small relatively to the body, it is absurd to say that a small thing (*σμικρῇ τι*) can be the cause of greatness in one object over another. There must, therefore, be supersensuous properties possessed by and inherent in objects, and partaken of by them, to which we give such names as magnitude (*μέγεθος*) and smallness (*σμικρότης*).

B. (8.) ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος] 'When one is added to one, two is produced, not by juxtaposition, but by duality being introduced.'

C. (2.) μέγα ἂν βοώης] Plutarch (Mor. 1058 D.) uses the same expression regarding the professions of the Stoics. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς βόων μέγα καὶ κεκραγώς, Ἐγὼ μόνος εἰμὶ βασιλεὺς.—You would loudly protest that you cannot conceive each thing arising in any other way than as it partakes of the particular Essence of which it is a partaker. τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας = τῆς ἰδέας the universal manifesting itself in, but prior to, the particular, so that the former is an οὐσία (*Sein*), the latter a γένεσις (*Werden*). Cf. 100 D., note. — (9.) κομψείας ἐφ' ἃν χαίρειν] Such refinements you would let alone (i.e., such as seem to explain, as if they were causes, when they are only effects or phenomena), leaving to others wiser than you the privilege of using them in reply, when asked for the cause. There is an allusion probably to the practical advice given to the æsthetical Amphion, in the *Antiope* of Euripides, Τοιαῦτ' αἰεὶ καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν Σκάπτων, ἄρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίων ἐπιστατῶν, Ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφ' εἰς σοφίσματα, Ἐξ ἃν κενούσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

ἀσφαλούς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐώς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἀλλήναι ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνεται, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο, ἔσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὔρεῖν. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκλώντες ὁμῶς δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ', εἴπερ εἰ

D. (1.) *δέδιως ἂν, τὸ λεγ.*] *Afraid, as the saying is, of your own shadow, i.e., with utmost caution.* Cf. Q. Cic. Pet. Cons. II. 9: 'Umbram suam metuit.' Cic. ad. Att. XV. 20.—(2.) *ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου*] *Adhering firmly to that impregnable position in the principle, viz., ὅτι τῇ καλῇ αὐτῇ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ, cf. 100 D.* On οὕτως following a participle, like an apodosis after a protasis, cf. 61 C., n.—(3.) *εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο*] In this clause *ἔχομαι*, being used of the impugner, has the unusual sense of *assail*, which is the more remarkable, as it follows immediately after *ἐχόμενος* in the ordinary sense. Ast proposed to get rid of this difficulty by reading, instead of *αὐτῆς τῆς, ἀλλῆς τινός*, which, however, destroys the continuity of the thought. The least difficulty is to accept *ἔχοιτο* in that unusual sense, much as *ἄπτομαι*, in 86 D., has the meaning of *assail*, the opposite of what it has in 64 A. The gist of the whole passage may be thus given. 'If any one should attack the principle you advance, you would let the attack pass,\* until you should have satisfied yourself, whether your conclusions drawn from it are in your judgment mutually consistent or otherwise; and then, when you were called on to give the grounds for that very principle, you would proceed in the same way, having laid down another principle, such as might appear most stable among principles more general and comprehensive, until you should arrive at something satisfactory.' In this passage the Editors and Commentators have supposed a profound meaning to lurk under *τὸ ἱκανόν*, as if it indicated what Plato elsewhere regards as the all-comprehending idea of the Good (*τὸ ἀγαθόν*), and have therefore referred to such expressions as *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος* in Pol. VI. 510 C., and 511 B., *τὸ ἀμνηστον* in Phædr. 277 C., and to the fact that in Phileb. 20 D., *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is said to

\* A certain analogy to this course is found in the Meno 86 E., where Socrates throws out a certain view, or *ὑπόθεσις*, of Virtue, and then says to Meno, *συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως σκοπεῖσθαι*, equivalent to, 'Allow me to verify this principle, and to see if it applies.'



102 τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιούσιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὃ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέρβης.

Phædo pauses briefly in the narration, before entering on the exposition of the Argument which Socrates founded on the previous reasoning.

EX. Νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστώσ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκείνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

EX. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

L. ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα B ξυνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν

be supremely *ικανόν*. The insuperable objection to understanding τὸ *ικανόν* in this lofty sense, besides the difficulty arising from the casualty of its mention, is contained in the word *ὡσαύτως*, which implies that, as the first process recommended, viz., the verification of the results (τὰ ὀρμηθέντα) is a descending and deductive process, so the second process recommended, whereby the principle under consideration shall be shown to be contained in some other more comprehensive and less disputable principle, is *also* (*ὡσαύτως*) a deductive or descending process. The success of the last process whereby the combated hypothesis shall be shown to be a leading link in a chain of mutually dependent sequences, is all that is meant by τὸ *ικανόν*. By this view of the passage, it is not meant to be denied that the Platonic Philosophy contemplated all truths and existences as resolvable into an Ultimate Essence, denominated the 'idea of the Good:' all that is denied is the presence of that conception in the present passage. (On the logical expression τὰ ἄνωθεν, i.e., the general as opposed to the particular, cf. Arist. Anal. Post. I. 20, 1, λέγω δὲ ἄνω μὲν, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον (κατηγορίαν)· κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος).

E. (1.) ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο] φύροιο, which some take as passive (drift), it is better to regard as of the middle voice, in the sense of ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκλῶν following.—(2.) οἱ ἀντιλογικοί] Cf. 90 C. οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διωτρίψαντες.

102 A. (10.) ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι] To the best of my remembrance. This use of οἶμαι is nearly equivalent to μέμνημαι: cf. 59 B.

B. (1.) εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν] 'That each of the Ideas has a certain real existence, and that phenomena receive such and such a name according as they partake of those very Ideas,' i.e., that τὰ δικάια are so called, as partaking of the supersensuous Idea τὸ δίκαιον inhering therein,

*Argument* V. *Development of the last formal argument for perpetuity of Existence, in opposition to Cebes' view of a limited and terminable existence.*

ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτω λέγεις, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἔγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν, οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα [ὑπερέχων], τῷ δὲ D τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐν

τὰ καλὰ by αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, etc. The same doctrine is stated in Parmen. 132 D., in almost the same words, and also with εἶδος, as here, in the sense of ἰδέα. On τὰλλα as the phenomenal, cf. 75 E., note.—(7.) τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκρ.] 'In the statement, Simmias exceeds Socrates, the truth is not exactly as the words convey it. For you do not mean to say, that Simmias is taller than Socrates by virtue of his being Simmias, but by the tallness which he happens to possess.' In common speech, the rigid accuracy of dialectics is not preserved, so that contrary predicates come to be affirmed regarding one and the same object, e.g., that Simmias is tall compared with Socrates, and small compared with Phædo. Therefore, argues Socrates, the predications of common speech are defective, inasmuch as they deal with the relative and not with the absolute, which last is the proper province of the philosopher.

C. (7.) ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει . . . . . εἶναι] Equivalent to ὀνομάζεται εἶναι, is affirmed to be both small and tall. A similar idiom in Herod. II. 44, ἱρὸν Ἡρακλέους, ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντος Θασίου εἶναι.

D. (1.) τὴν σμικρότητα [ὑπερέχων] The right reading in this subtle passage is disputed. The MSS., and the Aldine and Basle Editions, have ὑπερέχων in the first member. Stephens reads, in the first member, παρέχων for

ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Ξυνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βου-  
 λόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον  
 αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέ ποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν  
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχε-  
 σθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ  
 ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ  
 ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέ-  
 ναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέ-  
 λειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ  
 ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὦν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος  
 ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι· ἐκείνω δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκε μέγα ὂν  
 σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν  
 οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἄλλο  
 οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τοῦναντίον γίγνε-  
 σθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν  
 τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασι, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω  
 φαίνεται μοι.

LI. Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις

*ὑπερέχων*, thus inserting *πυρέχων* in both members. Hermann brackets *ὑπερέχων* as suspicious. The following may serve as an approach to a sort of literal rendering: 'Simmias stands midway between both, supplying an exemplification of smallness by the superiority of the one (*i.e.*, Phædo) in tallness, and in the case of the other (*i.e.*, Socrates), supplying an exemplification of tallness surpassing that other's small stature.'—(3.) *καὶ ξυνγραφικῶς εἶπεν*] To intend to speak with the precision of a bond or contract (*ξυνγραφὴ*). Wytttenbach understands it wrongly of the precision of a history.—(6.) *οὐδέ ποτ' ἐθέλειν*] This use of *ἐθέλω*, not with a personal nominative, is parallel to *τετόλμηκε* in E. Cf. *βούλεται* in 74 D. *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος*, *absolute Magnitude* (according to the Idea), is opposed to *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος*, *relative Magnitude* (according to the concrete or tangible External). 'Not only does the Idea of magnitude not admit of largeness and smallness being predicated of it at once, but even concrete magnitude never admits the small, nor allows itself to be surpassed, but one or other of two things is the result; either it vanishes and withdraws on the approach of its contrary, or altogether ceases when the approach has taken place: but it is not disposed by remaining and admitting smallness to be different from the very thing which it was.' He then illustrates from his own case, affirming that in these comparisons no change took place on the concrete figure of Socrates, any more than on the

The argument is founded on the principle that, as the Idea is the true cause of phenomena, no cause or influence from beyond itself can overpower it, or affect its own essence.

*Argument*  
V.

An auditor, whose name is not given, suggests that this view seems to contradict the view formerly advanced regarding the reciprocal intertransition of contraries.

δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι — Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῶν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μείζον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρειν τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίνεσθαι, νῦν δέ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῶν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δέ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομα-

primal idea of smallness, which was confessedly unchangeable. The purpose of this reasoning will manifest itself at an after part of the discussion.

103 A. (6.) αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νῦν] *The very reverse of the conclusions we formerly arrived at ; viz., in 70 E., regarding the transition of Life into Death, and the like. The objection is not attributed to any one by name: Olympiodorus speaks of it as the ἀπορία τοῦ ἀνωνύμου.*—(11.) παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν] ‘Leaning his head aside,’ so as to catch what was probably spoken in a low or hesitating tone, the speaker being probably unwilling to cast doubts on the consistency of the reasoning. Socrates, however, commends the manly spirit (ἀνδρικῶς), with which he had reminded him of the seeming contradiction. Compare Meno 81 D., ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀποκαμεῖν ζητῶν.

B. (3.) ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος] The distinction which Socrates says is overlooked by the objector, is that between the manifestation (τὸ πρᾶγμα) and the essence underlying the manifestation, the former being a γένεσις (Germanice *Werden*), and the latter an οὐσία (Germanice *Sein*.) ‘Although there may be a *transition* in the manifestations (τὰ πρᾶγματα), such as in *living creatures* passing into the condition called death, yet life, itself, that is, the essence of life, cannot be conceived as becoming its contrary, death, and yet remaining life. This cannot be, whether in regard to the life in us, or that in nature, for one contrary cannot become the other contrary, and yet remain the original contrary at the same time. In the former case, we were arguing regarding objects containing the contraries, styling them by the same name as the essences: here we speak of the

C ζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκείνα οὐκ ἂν ποτέ φάμεν ἐβελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἔρα μή πον, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὁδε εἶπεν ; ὁ δ', Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὐτι λέγω ὥς οὐ πολλά με ταραττει. Ξυνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἑναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. Παντά-  
πασιν, ἔφη.

Socrates corrects the misapprehension, and lays down the principle, that the intertransition of Processes referred to, did not imply an intertransition of Essences.

LII. Ἐτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα ξυνωμολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἐγωγε. Ἄρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὖσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰ ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος

Essences themselves, through the inherence of which the objects received their names; these essences are not reciprocally produced.' This is afterwards exemplified by illustrations from heat and cold, where there may be in outward objects a transition from heat to cold, but heat itself cannot become cold. So in regard to numbers, which contain either equality or inequality (oddness), but cannot contain both at the same time. (The distinction is not unhappily brought out by Deuschle (Plat. Myth. p. 8). 'In 70 D., it was not said that the great arose out of the small, but that the greater arose out of the smaller.')

C. (4.) ὁ δ', Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη] Most of the MSS. have simply οὐδ' αὖ, the Bodl. has ὁ δὲ αὖ. Hermann's reading, which is given above, is a combination of both. Cebes says that he does not feel his doubts return on this point; although he adds, 'I do not mean to say that few things give me difficulty.' His assent is given, in such a way, however, as that his character for *πραγματεία* is still preserved, since he is spoken of as being *κατεργάτατος πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν*, 77 A.: cf. 62 E. and 87 B.

D. (3.) Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι] The argument is, 'Heat and Cold are two contrary essences, and when we happen to observe what seems to be a transition from one to the other, such as snow melting, or fire burning down, it is not according to logic to say that either extreme has passed into or become the other, but that one or the other, as the case may be, has withdrawn.'—(4.) ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν] Namely, in 102 E.

*Argument* τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολείσθαι. Πάνυ  
*V.* γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ  
*Development* ὑπεξίναί τι ἢ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξά-  
*of the Argu-* μενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.  
*ment regard-* Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρ', ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἓνια τῶν E  
*ing Essences* τοιοῦτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι τοῦ  
*that exclude* ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ  
*each other.* ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰὲ ὅταν-  
 περ ἦ. ἐτι δ' ἐν τοῖσδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω.  
 τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰὲ πού δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχά-  
 νειν, ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρα μόνον τῶν  
 ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ  
 τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος 104  
 καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰὲ, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ  
 περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι  
 οἶον καὶ ἢ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ

E. (1.) Ἔστιν ἄρ', ἢ δ' ὅς] *It is, then, the case that.* ὥστε after ἔστιν, expressing the *result*, as in 93 B. So πολλάκις γέγονεν ὥστε in Isocr. 124 A.—(2.) ἀξιούσθαι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος] ἑαυτοῦ before ὀνόματος is the reading of almost all the MSS., except the Bodleian, which has αὐτοῦ along with Stephens. The former is the preferable reading, both by the sense, and also the analogy of μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος, in 104 A. After ἄλλο τι, repeat ἀξιούσθαι τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος.—(4.) ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰὲ] i.e., The *species* has the *μορφή* of the *genus* present, with whatever else that *μορφή* may be combined. Compare the contrast in B. between τὰ ἔχοντα τὰ ἐναντία, and the immanent Ideas, ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ ὧν ἐνόντων κ.τ.λ. 'An Idea does not admit of having its contrary predicated concerning it; and not only so, but any essence found in combination with it remains unchanged also, because the Idea combined with it, and inseparable from it, must be unchanged. Thus, in the genus of *odd* numbers there is, for example, the species *Three*, having, in combination with its own essence (triad), also the attribute of oddness or *imparity*. *Three* has no opposite to itself, considered as *Three*, but the attribute of *imparity* with which it is combined is the contrary of *parity*. Therefore, as *parity* can never become *imparity*, or the reverse, it follows that the essence of *Three* can never admit of change in itself, being in combination with the unchangeable.' The application of all this is as follows: The Soul (like the number *Three*) is not the (logical) opposite of anything, yet it contains that which is the (logical) opposite of something: we can conceive soul existing only in combination with Life, and

περὶ τῆς τριάδος· ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι  
 αἰὲ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ  
 οὐπὲρ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ  
 τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας,  
 B ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν αἰὲ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ  
 περιττός· καὶ αὐτὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ  
 ἕτερος αὐτῶν στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον  
 ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν αἰεὶ· ξυγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;  
 Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι,  
 ἄθρει. ἔστι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκείνα τὰ  
 ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα  
 ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰὲ τάναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε  
 δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ιδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσῃ  
 ἐναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ  
 C ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι  
 πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι

as the Idea of Life excludes Death, that which is always united with Life cannot be subject to Death in the sense of annihilation.

104 A. (1.) ὅμως εἰ δεῖ αὐτό] 'Is Imparity in absolute Idea the only thing of which imparity can be predicated, or is there anything besides, which is not equivalent to imparity, but of which, over and above its own name, we must predicate imparity also?' That is, can we not say of Three, for example, that over and above its own essence of Three, it possesses this property also, viz., that it can never become independent of or detached from the idea of Imparity, or be conceived as an even number?—(6.) ὄντος οὐχ οὐπὲρ τῆς τριάδος] An instance of Attraction, such as occurs so often with οἶος, as in Thuc. VII. 21, πρὸς ἀνέρας τολμηροὺς ὄντας οἶους καὶ Ἀθηναίους. The MSS. and Editions read ὕπερ, which Heindorf showed would require ἡ τριάς, and Editors since Heindorf have followed his alteration of ὅπερ into οὐπὲρ.—(8.) ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] According to the classic idiom, equivalent to τὸ ἡμισυ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ. ἀριθμός is here used for the whole series of numbers, embracing both the στίχοι (of odd and even numbers), into which the Pythagoreans were wont to divide all numbers.

B. (6.) ἐκείνα τὰ ἐναντία] Mutual opposites, such as τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν· τὸ ἄρτιον and τὸ περιττόν. But ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα κ.τ.λ., οὐδὲ ταῦτα, (equivalent to ἀλλ' αὐτὰ in C.), are modified opposites, such as τὸ πῦρ, which is not ἐναντίον αὐτό, and yet cannot admit the conception of τὸ ψυχρόν, because τὸ θερμόν is essentially combined with it: so with ἡ χιὼν, ἡ τριὰς, etc. In the end of B. there is a kind of anacoluthon of case,

Argument  
V.

Not only do  
contrary Es-  
sences ex-  
clude each  
other, such  
as Parity and  
Imparity in  
Numbers,  
but the parti-  
cular num-  
bers exem-  
plifying Im-  
parity never  
admit Parity  
and vice  
versa.

τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

LIII. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἰοί τε ὦμεν, ὀρισώ-  
μεθα ὅποια ταύτ' ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέ- D  
βης, τάδε εἴη ἅν, ἃ ὅ τι ἅν κατάσχη, μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει  
τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ δεῖ  
τινος ; Πῶς λέγεις ; Ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ  
δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἅν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ιδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐ-  
τοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιπτοῖς. Πάνυ γε.  
Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δῆ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ιδέα ἐκείνη τῇ  
μορφῇ ἢ ἅν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται, οὐδέποτ' ἅν ἔλθοι. Οὐ

viz., ἀπολλύμενα after δεχομένοις. εἴοικα, however, has the liberty of taking either case, as dative, in 62 C., εἴοικε τοῦτο . . . ἀτόπῳ : nominative, Crat. 408 E., εἴοικε . . . κατὰ ἔθλον γενόμενον κ.τ.λ.

C. (5.) οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη] The illustration promised in 103 E., by the words ἐν τοῖσδε σαφίστιρον is now finished, and the conclusion arrived at is therefore an echo of the terms in which it was there propounded.

D. (3.) ἐναντίου αὐτῷ δεῖ τινος] In this clause there is more perplexity of reading in the MSS. and Editions than in any other passage of the *Phaedo*. Many of them omit δεῖ, but they all agree in having αὐτῷ somewhere, and the great difficulty was in accounting for its construction, since to make ἐναντίου govern it would make the reasoning unintelligible. H. Schmidt accounts satisfactorily for αὐτῷ by restoring δεῖ, which is present in certain MSS., (and the version of Ficinus acknowledges it, 'contrario illi est opus') and is virtually contained in ἐῆνος, the nonsensical reading of the two earliest Editions. The position of μὴ μόνον before ἀναγκάζει is evidence in favour of the next member having a new verb, and the anacoluthon caused by this verb being of the impersonal form is a minor difficulty. Hermann reads ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου [αὐτῷ] δεῖ τινος, which is inferior to H. Schmidt's proposal, as not affording a basis to explain the origin of such readings as ἐῆνος, etc. 'Will they not be of this description, viz., such as, whatever thing they occupy, not only necessitate the thing so occupied to retain itself its own essence, but also involve the necessity of something which is a strict opposite being communicated to it at the same time?' This he exemplifies afterwards by ἡ τριάς, which, when it is predicable of any thing, communicates not



γάρ. Εἰργάζεταιο δέ γε ἡ περιττή; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ  
 Ε ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα  
 οὐδέποτε ἤξει. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἀμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.  
 Ἀμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρ' ἡ τριάς. Ναί. Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον  
 ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὁμως οὐ δέχεται  
 αὐτὸ [τὸ ἐναντίον], οἷον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα  
 ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον  
 αἰεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυνὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῇ  
 105 ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει,  
 μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν αὐτὸ  
 ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα  
 μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμνησκον' οὐ γὰρ  
 χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου

only its own proper conception, viz., triplicity (the *species*), but also imparity (the *genus*).—(7. ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐή] This general statement is explained more definitely afterwards: ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει, where τὰ τρία answers to τὸ τοιοῦτον, and ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα to ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα, and therefore ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ signifies ἡ τοῦ περιττοῦ ἰδέα, which is the cause of (τοῦτο, viz., τὸ περιττὸν εἶναι) the imparity of Three. ἡ περιττή afterwards is an abbreviation for ἡ τοῦ περιττοῦ μορφή.

Ε. (3.) ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι] *As to what I proposed to define* (referring to βούλει οὖν . . . ὀρισώμεθα above in C.). A similar infinitive is in 95 B., ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι. The sequence of the sentence is dislocated by the extended explanation, so that the apodosis begins properly at ἀλλ' ὅρα ἐή:—*Well, see now if you accept this statement*, etc. τὸ ἐναντίον is bracketed by all the recent editors, except Stallbaum, who inserts a comma, and makes τὸ ἐναντίον a kind of explanation of αὐτό, comparing such phrases as, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, λύσις, in 67 D. αὐτό, however, refers to τινι, which, by the previous part of the sentence, cannot be ἐναντίον. (H. Schmidt attempts to defend αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον by affirming it to be used here, not in the philosophical sense, but in a popular sense, and to mean the same as ἐναντίον τι πρῶγμα, but this is against the Platonic usage of such expressions as αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, a very different phrase from καλόν τι πρῶγμα.)

105 A. (3.) ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ] 'Such, for example, as ἡ τριάς, which carries with it, to whatsoever it applies, a certain absolute contrary, viz., Imparity, and never admits the opposite of that, viz., Parity, to be predicated concerning that to which it (the triad) applies. So the object involving any attribute never admits contrariety to that attribute.' αὐτὸ τὸ

Argument  
V.

Application  
of the pre-  
ceding princi-  
ple to the Es-  
sence, of  
which Soul  
is a manifes-  
tation: viz.,  
Life.

οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον·  
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλω οὐκ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν  
τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα B  
τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ  
καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶπερ ἔπει τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι οὐ-  
τως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

LIV. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι  
ὁ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ  
παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκεί-  
νην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ  
γὰρ ἔροιό με, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν  
ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν C  
ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν,  
ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται,

*ἐπιφέρων* is an emphatic repetition of *ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν κ.τ.λ.*—(6.) *τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου* Scil. *τὴν ἰδέαν*.—(7.) *τὸ διπλάσιον* 'As being the double of *τὰ πέντε*.'—(8.) *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν* 'This double, without being itself a contrary to something else, nevertheless will not receive the idea of imparity.' The MSS. omit *οὐκ* before *ἐναντίον*, but a comparison of this sentence with the exactly parallel one in 104 E., *ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό*, makes it manifest that a negative has here been lost, a view which is supported by H. Schmidt.

B. (1.) *οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον* 'Neither will the sesquialter, or any other of these fractional parts, involving the half, admit the notion of the whole being predicated regarding them, and so again the third, and so forth.' No subdivisions or Parts, (illustrated by two series of fractions, viz.,  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{2}{3}$ ,  $\frac{3}{4}$ , etc. and  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{2}{4}$ ,  $\frac{3}{5}$ , etc.,) can have the notion of the Whole affirmed respecting them, because the Whole is the logical contrary of their genus, Part. *τὸ ἥμισυ* is introduced much like *τὸ διπλάσιον* above in A. H. Schmidt gives it the sense of *ἂν τὸ ἥμισυ ἔχει*, as in Ficinus, *quæ dimidium habent*, and a reading in these words is found in Paris C.—(5.) *μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ* 'Do not answer with the same term as that with which I put the question, but do so according to the example I now give you. Socrates wished him to use the species in reply, and not the genus, which last would be merely echoing his question regarding the genus. Some of the MSS. have *ᾧ ἂν ἐρωτῶ*, as if the dative of instrument, which is here very awkward. Heindorf and Bekker, however, accept it and introduce *ἄλλῃ* from certain MSS. after *ἀλλά*. Stallbaum reads *ὃ* in the one place, and *ἄλλ' ἄλλο* in the other; but there seems to be no MS. in favour of *ἄλλο*, those that have not *ἄλλῃ* reading *ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ* simply. The above

νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῶ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἐσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὃ τι βούλομαι. Ἄλλὰ πάννυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἧ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σῶματι, ζῶν ἐσται; Ὡς ἂν ψυχῇ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν αἰεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἧ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα, ὃ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχη, αἰεὶ ἡκεῖ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ φέρουσα ζωὴν; Ἡκεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τι ζωὴ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἐστίν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰεὶ, οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξηται, ὥς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

LV. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν

is the reading of the Bodleian, accepted by Hermann and the Zurich Editors. —(6.) λέγων δὲ παρ' ἡν] *I mean, a reply more specific than that safe method of reply, such as in 100 C.* —(9.) ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἐσται] There is here a complication caused by the introduction of the interrogative into the relative clause and the ejection of the substantive verb attached to the interrogative. The full form would be, τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ᾧ, ἂν (τοῦτο) ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, (τὸ σῶμα) θερμὸν ἐσται. Hermann brackets ἐν τῷ σώματι, but its presence seems to be necessary in order that a subject may be supplied out of it to ἐσται.

C. (2.) ὅτι, ᾧ ἂν θερμότης] Scil. ἐγγένηται. *That it must be the means by which heat is produced.* This answer, Socrates says, is but an echo of the question: the answer which he aims at eliciting is one in which the *species* (fire) shall be substituted for the *genus* (heat).

D. (5.) ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει] The full form is τὸ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ὃ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει. The Soul, as involving the idea of Life, being the Life-bringer to whatever it possesses (ὃ τι ἂν κατάσχη), can never come under the category of the opposite of Life, viz., Death. Where the Soul is, there is Life, and where Life is, Death cannot come. Olympiodorus has this comment:— ἡ ἀποδείξις πρόεισιν ἐκ τῶν ὑποθέσεων τοιούτῃ συλλογισμῷ· ἡ ψυχὴ, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, ζωὴν τούτῳ ἐπιφέρει· πάντῃ δὲ ὃ ἐπιφέρει τι, ἀδεκτόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου αὐτῇ· ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου ᾧ ἐπιφέρει· τὸ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ᾧ ἐπιφέρει, θάνατος· ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀδεκτος θανάτου. Compare Cratyl. 399 E., where the Soul is spoken of as αἴτιον τοῦ ζῆν τῷ σώματι.

Argument  
V.

The Soul, by virtue of its partaking of the Idea or Essence of Life, which excludes its contrary Death, must be considered as not subject to Death or to Decay.

τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται, τί ἐκαλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὐ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ; Ἀθάνατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέρβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆει ἂν ἡ χιών οὐσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατ' ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὅσαύτως, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ἀψυκτὸν ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν τι ἐπῆει, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπесβέννυντο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὼν ὥχето. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἶπειν; Β εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἵη, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθ-

E. (1.) Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον] Abbreviation for τὸ μὲν ὠνομάζομεν ἄμουσον, τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ.—(2.) οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον] In a similar way Max. Tyr. XV. 6, argues that the soul, being the source of Life to the naturally perishable body, cannot lose that nature by which it gives Life: εἰ τῷ σώματι τῷ φύσει φθειρομένῃ παρέχει τὸ μὴ φθεῖρεσθαι, ἡνίκ' ἂν αὐτῇ συνῇ, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ φθαρῆναι αὐτήν. ἐν γοῦν τῇ συστάσει τὸ μὲν σῶμα συνεχεται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ συνεχεται.

106 A. (1.) ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἦ] The position of ἡ apart from ἄλλο τι throws greater emphasis on the word ἀνώλεθρα: cf. 106 E. ἄθερμον, ἀψυκτον are terms coined for the occasion, to be logically analogous to ἀνάρτιον—The steps of the reasoning in 106, for the purpose of showing that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος, contrary to the hypothesis of Cobes in 88 B., have been expounded and defended at some length by H. Schmidt: see Note T.

B. (5.) ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται] 'Just as, according to our former statement, three will not be an even number, nor again will the even be odd, nor of course will fire be also cold, nor yet the warmth contained in fire be

νηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδέ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἀλλὸ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἂν τις, ὅρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἄρτίου, ὥσπερ C ὠμολόγηται, ὁπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ αὐτ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῇ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῦται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι, ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἄρτίου, τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ὁπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἡ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη, πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνα- D τος εἶναι, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδῖον ὄν φθορὰν δέξεται.

LVI. Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

coldness.'—(7.) τί κωλύει] 'But, an objector may say, What hinders this view of the case—that, while it is granted that the odd does not pass into the even by the influence of the even, yet, on the perishing of the odd, the even is substituted in its room?' αὐτοῦ and ἐκείνου both refer to τὸ περιττόν. Compare the similarly free use of these same pronouns in 60 D. and 111 B.

C. (3.) τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν] *The odd is not imperishable as such.* This, however, does not affect his argument, as τὸ ἀνάρτιον and τὸ ἄθερμον do not necessarily involve in their very meaning τὸ ἀνώλεθρον, as τὸ ἀθάνατον does. If, however, this is not conceded (viz., that τὸ ἀθάνατον is ἀνώλεθρον), then it will be hard to find any thing having actual existence in the world, but only φθορά and consequent Chaos. This, however, he says, is against the universal consent of men regarding the nature of the Deity, and the Idea of Absolute Life, to both of which the notion of perishing ὀλεσθός cannot, from their very nature, be applied.

D. (2.) τούτου γε ἔνεκα] *So far as that is concerned, we need not go far to seek for that.* The proof is found in the very meaning of ἀθάνατος.

Argument  
V.

Conclusion  
of the last  
Formal  
Argument  
for the Im-  
mortality and  
Impertisha-  
bleness of the  
Soul.

Παρά πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ  
ἐτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθά-  
νατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος ἔ-  
τυχάνει οὐσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.  
Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπον, τὸ μὲν θνητόν,  
ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ  
ἀδιάφθορον οἵχεται ἀπίον, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.  
Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ  
ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ 107  
ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἄιδου. Οὐκ οὖν ἐγώ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω  
παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.  
ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ὁδε ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει  
μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντινά τις ἄλλον και-  
ρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων  
βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἢ δ' ὅς  
ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἐτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν

107 A. (2.) παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι] *I have nought to say in contravention of this.*—(9.) τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων] ‘Dissatisfied also with the (intellectual) inability of man to cope with such a theme.’ Wyttienbach compares Legg. IX. 854 A., τὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀσθένειαν εὐλαβοῦμενος, where, however, ἀσθένεια is weakness in regard to morality, while here it is weakness intellectually, or incapacity. Compare the similar feeling of ἀσθένεια uttering itself in the words of the same speaker in 85 D.

B. (2.) οὐ μόνον γ] Scil. ἀπιστίαν ἀναγκάζει ἐτι ἔχειν. ‘You must not rest in merely feeling mistrust, but, while you are right in what you have now said, in scrutinising *conclusions*, you must also examine more closely the *premises* from which they are drawn, even though they are, in your opinion, established.’ ἐπισκεπτέαι (owing to the attraction of πισταί near it) is an anacoluthon, as if ὑποθέσεις had been in the nominative, for ἐπισκεπτέον.—(5.) ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ] Compare the passage in 66 B., regarding the narrow path to be pursued under the guidance of Reason (μετὰ τοῦ λόγου) and the difficulty of following Reason to the full (ἐπακολουθήσαι), or obtaining absolute certainty (τὸ σαφές εἶδέναι, 85 C.), in the present life.—(7.) καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται] *And if certainty has once been attained in this matter, then only will your searching cease.* Compare similar language in the Timæus 29 D., ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν εἶτι περὶ αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν.

λεγομένων ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι  
 εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκά-  
 B ζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημέ-  
 νων. Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὦ Συμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ  
 ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ  
 εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὁμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ  
 ἔαν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διελητε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ  
 λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθη-  
 σαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε  
 περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

LVII. Ἀλλὰ τότε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον δια-  
 C νοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ  
 δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν  
 τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ  
 δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν  
 γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἐρμαῖον ἂν ἦν

Socrates now  
 passes on to  
 the moral re-  
 flection sug-  
 gested by the  
 whole sub-  
 ject, as to the  
 largeness  
 both of view  
 and of pur-  
 pose inspired  
 by the  
 thought of an  
 unending  
 Existence.

C. (1.) ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται] The practical conclusion of the whole  
 matter is the seriousness of Living, seeing it is not the span we call Life,  
 but a vast circle of Being, over which our interest extends. The same view  
 of Time as the vestibule to an unknown Depth of Being, is found in Pol. X.  
 608 C., πᾶς γὰρ οὐτὸς γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρός  
 τὸν πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη. Compare a similar exhortation  
 in Pol. X. 618 B., also the passage on the preciousness of the Soul, Apol.  
 30 B.—(5.) τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγὴ] Withdrawal from all being; i.e.,  
 annihilation. Cf. 91 B., εἰ μὴδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι.—(5.) ἐρμαῖον\*  
 ἂν ἦν] The Scholiast explains ἐρμαῖον as ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος, like the  
 easy luck of travellers finding things on the road through the favour of  
 Hermes. (ἐρμαῖον and ἐντύχημα are conjoined in Conv. 217 A.)

\* Justin Martyr has this Platonic passage in his mind when he says (contr. Tryph. § 4),  
 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκον φημι πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ. ἐρμαῖον γὰρ ἦν ὡς  
 ἀληθῶς τοῖς κακοῖς.—The refusal of funeral rites to great criminals flowed from an  
 atheistic fear lest death was to such persons a gain: hence Ælian says, in reference to such  
 refusals (Var. Hist. IV. 7), οὐκ ἦν ἄρα τοῖς κακοῖς οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κέρ-  
 δος, ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ τότε ἀναπαύονται κ.τ.λ. In later times the philosophy of Epicurus  
 accepted the principle which Plato here condemns, and regarded death as ἐρμαῖον τοῖς κακοῖς,  
 of which view the most memorable expression was that given by Cæsar, when he founded an  
 argument thereupon that the Catilinarian conspirators should be subjected to imprisonment as  
 a greater punishment than Death, which was *summum requies*, and no punishment at all.  
 Cf. Sallust, Catil. 51, 20, and Cicero's comment, Or. in Catil. IV. 4; also the remarks of  
 Plutarch (Mor. 555 D.); and the maxim of Theano in Clem. Al. Str. IV. 7, 44.

τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι, τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὕσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία, πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην D τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἄιδου ἢ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας.

D. (3.) παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς] When παιδεία and τροφή are opposed to each other, the former is properly used of the mind, and τροφή of the body. Here they are both used of the mind: cf. ψυχὴ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφόμενη in 84 B.—(6.) λέγεται δὲ οὕτως] Here opens a new and distinct portion of the Dialogue, in which Socrates attempts to lift the curtain of the Invisible world, and by means of semi-religious myths, to represent the condition of souls in Hades. On the analogy of the XI<sup>th</sup> Book of the Odyssey, this part of the Phædo is called by Olympiodorus (p. 193) a Νεκυία, being one of Three νεκυΐαι in Plato: ἦδε μὲν (ἐν Φαίδωνι) περὶ τῶν τοπῶν μᾶλλον ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, ἢ δὲ ἐν Γοργίᾳ (523 A.) περὶ τῶν δικάζοντων, ἢ δὲ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ (X. 614 B.) περὶ τῶν δικάζομένων.\* —(6.) ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων] The τελεταί probably supply the imagery: cf. the lines in Clem. Alex. Str. V. 14, 13, attributed to Menander, "Ἀπαντὶ δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρστατεί, Εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγῶ τοῦ βίου.† —(7.) ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει] There is an apparent inconsistency between this passage and that in Pol. X. 617 E., where Lachesis, daughter of Necessity, bids each soul, on his entrance into Life, choose his δαίμων: οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε, and again the statement in 620 D. Compare Phædr. 249 B., ἀφικνούμεναι (αἱ ψυχαί) ἐπὶ κλήρωσιν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἰροῦνται ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ ἐκάστη. The explanation seems to be, that the free-will of the individual soul chose the kind of life, but that Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, assigned the δαίμων according to the life chosen, so that a man was regarded as either εὐδαίμων or δυσδαίμων, according to his own choice.

\* The note of Olympiodorus on λέγεται δὲ οὕτως is interesting, though fanciful. He asks, τίνας οἱ λέγοντες; and answers, πρῶτον μὲν αἱ κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ σφύζουσαι ἀδιὰ ρηρώτως (i.e., instincts throbbing with inarticulate meaning,) δεῦτερον οἱ θεόλογοι τρίτον οἱ χρηστοὶ τῶν θείων τέταρτον, αἱ τελεταί πέμπτον, αὐτοὶ παραγενόμενοι (cf. Hom. Od. VII 201, XVII. 485) οἱ θεοί.

† It has been doubted whether a separate δαίμων was regarded as assigned to each individual, or only to a class. Olympiodorus argues for the latter view, Appuleius (de Deo Socr. p. 50) for the former. 'Ex hac ergo sublimiori daemonum copia Plato autumat singulis hominibus in vita agenda testes et custodes singulos additos.' The view of Appuleius is most in harmony with the text of the Phædo. (Compare, on this subject, Senec. Ep. 110, 1.)



λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάσ-  
του δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ  
εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ξυλλεγέντας διαδικασα-  
Ε μένους εἰς Ἄιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ  
δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεύσθαι· τυχόντας  
δ' ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μέιναντας ὧν χρή χρόνον ἄλλος  
δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακ-  
ραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου

Hence it was possible to say either *ψυχὴ δαίμονα λαγχάνει* or *δαίμων λαγχάνει ψυχὴν*. Compare Lysias Epitaph. p. 130, *νῦν δὲ ἥ τε φύσις καὶ νόσων ἥττων καὶ γήρως, ὅ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰλήχων ἀπαραίτητος*. Theocr. Idyll. IV. 40, *αἶ, αἶ, τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος, αἶ με λέλογχεν*.—(8.) *εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον*] *Ia nescio quem locum*. Examples of *δὴ τις* in 90 C., 108 C., 116 D., where it combines certainty of *fact* with uncertainty of *manner* or *detail*. The author of the *Axiochus*, § 20, specifies the locality more particularly as the *περίον ἀληθείας*: *Ἐνταυθοὶ καθέχονται εἰκασταὶ ἀνακρίνοντες τῶν ἀφικνουμένων ἕκαστον*. In Pol. X. 614 C., *διαδικάζω* is used of the *judges*; in this passage, of the *souls submitting severally* to judgment, hence in the middle voice. (It is worthy of remark, that *εἰκάζω*, notwithstanding the importance of *δικαιοσύνη* in the New Testament, is not the Scriptural word in regard to the final judgment, but *κρίνω*, as if simply a *separation*.)

E. (4.) *ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περ.*] The arrangement of the words is both musical and expressive. With regard to the extent of the Cycles, Plato does not here attempt to define the period. In Pol. X. 616 A., a cycle of 1000 years is spoken of as *ἡ ὑπὸ γῆς πορεία*: while in the *Phædrus* 249 A., *philosophic* spirits are said to recover their lost wings after *three* such cycles of 1000 years, the full cycle for other spirits being 10,000.\*—(5.) *ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τηλέφους*] Clem. Alex. Strom. IV. 7, 46, and Dionys. Hal. Rhet. VI. 5, quote the same proverb from a lost play of *Æschylus*† on the

\* Compare Empedocles Fragm. 1, who makes the cycle of banishment 30,000 *ἔσρα* to the soul that commits great crimes. Also Herodotus II. 123, regarding the Egyptian cycle, which was 3000 for every soul, from its migration at death into animal forms, until its return to a human frame.

† *Æschylus*, although a Pythagorean, is not, in this line of the *Telephus*, speaking as a Pythagorean, for it is manifest that he refers not to the different destinies of souls, but to the variety of ways by which death may be reached.—It was common to represent Death under the form of a journey (cf. 61 E., note), or *πορεία*. Cf. Müller's *Ancient Art* § 431, 2, and the funeral feast in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, under *Funus*, where a horse's head is introduced as a symbol of the journey of Death: also Danni's *Etruria* II. p. 193; Grimm's *Deutsche Mythol.* p. 801.

Repetition of the views previously enforced regarding the moral and intellectual condition of the Soul at Death, as determining its condition and destiny after Death.

Τηλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἰμόν φησιν εἰς 108  
 Ἄιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἀπλὴ οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι  
 εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν  
 διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὕσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε  
 σχίσσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων  
 τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν  
 οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐκ  
 ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος  
 ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκείνῳ πολλὴν  
 χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ B  
 ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγισ ὑπὸ τοῦ  
 προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην  
 δὲ ὅθι περ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιη-  
 κυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἣ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἣ ἄλλ' ἅττα

fortunes of the wandering Telephus. A similar saying is ascribed to Anaxagoras: Diog. Laert. II. 11, πρὸς τὸν δυσφοροῦντα ὅτι ἐπὶ ξένης τελευτᾷ, Πανταχόθεν, ἔφη, ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς ἧδον κατὰβασις. Cf. Cic. Tusc. I. 43, attributing it to Anaxagoras: *Undique ad inferos tantundem via est*. Compare the epigram of Leonidas Tarent., Append. 48, Εὐθυμος ὦν ἔρεσσε τὴν ἐπ' Ἄϊδον Ἀταρπὸν ἔρπων· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ ἐνσβάτος κ.τ.λ.

108 A. (5.) ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων] The early Editions have *θυσιῶν*, and such would appear to have been the reading in the time of Olympiodorus. The MSS., however, are in favour of *ὁσίων*, which harmonises better with *νομίμων*. The reference is to the rites in honour of the dead, connected with the worship of Hecate, and performed at the forking of a road (*ἐν τριόδοις*), which circumstance Plato converts into a kind of argument in favour of the notion that there was more than one *ὁδός* to Hades, one leading to Elysium, the other to Erebus. (Heindorf takes another view of *ὅσια* κ.τ.λ., and supposes a reference to the Mysteries, in which, it is said, there were tableaux exhibited representing the *descensus Avernī* as full of windings. According to Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 1343, Heindorf's view is a mistaken one, and *ὅσια* here can only mean the monthly rites to Hecate (cf. *Τριακάς*, in Harpocration) at the meeting of three ways.) It is probable, therefore, that Plato wished to use the superstition connected with *τρίεδρος* as a symbol to indicate that though one path led through death to the place of judgment, yet there it forked or diverged, one road leading to Elysium, the other to Tartarus. Compare Gorg. 524 A., οἷτοι οὖν (Μίνως, κ.τ.λ.) δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λείμῳ, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὴν ὁδὴν, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. Cf. Virg. *Æn.* VI. 540, 'Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas.'—(7.)

τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν  
 ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε  
 καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέ-  
 λει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπο-  
 ρία, ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐξελθόντων ὑπ'  
 ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἰκησιν ἥ δὲ  
 καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ ξυν-  
 εμπορῶν καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὥκησε τὸν αὐτῇ  
 ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμα-  
 στοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἶα οὔτε ὄση δοξάζε-  
 ται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὥς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος  
 πέπεισμαι.

D LVIII. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ  
 Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι τῆς γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ

οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα] Heusde's conjecture, οὐκ ἀγνακτεῖ for οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, is unnecessary, the meaning being, that the *meditatio mortis* has made such a soul familiar with whatever is its lot in Hades.

B. (1.) περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον] Probably, the neighbourhood of the grave, as in 81 D.—(6.) ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά] i.e., Actions akin to φόνοι.—(7.) ταύτην μὲν ἅπας] ἅπας = *unusquisque*, as in Eur. Bacch. 70, στόμα τ' εὐφημον ἅπας ὁσιούσθω.—(8.) οὔτε ξυνέμπορος] Compare Hor. Od. III. 2, 27, 'Vetabo . . . mecum solvat phaselon.'

C. (2.) χρόνοι γένωνται] Until certain periods are completed, i.e., αἱ πολλαὶ χρόνον καὶ μακრაὶ περίοδοι, in 107 E.—(3.) ὑπ' ἀνάγκης] Forster proposed to read Ἀνάγκης, as if a mythological person, such as is portrayed in Pol. X. 617 C. This, however, would require ἄγεται rather than φέρεται. In Crito 52 E., Phædr. 241 B., ὑπ' ἀνάγκης occurs in the sense, simply, of ἀνάγκη.—(7.) οὔτε ὄση] ὄση = *μόνον τοσαύτη ὄση*, not merely so small as: as interpreted by πᾶ μ με γὰ τι in 109 A. Compare also the passage quoted in note on 114 C.—(8.) ὥς γὰρ ὑπό τινος\* πέπεισμαι] Stephens reads πέπυσμαι, which is against the MSS., and would

\* As to the person referred to by τις, it is probable that Anaximander, who was the first to make a Map, or tabular representation of the earth, is the philosopher alluded to. The subsequent statement (108 E.) of the law of Equilibrium, being almost identical with that attributed to Anaximander by Aristotle, makes it probable that he is the τις referred to here. Stallbaum's notion that the reference is to Pythagoras is improbable: 1<sup>o</sup>, because Simmias, who is a Pythagorean, speaks of the view as new to him; and, 2<sup>o</sup>, the Pythagorean principle that the Earth had a planetary motion is departed from in 108 E. Cf. 97 E., n.

The Dis-  
course now  
passes into  
an exposi-  
tion, not,  
however,  
treated dia-  
lectically, of  
a possible  
Physical  
Theory of  
the World,  
as presenting  
more than  
one Platform  
of Existence,  
and therefore  
affording an  
arena for a  
Future Life.

ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σέ πείθει· ἠδέως ἂν οὖν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἃ γ' ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε εἶην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς, οἶαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς E τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδὲν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ. Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῇ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ 109 ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν·

require *παρά* for *ὑπό*, and is at variance with the analogous use of *πεῖθω* in 108 D., E.

D. (4.) οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη] It was a proverb regarding anything ingenious, to ascribe it to 'the art of Glaucus.' Who the famous artist was, is not sufficiently agreed: some say, a discoverer in music; others say, a worker in metals. Herodotus (I. 25) attributes the invention of *κόλλησιν*, or *soldering*, to a Glaucus of Chios, who belongs to the Samian school of art. (Müller's *Ancient Art*, § 61.) (It is somewhat remarkable that the Scholiasts and *Paræmiographi* do not connect the proverb with the prophetic craft of the Glaucus, who was regarded as the wizard of the sea.)

E. (3.) πέπεισμαι ὡς . . . . δεῖν] The intervention of a clause has the effect of disturbing the natural sequence. Compare the duplication of *ὡς* in 97 A.—(4.) εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ] 'The Earth, being a round body in the centre of the universe (or astronomical heaven), requires neither the air to float upon, nor any other similar external support, but the circumstance that the heaven is equiform with itself all around, and also the circumstance that the earth is itself possessed of equilibrium, are adequate to keep it (αὐτὴν, i.e., τὴν γῆν) in its place. For a body in equilibrium, placed in the centre of another that is equiform or homogeneous (in substance and density) will have no tendency to incline in any one direction, either more or less, but will remain suspended in perfect balance.' (ὁμοῖον τινός, i.e., homogeneous *with itself*, as in *Timæus* 42 C. Cf. *ἀεὶ ὁμοῖος εἶ* in *Conv.* 173 D., 'You are always like yourself.') Compare with this statement of the condi-

- ισόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλῶες μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἣ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. \*Ετι τοῖνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι
- B Ἡρακλείων σπηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν ᾧ περ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν
- C δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ

Socrates enlarges on the vastness of the world. The Greeks around the basin of the Mediterranean are like to Frogs on the edge of a marsh, having little or no knowledge of the other basins indenting the surface of the earth.

tions of Equilibrium,\* that of Anaximander in Aristotle (de Cælo II. 13, 25), εἰσὶ δὲ τινες, ἃ εἰς τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξίμανδρος κ.τ.λ.

109 A. (8.) *πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό*] αὐτό refers to γῆ: cf. in 88 A., αὐτό referring to ψυχὴν.

B. (1.) *μέχρι Ἡρακλείων σπηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος*] These were not only the extremities of Europe, according to Herodotus (IV. 45), but, in the time of Socrates, almost the extremities of the world, so far as then known to the Greeks. In the next generation the expedition of Alexander widened the horizon far beyond the Phasis, so that the scholar of Plato, Aristotle (de Cælo II. 14, 19; Meteorolog. II. 5, 16) puts India in the place of Phasis, a position which India maintained until the period of modern discovery; e.g., in Juvenal X. 1, 'Omnibus in terris, quæ sunt a *Gadibus* usque *Auroram et Gangem*.' On the enlargement of Plato's cosmographical view, as indicated by this passage, compare Humboldt's *Cosmos* II. 117.—(3.) *περὶ τὴν θάλατταν*] The Greeks naturally affected a peculiar property in the

\* Two things are worthy of observation here: 1°. The clearness and precision of Plato's statement of Equilibrium, almost in the strict and sober spirit of Newtonian Physics; 2°. The circumstance that at the time of the composition of the *Phædo*, Plato considered the Earth to be in the centre and at rest, certainly without a planetary progressive movement in an orbit, excluding also a rotatory movement on an axis. The dispute, as to whether Plato did not teach rotation in some form, belongs solely to the interpretation of the *Timæus*: for, in regard to the *Phædo*, the statement as to the condition of the Earth is so clear that the question could never have arisen.

ξυρρεῖν εἰς εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἶεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἰοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτά τε καὶ ὁσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης Δ ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς εἶη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἐκκηκὼς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τινὶ κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἶεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ δεινό-

Mediterranean, here simply called 'The Sea.' Cf. Herod. I. 1, ἥδε ἡ θάλασσα: V. 54, VII. 28, 'Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα and 'Ἑλληνίς θάλασσα, like the Latin 'nostrum mare.'—On the insignificance of even great nations compared with the vastness of the world, compare the kindred reflections in Cicero (Tusc. I. 20; Rep. VI. 19—20) and Seneca (Quaest. Nat., Praef. 7), 'O quam ridiculi sunt mortalium termini! Ultra Istrum Dacus non exeat, Strymo Thracas includat. . . . Siquis formicis det intellectum hominis, nonne et illae unam aream in multas provincias dividunt? Punctum est in quo navigatis, in quo bellatis! . . . Quantum enim est, quod ab ultimis litoribus Hispaniae usque ad Indos jacet?'—(8.) καθάρην ἐν καθαρί] This passage has an adventitious interest connected with it, as being the source from which Celsus accused the Christians of plagiarising the conception of a New Earth (Origen. c. Cels. VII. 28—30): ὑπολαμβάνει ὁ Κέλσος τὰ περὶ τῆς ἄλλης γῆς κρείττονος . . . εἰληφέναι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ μάλιστα Πλάτωνος, τοῦ ἐν τῇ Φαίδωνι περὶ τῆς καθαρᾶς ἐν καθαρῷ κειμένης οὐρανῷ γῆς φιλοσοφήσαντος.

C. (2.) ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι] Hesych. ὑποστάθμη· τρυγία. On ταῦτα, cf. 75 E., n.—(4.) οἰκοῦνταν . . . λεληθέναι] Scilicet ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς. According to Proclus (on Timaeus I. p. 56), this was also an Egyptian tradition: ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐν κοίλῳ φησὶν οἰκεῖν . . . ὁ καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἱερὰ φήμη παραδέδωκε.

D. (4.) τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι] σφίσι may stand after εἴ τις, as εἴ τις involves the notion of plurality. Cf. Pol. I. 344 B.—(8.) ὡς διὰ τούτου] τούτου, i.e., τοῦ ἀέρος.—(8.) τὸ εἰ δεινότερον] The MSS. and Editions have τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτόν, which Ast and H. Schmidt do their endeavour to

Ε τατον, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἶους τε εἶναι  
 ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν αέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ  
 ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν  
 ἂν ἀνακύνπαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες  
 ἀνακύνπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ  
 ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ, εἴ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνέχεσθαι θεω-  
 ροῦσα, γινῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς  
 110 καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ. ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ  
 γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα  
 ἐστὶ καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ  
 τῆς ἀλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ  
 θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον, ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῦν, οὐδέν ἐστι, σή-  
 ραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροι  
 εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν κάλλη  
 sea.

defend. Stallbaum adopts Heindorf's conjecture, τοιοῦτον for ταύτόν. The emendation by Vögel in the text is accepted by Hermann. Socrates declares that the most terrible part of man's situation is this, that, less fortunate than the fishes in their element, he must remain at the bottom of his sea, without a glimpse of the upper world, even from the surface. Compare the Platonic allusion in St. Basil (Homil. XV. 132 D.) regarding the purified intellect: οἷον τις ἰχθυὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ βυθοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἀνω ἐπιφάνειαν ἀνανῆξασθαι (ἐννηθεῖς).

E. (2.) ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις] ἐπεὶ is transitional, *Whereas*.—(4.) ἀνακύνπαντα] This word is used in Phædrus 249 C., of the soul obtaining a glimpse into the a-priori world of Reminiscence, ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φασιν καὶ ἀνακύνπαντα εἰς τὸ ὄν. Lucian (de Sacrif. c. 8) makes mirth of the word, to describe the situation of a cynic happening to find himself in Olympus. (Compare παρακύνπτω in a different sphere, 1 Ep. Peter I. 12.)

110 A. (1.) ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ] Plato here considers the Earth as a platform of life midway between two others; one, beneath, in the sea, where all the forms are, from the thickness of the element, low and coarse; the other, in the ether above, where the forms are pure and noble, our air being to them as dense and alien to life with them as water is to us.—(6.) ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ] The presence of the higher element of Land not being sufficient to neutralise the deteriorating properties of the Sea.\*

\* It is not necessary to suppose, with Wyttienbach, any expression of that semi-religious dread of the sea, which was an ethical feature common to Hesiod and the Pythagoreans with the ancient Egyptians and the modern Brahmins. All that is implied here is simply the inferiority of marine life generally (οὐδὲν τέλειον), the things 'rich and strange' belonging to

κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἄξια· ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐτῶν παρ' ἡμῶν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ B μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὃ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμίας, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσασιν.

LIX. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὃ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτῇ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος θεῶτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη, ὣν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν C τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὄση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ξυγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ

B. (8.) αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι] Compare the *pictæ pilæ* of Ovid, Met. X. 262; also the mystic Ball given by Adrastea, as a plaything to young Jovo (Apoll. Rhod. III. 132).—The reference is generally believed to be to the fanciful doctrine of the Pythagoreans regarding the geometrical figure, *dodecahedron*. Ps.-Plut. de Plac. Philos. II. 6: Πυθαγόρας, πέντε σχημάτων ὄντων στερεῶν, . . . ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κύβου φησὶ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν γῆν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς πυρραμίδος τὸ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀκταέδρου τὸν ἀέρα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ εἰκοσαέδρου τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δωδεκαέδρου τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖραν. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις Πυθαγορίζει. Cf. Timæus Locr. c. 5 (98 E.), τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐστάσατο (ὁ θεὸς), ἐγγιστα σφαίρας εἶναι. The number 'twelve' seems, therefore, to be chosen as representing the number of *surfaces*\* impressed

that element being far remote from the possession of vocal power in any form (cf. ἑλλοπερὶ ἰχθύς), much less of the gifts of articulate speech and reason. So, although full of vague wonder at the *κητή*, ἃ μυρία βόσκει ἀγαστονος Ἀμφιτρίτη, and although glorying in the majesty of the Element, Homer gives to the sea the name of ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτω in contrast with ζειδωρὸς ἄρουρα.

\* Gottleber understands *δωδεκάσκυτος* as referring, not to discs or surfaces, but to the *τάξεις*, or spheres within spheres, of which the Pythagoreans counted up twelve: viz., 1st, The *ἀπλανής*, or empyrean; 2nd, The seven spheres of the seven Planets; 3rd, The four regions of the four Earthly Elements (cf. Photil Biblioth. p. 713). This view, however, is untenable, as Plato is speaking of the *surfaces* of earth, of which he says the basin of the Mediterranean is one.



καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα  
 τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ αἰέρος ἐκπλεα ὄντα, χρώ-  
 D ματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι, στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων  
 χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς εἶδος ξυνεχὲς  
 ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὕσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ  
 λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς  
 καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν  
 ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν  
 καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίῳ· ὦν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι  
 ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ  
 E σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὃ τι  
 οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίῳ. τὸ δ' αἷτιον  
 τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ  
 κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ  
 σηπεδόνης καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυεερρηκότων, ἅ  
 καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς

The glories of this ethereal region portrayed by various imagery, such as, the splendour of its fruits, and flowers, and precious stones, the absence of disease and pain, and the presence and fellowship of the Gods.

upon the orb of Earth by the dodecahedric form ascribed to the encompassing Ether. Cf. K. F. Hermann *Gesch. d. Platon. Philos.* I. p. 687; also Stallbaum on *Timæus* 55 C.

C. (3.) τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργῇ] τὴν μὲν, scil. γῆν, the Earth in one of its discs or surfaces.—(6.) ξυγκειμένῃν ὡσαύτως] Scil. τὴν γῆν εἶναι.

D. (1.) στίλβοντα] 'Even the hollow in which we dwell (viz., the basin of the Mediterranean) will, by its gleaming transparency, yield (to a spectator from ether) a certain kind of colour, which will group with the variety of colours on the other discs, so that the earth thus presents one uniformly variegated aspect.' ξυνεχὲς ποικίλον Stallbaum considers to be for ξυνεχὲς καὶ ποικίλον, but such an asyndeton would imply that the adjectives were of a kindred meaning. Better, with Heindorf, to regard ξυνεχὲς as an adverb.—(6.) τὴν τε λειότητα] The oldest Editions have τελειότητα, which Stephens corrected into the reading of the text. The objection to τελειότητα was, that it is absurdly matched with such qualities as διαφάνεια and χρώματα, which are but species of the genus τελειότης.

E. (5.) ὑπὸ τῶν ἐσθρο] The first ὑπὸ indicates the immediate cause, the second ὑπὸ indicates the occasion, whereby the process of deterioration is brought about.—(6.) τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις] ἄλλος is here inserted, not as implying that λίθοι and γῇ are species of ζῶα, but simply in the sense of *præterea*. This usage of ἄλλος is found in all periods of the language: as Hom. Od. VI. 84; Plato, *Gorg.* 473 C., *Conv.* 188 A.; Xen. *Anab.* I. 5, 5.

αἵσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμησθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ 111 πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχού τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν αέρα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νήσοις, ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν αέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὖσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῶν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν αέρα, ὃ δὲ B ἡμῶν ὁ ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺν πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ ὁσφρήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἥπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκε καὶ

111 B. (2.) ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα] The ellipsis of εἶναι in both members is owing to the fact that it occupies the position of ἐστί in the direct speech, and therefore enjoys its facility of omission. Cf. 74 E., where εἶναι is omitted after ἀναγκαῖον.—(3.) ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους] ἐκείνους and αὐτοῖς are here used of the same persons (cf. 106 B. n.). Regarding the happy condition of these persons, Olympiodorus naively suggests, that they probably feed on the apples of the Hesperides!—(4.) καὶ ὁσφρήσει] All the MSS. except Aug. have φρονήσαι, which Bekker retains, and H. Schmidt defends. The internal evidence, however, is very strong against the probability of Plato having spoken of φρόνησις in the same breath with even the nobler senses, especially when followed by the almost contemptuous expression πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις (et hoc genus omne). (It is not unworthy of note, that ὁσφρήσις, in 1 Cor. XII. 17, forms one of a group of three, along with ἀκοή and ὄψις.)—(7.) θεῶν ἄλση] The Bodl. and the old Editions have ἄλση, while the great majority of the MSS. read θεῶν ἔδη. This latter reading would appear to be very old, since Timæus, in his Glossary of Platonic expressions, inserts ἔδος as a peculiar word, and as signifying τὸ ἀγαλμα· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἱερνται. As there is no other place of the Platonic writings from which it could have been taken, except this, (Conv. 178 B. is a quotation from Hesiod, and not in point), Heindorf proposed to replace ἄλση by ἔδη. It is unfortunate for this view, however, that neither of the meanings given by Timæus yields a satisfactory sense, for it is absurd to make Plato speak of ἀγάλματα in a region where the Gods dwell, and where,

αἰθήρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση  
 τε καὶ ἱερά αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς  
 εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν  
 C θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας ξυνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς  
 αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὀρά-  
 σθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὅλα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαι-  
 μονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

From the  
 Supernal he  
 now passes  
 to the Infer-  
 nal world,  
 in the interior  
 of the earth.  
 Rapid  
 sketch of  
 its pheno-  
 mena—sub-  
 terranean  
 rivers, boil-  
 ing springs,  
 and lava  
 torrents.

LX. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ  
 τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα  
 αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους  
 καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς  
 δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοῦς ἐλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ  
 D παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὗς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει  
 τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντας  
 ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ  
 κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἥ

therefore, ἀγάλματα were unnecessary. The alternative meaning of *Timæus* is equally unsatisfactory. The reading *ἄλση* is accordingly allowed to remain in combination with *ἱερά*. Cf. Liv. XXXV. 51, 'fanum lucusque.'—(9.) *ξυνουσίας*] A feature of the Golden Age. Cf. Pindar, Ol. II. 65; also Virg. *Æn.* I. 409, 'veras audire et reddere voces:' *Æn.* VII. 90, 'Et varias audit voces (*φήμας*), fruiturque decorum *Colloquio*.'

C. (5.) καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν] Having sketched his theory of a supernal world, he now passes on to exhibit a physical theory of the interior of the Earth, or the infernal world. This portion of the *Phædo*, in which are described the wanderings of the four rivers of Hades, Aristotle (*Meteor.* II. 2, 20) pronounces physically impossible, unless the old impossibility were overcome, as expressed in the proverb, *ἄνω ποταμῶν*. This, however, is about as just a criticism as to test the geography of Dante's *Inferno* by the laws and the discoveries of Physical Science.—(5.) *τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι*] Of these cavities he gives three varieties, some deeper and wider than the basin of the Mediterranean, others deeper and narrower, others more shallow and open. *αὐτοῦς* is redundant in the description of the middle group, and is probably introduced in consequence of the change from the construction with a participle to that with the infinitive.

D. (5.) *ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας*] Gottleber considers this to mean the crater of a Volcano, and quotes from Lucret. VI. 702, but the volcanic phenomena are not mentioned until afterwards, and *κρατῆρ* must here signify

πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὕγροῦ πηλοῦ, καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικε- E  
λίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ρέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὧν ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχη ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὃν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης 112  
τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

Τῇλε μάλ', ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·  
ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκείνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν

a basin for water: such as in Virg. Georg. IV. 364, '*Speiuncisque lacus clausos*,' etc.—(6.) ἀενάων ποταμῶν] The subterraneous rivers in the limestone districts of Arcadia, in the neighbourhood of the place where the Dialogue is supposed to be rehearsed, are probably referred to. Compare note in Arnold's Thucyd. V. 65; also the description in Virgil of the river Timavus (*Æn.* I. 245), in connection with the peculiar geology of Carniola. (Cf. Works of Sir H. Davy, IX. p. 323.)—(8.) ὕγροῦ πηλοῦ] Strabo VI. p. 413 B., describes the cauldron of Etna as melting rocks, and then pouring out πηλὸς μέλας, out of which, when it is cooled, are quarried mill-stones (λίθος μυλίας). (Humboldt, *Cosmos* I. p. 433, considers Plato to refer to an ejection of mud preceding an eruption of lava, similar to the mud-volcanoes known to the ancients at Agrigentum.)

E. (2.) ὁ ῥύαξ] ῥύαξ\* is the special name for the eruption of lava, as in Thucyd. III. 116. Cf. *Æsch.* Prom. V. 368.—(5.) ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινά] ὥσπερ similarly softened by τις in 66 B. αἰώραν is the subject to κινεῖν, ταῦτα being the object. αἰώρα in gymnastics is *swinging*, or playing at see-saw (ἀντιταλάντωσις Olympiod.) (Cf. αἰώρημα, the theatrical machine in which the *Deus ex machina* descended.) Hence it came to signify *oscillation*, or reciprocal motion generally, as here. Stobæus (*Ecl. Phys.* I. 33, p.

\* "In tracing all volcanic phenomena to a single cause present in the interior of the Earth, the Pyriphlegethon, or subterranean fire, the rich imagination of Plato has approached to the view of modern Science regarding the internal heat of the globe." Humboldt, *Cosmos*, I. p. 237. Eng. Ed.

Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρ-  
 ρεύουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέ-  
 ονσι· γίνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι, δι' οἷας ἂν καὶ τῆς  
 γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δ' αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ  
 B εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ  
 βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω  
 καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀήρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν  
 ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτᾷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκείνα τῆς  
 γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν  
 ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα,  
 οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ξυναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς  
 τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὼν καὶ  
 C ἐξίον. ὅταν τε οὖν [ὀρμήσαν] ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν  
 τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνα τὰ  
 ρεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ

249) gives the following as a Platonic view: εἶναι τινα φυσικὴν αἰώραν  
 διὰ τινος ἐγγείου τρήματος περιφέρουσιν τὴν καλῖρροιν, ἢ φ' ἣν ἀντικυ-  
 μαίνεσθαι τὰ πελάγη.

112 A. (2.) ὅπερ "Ὀμηρος" Referring to II. VIII. 13, 481. The Arcadian  
 form of βέρεθρον, scil. ξέρεθρον, was the special name for the singular  
 'Katavothra' of Arcadia: cf. 111 D.—(7.) εἰ' οἷας ἂν καὶ γῆς ῥέωσιν]  
 Abbreviated for τοιοῦτοι, οἷα ἐστὶν ἡ γῆ, εἰ ἣς ἂν ῥέωσιν. Aristotle (Meteor.  
 II. 2, 22), in his paraphrase of the passage, understands Plato to refer to  
 the taste and colour (χυμοὺς καὶ χροῖας) of the waters, as modified by the  
 kind of earth through which they flow.

B. (1.) πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν] πυθμὴν is *bed* or *bottom*, i.e.,  
*fundus*; βάσιν, *support*, i.e., *fundamentum*.—(3.) τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτό]  
 αὐτό, scil. τὸ ὑγρὸν. Plato contemplates simply dynamic contention of the  
 elements as accounting for the subterranean explosions (δεινοὶ ἀνεμοί, be-  
 neath); Olympiodorus adds chemical action: ὄντος πυρὸς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς,  
 καὶ ὕδατος καὶ αἰρος, εἰκότως γίνεται πολὺ πνεῦμα ἐκεῖ, τοῦ μὲν  
 πυρὸς ἐξατμιδοῦντος τὸ ὕδωρ, τοῦ δὲ ὕδατος εἰς πνεῦμα ἀναλυομένου.

C. (1.) [ὀρμήσαν] ὑποχωρήσῃ] ὀρμήσαν is not found in several of the  
 MSS., and is only in margin in Bodl. The parallel clauses ὅταν τε—ὅταν τε  
 describe the two movements of the αἰώρα, but though the general purport is  
 plain, there are difficulties in particular expressions. In τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμε-  
 νον the semi-ironical δὴ implies that Plato considered *up* and *down* as only rela-  
 tive expressions. This he probably owed to Philolaus, who (Fragm. Boeckh,

οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκείθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακρο- D  
τέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηγτλείτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἓνα μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἓνα δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἅπαντάσιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἣ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνα-  
τὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατόν δ' ἔστιν· ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἄναν- E

p. 84) had stated that *upper* and *under* are only relative terms, and that the true *under* is τὸ μέσον. Cf. infra E., μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὐ. Regarding τοῖς, Wytttenbach proposed to change it into τότε, Ast rejected it altogether and διὰ besides. H. Schmidt considers τῶν κατ' ἐκείνα τὰ ρεύματα a circumlocution for ἐκείνοις τοῖς ρεύμασι, comparing Thuc. I. 110, τὰ κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν for ἡ μεγάλη στρατεία, and, to account for dat. after εἰσρεῖ, refers to Herod. I. 1, χώραν ἐσαπικνέεσθαι. The passage from Thucydides, however, is not in point, as it is intelligible without supposing τὰ expletive, and it is harsh to resort to such a kind of explanation here. It seems better to translate τοῖς as a dative of instrument: 'By means of the channels communicating with those (subterranean) rivers, the water flows through the earth and fills them (the rivers), just as men who pump water (fill a cistern).' οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες, at the end, is instead of τὰ ἐπαντλούμενα, which is logically more correct.—(4.) τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις] Abridged for τοῖς ἐνθάδε διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτά, according to the fuller form in the previous member.—(7.) εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους] Into which several regions the overflow finds its way. τὰ πληρωθέντα is the subject to ὁδοποιεῖται.

D. (1.) τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους] 'Some of the streams performing longer and wider circuits, others shorter and narrower, discharge themselves again into Tartarus, some at a point far deeper than that at which they rose, others not much deeper, but they all return at a point lower than their rise.' The meaning of ἐπηγτλείτο is determined by ἐκροῆς in next clause, and must refer to the reflux back from Tartarus. It is probable that τὰ μὲν πολὺ

τες γάρ πως ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

- LXI. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὃ καλούμενος Ὀκεανός ἐστι, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ 113 ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινες εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μέινασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καιόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μεῖζον

The Myths of the Four Rivers: Oceanus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus, with their several wanderings, the last two passing into the abyss called Tartarus.

answers to those of the long circuit (τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους) and τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον to those of the short circuit (τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους).—(5.) καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ] H. Schmidt explains as equal to καταντικρὺ τῆς χώρας ἢ εἰσρεῖ, an instance of the absorption of the antecedent in the relative. κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος, as if making a bend in entering Tartarus, and then returning on the same side, whereas καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ implies passing right through Tartarus to rise on the opposite side of the same hemisphere.—(8.) εἰς τὸ ὕψιστον κατὰ καθέντα] καθίημι is intransitive here and in next sentence.

E. (2.) ἀναντες γάρ πως] 'To both sets of streams, the side (of the globe) opposite to that to which they belong, presents what we may call an opposing ascent.' πως, which is inserted by Hermann instead of πρὸς of the MSS., has an effect similar to ἐν in τὸν ἐν κάτω καλούμενον in C., implying that ἀναντες is an accommodation to popular language.—(6.) τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα] The germ of the myths of the Four Rivers has been attributed to Homer, Od. XI. 157, and especially Od. X. 511—4, where Circe is giving directions to Ulysses. Olympiodorus (p. 168) takes Acheron as an Orphic symbol of air, Cocytus of earth, and thus easily finds in the Four Rivers types of the Four Elements.—(7.) ρέον περὶ κύκλῳ] Heindorf proposes περίξ, Hermann accents περί, adverbially, which is preferable. περὶ κύκλῳ may be defended as signifying, round a circle; but in that case τινι would probably have been added. In B. and C., κύκλῳ is used without a preposition.

113 A. (5.) τοῦτων κατὰ μέσον] 'Midway between Acheron and Oceanus.' ἐκβάλλει (divulches off) is used in the sense of ἐξέπεισεν in 112 D.

τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὗ ξυμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι· περιελιχθεῖς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ὀνομάζουσι Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσώσιν, ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δ' αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δὲ ἔχοντα ὅλον οἶον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ C ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ

B. (1.) περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ] τῇ γῇ is bracketed by later editors as suspicious.—(3.) τῷ ὕδατι] i.e., With the 'waters of the Acherusian Lake.—(4.) κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου] 'Deeper into Tartarus.' Ταρτάρου is a genitive of *part.*—(8.) εἰς τόπον πρῶτον] The sequence (ἐπεῖτα) which ought to have followed πρῶτον, is interrupted by the explanation regarding Styx: hence the resumption by the *repetition* of ἐμπίπτω.—By κυανός is meant *lapis lazuli*, blue symbolising cold.

C. (1.) ὃν ἐὶ ἐπονομάζουσι] ὃν, scil. τόπον. The second member (καὶ τὴν λίμνην) is attached somewhat loosely to the preceding, ἐπονομάζουσι being made to serve in both clauses, in the first in the sense of *insuper nominō* (cf. ἐπωνυμία in 102 C.), in the second as simply *nominō*.

D. (3.) διεδικάσαντο] On this use of the aorist expressing instantaneousness and certainty, cf. 73 D., n.—(4.) μέσῳ βεβιωκέναι] Cf. οἱ μεταξὺ πλείστοι in 89 E.; also Legg. X. 907 A., ἀνθρώποι μέσοι. Appuleius Doctr. Plat., p. 22, 'medie moratus'; Tacit. Hist. I. 49, 'medium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus.'—(6.) ἃ ἐὶ αὐτοῖς ὀχῆματά ἐστιν] The Homeric myth of the Stygian flood was little more than a symbol of the barrier Death. In process of time the allegory was clothed with pictorial incidents, and hence the river came to have associated with it the old 'Ferryman' \* and his boat (θεωρίδα, τὰν ἀστιβῆ ἰπὸ λῶνι, Æsch.

\* Though Charon is among the younger creations of Greek mythology, not being found in Homer or Hesiod, he has survived the extinction of his compeers, and still lives in the superstition of the Modern Greeks.



περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρι-  
φλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι,  
Κωκυτός.

- D LXII. Τούτων δὲ οὕτω πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴν ἀφί-  
κωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἑκα-  
στον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ  
ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μὴ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως  
βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἂ  
δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματ' ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνούνται εἰς  
τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε  
ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι ἠδίκηκε,  
E τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκα-  
στος· οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν  
ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φό-  
νους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι, ἢ  
ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσή-

Different  
grades of fu-  
ture punish-  
ment pour-  
trayed: those  
who have  
committed  
venial wrong  
are purified  
in Acheron,  
those who  
have ren-  
dered them-  
selves incur-  
able by their  
crimes are  
buried into  
Tartarus.

Sept. 858; cf. Eur. Alc. 440). So here the mention of the Rivers naturally suggests the mention of ὀχήματα for sailing upon them. (Proclus and Olympiodorus understand ὄχημα here in the mystic sense familiar to the later Platonists, of the vehicle or new vestment of the disembodied soul. The question about the ὀχήματα in this sense belongs properly to the Timæus 69 C., which is the germ of the 'vehicular' speculations of the Alexandrian Platonists.)—(7.) εἰς τὴν λίμνην] Scil. τὴν Ἀχερουσιᾶδα. —(7.) καθαιρόμενοι] ὁ Ἀχέρων καθαροί γ' εἶκε καὶ οὐ κολαστηρίῳ, ῥύπτων καὶ σμήχων τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων' Suidas, on Ἀχέρων.

E. (6.) ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν] Compare Plutarch (Mor. 564 F.), τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν ἀνιήτους ἀπωσαμένης τῆς Δίκης, . . . Ἐρινύε, μεταθέουσα πλανωμένους καὶ περιφεύγοντας ἄλλον ἄλλως, . . . ἅπαντας ἠφάνισε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀόρατον. The doctrine here stated of the eternity of punishments in Tartarus, which also appears in Gorgias (525 C.), is one which some of the later Platonists endeavoured to modify or explain away, a tendency parallel to that exhibited by Origen regarding the similar doctrine of Scripture. Olympiodorus (p. 206) suggests that either this is one of Plato's politic fictions (πολιτικῶς ἐψευσταί) tolerated in order to deter from crime, or that perhaps οὔποτε is to be understood only of one Revolution or περίοδος, which last, Olympiodorus adds, is the view of Syrianus. (In his commentary on Arist. Meteor. II. 2, 20, Ed. Ideler, I. 283, Olympiodorus repeats the same softened interpretation.)

κουσα μοῖρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ, μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς, 114 τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσω, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιοῦτ' ἑνὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτὸν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσιν τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται εἶσαι σφᾶς B ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἔαν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσιν τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τόρταρον κάκειθεν πάλιν εἰς

114 A. (2.) τοιοῦτ' ἑνὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ] Such as, ὑπ' ὀργῆς before: i.e., homicides through provocation, not through malice.—(6.) πατραλοίας]\* This word originally means simply, one who *beats* a parent, as above, πρὸς πατέρα βίαιόν τι πράξαν. Cf. Virg. *Æn.* VI. 609, '*Pulsaturne parons.*'—(7.) γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην] 'Arrive at the lake,' in opposition to κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτὸν, 'down or along a river.' In conformity with his threefold division of men on the earth, Plato has made a threefold division of spirits in Hades: viz., εὐνίατοι, in Acherusian lake; δυσίατοι, if homicides, in Cocytus; if unnatural children, in Pyriphlegethon; ἀνίατοι, in Tartarus.

B. (1.) δέονται εἶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι] This meeting of the injurious and the victim has been likened to the parable in St. Luke, of Dives making supplication to Abraham. Compare Plutarch (*Mor.* 566 F.), who represents the shades as bewailing themselves (ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς) to a visitant of Hades, Thespesius.—(7.) δόξωσι ἐιαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ οὕτως βιώνειν] This passage has been the subject of very various conjecture, not as to the

\* The feeling of horror with which the actual murder of a parent was anciently regarded is well known. Solon passed it by in his legislative code as an impossible crime. The old Persians (Herod. I. 137) believed that it was a crime never possible, for that every parricide would be found, on inquiry, to be a supposititious or an adulterous child. Important passages regarding the same subject are Xen. *Mem.* II. 2, 13; Cic. *Roec.* 26; also Pausanias X. 28, regarding the picture by Polygnotus of Ulysses among the Shades, one group of which represented a father strangling a son that had been cruel to him during life.

- τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσω οὓς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιώσαι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωματίων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνούνται, ἅς οὔτε ῥάδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα χρὴ ὦν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.
- D LXIII. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως· ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διεληλύθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί·

Those eminent in piety are released from the prison of earth, and pass to an ethereal dwelling, among whom are those who have purified themselves by Philosophy.

sense, which is clear, but as to the reading whereby the sense is to be attained. Two MSS. (Vat. and Flor. d.) omit the two words, *πρὸς τό*. In order not to have *δόξωσι* used absolutely, Wyttenbach resorted to the desperate expedient of supposing that *πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως* was equivalent to *πρὸς τὴν ὁσιότητα*, and Stallbaum proposed to consider *βιώναι* as capable of being both object to *πρὸς* and infinitive to *δόξωσι* at one and the same time. The examples he adduces, such as Conv. 181 B., etc., are ordinary examples of ellipsis, and are not to the point. In two citations by Theodoret the defect is supplied by the addition of *προκεκρίσθαι*, which Heindorf imported into the Platonic text. The simplest explanation is either to follow the two MSS. and omit *πρὸς τό* altogether, or to read *διαφέροντες* for *διαφερόντως*.

C. (2.) *ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζόμενοι*] *ἐπὶ* here signifies *above*, opposed to the *πρὸς ἐν τῇ γῇ*.—(9.) *καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον*] Life is an *ἀγών*, Immortality is the *ἄθλον*. Compare the similar exhortation in Pol. X. 608 B., *μέγας γὰρ ὁ ἀγών . . . μέγας, οὐχ ὅσον σοι δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι . . . καὶ μὴν τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν*. Also Max. Tyr. XIV. 7. (In the language of the New Testament *βραβεῖον* takes the place of the Platonic *ἄθλον*.)

D. (1.) *τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι κ.τ.λ.*] The expression of doubt here contained concerns only the *μῦθος* beginning at 108 D. Regarding the special features, or the drapery with which he has depicted the scene

Peroration regarding the good hope in the view of death which that man may entertain, who has not pampered the Body, but has adorned the Soul with the ornaments befitting her noble nature.

ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτ' αἷτα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρ' ἔπειν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῶ· διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μὴκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς E κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὥς ἄλλοτρίους τε ὄντας καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησόμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδαςέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω 115

He disclaims any intention to dogmatise: while, at the same time, he expresses his firm belief in the existence of such a scene. A similarly balanced form of expression, conceding one thing, and reserving another, is found in 63 C., 108 D.; also *Meno* 86 B.—(5.) τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν] οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν belongs both to πρέπειν and to ἄξιον. In connection with πρέπειν it serves the part of an infinitive (Jelf. § 691); in connection with ἄξιον, which has an infinitive attached to it, it stands as an ordinary participle. 'Such an opinion it appears to me proper to hold: it also appears that any one so believing is justified in running the venture of such a belief.'

E. (2.) τοὺς κόσμους] κόσμοι, much in the sense of καλλωπισμοί above in 64 D.—The introduction of ἐλευθερία and ἀλήθεια as another expression for the Fourth Cardinal Virtue of 69 C. (φρόνησις), is worthy of notice. Although the ἐλευθερία of Plato is very different from that of Homer, as signifying deliverance from the body, it is interesting to find Homer similarly identifying νοῦς and ἐλευθερία in his peculiarly Hellenic distich, *Od.* XVII. 322.—(3.) πλέον θάτερον] 'Judging that all these things only make bad worse,' θάτερον being a euphemism for τὸ κακόν, as in *Euthydem.* 280 E. and 297 D. The origin of this euphemism was probably deeper than a mere feeling of politeness can explain, and is to be traced to the influence of Pythagoreanism, as first permeating Platonism, and thereby the subsequent periods of ancient literature.\* In a Dualistic system, such as that of Pythagoras, ἕτερος came easily to be a synonym for κακός.

\* The earliest traces of such an absolute use of ἕτερος are found in the Pythagorean poets: Pindar, *Pyth.* III. 34; Æschylus, *Agam.* 151. Wyttienbach has collected a profusion of similar examples after the Platonic period. Compare Plutarch (*Is.* et *Osir.* 369 D.), τὸν μὲν ἀμείνονα, θεόν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον, δαίμονα, καλοῦσιν, ὥσπερ Ζωρόαστρεῖς ὁ μάγος. In Homer there is no example of ἕτερος or ἄλλος used in such a sense abso-

περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἄιδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαυθὺς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὦρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

The narrative now turns from philosophy to personal matters connected with Socrates, and to the incidents of the Evening of the Day.

LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὁ Κρίτων, Εἰεν, Β ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἡ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἡ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἡ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὃ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιῶμεν; Ἄπερ αἰὲν λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦ-

115 A. (5.) φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός] The Socratic *εἰρωνεία* is represented as sparkling to the close, and as incapable of refraining from a quiet smile at the pompous phraseology of melodramatic Heroes dying on the stage.—(9.) νεκρὸν λούειν] This infinitive is appended as an epexegetis of πράγματα παρέχειν. Stallbaum aptly compares Meno 76 A., ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττειν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

B. (1.) ἐπιστέλλειν] The *vox sollemnis* indicating parting injunctions. Cf. ἐπιστείλας in 116 B.; also, Xen. Hell. I. 7, 11, regarding the drowning men at Arginusæ. Most of the MSS. have ἐπιτέλλεις, which is a poetic form of the same, as in Hom. II. XXIII. 107, καί μοι ἕκαστ' ἐπέτελλεν, of the shade of Patroclus to Achilles.—(6.) κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσῃτε] Socrates declares his belief, that if they attend to the major duty, the minor duty will not be neglected, even though they make no present profession regarding the latter; but if they neglect the major, no amount of loud profession will atone for that. Nüsslin quotes in illustration: Hom. Od. VIII. 351, δεῖλαί τοι δεῖλῶν γε καὶ ἐγγύαι ἐγγυάσθαι.

C. (7.) ὥς ἐγὼ εἰμι] ἐγὼ is here the predicate: 'constitutes the being I call I.' '*Mens* cujusque is est quisque.' Cic. Somn. Scip. 8. (Compare Cicero's elegant edition of this scene with Crito, in Tusc. I. 43.) It is in accordance with this view, that in Legg. XII. 959 B., Plato directs that the body, when dead, is to be regarded as the εἶδωλον, and that the Soul alone

lately, and apart from some contrast, either expressed (such as that in ἐτέρῳ in 79 E. above, cf. 1 Tim. V. 25), or implied (as in ἄλλως, frustra, 115 D., cf. 117 A.) The unconditional use of ἄτερος δαίμων in the so-called Epistles of Phalaris (Ep. 12) was one of the suspicious things, savouring of a later origin, detected by the acuteness of Bentley. (Dissert. § IX.)

Crito consults him as to his wishes in regard to burial, whereupon Socrates rallies him on the small extent to which he has profited by the preceding discourse, when he feels anxiety about such a matter.

μενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἂν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, ὥσπερ κατ' ἔχνη, κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλεον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον ; Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἔάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων. ἀλλ' οἰεταί με ἐκείνων εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι Δ πολὺν λόγον πεποιήμαι, ὥς, ἐπειδὰν πῶ τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχέσομαι ἀπὼν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμάντόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγυήν ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο. οὗτος

constitutes the Man (cf. 67 A., n.), in designed opposition to the Homeric view, which regarded the body (II. I. 4) as αὐτός, and the ψυχὴ as the εἶδωλον.

E. (4.) προτίθεται . . . ἐκφέρει . . . κατορύττει] Terms indicating different stages of the Funeral Ceremony. The πρόθεσις was the laying-out of the body, which took place soon after death, and generally a night before the ἐκφορά, which, again, was the preparation for the removal of the body to the place of interment, or to the pile.—(6.) τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν] Socrates is represented to the last as devoted to what had been his ruling desire in life, to obtain right definitions of words, and to secure adherence to them: cf. 90 C. n. (On the service rendered by Socrates to Logic in the matter of Definitions, compare the remarks of Grote, VIII. 583, 590.) Epictetus (I. 17) quotes as a Socratic maxim: ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκεψις.—(7.) θαρρεῖν τε χρῆ] What Socrates previously deprecated negatively, is now conveyed by a positive exhortation. Hence θαρρεῖν and φάναι are the positive correlatives to μὴ ἀγανακτῆ and μὴ δὲ λέγειν κ.τ.λ.: and τοῦμόν σῶμα is opposed to Σωκράτῃ.—The second θάπτειν is generally explained as depending on χρῆ, but this is wrong, as it is simply a

μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴν μὴ  
 παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἱ-  
 Ε χήσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾶον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ  
 ὀρώων μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον  
 ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ  
 ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Σωκράτῃ ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ  
 κατορύττει. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἀριστε Κρίτων, τὸ  
 μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές,  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν  
 τεχρὴ καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν αὐ-  
 116 τως ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.

LXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκημᾶ  
 τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ'  
 ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς  
 διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες,  
 τότε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῶν γεγο-  
 νυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι, ὥσπερ πατὴρ στερηθέντες.  
 διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο  
 Β καὶ ἡνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδιά—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς  
 μικροὶ ᾤσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες

repetition of the previous *θάπτειν*, which, again, is dependent, not on *χρή*, but on *φάναι*.

116 A. (2.) *ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκημᾶ τι*] Abridged by 'constructio præg-nans' from *ἀνίστατο καὶ ἀπὴ λθεν εἰς κ.τ.λ.* Grammarians find similar construction in *ἐπιχωριάζει Ἀθήναζε* in 57 A.; also Eur. *Herac.* 59, *Aristoph.* *Plut.* 683, and N. T., St. Mark III. 3.—(5.) *τοτὲ δ' αὖ*] *τοτὲ μὲν* is assumed to have preceded, in connection with the previous participles. A similar ellipsis of *μὲν* in 106 E. Heindorf aptly compares the idiom in *Hom. Il.* XI. 63, *παμφαίνων, τότε δ' αὖτις ἔδν νέφεα σκιέοντα*.

B. (1.) *δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς κ.τ.λ.*] This is in harmony with what Socrates says in the *Apology* (34 D.), *οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μενιράκιον ἢ δὲ, δύο δὲ παιδία*. The name of the youth (*μενιράκιον*) is generally said to have been Lamprocles, those of his two younger sons, Sophroniscus and Menexenus.—(2.) *αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες*] There has been considerable discussion as to the exact interpretation of this; some contending, that it gives countenance to the

Incidents of the Evening —the parting with his children, the appearance of the Officer of the Eleven, to announce the hour of sunset, and the Testimony of that Officer regarding the uniqueness of the character of Socrates.

ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παῖδιά ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδον. ἔλθων δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελονμένος, καὶ οὐ πόλλ' ἅττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγινώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουνσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίω-  
 ταιον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εἴ οἷδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γινώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους. νῦν οὖν, οἴσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας D

statement of Hieronymus of Rhodes and others (Diog. La. II. 26), that Socrates was not only twice married, but had two wives at once; others arguing, that it signifies simply, 'the women of his family or connexions.' It is in favour of the latter view, that if the ambiguous word *γυναῖκες* had borne the sense of *wife*, Plato would have said, *αἱ γυναῖκες αὐτοῦ*. Moreover, it is probable that Xanthippe was not present in the evening scene, otherwise Plato\* would have scarcely failed to mention her by name. (In Valer. Max. VII. 2, Xanthippe is spoken of as having been present at the death of Socrates, but the statement is not of any historical authority.)

C. (1.) οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ] The occurrence of *ἔγνωκα* in contrast afterwards, implies that *καταγνώσσομαι* is to be rendered with a similar sense, except in so far as modified by *κατα*:- 'I shall not find anything unpleasant in you, such as I have unfortunately had to find in others.'†

\* Both Plato and Xenophon agree in naming, as the wife of Socrates, only Xanthippe: and the story of his having Myrto to wife at the same time, besides resting on very secondary authority, involves numerous improbabilities. An examination of the whole question was undertaken by Luzac in his 'Questiones Atticæ,' who traces the story to a certain group of Peripatetics—Aristoxenus, Satyrus, and Hieronymus of Rhodes. The controversy would seem to have been vehement, even in ancient times, for Panætius, according to Plutarch (Vit. Pericli, sub fin.) wrote a treatise to refute the calumny.

† The reception of this Officer by Socrates is worth contrasting with that of Agamemnon's messengers by Achilles, Iliad I. 384—5.—The testimony to the nobleness of the



μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἄστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὥς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύνει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δῆ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μῆ, E τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἄλλ' οἴμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ οὐπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσι ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἷονται γὰρ κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως

Crito wishes to delay the execution as long as possible. Socrates declines the indulgence of a few hours added to life.

D. (2.) *τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος*] The Aristophanic scholar is reminded of the cruel clever pun, about the *deaton* path to Hades (Ranæ 123): 'Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ἀτραπὸν σύντομος τετριμμένη Ἡ διὰ θνητῶν. Δι. ἄρα κώρειον λέγεις; Ἡρ. Μάλιστα γε. Δι. ψυχράν γε καὶ δυσχείμερον· Εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀποσπῆγνυσι τάντικνήμια.

E. (2.) *ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι*] The time of the year is pretty nearly determined by the reference to the Delian festival (cf. 58 B.), which fell about the 20th of May, and the delay of thirty days would thus bring the execution very nearly to the longest day. At such a season the sun would sink behind the heights of Cithæron.—(5.) *ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν ἂν*] *τούτοις* or *τοιούτοις* is omitted, as a definite antecedent to *ὧν* is not required. The sensual and sexual indulgence at such a time is called by Dio Chrysostom (IV. 162) *Σακαίων ἑορτή*, it being a custom of the Πέρσαι, before executing a criminal, to tantalise him thus, allowing him καὶ πίνειν καὶ τρυφᾶν καὶ ταῖς παλλακαῖς χρῆσθαι . . . ταῖς βασιλέωσιν. . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀποδύσαντες ἐκρέμασαν.

character of Socrates is important, as coming from one of a class naturally the least disposed to believe in virtue or nobleness. Compare Philo Judæus (p. 420 D.) regarding the relenting of the Egyptian gaoler of Joseph: ὅσης δ' ἀπανθρωπίας οἱ εἰρκοφύλακες γίμουςι καὶ ὀμότητος, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ. φύσει τε γὰρ ἀνηλεεῖς εἰσι, καὶ μελετῇ συγκατοῦνται θηριούμενοι καὶ καθ' ἰκίστην ἡμέραν πρὸς ἀγριότητα, χρηστὸν μὲν οὐδεὶν ὁρῶντες, κ.τ.λ.

οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ὀλίγον ὕστερον 117  
πῶν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, γλιχόμε-  
νος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόυν-  
τος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσεν τῷ παιδί  
πλησίον ἐστῶτι, καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον  
διατρίψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον,  
ἐν κύλικι φέροῦντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν  
ἄνθρωπον, Εἰεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπισ-  
τήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πίνοντα περιέ-  
ναι, ἕως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα B  
κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ ἅμα ὤρεξε

117 A. (1.) οὐδὲν κερδαίνειν] The Zurich Editors read κερδανεῖν, in order to correspond to ὀφλήσειν, but unnecessarily. In Herod. IX. 106, a similar combination occurs: πίστι καταλαβόντες καὶ ὀρκίοισι, ἐμμένειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσασθαι. For the sentiment, compare Aesch. Agam. 1301, ἥκει τὸδ' ἡμαρ· σμικρὰ κερδανῶ φνηγῇ; also Hom. II. XII. 322; and Soph. Elect. 1485.—(3.) γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν] The striking fragment of Antiphanes (in Stob. Flor. 121, 4) occurs as the best illustration: (α) οὐδεὶς πώποτε, ὦ δέσποτ', ἀπέθαν' ἀποθανεῖν πρόθυμος ὦν· τοὺς γλιχομένους δὲ ζῆν κατασπᾶ τοῦ σκέλου· ἄκοντας ὁ Χάρων, ἐπὶ τὸ πορθμεῖόν τ' ἄγει Σιτιζομένους καὶ πάντ' ἔχοντας ἀφθόνους. (β) Ὁ δὲ λιμός ἐστιν ἀθανασίας φάρμακον.—(3.) φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόυντος] Referring to the proverb in Hesiod Op. 387, μέσσοθι φείδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φεῖδω, 'Begin to spare halfway, it is a sorry saving when you reach the lees,' Seneca Ep. I., 'Sera in fundo parsimonia est,' whence it has been thought that in the text of Hesiod he read δειλῇ. Cf. Theocr. XVI. 10; Pers. Sat. II. 51; also Antiphanes Fr. Incert. 68, Σφόδρ' ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ὁ βίος αἰνῶ προσφερής· Ὅταν ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν μικρόν, ὄξος γίγνεται.—It is worthy of remark that in the Phædo, although mention is made of the bath, there is nothing said as to the prisoner's taking supper, nor, indeed, as to his taking food at any time during the eventful day.—(5.) ἐνευσεν τῷ παιδί] Judging from ἐστῶτι, indicative of the attitude of a slave, παῖς must refer to an attendant on Crito (cf. 60 A., n.); otherwise, one would have been inclined to suppose that Crito would have delegated the melancholy duty to his son, Critobulus.

B. (2.) οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει] 'It will operate of itself.' ποιῶ, like Latin facio, of medical or chemical action.—(3.) καὶ μάλα ἴλεως] καὶ strengthens μάλα; cf. καὶ πάννυ μάλα in 80 C., and καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς in C.—(4.) οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρωμάτων] Compare the Homeric (II. XIII. 284), τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτ' ἄρ' τρέπεται χρῆς. διαφθεῖρω signifies

τὴν κύλικα τῇ Σωκράτει· καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἱλεως, The cup of hemlock brought in by the executioner, and drunk by Socrates.  
 ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ  
 χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ εἰώθει, ταυ-  
 ρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη,  
 περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι; ἔξεσ-  
 τιν, ἢ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον  
 οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ'  
 C εὐχέσθαι γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοί-  
 κησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε εὐτυχῇ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ  
 εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ταῦτα,  
 ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιε. καὶ  
 ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶς μὲν ἐπικεικῶς οἶοι τε ἦσαν κατέχειν

to alter for the worse: cf. Blomfield, Pers. 722. Liddel and Scott render *διαφθείρας* in the sense of *loss*, but this sense does not suit *προσώπον*. Plutarch, in his imitation of this passage (Mor. 499 B.), substitutes *σχήματος* for *προσώπον*, which is not an improvement.—(6.) *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας*] At first sight this feature does not seem to harmonise with the serenity of the picture. The explanation is to be found in the words *ὥσπερ εἰώθει*, indicating that it was the result of something peculiar in the look of Socrates. What this peculiarity was, we are informed in Theæt. 143 E., where his eyeballs are spoken of as prominent\* (*τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὀμμάτων*) and from Xenophon, Conv. V. 5., where the eyes of Socrates are said to have been *ἐπιπολαιοί* (called by the French, *à fleur de tête*). Eyes of this character, when the general countenance received an expression of firmness, would suggest a *ταυρηδόν* look, not in fierceness, but in fixity (cf. '*oculo irretorto*,' of Horace), like the large full eye of *βοῶπις πότνια* Ἥρη. (The Commentators refer to Aristoph. Ran. 803, regarding Æschylus, *ἐβλεψε δ' οὖν ταυρηδὸν ἐγκύψας* *κάτω*, where, however, the notion of fierceness is predominant.)—(7.) *πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι*] 'What say you as to a libation to some god?' The libation would probably be in honour of Apollo (cf. 60 D., n.), or perhaps Hermes, as *ψυχοπομπός*. Nothing could more powerfully set forth the collectedness of the mind of Socrates, than his proposal to give a religious significance to the drinking of the hemlock by prefixing a libation as a kind of consecrating grace.

\* This feature (prominency of the eyeballs), under the influence of the Socratic reflectiveness seems to have given a cast to his countenance which his enemies mistook for pride. Hence the famous description of him by Aristophanes in the Nubes 362, *βρενθίει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τῷ φθαλμῷ παραβάλλεις*. Compare, in Conviv. 221 B., *ἡρίμα παρασκοπῶν*, of the look of Socrates gazing, as it were, past present objects into distant space.

Emotion of his friends, whom he rebukes for their lamentations.

τὸ μὴ δακρύνειν, ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλειον ἐμαντόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείων γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαντοῦ τύχην, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἐτι πρότερος D  
ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἴα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ᾧ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ E  
τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. καὶ

C. (4.) ἐπισχόμενος] *Holding the cup to his lips.* The active ἐπισχών would not necessarily have expressed, 'holding it to his own lips.' Hermann interprets it, *Holding in his breath*, or, at a draught (cf. ἀμυστις), but this is unsupported by examples. It is therefore better to suppose it to have the same meaning, as in Aristoph. Nub. 1364, εἰ μὲν γε βρῶν εἴποις, ἐγὼ γνούς ἂν πιεῖν ἐπέσχοι. Stallbaum refers to ἐπισχόμενος in Apoll. Rhod. I. 472, Stesichor. Fr. 7: Lucian, Toxar. 37, ἅμα ἀμφοτέροι ἐπισχόμενοι πίνωμεν.—(9.) οἷον ἀνδρὸς] i.e., ὅτι τοιούτου. So in 58 E., ὡς ἀδεῶς = ὅτι οὕτω ἀδεῶς.

D. (5.) οὐ κατέκλασε] The common reading was κατέκλεισε, but Heindorf showed that it was out of place, as being too weak, and not conveying the right meaning. In Coisl. Vat., and several other MSS., is found κατέκλασε, which is accepted by all the recent Editors since Wyttenbach. The philological connection of κλαίω and κλάω is well indicated by this passage, showing that they have both in common the sense of *burst*. Heindorf compares the Homeric burden, αὐτὰρ ἐμοίγε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ. Compare Soph. Trach. 919, δακρύων ῥήξασα θερμὰ νάματα; Plutarch, Vit. Timol. c. 7, τὸ δὲ Τιμολέοντος . . . πάθος . . . οὕτω κατέκλασε καὶ συνέτριψεν αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. Jacobs, Ach. Tat. III. 10.

E. (1.) ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ] The author of the precept is believed to have been Pythagoras. Jamblich. vit. Pythag. § 267, κατὰ τὸν ὕστατον καιρὸν παρήγγελλε μὴ βλασφημεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγωγαῖς οἰωνύζεσθαι μετ' εὐφημίας. Similarly, Olympiodorus (p. 171) ascribes the precept to Pythagoras. Among the kindred loci classici as to the desire of εὐφημία in the hour of death, are Pa.-Plato, Axiochus, § 3; Eurip. Cresph. Fr. 13; M. Antonin. V. 33; Cic. Tusc. I. 49; Tacit. Hist. II. 48.

ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἥσυχνυθῆμέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ  
 δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη  
 τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπτίως· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄν-  
 θρωπος· καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ  
 φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ  
 τὰ σκέλη, καῖπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο,  
 εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰς  
 118 κινήμας· καὶ ἐπανιών οὕτως ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι  
 ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτeto καὶ εἶπεν,  
 ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσε-  
 ται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον  
 ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν,  
 ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκ-  
 ληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλ' ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ

The gradual  
 progress and  
 effects of the  
 poison de-  
 scribed.  
 The Dying  
 Words of  
 Socrates.

118 A. (2.) ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο] For some Historical and other notices of Poisoning by Hemlock, see Note U. The peculiar form of the optative *πήγνυτο* is accounted for by the circumstances that *νι*, before consonants, becomes *ν* (Donalds. Gr. Gr. p. 14), and that, in certain parts of verbs in *μι*, the Attic dialect accents as if no modal or intermediate vowel had been ejected. Cf. 77 B., note, and Goettling's Gr. Accents, § 16, 3.—(4.) ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι . . . καί] In this combination *καί* introduces the important statement, to which the preceding is only collateral, so that it may be rendered by *when* or *whereupon*. Compare the examples in Stallbaum's note on Conv. 220 B.—(5.) ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ] Socrates obeys the instinct of all nations to cover the head in entering the night of death. Xen. Cyr. VIII. 7, 28, *συνεκαλύψατο* (ὁ Κύρος) καὶ οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν. So of violent deaths: Liv. I. 26, 'caput obnubito;' IV. 12; VIII. 9, regarding Decius; also, Cæsar in Suetonius, c. 82; Pompey in Lucan VIII. 614: cf. Hor. Sat. II. 3, 37. The same instinct manifested itself on any occasion (cf. 117 C.) of deep sorrow, as Homer, Od. VIII. 84, X. 53; Soph. Ajax, 245; cf. Blomf. Choeph. Gl. 75; compare also 2 Sam. XV. 30; Esther VI. 12.—(6.) ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον] As examples of the interest attached to the 'Last Word' may be cited from the extreme periods of classical literature, Homer, Il. XXIV. 742, and Tacit. Agric. 45.—(7.) τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα] On the import of this Last Word of Socrates, see Note V.—(10.) ἐκινήθη] Probably not more than 'he quivered.' Convulsion in *articulo mortis* was, when violent, indicated by *σφαδάζω*.—(12.) *ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθ.*] Compare the Homeric *χερσὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐλέειν, σὺν τε στόμ' ἐρείσαι* (Od. XI. 426).—(15.) *τῶν τότε ὡν ἐπειράθημεν*] This passage has been the subject of very various conjectures. Wytttenbach proposed to read *τῶν πώποτε*, in the sense of

Crito performs the last office of a friend, and closes his eyes in death.

ἀμελήσητε. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

Epilogue.

Ἦδε ἡ τελευταίη, ᾧ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἂν, τῶν τότε ὦν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

'eorum qui unquam fuerunt.' It is evident, however, that this would be an enthusiasm of expression inconsistent, not only with artistic propriety, but also with the manifest reserve with which Plato restrains even just praise in the presence of the generation that put Socrates to death. Heindorf proposed τότε, ὡς ἐπειράθημεν, understanding τότε to refer to the day of his death, and ἄλλων to the rest of his life, a view followed by Brandis in his life of Socrates, in Smith's Dictionary of Biography. It seems to yield a sufficiently good sense to retain the reading of the MSS. and Editions, corroborated, as it is, by what is probably an echo of the present passage in Epist. VII. 324 E. (Σωκράτη, ὃν ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιοτάτον τῶν τότε), translating it thus: 'Such was the end of our companion, who, among the men of that day with whom we were acquainted, was the best; and who was, moreover, the most intellectual and the most just.' (Compare with this epilogue the more extended portrait in the end of the Memorabilia, where a prominent place is given, by the practical Xenophon, to the practical virtues of εὐσέβεια, σωφροσύνη, and ἐγκράτεια.)—It is scarcely necessary to direct attention to what cannot fail to impress every reader of the Phædo—the tender cadence pervading the dying strains of this great prose poem. There is a music in the words, wonderfully expressive of the melancholy in the minds of the Socratic group, and breathing the same hushed tenderness as the soft footfalls of the Muse of Virgil in the Elysian Fields. In the fall of the curtain of Night upon the scene, we may well believe that the friends of Socrates, as they now looked up to Cithæron and saw that all was dark, murmured to each other the words of Homer with a meaning unfelt before:

Δύσετό τ' Ἥλιον, σκιάωντό τε πασαι ἀγνυαί.

## NOTES.

## NOTE A.

### ON THE SCENE OF THE DIALOGUE AND ON THE 'DIALOGI PERSONÆ.'

THE occasion chosen by Plato, on which, as on a groundwork, he has interwoven his narrative of the last sayings and doings of Socrates, is a visit supposed to be paid by Phædo to Echecrates\* at Phlius. The conversation of these friends, which is introductory to the narrative, stands in the same relation artistically to the main portion of the Dialogue as the framework to a picture or the pedestal to a statue, giving the effect of projection and relief, as well as the mellowness of tone which is the fruit of distance.

The place where the rehearsal is localised is one both physically and historically remarkable. It was situated in the upper valley of the Asopus, above Sicyon, in a hollow or shell among the mountains at the meeting of the three adjacent countries—Argolia, Arcadia, and Sicyonia. Though the Phliasian† valley is at a height of 893

\* Though Plato has not given any particulars elsewhere regarding Echecrates, there is no reason to doubt that the Pythagorean of that name is referred to, who is spoken of by Diogenes Laert. (VIII. 46), as having been a hearer of the Tarentine Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus. This is rendered probable by the way in which Echecrates expresses himself in 102 A., as one familiar with philosophy; and by the statement put into his mouth in 88 D., which is in favour of his being a Pythagorean. It is probable that he was a native of Magna Græcia, and simply a settler at Phlius, as Philolaus was at Thebes; but there is a difficulty in identifying him with the *Loorian* Echecrates, who, according to Cicero (*de Fin.* V. 29), was among the Pythagoreans who influenced the mind of Plato during his visit to Italy, a journey which was certainly undertaken long after the period when Echecrates is already located in Phlius.

† The name Phlius is generally supposed to be connected with φλέω, and to indicate fertility. In an enumeration of various *ιδιώματα πόλεων*,



feet above the level of the sea, it resembles the sister hollow of Nemea (βαθύπεδος Νεμέα, Pind. Nem. III. 18) in its deep seclusion among the Arcadian hills, which rise around it to the height of from 4000 to 5000 feet, under whose 'immemorial shadow' (ἀσκήϊος Φλοιῶντος ὑπ' ὠρυγίοις ὄρεσιν, Pind. Nem. VI. 45) the high discourse is supposed to be held. In its chief physical features, and in some respects in its literary history, Phlius may be called, for its poetic seclusion, the Grasmere of Greece.

Homer knows it simply as 'the lovely Aræthyrea' (Il. II. 571). In the historic period it is remarkable for its adherence to Sparta politically, and especially for the connection which it has with the Pythagorean Philosophy. Not only was it visited by the great Pythagoras himself, who was, moreover, said to be a Phliasian by extraction; but it was the place, according to Cic. Tusc. V. 3 (Diog. Laert. Præf. 12, says, it was at the neighbouring Sicyon), where Pythagoras first uttered the important word which marked an era in the history of Thought, calling himself, not a 'man of wisdom,' but a 'searcher after wisdom'—a *Philosopher*. There is considerable ground, therefore, for supposing that Plato had a complimentary purpose in associating with the Pythagorean memories of the town of Phlius, a discourse which bears deeply and draws largely on the doctrines of the Pythagorean philosophy.\*

The group in the Prison around Socrates divides itself into two sections, the Athenian and non-Athenian (οἱ ἐπιχώριοι and οἱ ξένοι). By the same law of parsimony that forbade in the Drama more

or staples of production in various cities, Phlius is said to bear the palm in wine. (Athenæus, I. 27 D.).

\* Among the more prominent Pythagorean influences on the *Phædo* may be mentioned these: 1<sup>o</sup>, the important part assigned to the two Theban interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, who had enjoyed the teaching of the Pythagorean Philolaus; 2<sup>o</sup>, the importance attached to the doctrines of Philolaus (61 D., cf. 112 C., n.); 3<sup>o</sup>, the references to the doctrine of Metempsychosis (81 E., etc.), and to the doctrine of the Soul as a Harmony (86 D.); 4<sup>o</sup>, the speculations on the nature of Numbers, as arranged in two mutually repelling series (*even* and *odd*, 104 etc.). It is true that there is no servile adherence to the principles of this School, and one of the Pythagorean doctrines is actually refuted, and shown to be defective—viz., that the Soul is a Harmony—not to mention other divergences from the Pythagorean standard (cf. 96 E. n., and 108 E. n.). Pythagoreanism, however, was the only pre-Platonic system of thought, having a claim to the name of Philosophy, that professed to deal with the subject of a Future State; and, on this account, could not fail to exert a deep influence on Platonism.

speakers at a time than three, all the rest are mutes except the Three Interlocutors—Socrates as Protagonist, with Simmias and Cebes as Deuteragonist and Tritagonist. The following notices of the less known members of the group, are arranged in the order in which they are enumerated by Plato.

#### I.—ATHENIAN SOCRATICS.

**APOLLODORUS**, of Phalerum, one of the ἀριδάκρυες ἄνδρες, whom the ancient proverb pronounced to be ἀγαθοί, is memorable chiefly from his instinctive and child-like enthusiasm for Socrates, which showed itself in bursts of tears and lamentations at his death (117 D.). Hence he was surnamed ὁ μανικός (Conv. 173 D.), and he is thus spoken of by Xenophon, Apol. § 28, Ἀπολλόδωρος, ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ (Σωκράτους), ἀλλ' ὅς ἐστιν ἡθικός. In the Memorabilia (III. 11, 17), Socrates couples him with Antisthenes (who was also from Piræus) as a type of devotedness. There is no inherent improbability in the story told by Ælian (Var. Hist. I. 16; cf. Diog. La. II. 35), that, when his master was in confinement, the warm-hearted Apollodorus brought to the prison a finer robe, to be worn by him in place of the τρίβων in his last hours, a tribute of affection that Socrates is said to have declined.

**CRITO**, a wealthy and warm-hearted Athenian citizen, who stands in closest connection with Socrates. He was spoken of by Socrates at his Trial (Apol. 33 D.) as one of the same age, and from the same Demus\* (Alopecé); and, altogether, he is the friend who approaches more nearly than any other to the footing of a brother. In the dialogue to which Plato has inscribed his name, Crito endeavours to induce Socrates to quit the prison, informing him that he has secured the acquiescence of the gaoler. In the Phædo, he is represented as interesting himself similarly in every matter connected with the personal comfort of Socrates (63 D.), receives in private his last instructions regarding his family (116 B.); and, finally, does the last office of a friend, and closes his eyes at death (118). His attachment to Socrates, like that of Apollodorus, is mainly instinctive, being more for the Man than for the Philosopher;

\* The Demus or Parish of Socrates is memorable as having been that also of Aristides.

and Socrates rallies him occasionally on the naivete and unphilosophic nature of his notions (115 B., D.). (His sons, according to Diog. La. II. 121, were Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Ctesippus, all of which names appear here, but in such a way, that it is evident Plato considers Critobulus alone to be the son of Crito. So at the Trial (Apol. 33 D.), Critobulus alone is mentioned as present with Crito. In Euthydem. 306 D., mention is made of a *younger* son than Critobulus, but he happens not to be specified by name.

**CRITOBULUS**, a son of Crito, who figures more in the Socratic treatises of Xenophon than in those of Plato. He is a chief interlocutor in the Convivium and Economicus, as well as in the Memorabilia, of Xenophon.

**HERMOGENES**, probably the son of Hipponicus, and brother of the wealthy Callias. Xenophon mentions (Mem. IV. 8, 4) that, after his return from Asia, he derived from Hermogenes many interesting particulars of the death of Socrates. In the Cratylus of Plato he is a chief speaker, and in that dialogue (386 B.), expresses himself misanthropically, from which it is supposed that, although a member of a house that was proverbial for its wealth, he must have been a *νόθος*, or illegitimate son; for he is represented as in straitened circumstances (Xen. Mem. II. 10, 3).

**EPIGENES**, probably the same as the son of Antiphon of Cephisia. His father is mentioned as present at the Trial (Apol. 33 E.). Epigenes seems to have been a sickly student, and is the subject of an exhortation by Socrates (Xen. Mem. III. 12, 2) to take to gymnastic exercises.

**ÆSCHINES**, one of the most interesting and important members of the Socratic group. He was born in humble circumstances, the son of one Lysanias, who, along with his studious son, was present at the Trial (Apol. 33 E.). When he attached himself to Socrates, the story is told that he thus offered himself to his notice: 'I am poor, and have nothing else at my disposal, but I give you myself.' (Diog. La. II. 34). Æschines wrote Socratic dialogues, but none of them has been preserved. (Those which bear his name—Eryxias, Axiochus, and 'Concerning Virtue'—are generally admitted to be spurious.) Ancient authorities speak of the Æschinean treatises as more akin to the Xenophontine than to the Platonic: hence

Timon (Diog. La. II. 55) couples Æschines in the same breath with Xenophon.\*

**ANTISTHENES**, the future founder of the Cynic sect, was the son of Antisthenes, by a Thracian mother, from whom, perhaps, he derived some of the austerity in his blood. He was originally a pupil of Gorgias, but became an ardent admirer of Socrates, somewhat like Apollodorus, although with more of mind and manliness, and is said to have travelled up from the Piræus, 40 stades daily (Diog. La. VI. 2), to hear Socrates discoursing. After his master's death, he taught philosophy in the gymnastic school of Cynosarges. The great principle which was the corner-stone of his system, was that of Independence, that virtue was self-sufficient, and that it was god-like to have no wants. The importance of Antisthenes in the history of Thought arises less from the influence of his own sect, than from that of the school which arose out of it, namely, the discipline of the Stoics.

**CTESIPPUS** is described in Euthydemus 273 A., as a youth of the Demus of Pæania. In Lysis 206 D., he is mentioned in connection with his friend and relative Menexenus, with whom he is here conjoined.

**MENEXENUS**, a son of Demophon, of the Demus of Pæania. His name is associated with the imaginary Funeral Oration put into the mouth of Socrates, which appears among the Platonic dialogues under the title of Menexenus.

Including Socrates, ten Athenians are enumerated as present. Others are said to have been present but are not named. Among these were probably some of those who are named as present at

\* The same *litterateurs* who, in after time, attempted to prove a feud between Xenophon and Plato, represented Plato as at variance also with Æschines. The alleged ground of quarrel was that Æschines took money for his teaching, thereby departing from the Socratic usage; and it is also said that Plato gave Crito the credit of the proposal regarding the escape out of prison, when it was properly due to Æschines (Diog. La. III. 37). Farther, Diogenes Laertius, in the same passage, states, in proof of the alleged bad feeling, that Plato mentions Æschines only in the Phædo and the Apology. If this is a sample of the reasons generally, they are of little value; for, by parity of reasoning, Plato would be found to have had a poor opinion of himself, as he introduces his own name just the same number of times—twice—in all his works. Xenophon, singularly enough, does not mention Æschines at all.

the Trial (Apol. 33 E.), such as Adimantus, brother of Plato, Æantodorus, brother of Apollodorus, and Chærekrates, brother of Chærephon (Xen. Mem. II. 3, compared with Apol. 21 B.).

Three eminent Socratic names are absent from the scene : CHÆREPHON, XENOPHON, and PLATO. The former, who had the honour of being introduced in the 'Nubes' in the capacity of 'henchman' or Sancho Panza to the Socrates of that play, would scarcely have been passed over in silence, had he been alive: and accordingly we gather from Apol. 21 A. that he had died previous to the Trial.

Xenophon was not yet returned from the Cyreian expedition. In the spring of B.C. 399, we find him engaged in transferring the Cyreian Greeks to the command of Thimbron in Asia, and, consequently, he could not have been present either at the Trial or at the Death of Socrates. Moreover, he says it was from Hermogenes that he derived what information he possessed regarding the last days of Socrates (Mem. IV. 8, 4). Athenæus (XI. 504) blames Plato for his silence regarding the name of Xenophon in the prison-scene, and imputes the omission to jealousy. It were well if calumny were always capable of as easy refutation.

As for Plato himself, although he was present at the Trial and took a prominent part on that occasion, it is remarkable that he is not present in the prison, the sickness which detained him being doubtless a sickness of sorrow.\* This is one of the two places in which the author introduces his own name in the Dialogues, the other being in the Apology (34 A.).

## II.—NON-ATHENIAN SOCRATICS.

The strangers at Athens,† whose names are on the Socratic roll, are the following. First, the rehearser of the Dialogue,

\* Such was the interpretation put upon the statement (Πλάτων ἡσθένει) by Plutarch (Mor. 449 E.), who mentions ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Σωκράτει τελευτήσαντι λύπη as a memorable historic grief. So in the beginning of the Timæus, the unnamed auditor who is stated to be absent, detained by ἀσθένεια, has been suspected to be none other than Plato himself.

† Perhaps nowhere more than in the prison scene does Athens appear worthy of her appellation as Ἑλλάδος παῖδεναις (Thuc. II. 41), or ἡ κοινὴ ἐστία τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Orac. in Ælian, Var. Hist. IV. 6), not only 'native to famous wits,' but also 'hospitable.' The presence of ἐπιδημοῦντες ξένοι St. Luke remarks as a peculiar feature of Athenian society: Acts XVII. 21. Cf. also Hermann's Gesch. der Platon. Philos. Bk. I. n. 13.

PHÆDO, a native of Elis, of noble birth, and said to have had a romantic history. The fortune of war made him a prisoner and brought him to Athens as a slave\*, where he had the good fortune to attract the attention of Socrates, who, being struck by the beauty of his person, induced one of his richer friends to purchase and liberate him. The result was, that he joined himself to Socrates, and the attachment seems to have been mutual (cf. 89 B.). Their acquaintance, however, appears not to have been of long duration; for, if the war in which Phædo was taken prisoner was that of B.C. 402, little more than a year would remain for his intercourse with Socrates before the fatal year B.C. 399.† After the death of Socrates, Phædo appears to have returned to his native Elis, and there founded a branch school, thence called the Eliac, which ultimately merged in the Eretriac. It is said that Plato paid a visit to Phædo at Elis; but, be this as it may, the fact of Plato's having associated his name with a Dialogue of such weight and importance, is evidence that Phædo had made a favourable impression on Plato, as well as on his master Socrates.

SIMMIAS and CEBES.‡ Both are Thebans, and formerly disciples of Philolaus (61 D.); were active in assisting Crito to procure the escape of Socrates from prison (Crito, 45 B.). In 89 A., they are spoken of as still *νεανίσκοι*. They are twice grouped together in the Memorabilia as earnest conversers with Socrates (Mem. I. 2, 48; III. 11, 17). Simmias is evidently a favourite with Socrates for his honesty and boldness in searching for truth (85 C., cf. Phædr. 242 B.); and Cebes is represented as

\* It is said that when a slave he was compelled to follow evil courses, which, from the time of his meeting with Socrates, he abandoned. Origen (c. Cels. I. 64) couples the name of Phædo with that of the more famous Polemo, as heathen examples of a moral change akin to Christian conversion.

† It is worthy of observation that the name of Phædo does not occur in the Memorabilia, Xenophon having probably quitted Athens for his Eastern Expedition before Phædo came to Athens.

‡ Simmias and Cebes, according to Diogenes Laert. (II. 124—5), were themselves authors of dialogues, but their writings have perished. The famous allegorical treatise called the *Πίναξ*, or 'Picture,' and bearing the name of Cebes, is considered to be of a later date, as containing, among other things, Stoic Terminology (Brandis Gesch. Gr. Röm. Phil. II. p. 19).—In Plutarch (Mor. 576 B.) an interesting picture is given of Simmias in his later years gathering around him at Thebes a group of philosophic spirits, and discoursing to them his old experience.

remarkable for his acuteness, as well as pertinacity in arguing (77 A.), a character on which Cebes seems to pride himself (103 C.).

**PHÆDONDES**, a Theban, mentioned in similar conjunction with Cebes and Simmias in Xen. Mem. I. 2, 48. Nothing else is known regarding him.

**EUCLID**, one of the most notable members of the Socratic group, and the founder of the Megaric School, named from his native Megara. The zeal with which he availed himself of the discussions with Socrates (Theæt. 143 A.) gave birth to romantic stories (Aul. Gell. VI. 10) of his having come to Athens disguised in female attire, at a time when intercourse with Athenians was forbidden, under severest penalties, to all Megarians. After the death of Socrates, he returned to Megara, where he opened a school, and developed the dialectic spirit after the manner of the Eleatics, whence his followers are sometimes called *Ἐριστικοί* or 'Wranglers.'

**TERPSION**, also a Megarian, who is similarly coupled with Euclid in the Theætetus.

Those named above were present in the prison : the roll of foreigners contains other two names conspicuous by their absence.

**ARISTIPPUS**, the famous philosopher of Cyrene, founder of the Cyrenaic sect, and the antipodes of Antisthenes in the Socratic School. He may be said to have been in philosophy, what Alcibiades\* was in politics, clever and versatile, but without solid principle. The notice of him in the Phædo was understood by the ancients (Diog. La. II. 65 ; III. 36) as a direct censure on the part of Plato, whom they considered as intending to convey the impression, that when his Master was in prison, Aristippus had gone on a pleasure-boat excursion to Ægina. (Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 122, and Athenæ. XII. 544 D., *ἐκτρίβει δ' ὁ Ἀρίστιππος τὰ πολλὰ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ τρυφῶν* ; also XIII. 588 E., *Ἀρίστιππος ἐκ κατ' ἔτος συνδιημέρευεν αὐτῇ (Λατῶν) ἐν Αἰγίνῃ*. Cf. Demetrius de Elocutione c. 288.)

\* The sketch of Alcibiades adapting himself to circumstances the most varied (Corn. Nepos, vit. Alc. 11) is a companion picture to Horace's portrait of Aristippus : 'Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res.' (Hor. Ep. I. 17, 23.)

**CLEOMBROTUS.** Of this companion of Aristippus nothing is certainly known. It is not probable\* that this was the celebrated Ambraciot of that name, the Narcissus of Philosophy, who, on reading the Phædo, is said to have been so charmed with the prospect it opened up of a future life, that he threw himself into the sea in order sooner to realise the promised happiness. Compare the Epigram of Callimachus, n. 24 ; Ovid, Ibis 496 : also, Milton Par. Lost, III. 473. The Fathers occasionally allude to this romantic tradition, Greg. Naz., *περι ἀρετῆς*, l. 680 ; Augustine, de Civ. Dei, I. 22.

These are the most interesting and trustworthy particulars regarding the Socratics on the roll of the Phædo, unquestionably the most memorable gathering of Intellect ever witnessed by the world, whether in ancient or modern times. The number of intellectual spirits who were quickened, by the influence of Socrates, to become, in a certain measure, life-giving centres each to a similar circle, is without example or adequate approach to an example in the history of men. Yet, great as was the influence proceeding from Socrates, it was not a controlling or unifying influence ; and hence, although many stars began to roll into light received from him, the natural centrifugal force carried many of them into erratic and widely diverging paths.†

In this point of view it is important to observe the extraordinary diversity of result, both in tenets and in personal character, among the followers of Socrates. With perhaps one exception, each of them seemed to see only one side of the character of their common Teacher, and the result was a number of one-sided—and therefore false—developments of the Socratic spirit.

The character of Socrates is, therefore, in the generation immediately succeeding his death, broken up into fragments in the schools professing to be Socratic. Among the 'disiecta membra,' Antisthenes chose out, as his portion, that strong desire of independence, which declined the offerings of Apollodorus, and would resolve on bathing

\* Wieland's theory of identification ('Aristipp,' Letter 53) is ingenious : that it was the same Cleombrotus that committed suicide, who is represented as absent from the prison scene, but that the true cause of the fatal act was remorse at his desertion of such a Master as he found the Phædo to portray.

† 'Plura genera effecit (Socrates) *discrepantium* philosophorum.' Cic. Tusc. V. 4. '(Socraticorum) alius aliud apprehenderat.' Id. de Orat. III. 15.



before his execution, if only to save trouble to the women after his death. What was in Socrates a somewhat sturdy simplicity, became in Antisthenes austerity, and the result was Cynicism. On the other hand, Aristippus was attracted mainly by the same independence as showing itself in humour and *bonhomie*, which Socratic characteristic, when carried to an extreme, and not balanced by any qualities of a serious kind, degenerated in his hands into a careless pocurantism known as Cyrenaicism.

The admiration of Euclid was drawn mainly to the Socratic dialectics as an artillery against pretension, and thence resulted the formation of a school more remarkable for destructive than constructive tendencies. On the other hand, Xenophon and Æschines were moved by the weighty moral sense of the man, and in their hands Socrates becomes a shrewd and grave discourser, but more of a moraliser than a philosopher.


Only one of his followers seems to have had the comprehensive power at once to see and to seize all the elements of his Master's nature; and, if the 'disjecta membra' are found anywhere in living union, it is only in the dialogues of Plato, where it is difficult to say whether we are most drawn to admire the clear intellect and the large simple heart of the Master who is portrayed, or the artistic power of the Disciple who portrays.

As affording a means of indicating the extent of the Socratic influence, attempts have been made to reckon up numerically the schools and systems that radiate from Socrates as both focus and centre.\* Two separate estimates of this kind remain to us from antiquity, the more famous of which is that of Cicero (*de Orat.* III. 16), who enumerates ten distinct varieties of sects as claiming descent from Socrates. This, however, is perhaps an exaggeration, as some of the species which he there enumerates did not differ materially from each other. The other enumeration is that by Diogenes Laertius (*I.* 18, cf. *II.* 47), who reaches the same number

\* In the *Ciris*; ascribed to Virgil, Philosophy is elegantly styled 'the Castle of the Four Heirs,' i.e., of the four leading sects (Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans), which are regarded as dividing the inheritance received from Socrates.—The most frequent image, however, employed to express the Socratic influence, is that of 'Fons Philosophorum': cf. Cicero, *Brut.* 8, *de Orat.* I. 10; also Vell. Patere. I. 16, Quintilian, I. 10; all of which Milton seems to have had in view when he wrote regarding Socrates, 'From whose mouth issued forth Mellifluous streams that watered all the Schools.' (*Par. Reg.* IV. 277.)

(ten) by leaving out minor immediate varieties, and inserting remoter but more important descendants, such as the Schools of Aristotle, Zeno, and Epicurus.

The following scheme is an attempt to exhibit, in a tabular form, the leading divergences in the Socratic group. While Plato, as having accepted and appreciated all the main elements of Socratism, is the central figure among the Socratics, Antisthenes and Aristippus represent the two antagonistic extremes, each endeavouring to divide what Socrates said could not be severed (*τὸ λυπηρόν* and *τὸ ἡδύ*, Phæd. 60 B.). It is out of their Schools again that the Epicurean and Stoic systems respectively take their rise, which last, in the Roman period, absorb all the other forms of thought, so that these two are the sects which St. Paul, when he came to visit the city of Socrates, finds in possession of the Agora of Athens, beside the Prison where the Phædo was discoursed.



## NOTE B.

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ÆSOP : EVENUS : PHILOLAUS.

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ÆSOP.

THE circumstance that Socrates is represented in what was probably the first and last literary effort of his life, as attempting the versification of some Æsopic fables during his confinement under sentence of death, is evidently a matter of considerable significance in the mind of Plato. The chief points of latent interest connecting Æsop with Socrates seem to be the following.

The apologues of Æsop, dealing out parabolic wisdom with strokes of irony, would naturally be congenial to the man, whose peculiar delight it was, by the operation of his 'Elenchus,' or 'logical vice,' to administer similar shocks of electric surprise. Besides being congenial to the *εἰρωνεία* or characteristic humour of Socrates (Xen. Mem. II. 7, 13), we may readily believe that these productions were interesting to him, as savouring of life and manners, and as genuinely redolent of the people.

To these links of connection must be added the circumstance that the traditions regarding the fate of the fabulist, were such as to suggest to Socrates in the prison an image of his own. According to Herodotus (II. 134), Æsop fell under the displeasure of the people of Delphi, and was in consequence put to death. The story is given more circumstantially by Plutarch (Mor. 557 A.), that Æsop was sent by Croesus to Delphi with sacrifices and money : the former he offered, but the money he kept back, alleging that the people were not worthy of the boon ; a charge of sacrilege (*ἱεροσυλία*) was advanced, and he was thrown from the rock Hyampeia and slain. Hence it is not improbable that we have in the distich said to have been composed by Socrates in prison,

a genuine fragment in which we have the very words of Socrates, the burden of it being a warning against popular judgments :\*

Αἰσωπὸς ποτ' ἔλεξε Κορίθιον ἄστυ νέμουσιν,  
μὴ κρίνειν ἀρετὴν λαοδίκῳ σοφίῃ.

Æsop said once on a time to the men of the city of Corinth :  
Measure not Worth, if you're wise, after the multitude's mode.

It is worthy of remark that the manner in which the Æsopic fables are spoken of by Plato seems to indicate that they were not yet collected in any literary form, but were still dependent on popular tradition, like the popular proverbs of which they were the expansion. The example set by Socrates remained long unimitated. It was not till the Imperial Roman period that the Æsopic fables were thrown into metrical form, the Choliambic version of Babrius, which was discovered at Mount Athos in 1844, being probably the first following out of the suggestion of Socrates.

#### EVENUS,

A native of Paros, was a *σοφιστής*, or professional teacher of wisdom, as well as a poet, and is several times mentioned in Plato as an acquaintance of Socrates. There is always, however, a touch of irony in the way in which he is mentioned, implying that he laid himself open to ridicule by his favourable opinion of his own powers.

From the *Apology* (20 B.) we learn that he professed to teach *ἀρετή*, or 'Virtue,' for the sum of Five Minæ. Socrates laughed heartily at the idea, transfixing him on probably such a dilemma as this : 'Either you can or you cannot give the lesson you profess.

\* The tradition regarding the personal appearance of Æsop is of some importance in this regard. Though the *literary* evidence—that he was considered to be deformed—is of itself scarcely to be relied on, yet, taken in connection with the evidence from *sculptural* remains (Visconti, *Iconogr. Gr.* I. 166), belonging to a period when Greek art was still vigorous, it is deserving of more attention than it has received. Although not positively deformed, the personal appearance of Socrates was, in various respects, sufficiently quaint to suggest a resemblance to Silenus (*Conviv.* 221 D.), and it is not improbable that in this regard also Socrates was brother to the Wit, of whom it was said, in terms equally applicable to the Socratic humour, *παίζων ἐν σπουδῇ πείθει ἐχέφρονέειν* (*Anth. Plan.* IV. 332).

If you can, the pay is miserable : if you cannot, you are obtaining money on false pretences.' As Socrates rallied him on his profession as a σοφιστής, so now he professed to enter the lists against him as a poet, as if the occupation of Evenus was doubly in danger. Some fragments of Evenus have come down to us (Bergk's *Lyrici Græci*), from which it appears that he was one of the last of the old Elegiac School, moralising after the manner of Theognis, at a time when the Lyrical School, as a whole, was dwindling into feebleness in the presence of the younger and more vigorous Dramatic.

#### PHILOLAUS.

This name is one of considerable importance in the historical Progress of Philosophy, inasmuch as it serves as the connecting link between Pythagoreanism and Platonism. He is generally believed to have been a native of Tarentum, and to have flourished within the century B.C. 500—400 ; and is stated to have been the first to publish, in a literary form, the teachings of Pythagoras. Some time before the death of Socrates, Philolaus left Italy and settled in Thebes,\* where he had Simmias and Cebes among his auditors. The references to Philolaus in the *Phædo* do not imply that Socrates had seen or read the treatise by Philolaus : any knowledge of his principles is said to have come to Socrates by hearsay (ἐξ ἀκοῆς, 61 D.). Two reasons may be assigned for this—1°, that any more direct allusion, amounting to quotation, would have been inconsistent with the character of Socrates, who was well known to be a converser rather than a reader ; 2°, that Plato himself is believed to have obtained a copy of the Philolaic treatise only in the course of his Sicilian journey, considerably later than the date of the events recorded in the *Phædo*.

The name of Philolaus is of interest in another region of Philosophy. It is known that an ancient stray reference to his speculations in astronomy encouraged Copernicus to develope and apply the heliocentric theory of the Planetary motions.†

\* The capital of Boeotia was, like Phlius, an important centre of Pythagoreanism. It was an early nucleus of the kindred mysteries or orgies of Dionysus, and one of the earliest extant expressions of the Pythagorean doctrine of Metempsychosis occurs in a fragment of the Theban Pindar (Fragm. 98 Threni).

† The passage of Copernicus is as follows (*De Revolut. Præf. p. IV.*) :  
 ' Quare hanc mihi operam sumpsi, ut omnium philosophorum . . . libros

## NOTE C.

## PHILOSOPHY THE HIGHEST MUSIC.

THE description of Philosophy as the 'Highest Music'\* is an inheritance from the school of Pythagoras. The origin of this symbolism is traceable to the memorable principle first enunciated by that Philosopher, that Law, and Order, and Proportion are found underlying the arrangements of the World, and that the discovery of these hidden harmonies is the great work of the true Philosopher. These relations he considered to be not only capable of numerical expression, but also to be constituted fundamentally by ἀριθμοί or 'Numbers'; which, as being capable of endless combinations and illimitability, were employed as symbols of the infinitude of Nature, addition symbolising the process of Production, subtraction that of Decay.

In passing from the school of Pythagoras into the hands of Socrates and Plato, this maxim underwent a slight but important

relegerem, indagaturus ane ullus unquam opinatus esset, alios esse motus sphaerarum mundi quam illi (i.e., mathematici vulgares) ponerent . . . . Ac reperi quidem apud Ciceronem, Nicetum [Hicetam] sensisse terram moveri. Postea et apud Plutarchum inveni quosdam alios in ea fuisse opinione, cujus verba, ut sint omnibus obvia, placuit hic adscribere: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι μένειν τὴν γῆν, Φιλόλαος δὲ Πυθαγόρειος κύκλῳ περιφορεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ πῦρ κατὰ κύκλου λόξον ὁμοιοτρόπως ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ.' (The quotation from Plutarch or Ps.-Plutarch is Mor. 896 A.) From this statement of Copernicus it has been hastily argued that the Philolaic system was a complete anticipation of the Copernican. This is incorrect, as the quotation indicates that the sun was regarded by Philolaus as having a planetary motion (cf. 97 E., note). It was only in so far as it ascribed to the Earth a motion in an orbit, that the Philolaic system anticipated the Copernican.

\* Compare ἡ ἀληθινὴ Μουσική, ἡ μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας, Pol. VIII. 648 B.; and in Timæus Locrus, p. 104, ἀμωσιῶς ἀγεμῶν, φιλοσοφία. That this mode of symbolising Philosophy was originally Pythagorean, is stated by Strabo X. 468, μουσικὴν ἐκάλεσε Ἰλάτων καὶ ἔτι πρότερον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν.

modification. In conformity with their ethical tendencies, these last regarded it less from an astronomical or mathematical, and more from a moral\* point of view, than did the Pythagoreans. This naturally resulted from the strong position taken up by Socrates as to the primary importance of right ethical views, a position which led him to denounce as vain, and probably impious, any investigation of the Macrocosm, or Outer World, so long as the Microcosm, or Inner World, remained unexplored. Hence, the province of the Philosopher, in the Socratic period, came to be defined as the procuring† of a harmony of the Whole Man, under the presidency of Reason, so that each organ, both of the mental and the corporeal powers, might do its several work without a jar: in other words, that the 'Highest Music' might be evolved.

According to a well-attested tradition, it was Pythagoras that first gave distinct expression to the presence of Harmony in the arrangements of the Physical World, to which, therefore, he first applied the name of 'Cosmos.'‡ The regions in which Law and Order were

\* Compare Phædo 93 E., ἡ κακία ἀναρμωστίς, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία. Other passages clearly indicating an ethical conception of μουσική are Pol. IV. 430 E.; Legg. III. 689 D.; cf. Laches 188 D., βίος σὺ μὲν ων οὗς τοῖς λόγοις; also, Max. Tyr. Diss. XXXI. 2, on ὁμολογία ἔργου καὶ λόγου. Balde's poem, 'Lyra Pythagoræ,' although a beautiful expression of the thought, is conceived more in the Platonic spirit than the Pythagorean. (In Gorg. 482 C., consistency in reasoning is compared, in sustained metaphor, to concord in music.)

† In many passages of Plato there occur traces of a feeling which would indicate that this felicity was, in his view, not the acquisition of something new, but the restoration of something forfeited and lost. No philosophy has borne more deeply the impress of the conviction that there was a primal music in man's nature, which is now, 'like sweet bells jangled, harsh and out of tune.' Compare the remarkable expressions in Pol. VII. 521 C., φιλοσοφία ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς περιεργωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινοῦς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀλθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰούσης ἐπάνοδον. 532 C., ἐπαναγωγὴ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀριεστῆος ἐν τοῖς οὐσι θεάν. Though not in the mouth of Socrates, the sentiment in Protag. 326 B. (πάντες γὰρ ὁ βίος τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμωστίας δεῖται) is essentially Platonic. Compare Cicero's lament over the jar in man's nature (Tusc. III. 1), and the want of a 'medicine to the soul.'

‡ In Latin literature it was the Pythagorean Ennius who introduced a similar transference of the parallel term, *mundus*.—In the Memorabilia the word κόσμος occurs only twice in the sense of 'World';—viz., I. 1, 11 and IV. 3. 13—in the first occurrence with the apologetic explanation, ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος. In the Cyropædia (VIII. 7, 22, which

most clearly discerned to prevail, were the sciences of Music and Astronomy, in which departments of knowledge the Pythagoreans were able to predicate the existence of Cosmos by the circumstance that their laws were capable of representation by numerical symbols. Moreover, they proceeded to reduce these two sister sciences to one, by blending together their respective laws in the magnificent conception, which we owe to their philosophy, of the 'Music of the Spheres.'\* The mutual distances of the heavenly bodies were supposed to be arranged on a harmonic scale; and it was, therefore, both natural and beautiful to believe that the planetary spheres, in their calm well-ordered courses, send forth waves of sound according to the ratios of their intervals in space, whereby a mighty harmony is evolved.

From what has been stated, it is easy to perceive that the term Cosmos was at first, strictly speaking, not applicable to the whole frame of things, but was properly limited to that department of Nature where Law was perceived most firmly to reign, viz., the region of the Stars and Planets. Hence the distinction often met with in ancient thought, between the *sublunary*† world, where Chaos rather than Cosmos seemed to rule, and the *supertunary*, which was supposed alone to be the seat of Cosmos. It is only in modern times, under the surer methods of modern science, that the distinction between these two domains has been removed, and the dominion of Cosmos has been extended into regions where the Pythagoreans were either unable to trace its laws, or had no conception of its existence. Not only, however, has their principle of 'Order'‡

is an echo of the second passage of the *Memorabilia*), Xenophon uses instead of it a word less specially Hellenic—viz., *ἡ τῶν ὅλων τάξις*—as more appropriate to the mouth of a foreigner such as Cyrus.

\* In *Polit.* VII. 530 D., *Cratyl.* 406 D., Music and Astronomy are spoken of as sister sciences.—The finest expression ever given to this conception of Pythagoras is that in Shakspeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act V. Sc. 1.

† Cf. *Isocr.* 78 C., *ἡ ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένη γῆ*, where *κόσμος* is used in its original Pythagorean sense. The statement of Chalcidius (on the *Timæus* of Plato) regarding Aristotle's views of the region of Providence is illustrative: 'Aristoteles Dei providentiam usque ad lunæ regionem progredi: infra vero neque providentiæ scitis regi, etc.' *Senec. Ep.* 59, 'Talis est sapientis animus, qualis mundi status super lunam; semper illic serenum est.'

‡ A system like that of Pythagoras, bearing in such relief the conception of Order, may be naturally supposed to have approximated towards the



received, with every new discovery in science, more abounding illustration, but the various forces of Nature have, one after another, been gradually undergoing subjection to their favourite numerical relations. Chemistry revealing its unchangeable combinations based on fixed numerical proportions, and Astronomy unfolding its vast revolutions, calculable according to numerical laws with a precision beyond the dream of the most sanguine Pythagorean, are, each at the opposite extremities of the realm of Science, one great testimony that Order, and its symbol Number, are everywhere present in the physical Cosmos.

The vast spectacle of physical Order was regarded, by the loftiest spirits of antiquity, as pre-supposing Intellectual \* Order through the presence of a Great Constituting Mind. A loftier conception of Cosmos yet remained, under an aspect which may be said to have been unknown and almost foreign to the classical mind,† that of a Kingdom of Righteousness under a God of Holiness, as well as of Wisdom and of Power.

It is only in the sacred literature of the Hebrews that we are to look for this ascent from the Physical and Intellectual Cosmos

kindred conception of the Unity of God. Accordingly, in the earliest authentic record of Pythagoreanism—the fragments of Philolaus (Boeckh. p. 151)—is found the following: ἐντὶ ὁ ἀγεμὼν καὶ ἀρχὼν πάντων θεὸς εἷς αἰεὶ ἑὼν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁμοῖος, ἄτερος τῶν ἄλλων.—Polytheism and Chaos are correlated, as ἀκοσμά τε πολλὰ τε in the mind of Thersites.

\* In a memorable passage of the *Timæus* (47 C.), Plato regards the spectacle of the heavenly Cosmos as given to be a correcting model for rectifying man's intellectual operations. Compare Plutarch's commentary on the same, *Mor.* 560 D.—The same vision compels Lucretius (V. 1437) to confess, '*Et certa ratione geri rem, atque ordine certo.*'

† The nearest approach, in classical literature, to the Scriptural view of the Cosmos, is that in the famous Hymn to Jove by Cleanthes:

οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δέχα, δαίμον,  
οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον πτόλον, οὔτ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ,  
πλὴν ὅποσα ῥέξουσιν κακοὶ σφετέρησιν ἀνοίαις.  
ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θείναι,  
καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἄκοσμα κ.τ.λ.

Compare the moralisings of Euripides on the equableness of the celestial motions (*Phœnissæ* 541—8); and of Sophocles on the lessons of the aspects of nature (*Ajax* 669—77).

to the Spiritual, a transition which meets us everywhere as a distinguishing characteristic of the Old Testament Scriptures. In such Psalms, therefore, as the XIX<sup>th</sup> or CIV<sup>th</sup>, we find chords are struck over a vaster and wider scale of harmony than in either the poetry or philosophy of classical antiquity: out of the physical and intellectual worlds the strain of praise is borne aloft into the region of the spiritual, and creation may thus be said to have new strings added to its lyre. Each of these psalms begins with the sphere-song of Law in the Outer Temple of creation, and passes by what was, to the pious Hebrew mind, no saltus, but a gentle transition, to the aspiration after the dominion of Law in the Inner Temple, the Soul of Man,\* that so, in a higher sense than the Pythagorean, 'the Divine Will may be done upon the Earth, even as it is done in Heaven.'

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## NOTE D.

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### ON THE DIFFICULTIES IN 62 A.

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THIS passage has been the subject of very thorny discussion, and no interpretation has been brought forward that is not more or less unsatisfactory. The following review of the principal opinions is intended to indicate the leading points of difficulty, a just estimate of which is the first step towards the attainment of what is all that is likely to be realised in the circumstances of the case—a probable interpretation.

The text is sufficiently uniform in the MSS., so that editors finding no variations in the reading of any importance, have resorted to new punctuations and changes of order to elicit a natural sequence

\* The lines of Milton, entitled 'At a Solemn Music,' form a fine rendering of the Pythagorean maxim from the Christian point of view.—Compare Kant's memorable dictum regarding the 'Two Sublimities,' viz., the starry heavens above and the moral law within.

of sense. Translators have also generally grasped at a meaning without examining whether the Greek words could yield the sense they desiderated, or professed to find.

The punctuation which has prevailed since the time of Stephens inserts a comma after *τάλλα*, and takes *ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς* together, as equivalent to *ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐνίοις*. Conceding that it is possible to effect a junction of *τυγχάνει* and *βέλτιον*, notwithstanding the absence of the participle *ὄν*, we find this sense then results: 'It never happens that it is better in some circumstances, and in the case of some persons, to die than to live,' which is equivalent to saying that Life is to be chosen rather than Death. This, however, is a sense, as thus stated, at variance with the drift of the passage, as well as with the spirit of Platonic sentiment; and moreover, the next clause (*οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι*) admits the possibility, in certain circumstances, of the reverse, and would thus be a contradiction of the statement. Two devices have therefore been proposed to extract the sense which most interpreters have desired, viz., that of an absolute preferability of Death over Life.\* On the one hand, Wytttenbach boldly proposed to change the order, and read *οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει . . . βέλτιον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι*. Heindorf and Stallbaum, while retaining the common order, endeavour to elicit the same sense by a tacit insertion of *μόνον* before *ἔστιν ὅτε*, translating as follows: 'Fortasse tamen mirum tibi videbitur, si hoc unum de cæteris omnibus simpliciter verum sit et sine ulla exceptione (sc. *mori melius esse quam vivere*), neque unquam accadat, ut, quemadmodum in cæteris omnibus rebus, interdum et aliquibus hominum (non semper neque omnibus) satius sit mori quam vivere: quibus autem satius est mori etc.'

To this class of interpretations implying an *absolute* prefera-

\* Olympiodorus seems to have read the passage with this understanding: his commentary runs, *θαυμαστόν σοι φαίνεται, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπαμφοτερίζοντων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐνυαμένων εἶναι, σίον πλοῦτος, ξείρους, ὁ θάνατος μόνως ἀγαθός ἐστι*. So Simplicius on Epicetetus (Cap. X. p. 63), *ἀγαθὸς ὁ θάνατος . . . οὐ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς πᾶσι* λέγει οὖν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἴσως μὲν *θαυμαστόν κ.τ.λ.* On this passage of Simplicius Schweighæuser justly observes: 'prorsus in diversam sententiam verba hæc citavit (Simplicius), immemor scilicet connexionis in qua Plato illa posuerat. Nec enim hoc dicit Platonicus Socrates "*omnibus hominibus simpliciter et sine exceptione melius esse mori, quam vivere*;" sed nil aliud, siquid video, nisi hoc ait, "*nonnullis nonnunquam melius esse mori quam vivere*."'

bility of *death* over *life*, there are several formidable objections. 1°, If the statement intended to be conveyed by Plato is one thus entirely paradoxical, it is introduced very abruptly, in a manner which is neither natural nor Platonic. Compare the cautious way in which propositions much less startling are introduced with a modest *κινδυνεύει*, as in 64 A. and 66 B. 2°, The succeeding clause, *οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι*, followed especially by *τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, naturally implies that Socrates is predicating the desirableness of death only in the case of a *class* of men (namely, that of the *φιλόσοφοι*), not in the case of mankind as a whole. 3°, Although it is true that Olympiodorus among the later Platonists considers Plato as here expressing himself in favour of the absolute desirableness of Death over Life, it is scarcely warrantable to consider him as holding this doctrine, except in the case of the class whom he designates *φιλόσοφοι*. Not to speak of the rich enjoyment that the author of such a Dialogue as the 'Banquet' must have derived from life in all its forms, and the zest with which Socrates enjoyed Life, to the admiration of his friends (Xen. Mem. IV. 8, 2), it is to be remembered that Plato believed in a state of punishments as well as rewards (cf. Phædo, 72 D., *ταῖς μὲν ἀγαθαῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμεινον ἔσται, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κἀκκιον*, cf. 107 C., also Legg. XII. 959 B.), and that, while Death would bring blessing to the good, it would bring misery to the wicked.\*

The key to what appears to be the true interpretation of the passage lies in the right understanding of the pronoun *τοῦτο* in the previous clause. To what does this pronoun really refer? Those interpreters whose views have been adduced have made it refer to the clause *βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν*, considering it to be an anticipation of the proposition about to be announced. To this there are the objections, that *τοῦτο* is thereby rendered prospective in its reference, contrary to its common usage; and also, and more especially, that *τοῦτο*, whatever it may be, is regarded as something invariably valid and true, whereas the proposition *βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν* is not absolute, but conditional, for it may be taken for granted that *τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* is not the whole of humanity, but a class. Therefore, it seems clear that *τοῦτο* is not identical

\* Olympiodorus seems to have felt that this was a difficulty in his interpretation, for he says, *ἀμεινον μὲν τοῖς κακοῖς ζῆν· εἰκὸς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ζῶντας προκόπτειν, καὶ βιβλία ἔχοντας καὶ διδασκάλους, καὶ ἀμεινοναυ ἐαυτῶν γίνεσθαι* (p. 51, Ed. Finckh).

with βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., but refers to something else. The common sense of Nüsslin, and the perspicacity of Whewell, have discerned the right reference of τοῦτο, viz., the before-mentioned 'canon against self-slaughter' (τὸ οὐ θεμιτόν, in 61 E.), which canon Socrates avers is absolute, so as to be binding even on those to whom Death, if coming in another form, might be a boon and a relief.

Another cause of error on the part of critics was what appears to be a misapprehension of a subtlety in the use of τυγχάνω in this passage. This might have been suspected from the awkwardness of supposing τυγχάνω to have first a personal dative, and then a verb-clause construction, two usages which are separately legitimate, but which it is not natural to suppose fused into one. May it not be that οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ is a complete construction in itself, and that the whole, down to ἔστιν ὅτε inclusive, is an explanation *negatively* of what was expressed by ἀπλοῦν *affirmatively*? On this supposition the gist of the passage is reduced to, and concentrated in, τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν ἐστι, καὶ οἷς βέλτιόν (ἐστι) τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, the last clause being an appended member, indicating a special case which might have been expected to prove an exception to the rule (viz., against self-slaughter), but which does not prove so after all. Similar usages of ἀπλοῦς as opposed to an *alternative*, whether of chance or of choice, may be found in Conv. 183 D., Gorg. 468 C., Phædr. 257 B., Pol. I. 331 C.

Some such solution was divined by Forster when he proposed to read ὥσπερ καὶ τὰλλα· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε κ.τ.λ., a reading which, at all events, would have the advantage of disentangling the clause καὶ οἷς κ.τ.λ. from immediate dependence upon τυγχάνει.

The following rendering, founded on the foregoing considerations, is proposed as a solution involving fewest difficulties and restoring harmony to the whole context: 'It will appear strange, that this law [of which I have been speaking] is above all other things absolutely fixed (and it never therefore falls as a matter of chance or choice to the human creature, as other things do according to occasion), even in the case of those for whom otherwise it is better to be in the other world than in this; now, in the case of such persons for whom death is better, it may, I repeat, appear strange to you that these are not entitled to do themselves a good office, but must wait for another to be their benefactor.'

## NOTE E.

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### PHASES OF ANCIENT FEELING TOWARDS DEATH.

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As collateral to the *Phædo*, no inquiry is of more importance than an investigation into the leading phases of feeling in the ancient mind on the subject of Death. The following sketch is an attempt, not indeed to exhaust the subject, but to gather the chief facts and phenomena and present them in their historical sequence.

The leading aspects under which Death was contemplated by the ancient mind are mainly reducible to three: that of the early and simple Heroic time, in which it is regarded with shrinking as simply unspeakable gloom; and that of the Reflective time, when it came to be regarded with less repulsion, either negatively, as bringing with it the absence of pain and an end of trouble, or positively, as introducing to the presence of actual joy. The first aspect, though essentially characteristic of the heroic time, manifests itself largely also in the reflective time; and the two latter aspects, although often found distinct, are frequently met with united in such a way, that it is difficult to determine whether the negatively or the positively cheerful view of death predominates.

The first of these aspects finds its most pregnant and memorable expression in the words of Achilles in the shades (*Od.* XI. 490), where the ghost of the great Hero is represented as deploring to his visitant Ulysses the loss of the light of the Sun, and as longing for the life of a serf or a drudge on the Earth in preference even to the sceptre of the Realm of the dead. That a people like the Homeric Greeks, in whom the warm tide of life flowed with such impetuous strength, should have recoiled from the thought of that mortality, in which their sensuous perceptions could see nothing but a freezing up of life's fountain and a lying in cold obstruction, is nothing strange: the Titanic hearts, whose pulses still beat strong under the inspiration of the Epic muse, could, in that early morning of Time, have but one natural feeling—that of horror—towards the grave.

Nowhere, therefore, is the hope of a happy hereafter to be met with in Homer as a consolation for any afflictions of the present life: the only balm is blind resignation to Fate or the decree of the gods.

In Homer's representation of the local circumstances of the dead, two features are to be remarked. Not only is the habitation assigned to them both cheerless and dark, but the existence attributed to them is regarded as inane,\* and bordering on nothingness—according to the Lucretian description of the Homeric Hades,

‘—— Acherusia templa  
Quo neque permanent anime, neque corpora nostra,  
Sed quædam simulacra modis pallentia miris.’ (I. 120.)

These *simulacra* are represented as becoming in some way both intelligent and intelligibly communicative, but only when once they have had a taste of blood—that element of life from which they have been estranged.† Moreover, the Homeric Hades exhibits scarcely any separation of the Evil from the Good: the whole multitude of ghosts wanders together in one gloomy hall, each apparently with the same measure of enjoyment; only a few notorious offenders, such as perjured men (Il. III. 278), are represented as suffering punishment apart; while, on the other hand, a few privileged persons, by special favour of the gods, are spoken of as receiving an *increase* of happiness by transportation to the Elysian Plain (Od. IV. 562).

The feeling expressed by the Homeric view re-appears frequently in the Lyric period, though in more languid and querulous tones, and without the Homeric vigour of expression. Compare the dreary forebodings of Anacreon (Fr. 43), ἀνασταλίζω θαμὰ Τάρταρον δειδοικώς. Ἀΐδew γάρ ἐστι δεινὸς Μυχός κ.τ.λ. With

\* Tiresias alone is represented as retaining his full powers of mind (φρένες ἔμπεδοι), by special privilege from Persephone (Od. X. 494—5). Hence Plato's anxiety to predicate, in opposition to the Homeric view, both φρόνησις and δύναμις (70 B.) as still belonging to the disembodied spirit.

† Compare Buttmann's note on the Homeric καμόντες, which he interprets to mean the *pitiless*, or those in a state, as he phrases it, one remove from annihilation. Compare Aristotle's protest against the notion of εὐδαιμονία being possible apart from ἐνέργεια (Eth. Nic. I. 11, 2). The Jupiter of the 16th Book of the Iliad, who shed tears of blood at the death of Sarpedon, had evidently, as Gibbon grimly remarks, a very imperfect notion of happiness or glory beyond the grave. (Compare Gladstone's Homer, II. p. 393.)

Tyrtæus the only immortality worth having appears to be that of fame (IX. 31). Archilochus finds comfort only in the commonness of the misery (Fr. 8). So Theognis (570, cf. 973) exhorts himself to take enjoyment in life, since after death there is none, 'I shall lie like a stone' (*κείσομαι ὥστε λίθος*).

Towards the end of the Lyric period, however, a new phase of feeling makes itself manifest, entirely distinct from the Homeric, and marking the presence of a peculiar vein of thought, of which the two Homeric Epics can scarcely be said to present anything like a decided trace. This is the mystic or Orphic spirit, of which the germs are discoverable, to some extent, in Hesiod, and the fruits are manifest in the philosophy of Pythagoras and the poetry of Pindar. Whatever may have been the origin of this peculiar influence, whether it was of Oriental birth, or of internal and native growth, certain it is that it induced a contemplative study of the powers of nature, of the processes of generation and decay, which, although mainly Pantheistic in its principles, was accompanied by, if it was not the cause of, more hopeful views regarding the state of the Dead. The happiness of the Elysian fields, which in Homer was confined to children of the gods, such as Helen and her husband Menelaus, is now regarded as the inheritance of all the truly brave and wise, and the accession of enjoyment thence arising is spoken of as an object of confident anticipation in more than one passage of the odes of Pindar, (Ol. II. 68; Threni fr. 4; compare the Hymn to Demeter, 480, where a higher degree of future happiness is said to follow initiation in the mysteries).\* This, which may be called the Pindaric view, in contrast with the Homeric view, is found also glimmering in those pious legends (one of which is told us by Herodotus, I. 31), which had for their burden the lesson, that in the mind of the gods Death was rather to be chosen than Life.† The most famous of these tales, in which Death is given as a reward and not a punishment (such as that of Cleobis and Bito,

\* The earliest use of the euphemistic *μακαρίτης* regarding the dead occurs in the Pythagorean Æschylus.

† It is doubtful whether the extraordinary account given by Herodotus (V. 4) of the Thracian tribe *Trausi* can be here adduced as an illustration. The celebration of funerals with joy, and of births with weeping, may have arisen from an irreligious, as well as from a religious view of Life, and our information is too scanty to enable us to determine which of these was the cause.



and of Trophonius and Agamedes) are collected by Cicero (Tusc. I. 47—9), who has grouped with them in the same connection, as evidence converging in the same direction, the numerous tales of death endured for some unselfish cause—patriotic martyrdoms\* which it was unnatural to believe would bear no fruit and produce no recompense to the sufferer in another scene. These gleams of light, from whatever source they were derived, are all concentrated in Plato, in whom this milder view of Death finds in antiquity its most distinct and assured expression. The cause of this pre-eminence is without question attributable to the circumstance, that while Plato felt a deep sense of the evils and misery of the world, he did not suffer it to overwhelm him, but was able to subdue it by a firm belief that virtue and wisdom cannot be in vain.†

By far the most frequent, however, and pervading view was that which regarded Death negatively, as a discharge from pain and trouble. Very early expression was given to this view by Mimnermus, who flourished from B.C. 634—600, in whose fragments (especially fr. 2) we find a languid longing for Death as the great comfort when once the youthful blandishments of life are gone. Compare, at different periods of Greek literature, Theognis (425—8); Bacchylides (fr. 2); Æschylus (Frag. 376 Herm.); Sophocles (Ed. Col. 1225); Euripides (Fr. Inc. 99, also Troad. 603, 631—2, τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τῷ θανεῖν ἴσον λέγω, Τὸ ὤξῃν δὲ λυπρῶτερ κρεῖσσόν ἐστι κατθανεῖν. Ἀλλ' ἡγεῖ γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν κακῶν ἡσθημένος); Anthol. VII. 339, 472; IX. 359 (imitated by Ausonius, Id. XV. 50: cf. Plin. H. Nat. VII. 1). Many others may be found in Stobæus Flor. § 120, each more or less gloomy, all proclaiming that Death is better than a life of sorrow, and some professing that Death is better than Life in any shape, and that it was a misfortune ever to have been born.‡

\* Compare remarks in note on 68 A.

† Of the post-Platonic utterances regarding Death, that of Antiphanes (Stobæ. Floril. § 124), is among the most remarkable: πενθεῖν δὲ μετρίως τοὺς προσήκοντας φίλους. Οὐ γὰρ τεθνήσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δόξον ἥν πάσιν ἐλθεῖν ἔστι ἀναγκαῖον ἔχον Προεληλύθασιν· εἴτα χημεῖν ὕστερον Ἐν ταύτῳ καταγωνεῖον αὐτοῖς ἥξομεν, Κοινὴ τὸν ἄλλον συνδιατρίψοντες χρόνον.—The proverb, 'Whom the gods love die young,' is interesting in connection with such legends as that of Cleobis and Biton. (Ὅν οἱ θεοὶ φιλοῦσ', ἀποθνήσκει νέος, Menander.)

‡ The original utterance of this sentiment was attributed to Silenus, when caught by Midas. When asked, 'What was the best thing?' he

In the later periods of Greek history, when the languor manifesting itself in Epicureanism had diffused itself over the national mind, this doleful view of Life became largely predominant. The life of tumult, in which the Homeric hero consumed away any morbid reflections on the misery of mortality, had long passed away, and even the life of energetic action, in which the Ἄνδρες Μαρθωνομάχαι had won such glory, was now closed to the Greek race generally, first by the rise of the Macedonian, and then of the Roman political supremacy. The Greek mind, debarred from political and military life, addicted itself henceforth to speculation in philosophy, which, in general, became gradually more and more unhealthy the farther it was removed from the salutary influence of active and energetic Life, and the more Society advanced on the road of luxury and refinement.\* Hence the development of a number of speculative systems, in which there was a tendency to dwell on the sorrows inseparable from mortal flesh rather than on the self-inflicted miseries of ignorance and vice. Among the more famous fruits of this garden of Indolence and Ennui, was the public preaching of suicide by Hegesias (Cic. Tusc. I. 34), a follower of the Cyrenaic School of Aristippus.

In the period nearly contemporaneous with the diffusion of the Gospel, we find a remarkable phenomenon appearing in the shape of a number of treatises called by the special name of CONSOLATIONES,† which are attempts to embody whatever of

replied, 'Not to be born.' 'What is the next best thing?' 'Soon to die.' Lactantius (III. 18), in relating this story, says quaintly, with reference to the sleepy character of its subject, 'Quæ sententia, ut majoris sit auctoritatis, Sileno attribuitur.' The same Father has preserved a fragment of Cicero de Consolatione, in which that sentiment is rendered in the magnificent language of the Roman forum. The legend regarding 'Silenus and Midas' bears a family resemblance to the story of 'Solon and Croesus,' the burden of each being originally a warning against the conceit of Power.

\* The natural tendency of the voluptuary is represented\* in Ecclesiastes IV. 2, 3.—It is a fine trait in Homer's description of Bellerophon, that it is only after the hero has ceased to be a fighter with monsters that he becomes a misanthrope.—Hamlet's meditations on suicide arise from weakness of will, combined with a doleful view of the perplexities of Life.

† The oldest of these treatises seems to have been that of the Academic philosopher Crantor, which was once famous (Cic. Tusc. I. 48), but has perished. Hermann (Gesch. der Plat. Phil. p. 418) considers the Axiochus, which goes under the name of Plato, as probably largely drawn from this treatise of Crantor.

argument or reflection Antiquity had been able to suggest, in order to fight the fear of Death.

The treatise of Cicero under this title is lost, with the exception of a few fragments, but the 'De Senectute' and 'Tusculan Questions,' as well as the letters to and from Serv. Sulpicius, enable us to understand what the staple and texture of it had been. Though, in many respects, wonderful efforts to 'smile through the tears,' they must be confessed to be, at the best, but 'dull narcotics numbing pain.' The same remark applies even more strongly to the two *Παραμυθητικοί* of Plutarch, and the three 'Consolationes' of Seneca,\* in which the negative view is almost entirely predominant. It is interesting to note that the last fruit off the Old Tree of Ancient Philosophy was a 'Consolatio,' namely, the famous treatise bearing the name of Boethius.

## NOTE F.

### ANCIENT VIEWS OF SUICIDE.

It is of importance to remember the close connection of the Crito with the present Dialogue in order to a right appreciation of this portion of the Phædo. Socrates, in that dialogue, had shown that any attempt to escape from the prison, in which the laws of his country had confined him, would be unlawful, as involving disobedience to those laws. It is not matter of accident that the discourse in this Dialogue opens with an apparently incidental train of thought, whereby Socrates is conducted to a similar con-

\* It is when passing from these exhortations of Seneca to the Epistles of his contemporary St. Paul, that one can measure, to some extent, the depth of the emotion with which the proclamation of the Gospel must have shaken the old Pagan world. Compare the remarkable words of Fronto (de Nepote amisso), that these 'Consolationes' might afford a pleasant theme for philosophers to descant upon, but could not heal a parent's sorrowing heart. 'Si maxime esse animas immortales constet, erit hoc philosophis disserendi argumentum, non parentibus desiderandi remedium.'

clusion regarding any attempt to escape from the prison of his body, which, he argues, would be disobedience to a higher law, the will of the gods. Thus the civil or political virtue of the Crito becomes exalted in the Phædo to a religious duty.

The whole doctrine, therefore, of this interesting passage (61 C.—62 C.) goes directly and clearly to the condemnation of suicide in every circumstance and form, and it may be doubted if the unlawfulness of such an act was ever demonstrated with more constraining power.\* The admiration due to this portion of the Phædo is enhanced by the remembrance that Plato was under strong temptation to adopt a position which would have led to an entirely different conclusion.† Human life appeared to him so full of miseries and infirmities of the flesh, and his anticipation of an ampler field for the development of Pure Intellect was so strong, that he was in danger of gliding into the snare into which in after time, not only the Epicureans, but the Stoics fell in their fanaticism, of proclaiming the lawfulness of suicide. The peculiar eminence of Plato in this regard is more distinctly recognisable when

\* It is singular, therefore, that we hear of two instances in which the perusal of the Phædo was followed, through a singular perversity, by the commission of the act which this portion of it condemns: viz., Cleombrotus (see p. 181) and Cato of Utica (cf. Florus IV. 2, 71). What may have been the real circumstances attending the death of the former, we have no satisfactory means of knowing: the suicide of the latter was chargeable, not to the teaching of Plato, but to that of the Stoics, to which sect of Philosophy he belonged. Hence the censure of Lactantius (III. 18) is false, as well as rash: after borrowing the argument of Plato on the subject, he says of Cato, ‘ad summum nefas philosophi (Platonis) auctoritate compulsum est.’ Much more justly Augustine speaks regarding the suicide of Cleombrotus: ‘Quod tamen magne potius factum esse quam bene, testis ei potuit Plato ipse, quem legerat: qui profecto id præcipue potissimum fecisset, vel etiam præcepisset, nisi ea mente, quæ immortalitatem animæ vidit, nequaquam faciendum, quin etiam prohibendum esse judicasset.’ (de Civ. Dei, I. 22.)

† The passage in Legg. IX. 873 C. has been alleged as inconsistent with this doctrine of the Phædo. It is true that Plato there exempts certain forms of suicide from punishment; but probably he is only showing how, as a legislator, he would deal with a necessary evil under the widely different circumstances in which it would occur; whereas in the Phædo he is reasoning *a priori* on a principle that should go to exclude its occurrence. (The language employed in Pol. III. 406 E. and Legg. IX. 854 C., only shows how narrowly Plato escaped the Stoic conclusion.)

it is borne in mind that even Cicero,\* although mainly professing allegiance to the Academy, departed from the Platonic position, and expressed himself favourable to the Stoic view, which allowed a man, when circumstances seemed to call for it, to anticipate his fate (*mortis iam ipsi adventanti paulum procedere obviam*. Tusc. V. 19).

In the healthy and simple freshness of the Homeric period, it is natural to expect that a crime such as suicide should, as among the early Hebrews,† be almost unknown. In the first agony on hearing of the death of Patroclus, it is said that Achilles was with difficulty restrained from doing himself violence, but this is given as a proof of the transcendent violence of his passion. The suicide of Anticlea is certainly a post-Homeric story: that of Epicaste or Jocasta, in Od. XI. 276, has every appearance of being an interpolation, and even the manner of the death of Ajax‡ is nowhere distinctly indicated by Homer.

\* The evidence of Cicero is on this subject vitiated by the influence which the Roman patriotic sentiment exerted over him. Compare the remarkable fragment of his oration 'pro Scauro,' where he indulges in a reproach at the Greek nation as not having their annals illustrated by deeds of this description, like those of Rome. The sneer in this passage is unworthy of the man, who might have at least remembered the name of Demosthenes, and is in keeping with the carelessness with which (in Tusc. I. 30) he couples together the names of Socrates and Cato Uticensis, as if their deaths were precisely parallel and equally voluntary.

† The Mosaic Law is silent regarding suicide, and probably for the same reason as the Solonian legislation (p. 158) was silent regarding parricide. It is remarkable that there is no allusion to such an exit from misery in the manifold questionings of the Book of Job, and the occurrences of the crime in the Jewish annals are both rare and peculiar (Saul, Ahithophel, Zimri, Judas; Ptolemæus, in 2 Mac. X. 13, is a Greek). Among the zealots of the later period of Jewish history, it appears that a less salutary view (probably from such examples as Razis in 2 Mac. XIV. 42,) had diffused itself: compare the elaborate argument of Josephus (Bell. Jud. III. 7, 5), where he discusses the question of the lawfulness of suicide, and gives his verdict in the negative.

‡ Regarding the death of Ajax there were traditions different from that which Sophocles rendered current (Wunder's Soph. II. p. 14). It is not improbable that it was on the strength of some of these that the honourable mention of Ajax rests in the Apology (41 B.).—The name of the Theban *Αἰτόφρων* (Il. IV. 396) probably connects itself with the legend of Menœceus sacrificing himself for Thebes. The custom of sacrificing on the funeral pile gave rise to tales of self-sacrifice, which bear a distant resemblance to, but must not be confounded with, suicide, such as that of Evadne (cf. 68 A., n.) and Clite (Apoll. Rhod. I. 1063).

In the Lyric period the traces of the occurrence of this crime are found gradually increasing ; and, in the Attic period, it becomes a comparatively familiar thing. The earliest instance resting on any tolerable basis of historic fact is probably that of the daughters of Lycambes, under the scourge of Archilochus. Simonides of Amorgus (l. 17) speaks of ἀρχονή as a resource adopted in his time by some persons to whom life was burdensome. The tales, however, of the deaths of Lycurgus, Othryades, and Sappho are either fictitious or susceptible of other explanations.

In the period of the Attic drama references to suicide become more numerous, insomuch that the tragedians\* transfer the character of their own age to the heroic time, which, in this respect, receives the reflection of a darker colouring than the Homeric poems warrant us in ascribing to it. In the public history of the Dramatic period, the occurrences are nevertheless few and unimportant : besides the Spartan coward after Thermopylæ (Herod. VII. 232), the mad Spartan Cleomenes (Herod. VI. 75), and the defeated Spartan Timocrates (Thuc. II. 92), it is doubtful if there is any recorded instance of note : the story regarding Themistocles is evidently disbelieved by Thucydides (I. 138).

It is only in the age succeeding the great Attic period, when the ancient fibre of the nation was dissolved, that we find a new phenomenon appearing in the rise of phases of thought, which regarded suicide not only without aversion, but even with a certain complacency. The materialistic philosophy of Democritus is said to have adopted it as a legitimate conclusion to life (Lucr. III. 1052) : in certain sections of the school of Socrates† it was regarded as both

\* Especially Euripides, being τραγικώτατος. Cf. Æsch. Agam. 875 ; Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1237 ; Eurip. Hippol. 767. The prevailing sentiment is that expressed in Soph. Ajax 635, κρείσσειν γὰρ Ἄϊδά κεύθων ὁ νόσῳ μάλιστα.

† Although Xenophon has given no distinct or direct voice on the subject of suicide, and may even be considered as lending some countenance to it by the pains he has bestowed on the Oriental romance of Panthea in the Cyropædia (Cyr. VII. 3, 14—17, also the devotion of Artapatas, Anab. I. 8, 29), there is little or no dubiety as to the opinion of Plato and Aristotle, who are both at one in this regard. Each reaches his conclusion in his own way : while Plato takes his stand upon the dependence of Man on a higher power, and therefore pronounces it impious, Aristotle rests his conclusion partly on the fact of suicide being not courage, but cowardice (Eth. Nic. III. 11, 1, 'When all the blandishments of life are gone, The coward sneaks to

a competent and desirable exit from misery, viz., in the Cyrenaic or section of Aristippus (cf. p. 199) and the Eretriac or section of Menedemus;\* and the founders of Stoicism, Zeno and Cleanthes, are said to have exemplified personally what they taught theoretically. In the actual history of the period, both national and domestic, the catalogue of such occurrences must be confessed to augment in a similar proportion.†

If we turn from the annals and literature of Greece to those of Rome, we discover a state of feeling and of practice in this regard reflecting a somewhat lurid light on the history of the Imperial people.‡ Two causes concurred to render Roman history more tragic in this respect than that of Greece. The first was the greater intensity of the Roman character, imposing on itself tasks, and arrogating to itself claims, in the pursuit of which Fortune was indeed despised, but in the failure of which the Nemesis was both

death, the brave live on'), partly on the fact that it is an injury to the state of which one is a member (Eth. Nic. V. 16, 3). The story, therefore, regarding Aristotle, that he threw himself into the mysterious current of the Euripus, with the words, 'If I cannot comprehend thee, thou shalt me,' must be pronounced, on internal as well as external grounds—like the story of Empedocles plunging into the cauldron of Ætna—a mere bravery of fiction.—Compare the story regarding the death of Zaleucus (told also regarding Charondas and Diocles), which is equally untrustworthy.

\* So Antisthenes is said to have directed one 'to get sense or a halter' (Plutarch, Mor. 1039 F.). This, however, is possibly hyperbole, like the exhortation by Theognis (175). Compare regarding the teaching of Diogenes and Crates, the similar traditions in Diogenes Laert. (IV. 3, VI. 86); also in Julian Orat. VI. ad. init. Hence, in all probability, part of the admiration awarded by the Cynic School to Ajax, their favourite character among the ancient heroes.

† Among the more notable examples are Isocrates, Demosthenes, Nicoles, and Cleomenes (Plutarch, Vit. Cleom. ch. 31—37, where Cleomenes first argues against the act, and then forgets his own reasonings). Cf. Xen. Hell. VI. 4, 7; Arist. Rhet. I. 14, 3; Anthol. VII. 493, 517.

‡ It can scarcely be called injustice to make reference here to the greater disregard of human life which we are entitled to prefer as an impeachment against Rome as compared with Greece, more especially when we remember the bloody shows of the Roman amphitheatre, the butcheries of which were never naturalised in Greece. Compare the striking protest in Seneca's seventh Epistle, on his return from the amphitheatre: '*crudelior (redeo) et inhumanius, quia inter homines fui!*'—The national enthusiasm for the not much superior spectacle called a 'Triumph' fostered the tendency to concentrate the issues of life upon the fortune of an hour, whence came gambling for glory, and from gambling madness and death.

swift and tremendous. The magnitude of the theatre on which the Roman played his part, the grandeur of the issues involved in the various struggles, the consequent frequency of portentous crises in the national history, conspired to multiply the recurrence of tragic times, in which the proud spirit of the Roman, unlike the elastic spirit of the more supple Greek, refused to bend, and therefore could but break. The second cause, which came to reinforce and sanction the tendency already native to the national character, was the prevalence, during the most fervid and tumultuous period of Roman history, of the Epicurean and Stoic Philosophies, both of which, although they had their origin in Greece, received their strongest historical impersonations from Rome, and although they differed in much, agreed in this, that each postulated for man liberty over his own life. Hence suicide became fashionable at Rome, as the appropriate end, in certain circumstances, of a Roman citizen; and a 'Roman death' \* came to be another name for suicide.

The downfall of the Republic in the bloody fields of Pharsalia and Philippi† was accompanied by an outburst of the Roman madness, in which it may be said to have reached its climax. The contagion extended itself into the Imperial period, the political condition of Rome under the early Cæsars being calculated to irritate rather than appease the malady. The pages of Tacitus contain ample testimony both to the symptoms and the cause.

It was natural that the tragic scenes, in which the great Republicans signalled their departure from a world not moving to their mind, should come to be surrounded with a halo of romantic or melodramatic splendour, partly through voluntary admiration for their principles, partly through involuntary sympathy with a

\* 'Sanctam Romana vitam sed morte peregit, Dimisitque animam nobiliore viâ' Martial I. 78. (Compare Shakspeare, *Ant. and Cleo.* Act IV. Sc. 13, 'And then, what's high, what's noble, Let's do it after the *high Roman fashion*, And make Death proud to take us.').—As the Romans were reckoned a nation of kings, so the Roman mode of death was reckoned peculiarly regal. '*Regio mors*,' says Livy (XXX. 15), '*ad incerta fortunæ venenum erat*,' regarding Masinissa giving the bowl to Sophonisba. So the two greatest enemies of Rome, Hannibal and Mithridates, vied with their august foes in the manner of their death.

† The examples of Cassius, Titinius, and Brutus at Philippi, seem to have left a contagious influence in the memories of the place (*Acts XVI.* 27).



fallen cause. Among these scenes none has been invested with greater pomp of colouring than the death of Cato of Utica,\* which may be said to have exerted, at the close of the Republican period, a fascination exactly similar to that of Lucretia at the beginning of the same period.† It is only from the influence of such examples that we can explain the memorable fact that the grave and venerable jurisprudence of the Republic not only expressed no direct aversion to suicide, such as we find appearing, more or less, in the legislation of the Greek communities,‡ but even accorded to it in certain instances an honourable immunity. Under the early Emperors, such persons as became obnoxious, and would have been condemned, whether justly or unjustly, as criminals, frequently executed sentence on themselves, in order to secure what they would have forfeited by any other death—burial to their bodies, and the possession of their property to their families.§ In process

\* Among these encomiastic praises of Cato may be specified, as among the most fantastic, the epigram of Florus (*Anthol. Lat.* I. 218, Meyer), where one Cato is said to be worth three hundred Socrates.—From Virgil (*Æn.* VIII. 670) the admiration for Cato passed to modern times, through Dante (*Purg.* I. 73).

† The yoke of the Tarquins seems to have been as fruitful in causing this crime as the domination of the Cæsars. Compare the traditions in *Plin. N. H.* XXXVI. 24, and *Serv. Virg. Æn.* XII. 603, regarding the effects of Tarquinian oppression near to the beginning of the Republican period.—Although it would be unjust to say that the Republican period in its earlier course, previous to the introduction of Stoic and Epicurean principles, contains so many dark entries as its later (the example of Regulus being a striking contrast to that of Cato), yet the peculiar attitude of Roman law toward suicide justifies the allegation regarding the history of Rome considered as a whole.

‡ Penalties, such as exclusion from interment, or the like, were common. Cf. *Zenob. Prov.* VI. 17. *Æschines* (contr. *Ctesiph.* 88, 38) makes mention of an Athenian law that the hand of the suicide was to be buried apart from the body which it had slain. So *Plato*, in *Legg.* IX. 873 C., legislates for the punishment of suicide arising from cowardice. Compare the traditions regarding the polity of *Ceos* and of *Massilia*, which allowed a man to obtain leave from the magistrate, on cause shown, to put himself to death. (*Val. Max.* II. 6; cf. *Liban. Declam.* X., XII.; also *More's Utopia*, Book II.) In this respect Greek jurisprudence seemed to follow the Aristotelian principle, that a man was answerable for all his actions to the state, and that he was not his own master—a very different principle from that of Rome, which might have taken for its motto, '*Dextra mihi Deus.*'

§ '*Forum qui de se statuebant, humabantur corpora, manebant testamenta, pretium festinandi.*' *Tacit. Ann.* VI. 29.

of time, however, it was discovered that the state was itself thereby frequently a pecuniary sufferer, and that, by following the example of Cato, villains of the Verres type obtained a posthumous immunity for their crimes. On this account these privileges were circumscribed by the later Emperors, not that these rulers had become more humane, but that they had become more avaricious. Whatever provisions of a prohibitive tendency appear in the later stages of Roman law, arise from fiscal, not from moral considerations.\*

It would be both instructive and interesting to trace the influence of this taint in the later periods of Roman history and literature,† but space forbids. The survey, however, which we have made will, though short, be sufficient to show how memorable is the revolution of sentiment in the Roman world, which meets the student of History in the first chapters of the work that may be said to ring the knell of the Empire of Rome—the ‘Civitas Dei.’ There, in the face of all his national prejudices, against the fascinations of national history, the maxims of prevailing philosophy, the seductive strains of national poetry,‡ and the sanctions of the time-honoured Republican jurisprudence, Augustine dares to lift his voice against the lawfulness of the ‘Roman Death,’ in every phase and form.§ (I. 22—6.) The verdict of Augustine, founded on

\* ‘Ausim præstare totum quâ patet Jus civile Romanorum, nihil aliud coercere quam injuriam aliorum corpori bonis et existimationi illatam, nec cuiquam invidiam, *nedum pœnæ* fuisse, se et sua, modo alterius injuria absit, profligare, perdere. Neque adeo dubitari videbatur posse quin eo jure *licita* quoque fuerit *naturalis libertas* *se ipsum occidendi*, hac una cautione “si citra alterius injuriam fiat.”’ Bynkershoek *Observat. Jur. Rom.*, L. IV. c. 4. Compare the pregnant observations of Montesquieu (*Esprit des Lois*, 29, 9) and Gibbon (*Rom. Emp.* ch. 44).

† Among the chief sources on the subject are Tacit. *Hist.* IV. 59; Plin. *H. Nat.* II. 7, XXVIII. 2; Plin. *Epp.* I. 12, 22, III. 7, 16; Senec. *Epp.* 12, 58, 70, and de *Ira*, Lib. III. 15. The Stoicism of the Greeks (Epictetus and Antoninus) is much less fierce on this matter than the Roman Stoicism of Seneca. So Neo-Platonism adhered with considerable faithfulness to the Socratic view: cf. Plotin. IX., Ennead I.; Porphy. de *Abst.* I. 38, II. 47.

‡ The famous and much-disputed passage in Virgil (*Æn.* VI. 434), where he speaks of suicides through impatience of ‘poverty and toils,’ forms no exception to the general tenor of Roman poetry, inasmuch as those persons are described rather as unfortunate than as morally blamable.

§ It is a striking evidence how deeply the Roman world was almost educated to familiarity with suicide, that the toleration, and even applause of such an act found its way for a time into the Christian Church. Compare St. Ambrose’s eulogy on Pelagia’s drowning herself to escape the fate of

considerations derived from the precepts and the example of Christ, has been sustained by the vast consent of modern thinkers, the strain of whose sentiment has therefore been, in the main, in harmony with the Socratic.

Although in modern times, and even in Christian countries, the number of its victims has, from various causes, even in circumstances of apparent sanity, been lamentably great, its apologists have, as compared with those in ancient times, happily been few, and these chiefly rare and solitary speculative individuals, not, as in ancient times, a great majority, consisting of whole successions of thinkers. For this fact there is only one cause that can adequately account, and that is, the silent influence of the Gospel, which has indirectly but powerfully reinforced the philosophical argument against its lawfulness. This result will appear the more remarkable, when we take into account the vastness of the disturbing influence which has been exerted on modern society by the fruits of the Scandinavian mythology—the creed of ‘honour’ which has so largely resulted in modern suicide and its sister-crime duelling, being the direct descendant of the doctrine, that Walhalla received none but those who died a death of violence. The double triumph at once over the spirit of Roman pride and Scandinavian ferocity, is traceable to the clearness with which the Gospel has familiarised the modern mind with the doctrine that the present life is a state of probation, in which endurance or patience becomes a primal duty, and also to the certainty with which it proclaimed, as the necessary and solemn consequent of such a view of life—‘after death the Judgment.’ It is by this ‘dread of something after death’ that Hamlet is represented as feeling himself restrained when otherwise his speculative spirit might have led him astray; and, what is still more remarkable, under the influence of similar feelings, and in the absence of any warranty from historic fact, Addison could not allow his Roman hero to die without putting into his mouth a mild repentant condemnation of his own fatal act.\*

Lucretia (*De Virgin. Lib. III. ad fin.*); also Augustine’s protest against such canonisations, *de Civ. Dei*, I. 26.

\* The line by Budgell—

‘What Cato did and Addison approved,  
Cannot be wrong’—

contains a misreading of the mind of Addison almost as egregious as that of Cato when he misread the mind of Plato in the *Phædo*.

It was undoubtedly a significant feature of the Eighteenth century, that there appear within it several writers and thinkers\* who, without absolutely postulating the same amount of bold liberty as the ancient Stoic or Epicurean, lent their countenance more or less, at all events theoretically, to Suicide; and it is equally significant that the same century was distinguished towards its close by an ebullition of the 'Roman Madness,' natural in the age when Plutarch served as the text-book for young heroes, and the French Republic aped its prototype of Rome. With the exception, however, of this period, the sentiment of modern times,† so far as it has expressed itself in a literary or philosophical form, must be considered as forming, in this respect, a remarkable contrast to the prevailing spirit of Antiquity.

This short recension of opinion may perhaps be not inappropriately concluded with the judicious maxim in Terence (*Heaut. V. 2, 17*), probably derived originally from the Greek Menander:—

'CL. *Emori cupio.* CH. *Præsum, quæso, diace quid sit vivere :  
Ubi scies, si displicebit vita, tum istoc utitor.'*

'CL. I long to die. CH. Prythee, first learn the lesson,  
What 'tis to live. When thou hast mastered that,  
If life please then no better, go try death.'

\* Hume, *Essay on Suicide* (posthumous, suppressed); Rousseau, *Nouv. Heloise*, Let. 114; Goethe, *Sorrows of Werter*. Madame de Staël wrote at first in favour of Rousseau's view in her '*De l'Influence des Passions*,' but afterwards retracted in her '*Reflexions sur le Suicide*,' where she distinguishes between the two consummations, Martyrdom and its counterfeit Suicide, the former the fruit of Religion and unworldly feeling, the latter of worldly selfishness and Pride.—The most important among the older apologists of suicide, as lawful in certain extremities, are Montaigne (*Essais* II. 3) and Dr. Donne in his youthful Disputation entitled '*Biathanatos*.'

† Compare, among others, Dante, *Inferno* XI. 43, XIII.; Spenser, I. 9, 41; Milton, X. 1012—9, *Sama. Ag.* 508; also Montesquieu, *Espr. d. Lois*, XIV. 12. In Shakspeare's plays, non-Roman as well as Roman, there occur, necessarily under the conditions of the drama, complaints and writhings against the acknowledged canon—

'Is wretchedness deprived that benefit,  
To end itself by death?'

The spirit of the poet himself must be regarded as speaking in the *second* thoughts of Glo'ster on the cliff edge (*K. Lear* IV. 6), 'I do remember now: henceforth I'll bear Affliction till it do cry out itself, "Enough, Enough," and die.'

## NOTE G. (1)

(PAGE 21.)

## PHILOSOPHY A MEDITATION OF DEATH.

THERE are few, if any, of the Platonic maxims that have obtained more currency than this second description or definition of Philosophy—that is, a Meditation of Death.\* Not that it has always been cited as bearing the same sense that Plato assigned to it, for moralists and theologians have, at various times, and under divers influences, assumed and adapted it to their several phases of thought, without always examining what was the interpretation originally attached to it by its author. Hence it has been adduced, more or less erroneously, sometimes as inculcating a kind of monkish meditation simply on the outward aspects of Death and the noisomeness of the wormy grave; at other times it has been made to figure as a precept of the same import with the Scriptural exhortation ‘to know one’s end and the measure of one’s days’; and, again, as an analogon to the Christian desire after deliverance ‘from the body of this death.’

The true and Platonic sense of the maxim, although not inconsistent with these applications, is yet distinct from all these, and is deducible only from the peculiar teaching of the Platonic Philosophy regarding the relation of the Soul to the Body. That relation was one in which the Soul was considered as both superior and subordinate—superior by its inherent nature and independent existence, but subordinate as being linked to and imprisoned in a fleshly tabernacle, which clogged its aspirations and impeded its desires.† The aim of the Philosopher, according to Plato, was to

\* The Platonic maxim is rendered ‘commentatio mortis’ in Cic. Tusc. I. 30—1; Appuleius de Philos. Plat. p. 277, ‘Philosophia est mortis affectus consuetudoque moriendi.’ Compare less direct imitations of the same, in Senec. Consol. ad Marc. c. 23; Epp. 102; 120, 15, ‘Nunquam magis divinum est (pectus), quam ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat;’ Id. Ep. 24, 19, ‘Quotidie morimur, quotidie enim demitur aliqua pars vite.’

† The Platonic view of the clogging of the Soul is presented in the splendid passage of Virgil, *Æn.* VI. 730—4.—Compare a prose version of the same in Senec. Consol. ad Helv. c. 11 ad fin. Cf. Note on 62 B.

become 'pure spirit,' but this was not possible so long as the mortal coil still clung to him ; and therefore, in longing to become 'pure spirit,' the Philosopher might be said to desire the shuffling off of the mortal coil, that the imprisoned spirit might go free ; and thus his whole life becomes a meditation of Death, as the state of Perfect Intellectual Freedom.\* Therefore, the notion underlying this maxim is nearly identical with the allegory in the Phædrus, of the 'Soul recovering her wings,'† and thus the longing to escape from the prison-house was with the Platonist no wish for extinction, or even contraction of being, for he was persuaded that Death was not a Νύξ, but a Εὐφρόνη, and that in departing he would not cease to be, but then only truly begin to be.‡ In this regard all

\* Compare the reasoning in 65 B. Xenophon (Cyrop. VIII. 7, 19—20) uses language, regarding Death as a deliverance of the Soul, remarkably akin to the Platonic: *ὅταν ἄκρως καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἰκὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι*. The same thought is expanded in Pol. X. 611 B.—D.

† The joy of song and the joy of swiftest motion are united in the bird, whose endowment of wings has been the one attribute most envied among those accorded to a portion of creation and denied to man ; and it therefore seems destined to remain in all time the symbol of the unattainable by man, at once to chastise his ambition and to excite his aspiration. Hence the frequency with which the Soul at death is represented winging its flight from the body as a bird from a broken spray : Soph. (Ed. Tyr. 175 ; Eurip. Hipp. 827 ; Anthol. VII. 62 (of an eagle rising from the tomb of Plato).

‡ 'The inconceivable rapidity of the operations of Mind,' says Lord Brougham (Nat. Theol. p. 73), 'is perhaps the most striking feature of its diversity from Body, and there is no doubt that the rapidity increases in proportion as the interference of the Senses—that is, the influence of the Body—is withdrawn.' This passage is an effective modern statement of the principle which is found underlying the Platonic speculations on the effect of Death upon the Soul, and gives the key to understand Platonic utterances like the following : Plutarch (Mor. 563 F., regarding Death), *περιορᾶν πανταχόθεν, ὥσπερ ἐνὸς ὄμματος ἀνοιχθείσης τῆς ψυχῆς*. Clem. Alex. Strom. VI. 6: *καθαρώτερον διορᾶν δύνανται τῶν σωμάτων ἀπηλλαγμένοι ψυχαί, κἂν πάθουσιν ἐπισκοτῶνται, διὰ τὸ μηκέτι ἐπιπροσθῆσθαι σαρκίον*. Compare Henry More's simile of the 'Light in the Lantern :—

'Like to a light fast locked in lantern dark,  
Whereby by night our wary steps we guide  
In slabby streets, and dirty channels mark,  
Some weaker rays from the black top do glide,  
And flusher streams perhaps through th' horny side :  
But when we've past the peril of the way,  
Arrived at home and laid that case aside,

traces of the mental activity where it was independent, or seemed to be independent of the material frame, assumed a peculiar interest, and were believed to have a peculiar meaning, as foreshadowing the freedom of a future state.\*

Kindred with this Platonic conception of the Emancipation of the Soul, although distinct from it in recognising other causes of misery than in the noxious encumbering of the Body, is the modern argument for the belief in a Future State derived from the frustration to which, in all its forms, the Ideal is subject, and the poverty or vanity of the Soul's highest conquests compared both with her purposes and powers. Under such a consciousness, the poet and the philosopher have alike confessed that 'it is a thing impossible, to frame conceptions equal to the soul's desires';† and History, both national and individual, is one great testimony that even those conceptions which men have framed in blood and tears are at best but truncated aspirations and broken hopes. In like manner Art, in so far as it is ideal, and not simply imitative, has ever been but a shadow, which may suggest, but cannot realise, the image of what is Eternal struggling out of the indignities of time. In this regard the very misery of man, whether the noble pain of aspiration unfulfilled, or the anguish of unsatisfied desire, is the seal of his

The naked light, how clearly doth it ray,  
And spread its joyful beams as bright as summer's day.

Even so the Soul, in this contracted state,  
Confined to these straight instruments of sense,  
More dull and narrowly doth operate;  
At this hole hears, the sight must ray from thence,  
Here tastes, there smells. But when she's gone from thence,  
*Like naked lamp, she is one shining sphere,*  
And round about has perfect cognoscence  
Whate'er in her horizon doth appear;  
She is one orb of Sense; all Eye, all airy Ear.'

(*Poem on Pre-existence of the Soul, Stanzas 101—2.*)

\* The soul was believed to 'imp her wings,' even in this life, in such peculiar manifestations as the power of vaticination or 'clairvoyance' accorded in dreaming, and especially before death, in the hour when—

'The Soul's dark cottage, battered and decayed,  
Lets in new light through chinks which time hath made.'

Compare the Horatian '*Dum peregre est animus, sine corpore velox*,' and consult Aristotle's remarks in *Sext. Empir.* p. 311—2; also, Note on 86 B.

† Compare Wordsworth's *Excursion*, Book IV.; also Schiller's hymn, '*Ideal und Leben*,' and Goethe's lines in *Faust*, '*Zum herrlichsten, was auch der Geist empfangen, Drängt immer fremd und fremder Stoff sich an.*'

greatness: the ennui of the worldling, causing pleasure to turn to dust and ashes on his lips, and consummating itself in suicide,\* is a signature of immortality as deep and strong as the aspiration of the saint submitting to a death of martyrdom. 'So much is left unsaid,' so many dark things are left uninterpreted, and so large a portion of man's noblest desires is left unfulfilled, that it must be confessed, that the negation of a future state would draw a dark pall over creation, and leave a blot upon the scutcheon of the Divine Majesty.† In this aspect our Æsthetic Powers, as enabling us to discern the Teleology of the Universe, contribute largely to strengthen that hope of Immortality without which Creation were dark, and the Cosmos but a fragment and a name. Thus the conception of Beauty, which it has been given to man to frame, goes hand in hand with the conceptions of Goodness and Truth in postulating a future state, and the Æsthetical faculty unites with the Moral and the Intellectual faculties in strengthening the confidence, that there is a scene in store where the Beautiful, and Good, and True shall be seen to be alike rays of one stainless and infinite Holiness.

Of this confidence the Platonic doctrine was able to attain and inspire a larger measure than any other ancient system of thought, and therefore proved a more effective weapon against that fear of Death which more than all other fears has kept men subject

\* It is worthy of remark that man seems to be the only creature that takes to himself the prerogative of the 'grande sortie,' or, as the Stoics called it, *ἐπ'λογος ἐξαγωγή*. It is doubtful if the scorpion 'ringed with fire' is entitled to the name of an 'insect Cato'; its stinging of itself may be simply the result of a convulsive bewildered writhing to reach its enemy.

† 'It would discover us to have very vile and low thoughts of God, if we did not judge it altogether unanswerable to his perfections to design no farther thing in creating this world, and placing such a creature as man in it than only to please himself for a while with such a spectacle, and then at last clear the stage, and shut up all again in an eternal perpetual Darkness.' (Howe, *Blessedness of the Righteous*, ch. I.) Compare the melancholy language of Herodotus (VII. 46), *ὁ Θεός, γλυκύν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα, φθονερός ἐν αὐτῷ εὐρίσκειται ἑών*; also the conclusion arrived at in Sophocles (Trach. 1272), to the effect that it was strange that the gods should deal hardly with the best, with those who if there is to be no recompense for virtue, have, for the sake of virtue, made themselves 'of all men the most miserable.' *Τὰ μὲν οὖν μέλλοντ' οὐδεὶς ἐφορᾷ, Τὰ δ' ἔ νῦν ἰστώτ', οἰκτρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν, Αἰσχρὰ δ' ἐκείνοισι (i.e., θεοῖς).*



to bondage.\* Other philosophies, such as the Stoic or the Epicurean, never, in their meditations, got beyond the troubles of the dark journey: that of Plato dwelt rather on the pleasures which remained at the journey's end, and to which Death was only the necessary passport. Hence, while other forms of ancient Philosophy mainly addressed themselves to seek anodynes for the pain of Dying, Platonism sought to cast a ray of light beyond the cloud of Death, long before the time when that cloud was made to 'turn out its silver lining on the Night.' In this point of view Platonism must be regarded as standing alone in its affinity to the Gospel; for it, too, strove after the faith that looks *through* death, and, in aim if not in effect, sought to teach men how to conceive new hope even from advancing infirmities and decay.

Among the more felicitous forms in which this Platonic maxim has been found capable of being transferred to Christian thought, none is more remarkable than that in the spiritual Howe,† where, with singularly clear insight into the meaning of the Platonic maxim, he uses these words: 'The degenerate torpid condition of a soul lost in flesh, and inwrought in stupefying clay, hath been deeply resented by many heathens. . . . To the same purpose

\* Very beautiful is the light thrown on this feeling by the story of the greatest of the Greek heroes. The crowning legend of Greek mythology is that in which the 'Labours' of Hercules are consummated by an invasion of Hades, as if there was a faint consciousness that the last enemy to be destroyed was Death. Hence the climax in the Virgilian lines (Georg. II. 490), 'Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.'

† Howe's Blessedness of the Righteous, ch. X. Compare, at different periods of Christian Literature, Prudentius *Præf. Cathem.* 14—16; also Latimer (Serm. XIII.), 'The life of a Christian man is nothing but a readiness to die and a remembrance of Death.' Sutton ('Learn to Die,' anno 1634), 'The philosophers, who saw no further than the clouds of human reason, perceiving the declining course of human nature, could say, "The life of wise men, what should it else be but a continual meditation of Death?" But the Apostle telleth us in effect, the life of a Christian, what should it else be but *a meditation withal of a better life after death?* and therefore saith, "Set your affections on heavenly things, not on things on the earth."' This last may be said to be an anticipation of Spinoza's maxim (*Ethica*, Prop. 67), 'Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat, et ejus sapientia non mortis sed *vite meditatio est*,' which maxim, although apparently a contradiction of the Platonic, is in reality identical with it when rightly interpreted: the true antagonism of each being the Buddhist meditation of 'Nirwana,' or absolute annihilation. Compare Shakespeare's Platonic Sonnet (146).

Plato often speaks of the winged state of the good soul (πτέρωμα, in Phædro) when apart from the body, carried in its triumphant flying chariot (of which he gives a large description, somewhat resembling Solomon's rapturous metaphor, "Before I was aware, my soul made me as the chariots of Amminadib," Cant. VI. 12), but being in the body, it is with it as with a bird that has lost its wings, it falls a sluggish weight to the earth, which indeed is the state even of the best within this tabernacle.'

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## NOTE G. (2)

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### ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SENSES.

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If the earliest expression in which philosophical Idealism is represented with tolerable clearness, is the maxim of the Syracusan Epicharmus,\* which is quoted and adopted in the passage in the text, it is certain that the fullest and weightiest expression ever given, in ancient times, to its principles, is that which is to be found developed in Plato. As the chief of the ancient Idealists,† he pronounced the Senses to be merely instruments, not judges, but reporters, and that, in the discovery of Truth, they have simply a suggestive, not an originating power. The close connection between the Senses and the prison-house of the Body contributed to lower their importance philosophically still farther in the Platonic view, and the result

\* The line of Epicharmus (Νοῦν ὁρᾷ κ.τ.λ.) is referred to by Maximus Tyr. (Dis. XVII. 10) as the αἶνιγμα Συρακοσίων.—The allegorical interpreters of Homer found Idealism long before Epicharmus in the confession of the poet that Truth was the possession, not of the singer, but of the Muse; and that the strains of the poet were faint echoes of the Reality (Il. II. 486, ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν: cf. Il. V. 127).

† Cicero (Acad. II. 46) places together Epicurus and Plato as the types of ancient Sensationalism and Idealism. 'Epicurus omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam, abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus, cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse statuit.'

has been that, under the influence more particularly of the Heraclitean doctrine that all phenomena are in a perpetual flux, Plato has occasionally expressed himself in a way that has been understood as removing the notion of matter to a vast distance, or even banishing the world of sense into the limbo of nonentity. Yet the conclusion would be rash which would represent him as considering the Senses as positively fallacious: all that we are entitled to infer from a conjoint view of what he has delivered bearing on this point, is simply that he considered the Senses as affording an inferior kind of *information*, not worthy of being compared with the *knowledge* revealed by the contemplation of the Eternal Ideas, which was the proper office of the Mind.\* These Ideas the Senses are represented, not indeed as giving, but as suggesting, and the important function of eliciting those primary principles of knowledge by means of Reminiscence† is assigned to the Senses under the regulative‡ and judicial faculty of the Reason.

The importance of the right to claim for the Mind itself the possession of a higher knowledge than the Senses could furnish, commended itself also to Socrates. Although developed with less power of analysis and metaphysical acumen, the same principle appears also in the *Memorabilia* (IV. 3, 14), where Socrates is introduced as arguing against the error of regarding the Senses as

\* Olympiodorus (p. 80), referring to the two extremes of opinion regarding the Senses—that of the Idealists, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras on the one hand; and on the other that of the Sensationalists, Protagoras and Epicurus—says of Plato, ‘that he seems to side with both parties, the reason being that he lays down several grades of Truth’: ἀμφότερα δοκεῖ λέγειν αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι πολλοὺς εἶναι τίθεται βαθμοὺν τῆς ἀληθείας.—Hence, in the *Timæus* (47 A.), the rise of Philosophy itself is traced up to the *visual* perception of the heavenly bodies: in the *First Alcibiades* (132 D.) Socrates assigns a high dignity to the function of the Eye, and says that he cannot find any adequate emblem (παράδειγμα) to represent the intuition of the mind but only *vision*, with which passage compare *Phædr.* 250 D., *Pol.* VI. 507 C. The sense of sight thus receives especial honour in the Platonic system, the important term *ἰδέεσθαι* being an additional evidence of the same.

† Compare the statement in *Phædo* 75 E., also the observation of Olympiodorus (p. 22), λέξομεν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀρχὴν (τῆς ἐπιστήμης) οὐχ ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου, καὶ τὰ ἀληγέλου καὶ κήρυκος ποιοῦσαν.

‡ Cf. *Pol.* X. 602 C., where a correcting office in the case of optical and other deceptions, is assigned to the Reason.

the sole source of Knowledge. For, he observes, if Knowledge were to be predicated simply of what is presented to us through the Senses—such, for example, as sight—we could not on that basis attain philosophically to a knowledge of such truths as ‘the existence of the motion in the air called Wind, much less of the existence of the human Soul and of God.’\*

Among the many illustrations in modern thought of the principle of Epicharmus, perhaps the most important is the train of reasoning adopted by Butler in the first chapter of his *Analogy*, where the instrumental character of the Senses is largely brought out, and the conclusion is reached that ‘we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses in optical experiments.’ That there is a power behind the material framework of the human eye, of which any science dealing simply with the external must fail to render any satisfactory account,† but which, itself invisible, is yet ‘the master light of all our seeing,’ is a truth which lies at the root of all just Philosophy; but it may be doubted whether,

\* Probably the best comment on this passage of Xenophon is the light thrown upon it by an important chapter in the history of Modern Philosophy. The system of Locke, which referred all knowledge ultimately to Sensation, was found, when consistently developed, to bear fruits after the kind discerned and described by Socrates. By rendering man a recipient solely from without, it had the effect of destroying human liberty and therefore responsibility; morals became reduced to a mere choice of external chances, mind to a relation, or at best an organisation to which immortality need not apply, and Deity to a synonym with Nature, and therefore a superfluity in the world. Compare Morell’s *History of Modern Philosophy*, I. 99—148; 433—50.

† Compare the observations on this subject by Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, I. p. 326—6; also Sir Humphrey Davy (*Works*, Vol. IX. p. 335), ‘That which touches will not be felt, that which sees will not be visible, that which commands sensations will not be their subject; it is vain to seek the living among the dead.’—The question of the schools of the present day as to Man’s place in creation assumes, in this point of view, considerable interest, for the more nearly Man is brought into the same category, anatomically, with the brute creation, the more constraining becomes the necessity for a super-sensuous cause to account for the indubitably distinctive psychical phenomena. The senses of the higher Mammalia are the same in number with those of Man, and in many cases seemingly superior in power: but where are the results in the lower creation answering to the presumed identity of organisation? ‘To Man, and to Man’s noblest comrade the Dog, what a different pair of worlds!’ Compare on this subject the remarks by the English Editor of Saisset’s *Modern Pantheism*, I. p. 34.

with all the lights of our modern times, we are yet independent of the powerful expression which has been given to it by the prince of the ancient Philosophers.

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## NOTE H.

(PAGE 26.)

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### ON THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF 'IDEAS.'

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ALTHOUGH we have the express authority of Aristotle (Metaph. XII. 4, 5) for the assertion, that the *idéai* of Plato was not a part of the Socratic teaching, but an advance upon it, it is no less true that the doctrine was already contained in embryo in the Socratic method of dialectic investigation.\* The service which Socrates performed to Logic in the matter of Definitions (cf. 115 E., n.), whereby general terms were first made to run the gauntlet of dialectic discussion in such a manner as that their validity should, in every combination, be rigidly preserved without either enlargement or diminution, was a necessary antecedent to the development of the Platonic principle of the Unchangeable Ideas. To understand aright the external occasion or historical exigency, under the pressure of which Plato developed from that Socratic source this important doctrine of his Philosophy, it is necessary to bear in mind the position in which the problem of ontology descended to his hands. Two opposite movements had taken place in this domain of Metaphysics; on the one hand Heraclitus, proceeding on the observation of the phenomena of change, and therefore on an *a posteriori*

\* Compare *κατὰ γέννη* in Xen. Mem. IV. 5, 11, as a characteristic part of the Socratic *method*, and the statement of Aristotle (Metaph. I. 6, 2) that the doctrine of Ideas was dialectic in its origin. Moreover, the Socratic process of Education was but a step removed from the Platonic principle; the *μαίευτική* or 'midwife-craft' proceeded on the supposition that knowledge must unfold itself from *within*, like the germ in the bosom of the flower.—Aristocles (in Euseb. Præp. Ev. XI. 3) goes so far as to attribute the fully-developed doctrine of Ideas to Socrates.

principle, undermined the reality of the external world by his doctrine of a Perpetual Flux, while the metaphysical school of the Eleatics, proceeding on the *a priori* method, condensed all existence into a metaphysical Unity, by them denominated the Absolute One. Under the manipulation of the former, the world seemed, if the metaphor may be allowed, to transform itself to a turbid unresting sea; under that of the latter, it assumed the likeness of a monotonous although sublime Sahara; and Plato, in seeking for a home to Philosophy where she might build and inhabit, had to search for a basis of being that would yield a territory more promising than either of those domains. His object was therefore to find a middle point to unite together the πολλά of Heraclitus with the εἷν of the Eleatics: in other words to find a method whereby he might bridge over the gulf between the multiform Phenomenal and the unchangeable One. This he sought to accomplish by his doctrine of ἰδέαι or 'Forms,'\* which he regarded as constituting a world of *a priori* Reality, of which the world of *a posteriori* Appearance was but the shadow. These Ideas or Intellectual Forms include everything which lies at the basis of the changeful Phenomenal, are the unchanging elements of being, and the only proper object and foundation of Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Hence are included among the Platonic ἰδέαι, not only the mathematical and logical conceptions, such as those of a *Triangle* or a *Circle*, a *Whole* or a *Part*, but the ground-principles of moral action, as the *Good* and the *Beautiful*, and the types of objects in Nature, whether genus or species, such as *Animal* or *Man*, *Oak* or *Tree*, and even of objects in Art, such as *Chair* or *Table*.† These conceptions Plato regarded as not the fruit of mere

\* The word ἰδέα properly denoted 'appearance,' but underwent a similar change to that of the Latin *species*, so as to indicate that which lies at the basis of appearance. It retains, however, occasionally its primary sense, even in Plato, as τὴν ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς in Phædo 108 D.: cf. 109 B. In older language, such as that of Theognis (l. 128), it was used to signify mere appearance, and was therefore the reverse of what Plato transferred it to signify: πολλάκι γὰρ γινώμεν ἑξαρπάζειν ἰδέαι.

† One of Aristotle's objections to this part of his Master's teaching was founded on this multiplication, as he considered it, of Factors in the Problem of Being. He alleged that the difficulty was doubled, and that it was the same as if in a difficult calculation one was to increase the numbers, in order to simplify the calculation. Metaph. I. 9, 1. Other passages in which he contends against it, sometimes with a tinge of acrimony, are: Metaph. XII. 5, 4; Anal. Post. I. 22, 4; de Gener. et Corr. II. 9, 5; Eth. Nic. I. 4, 1.

Sensation, inasmuch as they are not dependent on our own will, being unalterable and common to all minds alike, when once comprehended and realised.

The most characteristic article of Platonic creed regarding them was that these forms are not the result of abstraction: on the contrary, they are pre-existing in the mind, which has come into the world capable of seeing the image of external things reflecting back its own native Forms; the observation of this reflection constitutes cognition, and without this internal answering 'Idea' there would, according to Plato, be no cognition. The mind becomes conscious of these internal *ιδέαι* through the awakening effect of experience, but they are not derived from experience, which is their occasion, not their cause. The process whereby they are elicited out of dormancy is called by Plato that of 'Reminiscence' or *ἀνάμνησις*.

Lastly, as the most important article regarding these Ideas, although these *ιδέαι* or Forms are thus called into representation in the human mind,\* the perfect contemplation of them is not possible in the present world. This is reserved for another scene when the *ιδέαι* shall be known as they exist in the depths of the Divine Mind, where they constitute the Exemplars or Archetypes according to which the world has been framed.†

One important practical end which Plato had in view was the forging of a weapon that should effectually discomfit what is usually known as the Sophistic tendency, which regarded *λόγοι*, or the reasons and grounds of Things, as nothing more than the term seemed to imply, viz., words or counters, which were indeed convenient, but had no other than a conventional existence. Plato, however, wisely asserted and vindicated an element in the possession

\* According to the Platonic view, the mind of a child is more than Locke's *tabula rasa* or 'sheet of white paper,' or than Aristotle's *γραμματεῖον ὃ μὴ θεὸν ὑπάρχει* (de Anim. III. 4, 12): it is a closed book of hieroglyphics, to be opened by experience, as the flower develops its own proper and pre-destinate features under the influence of the external.

† An analogon in Theology, which may serve to convey a conception of the grandeur of the office assigned by Plato to the Divine Ideas, appears in the Divine Decrees of Calvinism. While Calvinism finds the basis of Order in the Divine Decrees of the Eternal Purpose, Platonism seeks to build the same in the Divine Ideas of the Eternal Reason. This analogy has been largely and happily brought out in the article on Plato by Prof. Blackie in North Brit. Review 1861.

of the mind antecedent to mere logical terms, which, he contended, signified more than simple generalisations and represented an actual *objective* reality independent of the mind although subjectively apprehended, whereas the so-called Sophistic mode, by denying objectivity to these subjective principles, contented itself simply with the λόγος on the lip, without inquiring how far these answered to the λόγος in the mind, and thus could never attain to the firm ground of ἐπιστήμη or Knowledge, but remained in the sea of δόξα or mere Impression, where one view was to be preferred to another only by the greater speciousness which it presented for the moment.

With regard to the permanent value of this part of the Platonic teaching, different opinions have been, and probably will continue to be entertained. While it possesses certain great and weighty merits, it is unfortunately in its original form, at all events, encumbered with equally grave defects, which have largely militated against its general reception, and caused it to be regarded too often in the light of a poetical ornament rather than a vital portion of his Philosophy. Among these defects may be specified as the chief, the semi-poetic machinery of Reminiscence, which he employed to elucidate his principle, and its consequent connection with the startling hypothesis of the Pre-existence of the Soul, which was believed to be its necessary concomitant. On the other hand, it is no less certain that it was philosophically correct in postulating to the mind the inherent possession of necessary Forms, without which experience could only passively observe, and could neither actively compare, digest, nor understand. In this point of view it would be difficult to imagine a stronger testimony to the wisdom of the Platonic principle than is found presented in the ultimate fortunes of that antagonist philosophy, which more than any other was supposed to have refuted this theory of innate or, as Plato in his ethereal eagerness denominated them, *pre-natal* ideas. The system of Locke, by deducing all Knowledge ultimately from Sensation, produced, as is well known, disastrous issues both in morals and philosophy, and it is a historical fact that the laborious industry of what is called the Scottish school, was devoted to an attempt to heal this πρώτον ψεῦδος in a few of its more fatal consequences. The positions which Reid and others had to reconquer—such as the all-important inherent notion of Cause as necessary to an Effect, without which notion we could never even seek for, much less attain to, either Philosophical Science, which is



a knowledge of Causes, or to a knowledge of the existence of God, who is the Cause of Causes—ought never to have been surrendered; and if the true scope of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas had been rightly understood, the necessity of regaining those positions would never have arisen.\*

Divested of its connection with any hypothesis of Pre-existence, the Platonic doctrine of Ideas has thus received from the Scottish school a virtual revival, in respect at least of the primary and necessary intuitions, such as those which form the axioms of mathematical and logical science. The universality and necessary validity of these cognitions the highest amount of induction would be impotent to establish: they must be regarded as 'there sitting where experience cannot soar'—resting on that self-witnessing basis on which they are placed antecedently by the very constitution of the human mind. But, while the recognition of this truth is certainly the most important element in the Platonic doctrine, there is a point of view in which, in a certain sense, that doctrine is true even in the case of those secondary notions which the Scottish school concedes to be derived from Experience, and not to be necessary in the sense of their negation involving a contradiction or an abnegation of Reason. If it is admitted that the world has proceeded, not from blind chance, but from an Infinite Intelligence, it will not be denied that the types of external objects in Nature, and the forms of conceptions in Thought have had an antecedent existence in the designs of that Intelligence.† The vast Typology,

\* As a modern statement of the Platonic principle, the most remarkable is the trenchant criticism of Leibnitz (V. 483) on the philosophy of Locke: 'In Lockio sunt quædam particularia non male exposita, sed in summâ longe aberravit a januâ, nec naturam Mentis Veritatisque intellexit. Si discrimen inter veritates necessarias sen demonstratione perceptas, et eas quæ nobis sola inductione utcumque innotescunt, satis considerasset, animadvertisset necessarias non posse comprobari nisi ex principiis menti insitis, quum *sensus* quidem doceant quid fiat, sed non quid necessario fiat. Idem non satis animadvertit ideas entis, substantiæ, unius et ejusdem, veri, boni, aliasque multas menti nostræ ideo innatas esse, quia ipsa innata est sibi, et in se ipsa hæc omnia deprehendit. Nempe, "nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu," NISI IPSE INTELLECTUS. Multa alia in Lockium animadverti possent, quum etiam immaterialem animæ naturam per cuniculos subruat.' Compare the lucid statements of Morell, *Hist. of Philos.* I. 103 and *passim*.

† The antecedency of a Reason to the Facts in which it is exemplified, may be said to be the key to the Platonic Doctrine generally.—An admirable

therefore, which modern Science has done so much to reveal as pervading the departments of Nature, running through stone, and leaf, and bone, with marvellous unity in the midst of inexhaustible variety, is none other than the reflection of those Primal Designs, and all true knowledge, in so far as it is independent *ἐπιστήμη*, not vague individual *δόξα*, is what it is only by faithful reading of this Typology. But how can this Typology be read unless there is conceded the indefeasible validity of those primary intuitions, which are as the Alphabet for syllabing the interpretation of the world, and enabling the interpreter to enter, however distantly, into the counsels of Him whose purposes he has the high function of interpreting? Man can know only in so far as he carries in the furniture of his Soul an intellectual form which he finds to answer to and thereby expound to himself the objective impress left by the creative Intellect. In this sense it is certain that all true and perfect Ideas, whether from the world of Thought or the world of Nature, are innate, for, since Man was made in the image of God, he was thereby made capable of reading the signatures of that Image, which signatures are none other than the Ideas of the Divine Mind. Thus what Scripture affirms of the spiritual perceptions, it may be said that Plato would have accepted as true regarding the intellectual, 'that it is in the Divine Light that Man sees Light.'

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## NOTE I.

(PAGE 33.)

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### ON THE PLATONIC VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

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ACCORDING to Plato, the constitution of Man in this life was framed by the union of Three Elements in certain fixed relations

exposition of Plato's Ideal Realism is to be found in Dyer's article on this subject, in *Philol. Society's Proceedings* (vol. III. p. 139).

—Reason (λόγος), Spirit (in the sense of Courage, θυμός), and Appetite (ἐπιθυμία). To these Elements he assigned separate domains in the human body: Reason he placed in the *head*, as the governing Estate in the Acropolis or citadel; Spirit, or as it is called by Cicero (Tusc. I. 10) Anger (Ira), he placed in the *breast*, which was the region of the Emotional, and from which also proceeded the arms, the great instruments of Defence and Action; and Appetite he supposed to have its seat in the lower portion of the body, the region of the *abdomen*. The localisation\* of each estate was to the mind of Plato symbolical of its relative dignity.

Each of these elements, when rightly exercised in its true relation to the whole constitution, performed a function the discharge of which constituted a Virtue appropriate to that Element. From the right exercise of Reason was developed the lofty Virtue of *Intellectuality* (φρόνησις); the right exercise of Spirit produced the Virtue of *Manliness* or *Bravery* (ἀνδρεία); while the right exercise of Appetite, which was to be held in subjection, gave birth to the consequently negative Virtue of *Temperance* (σωφροσύνη). In addition to these three Virtues, appropriate severally to the three Estates, there was a fourth Virtue, believed to result from the conjoint right action of the Whole, when each of the parts fulfilled its proper function (οἰκαιοπραγία). This comprehensive Virtue he denominated *Justice* (δικαιοσύνη), which was 'the very girdle and Equator of the Microcosm Man.' The introduction of Disorder into their several relations was followed by derangements and mutual aggression (πολυπραγμοσύνη), and resulted in Four corresponding Vices.

The consistency with which Plato carried out this principle of Triplicity† into all his speculations, political as well as philosophical,

\* Compare the quaintly Platonic sketch of the geography of Man's frame in Philo Jud. (p. 63 A.).

† The Platonic doctrine of a triplicity in Man's nature culminating in intellectuality finds an analogon, in certain respects, in the Christian triad spoken of by St. Paul, 'body, soul, and spirit' (1 Thess. V. 23) culminating in spirituality. Compare the able and learned exposition of this part of Christian Psychology in Elliott's *Destiny of the Creature* (Serm. V.).—In modern mental Philosophy a closer parallel to it is found in the usual distribution into three Faculties: Intellect, Will, and the Emotional Powers, or the Faculties of Cognition, Conation, and Feeling. It is important, however, to remember that as it was only the λόγος or νοῦς that was supposed by Plato to constitute the

impelled him to draw a series of the boldest and most striking generalisations in the whole history of Philosophy. His ideal Polity, or model of the perfect commonwealth, is simply the expanded pattern of the perfect Man; and the same principles by which he supposes Virtue to be developed in the Microcosm of the Individual, are brought into play for determining what is the right balance of relations in the Macrocosm of the State.

In the ideal Polity, those members in whom the Virtue of Intellectuality (*φρόνησις*) is developed, and the Reason (*λόγος*) rightly and fully exercised, have assigned to them the function of *Governors* or *Conservators* (*φύλακες*), constitute the *gold* of the constitution (*χρυσός*, Pol. III. 415 A.), and are supposed to have as their characteristic the love of *Wisdom* (*φιλόσοφοι*).

Those members who have attained to the second Virtue of Bravery (*ἀνδρεία*) by the right exercise of Spirit (*θυμός*) or Courage, have assigned to them the function of *Warriors* (*στρατιῶται*), constitute the *silver* of the constitution, and are supposed to have as their characteristic the love of *Honour* (*φιλότιμοι*).

Those members who have not attained to either of the two loftier Virtues, but who exercise the element of Appetite (*ἐπιθυμία*) in various ways, have assigned to them the function of the *Industrial* or *Productive* class (*βάνανσοι*), constitute the *copper* and *iron* of the constitution, and are supposed to have as their characteristic the love of *Profit* and *Pleasure* (*φιλοχρήματοι* and *φιλέδονοι*).\*

The relation of these three political sections was otherwise expressed by what was in his hands a highly characteristic zoological simile (Pol. IX. 588 C.). The lowest class was compared, from their

true Man, so it was only of this Intellectual part of his nature that he predicated immortality (cf. Tim. 89 C.). (Compare Aristotle's distinction between active and passive Intellect (De Anim. III. 5, 3): *τοῦτο (i.e., ἀπαθήν νοῦς) μόνον ἀθάνατον, ὃ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός.*) In Olympiodorus (p. 98) will be found a curious recension of opinions among the followers of Plato, as to the controversy how far down in the scale of human faculties immortality could be supposed to extend.

\* Olympiodorus (in Phæd. p. 19) condenses it thus: *πρὸς μὲν τὸν λόγον ἀφορῶν, τάττει τοὺς φύλακας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θυμὸν τοὺς στρατιώτας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοὺς θήτας.*—Compare the Brahminical doctrine of the three superior Castes originating from the different parts of the body of Brahma: viz., Brahmins from the mouth, Warriors from the arms, Merchants and Agriculturists from the thighs of Brahma.—Compare Strabo's account of the castes in Egypt (XVII. p. 1135). In the Timæus (24 A.) these castes are—1° *ιερεῖς*, 2° *μάχιμοι*, 3° *δημιουργοί*, under which last are included *νομεῖς*, *θηρενταί*, and *γεωργοί*.

numbers and impulsiveness, to a *many-headed monster* (θηρίον πολυκεφάλον); the second, as distinguished by courage, was likened to a *lion* (λέων); the highest class was supposed to occupy a place in the constitution like that occupied by *Man* (ἄνθρωπος) among the lower creation.

This principle of triplicity Plato employed as a basis on which to lay down a classification of Nations (Pol. VI. 435 E.). The type of the simply, and it might be sordidly, industrial race he found in the agricultural nation of the Egyptians, and the commercial nation of the Phœnicians; that of the warrior-race\* (στρατιῶται), distinguished by vehemence and eruptive impetuosity, he found in the Scythians or Thracians (cf. remark of Galen quoted on p. 103); the type of the philosophic race (φιλόσοφοι or φιλομαθεῖς) he finds only in his own countrymen the Greeks (cf. 78 A., note).

The following attempt at presenting a Tabular View of the leading results will show with what consistency Plato drew the lines of his vast generalisations.

Elements.	Virtues.	Representatives in Thought.	Representatives in Politics.	Representatives in Social Character.	Typical Races.
ΛΟΓΟΣ.†	φρόνησις.	φιλόσοφοι.	φύλακες.	καλοὶ καγαθοί.	Greeks.
Θυμός.	ἀνδρεία.	φιλότιμοι.	στρατιῶται.	γενναῖοι.	Scythians. Thracians.
Ἐπιθυμία.	σωφροσύνη.	φιλήδονοι φιλοχρήματοι.	βάνανσοι.	ἀνδραποδῶδεις.	Phœnicians. Egyptians.

\* If the future of the Romans had been known to Plato, it is probable that they would have been taken as the type of this class: but they were as yet beneath his horizon.

† The importance attached to λόγος and its virtue φρόνησις induced

## NOTE K.

(PAGE 35.)

## ON THE PLATONIC DIVISION OF THE VIRTUES.

THE ancient division of Virtue into four leading forms, known in modern times as the 'Cardinal\* Virtues,' was probably of Pythagorean origin. Among the earliest traces of such a division is that which we find in the Pythagorean Pindar (Nem. III. 76), who speaks of 'Virtues Four' in such a connection as to indicate their correspondence with the four ages or marked seasons of the life of Man. In this case they may be supposed to have been successively evolved in the life of the individual in the following order :—

Virtue of Youth† (παῖς).	SELF-CONTROL OR TEMPERANCE (Σωφροσύνη).
Virtue of Early Manhood (ἀνὴρ).	BRAVERY (Ἀνδρεία).
Virtue of Mature Manhood (παλαιῆρος).	JUSTICE (Δικαιοσύνη).
Virtue of Old Age (ὁ μακρὸς αἰών).	PRUDENCE (Φρόνησις).

Whatever may have been the historical origin of this classification, it is certain that its scientific development is due to Plato, who gave it a firm foundation in the history of Thought,‡ by evolving it, as

Plato occasionally to represent the two remaining elements as the *non-rational* (τὸ ἄλογον), thereby changing the triad of elements into a duad. Hence, in Phædo 68 B., those under the influence of the τὸ ἄλογον are grouped in one class as φιλοσώματοι, opposed to those under the influence of the λόγος or φιλόσοφοι.

\* The phrase 'cardinal virtues' is believed to be met with first in St. Ambrose (Lib. V. in Lucam); cf. Noltenii Lexicon Antibarbarum, p. 455.

† Cf. Diog. Laert. II. 32: Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς, τίς ἀρετὴ νέου; τὸ Μῆ δ' ἐν ἀγαν, εἶπεν. Compare the exhortation in 2 Tim. II. 22: τὰς δὲ νεωτερικὰς ἐπιθυμίας φεύγε.

‡ Cf. τέτταρα ἀρετῆς εἶδη, Legg. XII. 963 A.—C.; αἱ πέντε ἀρεταί, Anthol. VII. 343: also Book of Wisdom VIII. 7; Philo Jud., Leg. Alleg. I. p. 39 F.—The most ingenious, not to say most correct, summation of the Quaternion is that of Mr. Ruskin: 'Temperance, the principle of desistence; Courage, the principle of resistance; Justice, the principle of assistance; Prudence, the principle of consistence.'

was explained in the previous Note, from what he considered the elements of the Constitution of Man. In conformity, however, with his intellectual tendency, Plato here introduces the noble generalisation in the text, whereby, while acknowledging the fourfold division of Virtue, he reduces the four forms of it to one, constituting Prudential Insight or Intellectuality\* the one vital principle, separated from which all excellences sink in his view to mere instincts, or precarious, though it might be, fortunate felicities.

While, however, the whole character of the Platonic philosophy and its historical antecedents, as descended from Socrates, justify the above assertion as to the Virtue that had the pre-eminence in the mind of Plato, it is not to be denied that, on certain occasions, he has expressed himself in such a way as that the pre-eminence seems for the time to be given to other Virtues than Intellectuality, according to the aspect of the sphere of Virtue which happens to be the object of Contemplation. In the *Gorgias* (507 A.—B.), where his main object was to rebuke the presumption of the Sophists in pandering to the inclinations of the populace by rhetorical arts, the Virtue of Youth (Modesty or Temperance, *σωφροσύνη*) appears to occupy the foreground.† On the other hand in the discourse entitled *Menexenus*, deriving its theme from the events of military life, Bravery (*ἀρετή*, opposed to *ἀνανηρία*) naturally has its turn of precedence, and all else is there declared valueless without bravery. In the *Republic* (cf. IV. 433 B.), where he is laying the foundations of political Law on large principles of Right, the

\* Whatever estimate may be formed of the intrinsic value of this part of the Platonic teaching, it is remarkable as an intuition of the nature of Virtue, which is in one respect in harmony with Scripture Truth. As Clemens Romanus (Ep. ad Cor.) gives to the Christian virtue of Faith the epithet of *πανάρητος*, as the root of all Christian Excellence, so Plato may here be said to have discerned the necessity of some great unifying Principle, which should be to Man the *one* thing needful, by which a perpetual habit of soul might be attained, such as would modify and rectify, not one, or two, or three actions in one, or two, or three relations, but all actions in all relations, and be the principle of a Divine Life.—In this respect Stoicism joined issue with Platonism in recognising a unity among the Virtues, an inference which may be drawn from the famous maxim of Chrysippus, that ‘he who hath one virtue hath all’ (Diog. Laert. VII. 126; cf. Cic. Tusc. II. 14); and conversely, ‘that all sins are of the same magnitude’ (Cic. Acad. Quæst. II. 43. 133).

† *Σωφροσύνη* is almost invariably in the foreground with the practical Xenophon, as in *Mem.* I. 6, 4; also *Cyr.* III. 1, 16, *ἀνευ σωφροσύνης* — οὐδ’ ἄλλης ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ὀφελὺς ἐστι. Cf. Note on p. 170.

Virtue which seems for the time to be the summation of the rest is that of Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*). In the *Phædo*,\* however, the main subject of which is the preparation for a new Life in the region of Pure Intellect, it naturally follows that the form of Virtue which is regarded as the crown of Life, is Intellectuality (*φρόνησις*), the long result of all 'the years that bring the *philosophic* mind.'

The position of honour occupied in the Platonic system by *φρόνησις* (which for want of any nearer equivalent we have called Intellectuality), was due to the influence of Socrates. To him Aristotle distinctly refers the origin of the principle, which made the Virtues sciences, and thereby constituted Knowledge the essence of Morality. Accordingly (*Eth. Nic. VI. 13, 3*), he criticises it as a Socratic tenet (*φρονήσεις ὥστε (Σωκράτης) εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς*), and affirms that 'it was partly correct, partly incorrect; for Socrates was wrong in making the virtues sciences or intellectual processes, although he was right in making them always accompanied by intelligence.'†

The adoption of one principle, and that the noble one of *φρόνησις*, as the touchstone of all excellence, was unquestionably a remarkable effort of thought; yet it involved a serious disadvantage, inasmuch as it tended inevitably to subordinate the moral to

\* Although nowhere has Plato expressed himself so strongly regarding *φρόνησις* as in the rushing eloquence of the passage in the *Phædo* (69 A.), there are not wanting other Platonic texts of a similar import: cf. *Meno*. 88 C., *συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡ ἡ οὐ μὲ ν η ε φ ρ ο ν ῆ σ ε ω ε εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ*: also *Legg.* I. 631 C., III. 688 B. The same reduction of the four virtues under the generalship of *Noûs* is found in *Legg.* XII. 963 A. So in Xenophon (*Mem.* III. 9, 5), *σοφία* or *φρόνησις* is said to be the essence of virtue, whether it appear in the form of *justice*, or any other form: *ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι*. Compare the Homeric praise of *Μῆτις* in the mouth of Nestor: II. XXIII. 316.—The proof that true *ἀνδρεία* is determined by the presence or absence of *φρόνησις* is given at length in *Protag.* 360. (Compare *Thucyd.* II. 40, where Pericles represents the courage of the Spartans as being, through *ἀμαθία*, not so much *ἀνδρεία* as *θράσος*, animal courage.)—With regard to *σωφροσύνη*, the very derivation of the word implied *φρόνησις* as necessary to its existence, and in *δικαιοσύνη* the *Knowledge* of the limits of a neighbour's rights is necessarily implied.

† Compare Butler's statement (*Anal.* I. ch. V.), 'Moral understanding includes a *practical* sense of virtue, as well as a *speculative* perception of it.' Some instructive remarks on the weak as well as the strong points of the Socratic principle are to be found in Grote (VIII. p. 627—8).



the intellectual. This appears, at first sight, an extraordinary result to have come from the practical Socrates, whose whole history (cf. Xen. Mem. III. 9, 4) gives ground for the belief that he did not understand by *φρόνησις* mere Intellectualism or head-knowledge, apart from living fruits in the Life: yet there was nevertheless, in his fundamental position, a grave original defect, from which, however, confined as he was to the stand-point of the ancient world, he had no means of escape. The nature of that defect is manifest, and the force of Aristotle's criticism is apparent, when we turn to the converse proposition as to the ground of Immorality: for, if Morality or Virtue is constituted by *knowing*, it follows that Immorality or Vice is constituted by *not knowing*, that is, by something negative, involuntary; whence it results that the true ground is lost for constituting the Evil, namely, a wayward will. That this is a fair representation of the not distant consequence of the Socratic principle, is borne out by the somewhat remarkable fact, that Socrates was constrained by the necessity of his logical position to maintain the consequent paradox, that 'no man is wicked with his will' (*οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός*, Protag. 345 D.: cf. Stallb. note); and that, if a man was wicked, it was because he did not know better, and therefore that he was more an object of compassion than of blame.

It was reserved for Aristotle\* (and this, as Neander has observed (Wiss. Abhandl. p. 197), is his great contribution to the *science* of Ethics) to rectify the doctrine of Socrates, by developing the important principle that it is not the Cognitive Faculty that constitutes the basis of Virtue, but the Will; that it is not in the Judgment that the initiative is to be sought for in matters of Morality, but in the series of Volitions which give the tone to the Judgment; that wickedness, therefore, must be held as embraced, where it is embraced, of free choice; otherwise man could not be regarded as the author of his own actions and a responsible creature, such as all legislation takes it for granted that he is. While, therefore, there is no question that the aim of Socrates was eminently practical, it is not the less true that the tendency to make intellectual speculation the essence as well as the crown of Virtue, a tendency to which the Greek mind was at all times naturally prone, was largely strengthened by this part of the Socratic teaching. It was to some

\* Aristotle's refutation of the maxim *οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός* is found in Eth. Nic. III. 7, 1-8.


extent modified by Plato, who introduced a new expression of the same principle, viz., that the great desire and chief aim of man ought to be (*ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ Θεῷ*, Theæt. 176 B.) *to obtain a likeness to God*. Even here, however, magnificent to our minds although this conception seems, when read in the light of later knowledge the modification was less in substance than in form. It is manifest that the value of this new and noble expression of the principle was necessarily dependent on the particular conception of God, with which it was conjoined; and as that conception was one which regarded God as Perfect Reason rather than as an Infinite Being, not of Perfect Reason alone, but of all Moral, as well as Intellectual Perfections, the tendency to Intellectualism, degenerating eventually, as in the later stages of the Academy, into mere speculative inanities, received from this source no material counteraction. Intellectualism accordingly remained in possession of the high seats of mind until the proclamation of the Gospel of Christ, which substituted for the Greek idea of Culture,\* and the Roman idea of Strength, the nobler idea of Service in the Kingdom of God.

The ancient Scale of the Four Virtues, on which we have been commenting, possesses, at all events as developed by Plato, a comprehensive completeness beautifully characteristic of the classical mind. Noble, however, as this comprehensiveness was, there were, it must be admitted, grave defects in the standard, which militated largely against its practical value, two of which it may not be improper briefly to indicate. One of these was the fruit of that intellectual tendency to which reference has been made, and consisted in the virtual exclusion of the great majority of mankind from any hope of attaining to the excellence prescribed, inasmuch as the ambition set before them was the culture of the mind, which is the privilege of the few, rather than the training of the heart, which is within the competency of all. Another, and probably the most serious, defect consisted in the circumstance that it prescribed a standard manifestly almost entirely self-regarding and subjective in its sanctions, and contemplated each individual chiefly in reference to himself and the mutual relation of the elements of his own being, as if each individual were, if not solitary in the world, at all events not necessarily amenable to a higher jurisdiction than his own soul.

\* Compare the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. I. 22) regarding the characteristic of the Greeks (*Ἕλληνες σοφίαν ζητοῦσιν*).

It is in this last respect that the ancient scale of Virtues falls conspicuously short of what we may call the new scale of the Excellences as exhibited in the Gospel; the peculiar power of which consists in this, that while it has not only not diminished, but intensified the subjective responsibility of each man, by giving a depth of tone to the voice of conscience unknown before, it has at the same time surrounded him with an *objective* responsibility, by testifying that he is not alone in the world, that he owes a duty of love to those around him, and is under a felt dependence on a higher Power. This latter feature,\* although not incompatible with the ancient scale of Virtues, must be confessed not to be prominent or even necessarily present in the classical Ideal.

The scale of Christian Excellences which affords to the ethical student of History the most instructive parallel to the ancient scale of Virtues is probably that which is found exhibited, with a comprehensiveness no less beautiful, in the Epistle to Titus (II. 12). All Virtue may be said to be there comprehended under three forms: Duty to one's self, to one's neighbour, to God; in other words, (*σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια.*) *Temperance, Righteousness, Godliness.* The two scales may therefore be arranged in contrast as follows:—



It is no doubt true that the Excellences which St. Paul denominated Temperance and Righteousness differed as largely, both in their sanctions and comprehension, from the Virtues of the same name in the mouths of the philosophers, as the morality of the Sermon on the Mount differs from any other morality known to History, yet the Virtues so named were the same in kind, and therefore the parallel between the two scales may be said to hold good up to a certain point regarding these two Excellences.

\* 'Piety' or *ὁσιότης* is in the Platonic view a branch of *δικαιοσύνη*, Gorg. 507 B.: cf. Protag. 331 A. So in Euthyphro 14 C., *ὁσιότης* is defined as *ἐπιστήμη αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς*.

Further comparison, however, reveals two divergences of a graver kind. The Christian 'Piety' or 'Godliness,' in its triple form of Faith, Hope, and Love (1 Cor. XIII. 13), takes the position of the Greek 'Intellectuality,' while for the 'Bravery' of Philosophy no place is found in the front rank of the New Testament Virtues.\*

In the gradual evolution of Greek history, a distinct progression may be discerned in the development, successively, of the three Active Virtues into prominence in the consciousness of the Greek

\* The absence of any prominent honour to what may be called the Valorous tendency, is a feature of deep import in the Christian scale, and a remark is therefore due regarding the error of those writers, who think this absence a defect and would refer us to the Koran for superior instruction in such matters. It is manifest that the Ethics of the Gospel, as taught in the Sermon on the Mount and exemplified in the life of Christ, involved the dethronement of what the Heathen called *'Ανδρία* or 'Bravery,' from its former high place among the Excellences, and that a solemn condemnation had to be passed on that spirit of aggression forming the main element of *'Ανδρία*, which it was the historical characteristic of heathenism to cherish, but which, thus cherished, had borne, not the fruits that make for peace, but the bitter fruits of Rapacity and Pride. All such products of the selfish, although it might sometimes be, nobly selfish type, were no longer to be pronounced inherently good, but were subjected to conditions which should secure that their cultivation subserved good and not evil. Hence the Virtue of 'Bravery' was left in the same position with what are called the natural Virtues of Friendship and Patriotism, toward which, although there are many precepts tending to their right regulation, there are no direct inculcations in the New Testament, as if they were in themselves necessarily subservient to good. In this point of view it is a significant circumstance, that, while the Gospel, both by example and precept, gives a high value to all truly manly qualities tending to peace, the name of the vaunted but questionable heathen excellence appears nowhere in the language of the Greek New Testament. (*ἀνδρῆζεσθε* ('quit yourselves like men') in 1 Cor. XVI. 13 is scarcely an exception, being a quotation from the Old Testament, and conditioned by the accompanying exhortations which imply that the aggressive spirit was taken away, and only the *ὑπομονή* remained.) Moreover, so long as *'Ανδρία* in the heathen sense remained in the front rank of the Virtues, Woman was necessarily either entirely ignored, or, on the other hand, tempted or tortured into false developments of her character; but when a more just and wise, as well as beneficent, standard of Human Excellences was proclaimed, one half of humanity ceased to be debarred from the attainment of the Virtue of the Race.—In this respect a fine sense of just relations appears in a region of thought where it might otherwise not have been expected: in the Confucian scale of the Excellences, 'Bravery' has not the position of a Cardinal Virtue, but is expressly assigned as a vassal to one of the Cardinal Virtues—Righteousness.

Nation. In the first or Heroic period the *ἀρετή* or Virtue, which comprehends and crowns all excellence, is naturally that of Bravery or *ἀνδρεία*, under its Epic name of *ἡγορέη*, being the martial quality of a man of war. In the second or Legislative period, which is parallel with the Lyric period of Literature, the *ἀρετή* in the ascendant is that of Justice or *δικαιοσύνη*; hence the sentiment of Phocylides (fr. 14, echoed by Theognis 147), *ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβειν πᾶς ἀρετὴ ᾽σιν*. In the third, or what may be called the Philosophic period, nearly parallel with the Attic period of Literature, the Virtue which then rises, so to speak, to the zenith of the Greek mind under the influence of Socratic thought, is that of Intellectuality or *φρόνησις*, at which point Greek thought may be said to have reached its culmination.

Among the most interesting facts connected with the history of the ancient scale of Virtues, is the circumstance that certain of the nobler minds of Antiquity attained to the conviction that some of those Virtues were adapted only for the present life, and would not belong to humanity in another world.\* In the Phædrus 247 D., Plato uses language to imply, that the exercise of the disciplinary Virtues, such as *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*, would be left behind with the body over which they had borne rule, and that only the *θεωρία* or contemplation of such Virtues would remain. So Aristotle avers (Eth. Nic. X. 8, 7) similarly regarding the gods, that it is not possible to suppose that the gods exercise Virtues like Temperance or Bravery, and that therefore their perfection consists in *θεωρία*, not in *πραξις*.†

\* Compare the analogon in St. Paul, 1 Cor. XIII. 8. Cf. Plato Conv. 204 A., *θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ σοφός*.

† This notion finds remarkable expression in the fragment (12) of Cicero's Hortensius, where the eloquent Roman naively regrets that in another life not only the Virtues would be no longer needed, but that, as there would be no injustice, there would therefore be no Forum, and no opportunity of forensic eloquence.—Compare the criticism of Augustine (de Trin. XIV. 12) on this Ciceronian fragment, and on the questions which it suggests; also the statement of Butler (Anal. I. ch. 5), 'It is indeed true, that there can be no scope for patience where sorrow shall be no more: but there may be need of a temper of mind which shall have been formed by patience.'

## NOTE L.

(PAGE 40.)

## ON THE DOGMA OF METEMPSYCHOSIS.

It is not the purpose of this Note to embark on the wide sea of speculation as to the origin and multitudinous phases of this much diffused Dogma, but simply to present the chief features of its history as developed in connection with Greek Thought.

The position which it occupies in the Platonic Philosophy is an inheritance from Pythagoras. From what source the latter derived it is still a mystery, its origin being lost in the mists surrounding the birth of what is known as the Orphic Discipline. Whether this peculiar influence, which was the precursor of Pythagoreanism, came from a foreign source, or whether, as many suppose, it was the fruit of an old Pelasgian Nature-worship revived after a partial obscuration under the Hellenic Anthropomorphism, are questions that may admit of much discussion, and in regard to which there are not materials to enable one to come to a safe conclusion.

One thing, however, is tolerably established, that in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* the Orphic influence is nowhere recognisable, and therefore there is no indubitable allusion\* to or trace of the dogma of Metempsychosis in those oldest monuments of Greek Literature. The soul of the Homeric hero, when once 'Darkness has covered his eyes,' passes after interment into the halls of Hades, there to dwell in one unending and changeless state. There is no trace of

\* The dreams of Porphyry about the mystic meaning of the 'Cave of the Nymphs with its double entrance' (*Od.* XIII. 103), may be set aside as allegorical foolishness.—The transformations of Proteus, and the enchantments of Circe, are evidence to show how easily Metempsychosis would take root when promulgated; but, as they have no reference to the state of the *dead*, these legends are not to be relied on to prove its presence in the Homeric time.—So, in the Brahminical literature, the Vedas, which are the oldest portions of it, contain no trace of Metempsychosis.

any hope of re-ascending,\* such as Pythagoreanism taught later ages to conceive: the Homeric state of the dead is like the Night of Catullus, 'Nox est perpetua una dormienda.'

It is towards the close of the Lyric period that we begin to find the first distinct lineaments of the belief in Metempsychosis, and these invariably connect themselves with the personal history or the teaching of Pythagoras. Although we have nothing beyond a few maxims that can be said to have emanated directly from this thinker, there are literary remains still extant which bear a very high antiquity and contain references to this part of his teaching. The oldest of these is the important fragment (Bergk, fr. 6) by his contemporary Xenophanes, who flourished about B.C. 540—500, in which he describes Pythagoras as interceding for a whelp which he happened to pass when it was under the lash, because he said he recognised in its whine the voice of a departed friend.† So Pindar, himself a Pythagorean about the same period, interweaves the notion of a triad of cycles in the life of the just and brave:—

'Whoso has had the heart of endurance  
For three rounds in either world to keep pure from all Wrong  
His Soul, that man treads Jove's path to the tower of Cronus,  
Where evermore, round the isles of the Blessed,  
The ocean breezes breathe.' (Olymp. II. 68; cf. Thren. fr. 4.)

In the next generation Empedocles, B.C. 444, asserts the doctrine on the strength of his own consciousness,‡ and condescends on some of the transitions through which his soul has passed:—

Ἦδη γὰρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμεν κούρη τε κόρος τε,  
Θαμνός τ' οἰωνός τε, καὶ εἰν ἀλί ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς. §

\* The special term for this re-ascending was *ἀνοδος*. Cf. Callimachus, Epigr. 14; Diog. Laert. III. 67, and note by Menage; also Creuzer, Symbol. IV. p. 135.

† Compare Grote's observations on this anecdote, which are as just as they are interesting (IV. p. 530).

‡ The similar stories regarding the round of lives by Pythagoras are well known, but they do not rest on so early testimony. The chief *loci classici* regarding them are enumerated by Orelli, Hor. Od. I. 28, 10.

§ Compare the interesting statement of Metempsychosis, modelled apparently on the Empedoclean passage, by Gregory of Nazianzum (*περί ψυχῆς*, l. 36), where he says of the believers in Metempsychosis—

Ἰξίονον κ' ἐκλοισιν ἡλεκτροτάτοις φέροντες,  
Θῆρα, φυτόν, βροτόν, ὄρνιν, ἄφιν, κύνα, ἰχθύν ἐτενξαν.

'Once on a time I figured in life as Boy and as Damsel,  
Bush have I been with its Bird, and speechless Fish in the salt sea.'

In the same period as that in which we find the dogma of Metempsychosis, there appear to spring up almost simultaneously many kindred phenomena, marking a new epoch in the development of Greek mind. The peculiar phase of thought to which these phenomena belong is unmistakably distinct from the Homeric, and marks the rise of a mystic and hieratic spirit, alien from the anthropomorphic spirit of the Iliad and Odyssey. The chief of these are the so-called Mysteries or Orgies, and the ceremonies of Purification (*καθαρμοί*), both of which are things unknown to Homer, and appear in close connection with that Pantheistic cycle of religious rites, of which the deities Dionysus and Demeter are the central figures.\* In this peculiar group of hieratic mythology, one great type-legend seems to prevail, symbolising the return of the cycle of the year, and the annual restoration in spring of the bloom and beauty of the world. The return of Proserpine after her captivity in the under world, and the restoration of Dionysus after his laceration by the Titans,† were kindred mystic allegories representing what may be called the Metempsychosis of the year. From the annual genesis of plants it was but a step to transfer the same notion to the genesis of animals, and from that of animals to the generations of men; and hence the belief that, as the vegetable and

\* Grote (I. p. 33—34) remarks on the absence of any mention of *καθαρμοί* in the Homeric poems. With regard to the Mysteries, it is a significant circumstance that there is no mention of Eleusis in the catalogue of the ships, a circumstance which ought to be taken into account in the question as to the alleged interpolations in honour of their native land by the Athenians.

† By this extraordinary legend seems to have been signified the disintegration of the sown seed under the powers of Nature in the process of germination. Of this legend Homer, as has been said, knows nothing, neither do any of those legends date back to the Homeric time, which speak of renovation by such processes as boiling or burning (*Æson*, *Demophoon*, cf. *Class. Mus.* III. p. 421; *Phil. Mus.* II. 352).—In this regard it is worthy of note, as showing the connection between the hope of a future life and the return of the seasons, that the favourite subjects delineated on ancient sarcophagi are taken from the Dionysos and Eros cycles of mythological lore (*Müller's Ancient Art*, § 206; *Denkmäler* II. 360, 374). So the singular popularity of the worship of Isis during the early Cæsars was mainly due to the figment of hope which it shadowed forth regarding a future life, and which it derived from the kindred Egyptian allegory of the restoration of the dismembered Osiris.



animal creations seemed to be the old returning under a new form, so the old generations of men were ever re-appearing under new names.\*

Metempsychosis, however, was found to assume a more startling, and even revolting form. The souls of a past generation were believed capable, not only of returning into the human, but also of re-appearing in animal forms. The origin of this application of the dogma it is vain to expect to be able to unravel,† but whatever may have been its origin, there can be no question that it was taught by many of the philosophers (cf. 81 E., note), and literally accepted by the common mass of men.

The dogma of Metempsychosis, once originated, was calculated to meet with considerable acceptance for several reasons. In the darkness of the ancient mind on the subject of a future state, it seemed to satisfy to some extent the natural desire of continued existence, and supplied, moreover—what was to the common mind a great defect in any theory of Immortality—a conceivable and even probable machinery or bodily apparatus in connection with which life might still be considered possible. It had also the advantage, not indeed of solving, but of removing to a more convenient distance the great problem that haunted the ancient as well as the modern mind for solution—the origin of Evil (Eur. Fr. Inc. 103, *τίς ῥίξα κακῶν*;) and it suggested the thought that the present life might have a retrospective and penitential purpose, as well as a prospective and probationary end. It was, therefore, a convenient instrument for the philosopher, as a plausible explanation of present disorders, and at the same time served the purpose of the moralist, in enabling him to surround the issues of life with terrors more palpable to the popular mind.‡

\* The simile in Homer (Il. VI. 146) regarding the generations of men as like the leaves of the trees, is a poetic preparation for the dogma of Metempsychosis. Cf. Eur. Iro, Fr. 19, *κύκλος γὰρ αὐτὸς καρπίμοις τε γῆς φυτόισι θνητῶν τε γενεῇ κ.τ.λ.*

† The following historical phenomena are worthy of attention in this regard: the animal fetichism of Egypt, according to which not the spirits of men, but deities, were supposed to take up their abode in animal forms; the physiological speculations of Anaximander, who, by a kind of second sight of a celebrated modern theory, deduced the human race from fishes (cf. Cudworth, vol. II. p. 623); also the Æsopic animal-fable, and such allegories as that of Simonides of Amorgus on the sources of the different characters of women.

‡ In addition to these considerations may be mentioned the circumstance that among some races, although certainly not among the Greeks, the dogma

Parallel to and sometimes united with this dogma, was the kindred principle of the Renovation\* of the world, whereby a similar transition was ascribed to the Anima Mundi or Soul of the Universe, such as that ascribed in Metempsychosis to the Soul of the individual Man. In later times this Pantheistic principle fell into the hands of the Stoics, by whom it became so largely developed, that it came to be considered peculiarly their property in philosophy. According to the Stoics there were certain great mundane periods, at the end of which all things were dissolved to begin *de novo*, and the personality, not only of human souls, but of the gods themselves, melted away in the crucible of Renovation. These periods were supposed to connect themselves with a certain cycle of astronomical revolutions,† at the close of which a catastrophe, sometimes by fire, sometimes by water, was believed to close the old world and initiate the new.‡

of Metempsychosis was further perpetuated by its usefulness in the hands of a priestly caste as an engine of oppression. The culmination of this tyranny is found in the laws of Menu (ch. XII. 57), where Metempsychosis assumes this convenient form: 'He who steals the gold of a priest shall pass a thousand times into the bodies of spiders, of snakes, and chameleons, etc.'

\* The Hesiodic poems contain the earliest trace, although in modified form, of this doctrine of Renovation. The mythe of the Five Ages, or successive Lapses of Humanity, combined with those of the Translations of the men of the Golden Age to be *Δαίμονες* or Guardians of men, and the similar Translation of the Heroes of Thebes and Troy to the islands of the Blessed, present important phenomena in the history of Greek Thought, as embryonic manifestations of a Cyclical Theory of the world.

† The fable of the Phoenix rising from her ashes is a mystic form of this doctrine of Renovation, and is believed to have hieroglyphically represented a definite Astronomical Period, known as the Sothic cycle (*κυνικὸς κύκλος*, cf. Creuz. Symbol. I. p. 138). It is a singular circumstance that some of the early Christian writers (Clemens Apost. Ep. I. 24) employed the story of the Phoenix as an emblem of, if not as an argument for, the doctrine of the Resurrection.

‡ Compare the important chapters in Augustine's 'Civitas Dei' (X. 30; XII. 130) on the Metempsychosis into animal forms, or, as it is more properly denominated, *Metensomatosis*, and on the Pantheistic revolutions of Cycles.

## NOTE M.

(PAGES 45, 112.)

## ON THE MAXIM OF ANAXAGORAS.

THE famous maxim, by means of which Anaxagoras (B.C. 499–427) inaugurated a new epoch in Philosophy, and rendered possible an Intellectual Theory of the World, is found preserved in Diogenes Laert. (II. 6) in these words: Πάντα χροήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ.\* εἶτα ΝΟΥΣ ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν. ‘All things were once tumbled together in Chaos: Mind came and arranged them asunder in Cosmos.’

The importance of this enunciation in the history of Thought is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the terms of unwonted eulogy in which Aristotle speaks of Anaxagoras, to this effect—that the appearance of this thinker in the history of the older schools and theories is like that of a sober man rising to speak in a company of babblers. (Νοῦν δὲ τις εἰπὼν ἐνεῖναι . . . . τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης, οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ’ εἰκὴ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον. *Metaph.* I. 3, 16.)

That the statement of the principle is entirely original in the hands of Anaxagoras there can be little or no doubt; for, although Cicero (*de Nat. Deorum* I. 10) attributes a similar doctrine to Thales, the silence of Aristotle in the case of the one philosopher, and his express ascription of it to the other, must be held as conclusive against any antedating of its origin previous to Anaxagoras. Neither is any value to be attached to the loose statement of Diogenes Laert. (II. 4) that Anaxagoras plagiarised from an old poet Linus,† in proof of which he quotes the line, Ἦν ποτέ τοι

\* The Anaxagorean phrase for Chaos (ὁμοῦ πάντα χροήματα) became proverbial to indicate what may be called a dead lock in Logic or Metaphysics: hence its employment in the *Phædo* (72 C.), with which compare the kindred use of the same in *Gorgias* 465 D.; also *Arist. Metaph.* III. 4, 28.

† If, as there is every reason to believe, the so-called cosmogony of Linus was of the Orphic character, it is certain that it was not a Theistic

χρόνος οὗτος, ἐν ᾧ ἅμα πάντα ἐπεφύκει. It is manifest, however, that for such a purpose more of this so-called poem of Linus ought to have been adduced, for the quotation proves only that the notion of Chaos was older than Anaxagoras, whereas the gist and merit of the maxim of Anaxagoras lie in the enunciation of a principle whereby Chaos could be conceived to become Cosmos, which is precisely the thing that is wanting in the fragment, so far as Diogenes has enabled us to judge of it.

Regarding the value of the principle itself, it may be doubted if there has ever appeared in the history of Philosophy a maxim in so few words, which has produced equally great results with that of Anaxagoras. It was the corner-stone of the edifice of Attic Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle alike regarded it as the root, historically, from which all their speculations sprang. It is true that the maxim affirmed not indeed the absolute priority,\* but simply the vast superiority of the function of Mind; nevertheless, this was the

cosmogony. The Orphic cosmogonies in Apollonius Rhodius (I. 496—8), and in the Orphic Argonautica (I. 423) offer no nearer approach to a personal principle than *νεῖκος* and *ἔπος*. That of Virgil in his Silenus bears a family resemblance to the Lucretian (V. 417); and in the kindred passage of the *Æneid* (VI. 724), although *Mens* and *Moles* are nominally distinguished, they are really pantheistically confounded. The Ovidian cosmogony is a remarkable exception to the general strain of the classic cosmogonies, inasmuch as it brings forward, though darkly, the presence of a *Personal Architect* of the world, and also, what is a distinctive and consonant feature, brings out in strong relief the dignity and capacity of Man (Met. I. 76—85).

\* Sir William Hamilton (Metaph. I. p. 48) overstates the import of the maxim, when he interprets it as meaning that 'Intelligence stands first in the order of Existence.'—Thus stated it would be an approach to the idea of *Creation*, which is confessedly the peculiar property of the Jewish people (Ep. Hebr. XI. 3). Other cosmogonies begin with Chaos; the Mosaic begins before it. Hence ancient Philosophy was never able to overleap a primal Dualism without falling on the one hand into Atheism, or on the other into Pantheism. Aristotle, as is well known, held the world to be eternal, and even Plato cannot be interpreted otherwise than as holding the independent existence of *πρώτη ἰλη* or matter, before it received shape and form (Compare Mosheim's elaborate dissertation on this subject in his edition of Cudworth; also Prof. Thompson's note on Archer Butler (Lect. II. 189—90). Hence Leibnitz justly observes, with reference to the enthusiasm of some who would strain Platonism to the stature of the Gospel of Christ: 'Nulla veterum philosophia magis ad Christianam accedit; etsi merito reprehenduntur, si qui ubique putent Platonem conciliabilem Christo. Sed ignoscendum est veteribus, initia rerum creationem et corporum nostrorum resurrectionem

germ of much, inasmuch as it rendered the Philosophy of Plato, with its lofty aspirations founded on the antagonism of the phenomenal Matter and the unchanging Mind, a possible thing. Moreover, the notion of personality in the Ordering Mind is not necessarily present in the Anaxagorean doctrine; for the purely Theistic relation of the Finite to the Infinite was not present in the schools of Antiquity, and hence the perpetual tendency of both the ancient Materialism and Idealism to pass ultimately, the one into Atheistic, and the other into Pantheistic views of the Universe.

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## NOTE N.

(PAGE 58.)

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### ON PRE-EXISTENCE AND REMINISCENCE.

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THE Platonic principle of Reminiscence as the origin of Cognition derived itself directly, as was briefly indicated in a previous note (H), from the doctrine of Ideas, and upon the principle of Reminiscence thus acquired was built, as an implied consequence, the dogma of the Pre-existence of the Soul (cf. Cic. Tusc. I. 24). This dogma was in Plato's hands more than a simple postulation of the antecedency of the cognitive powers to the exercise of Cognition: the reiterated language of Plato leaves no room to doubt that he claimed for the Soul a veritable antecedent state of conscious being. Of this condition no direct history remained: the knowledge of such a period consisted, in his view, only in glimpses of an ancient past, such as the degenerate dwellers among monumental ruins might be supposed to gather from the half-obliterated sculptures adorning the waste of a now desolate wilderness.

The influence of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis had prepared the way for the introduction of such a belief. For, if Being was to be regarded as one great chain of Transmigration doubling back in a circle upon itself, it was natural to suppose that Birth and Death were both only appearing and disappearing nodes on the chain; *negantibus. Hæc enim sola revelatione sciri possunt.* Leibn. Op. Philos. p. 445, Ed. Erdmann.

that Life was an internode, or parenthesis, between these circumscribing boundaries, and therefore that Birth was a transition out of a prior state of Being.\*

The Platonic dogma of Pre-existence was an advance upon its Pythagorean predecessor in two important respects. In the first place it was engrafted on, and made to spring from, his own peculiar doctrine of the Eternal Ideas,† and thereby received a certain intellectual basis apart from the arbitrary foundation of an *Αὐτὸς ἔφα*, or such personal asseverations of Pythagoras as his recognition of the shield which he had worn in the character of Euphorbus. In the second place, Plato developed largely, if not entirely, the ethical purpose which as a theory it subserved: and hence, although it laboured under the defect of being only a removal of the difficulty regarding the origin of Evil to a more distant stage, this dogma became in his hands a hypothesis intellectually defensible as an explanation of the sorrow-laden condition of the world,‡ and also

\* Compare the oft-quoted Montaigne-like query of Euripides (Fr. Polyid. 7): *τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ καταθεῖν, τὸ καταθεῖν δὲ ζῆν*; The germ of the same is found in the fragment of Heraclitus: *ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον*, κ.τ.λ. (Zeller's *Philos. d. Griechen*, I. p. 483.)

† The precedence which must be conceded to the primary intuitions in the matter of cognition is a priority, not in time, but in logic. Plato wished to give the 'Ideas' precedence in both regards (cf. 72 E., 75 D.), and as the Ideas, being unchangeable, were supposed to have an existence undetermined by the relations of time as past, present, or, to come, the eternity of the cognoscent principle or Soul, in which the Ideas were immanent, was the necessary consequent. Hence the corollary of the *æternitas animorum*, not only *a parte post* but *a parte ante*. Cudworth, vol. I. p. 70. (Compare the Brahminical dogma in the Bhagavat Gita.)—'Ad sapientiam pertinent ea quæ nec fuerunt nec futura sunt, sed sunt, et propter eam æternitatem in qua sunt, et fuisse et esse et futura esse dicuntur, sine ulla mutabilitate temporum. . . . Unde Plato ille philosophus nobilis vult persuadere vixisse hic animas hominum, et antequam ista corpora gererent; et hinc esse quod ea quæ discuntur, reminiscuntur potius cognita, quam cognoscuntur nova:' Augustine de Trinit. XII. 24, where he criticises the experiment of Reminiscence by the slave in the Meno (cf. 73 A., n.), and shows that Plato overstated the result of that experiment. Consult also Cudworth, Book V., Vol. II. p. 629.

‡ While seeming to remove one difficulty, this dogma, however, created another of equal magnitude. For, as each person has no consciousness of the presumed prior state, which has become a blank to the memory, it is manifest that it is equally easy to suppose that a similar Lethe would wash away all memory of the present, and that, as all souls would enter on a

ethically important, as suggesting hopes and fears of a salutary influence on the conduct of the present Life.

The inability of the ancient mind to acquire or entertain the notion of absolute causation or *Creation* contributed to give the dogma of Pre-existence a verisimilitude which it would not otherwise have assumed. The dominion of the maxim 'Ex nihilo nihil fit,' which is virtually a negation of Creation, may be said to have been complete in the various schools of Antiquity; and the ancient mind, which could not conceive of a beginning in the material world, assented in some form or other, more or less pronounced, to the dogma which denied a beginning to the intellectual world. Hence it is not to be wondered at that the hypothesis of a pre-existing state, especially as having a place in the Platonic Philosophy should have re-appeared from time to time on the stage of thought, and exerted a considerable fascination over many speculative minds. In the Alexandrian period there are traces of its appearance as a belief, at all events, among Platonising Jews (Book of Wisdom, VIII. 20; compare the commentators on St. John IX. 2, 3).<sup>\*</sup> In the Patristic period it found a place among the speculations of Origen, and figured largely in the controversies of that age under the name of *πρὸ ὑπαρξιν* (cf. Origen de Principiis, I. 3, 8; III. 1, 21, ad fin., also Synesius Epist. 105, Hymn 3), until this dogma, along with others of kindred origin, was condemned by the V<sup>th</sup> Council of Constantinople under the Emperor Justinian. Even Augustine himself, although he gives no countenance to the transplantation of a modified Metempsychosis to a Christian soil as attempted by Origen (Civ. Dei XI. 23), and alleges the passage in Romans IX. 11 to be a barrier against Pre-existence (de Pecc. Orig. X. p. 269 A., Ed. Bened.), yet does not pronounce absolutely against its possibility, and simply says that it is a secret thing, beyond the human understanding: 'Utrum ante consortium hujus

future life equally unencumbered, it was a matter of indifference what life was enacted on the present stage.—It is worthy of note that a Lethe is therefore not introduced into the Platonic picture of the rivers of Hades in the *Phædo*.

\* In Eisenmenger (*Entdecktes Judenthum*, I. p. 467, II. p. 11—13) may be found a number of extracts from the Rabbinical writers, showing the extent to which the dogma of Pre-existence had influenced Rabbinical thought, whether from a Platonic source or not it would be hazardous to affirm. It also appears that the dogma of a definite number of Souls was also common to these writers with the Platonists (cf. 72 B., note).

corporis alia quadam vita vixerit Animus . . . magna quæstio est, magnum secretum' (de Lib. Arbitr. I. 24, cf. III. 59).

In the more recent developments of German Philosophy, a disposition to return, if not to the hypothesis of a Pre-existing state, yet to something analogous to it, has been manifested in the school of Herbart and the younger Fichte. The latter has endeavoured to elaborate a theory of a pre-conscious, or rather infra-conscious existence of the Soul, with a view to explain the abnormal phenomena which the Soul manifests in certain phases of its condition, such as in dreaming and in those sympathies and antipathies which it shows prior to all experience, and which transcend what is known to us from its ordinary conscious condition.\*

The instantaneousness of fine perception constituting what is called Genius has not unfrequently commended itself as an analogy to the Platonic Reminiscence.† Those unconscious visitings of noble

\* Consult Morell's Edition of H. J. Fichte's Contributions to Mental Philosophy, where the phenomena of what may be called the 'night side of the Soul' are largely expounded.—In this point of view it is interesting to find similar observations in the ancient Platonist Olympiodorus. In p. 126, 12, he calls attention to the smiling of infants in their sleep very early after their birth; and likens the oblivion of birth—which Platonically 'is but a sleep and a forgetting'—to the forgetfulness which, according to Thucydides (II. 49), befel for a time those who recovered from the plague. Another not unhappy illustration is his comparison of the human mind to the tablet of Demaratus, in which the important writing was within, and only the show without (Herod. VII. 239).

† The electric ease with which the boy Newton glided through Euclid as a self-evident and self-witnessing book, is a fine illustration of what Plato aimed at, if he did not establish, in his principle of Reminiscence. The emotion with which Plato would have hailed such a fact in the history of such a soul, only a Platonist can conceive.—Compare Philo Jud. p. 470 (Vit. Mos. Lib. I.) regarding the aptitude of Moses for acquiring the wisdom of the Egyptians: *ἐνμοιρία φύσεως φθάνων τὰς ὑφηγήσεις, ὥς ἀνὰ μνησιν εἶναι δοκεῖν, οὐ μάθησιν*.—The student of English Literature will remember the encomium, more elegant than well deserved, bestowed by Bacon on King James I.: 'Your Majesty is the best instance to make a man of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of man knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and original notions (which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again revived and restored' (Adv. of Learning I. 1). In this point of view the Platonic doctrine throws light on the old doctrine of Mythology, Memory being appropriately and Platonically called the mother of the Muses.



thought and emotion, which seem to break on the Soul like gleams of pearls heaped in the depths of Lethe, are aptly imaged by the radiations from the Unchangeable Ideas, which in Platonic view constituted the sole true knowledge. The finest expression that has ever been given to this thought since the time of Plato himself, is unquestionably that which we owe to an English poet; and although in a certain sense all true Poetry, as transcending the temporal and external, is in that measure Platonic, it is not the least among the honours of English Poetry that it can claim to possess what is pre-eminently the one Platonic Ode within the domain of Literature. The poem by Wordsworth on the 'Intimations of Immortality from the Recollections of Early Childhood,' stands in this respect alone, embodying the thoughts of Plato in the words of Pindar, and founding on the richly emotional nature of Childhood a triumphal hymn to the glory of Man's being. In the rosy light and rich fragrance of that period where 'dwell the spirits of the dawn,' he has taught us to discern the radiance of a Golden Age surrounding us at the beginning of Life, and prophetic of another awaiting us at its close. To have preserved this young fragrance of the Soul onward from the dews of the morning, or, in less poetic phrase, to have carried forward into manhood in their undiminished freshness and simplicity the emotional susceptibilities of the child—this the poet interprets as the secret charm of that *a priori* power called Genius, whose felicity is to feel itself ever as the self-forgetting child lapped in delighted wonder on the bosom of God's living world. Under this aspect it is no mysticism to look on those susceptibilities, whether we consider them Reminiscences from a prior being,\* or radiations from a present being, as weighty

\* It may be proper to remark that Wordsworth did not consider an actual Pre-existence entitled to philosophical belief: in one of his Letters (Mem. vol. I. p. 190) he disclaims such a notion, although he observes that the doctrine of the 'Fall passing upon all men' supplies an analogy in that direction: he simply employed the Platonic principle of Reminiscence as a poetic means of representing what appeared to him the sanctity of childhood.—Compare the kindred imaginings of Rabbinical thought (Flugge, *Gesch. d. Unsterbl.* I. p. 365): 'Children, before they are born, are led by an angel into Paradise, and instructed in all that is found there. The righteous are shown to each child, and held up before it as an example, after which it must mould itself in order to be thought worthy one day of their fellowship. But when the hour of birth arrives, then the angel strikes the child and extinguishes the light, through the help of which it was able to see all: the child

evidences—at once memorial and prophecy—of a dignity and destiny greater than we can know. This conception of the great Platonic poet, that 'Heaven lies about us in our infancy,' receives countenance, it is scarcely necessary to add, from those intimations of Scripture (St. Matth. XVIII 3, 10) which speak of a peculiar nearness to the Divine in the nature of the child, 'for of such is the kingdom of God.'

## NOTE O.

(PAGE 80.)

### ON THE ATTIC GROUP OF BIRDS, AND THE SONG OF THE SWAN.

OF the four birds mentioned with honour in the Phædo (85 A.), three belong to a group peculiarly Attic, the association of which together is not a matter of accident. In the grouping of the Nightingale (*ἀηδών*), the Swallow (*χελιδών*), and the Hoopoe (*ἑρπύς*), there is a silent reference to the tragic legend in the history of early Attica regarding that metamorphosis of the daughters of Pandion, Progne and Philomela, which forms one of the pictorial scenes from the hand of Ovid (*Met.* VI. 430—674).

This passage of Plato is perhaps the only protest in antiquity against the prevailing impression that the song of the Nightingale betokens sorrow.\* Modern poetry followed the classical tradition

must now forget all again that it has seen, and is pushed forth into the atmosphere of the cold world, whence it is that children always weep when they come into the world.' Shakspeare platonises similarly regarding infants' tears: 'When we are born, we cry, that we are come To this great stage of fools' (*K. Lear* IV. 6).

\* It is worth remarking that, in showing the connection between song and gladness, Plato makes no reference to a bird regarding whose song there has never been either dispute or mistake, the mention of which would have served his purpose well. The honours, however, of the skylark among birds, like those of its companion the daisy among flowers, belong entirely to modern Literature.

till the time of Coleridge, who renewed the protest in his poem of 'The Nightingale,' and pronounced the melancholy attributed to its song a misinterpretation.

Regarding the dying song of the Swan, to which Socrates here makes a beautiful allusion, and which has found poetic currency in ancient and modern times, the following are the most important historical particulars.

It is frequently supposed that the ancients considered the dying song of the Swan to be both its first and last musical strain, as if it were the bursting forth of a power unknown before. This, however, is an erroneous impression, and the passage in the *Phædo* is proof to that effect: for, although Socrates is represented as saying that it sings most richly at death, he yet admits that it sings also at other times (*ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῇ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ*). The oldest references to its cry make no mention of the approach of death and regard it as a familiar phenomenon of its *life*: cf. Homer, *Il.* II. 463; Hesiod, *Scut. Herc.* 316. (Cf. Aristoph. *Av.* 776; Callim. *H. Apoll.* 5, *H. Del.* 249, in which last passage the Swans are represented as singing, not on the occasion of their own death, but on that of the *birth* of Phœbus.)

Although, as Sir Thomas Browne remarks, the Swan, as having a 'latirostrous bill,' is not a bird from which music might be expected, there are several circumstances which taken together are adequate to account for its frequent enrolment in ancient times among the birds of song. The majestic form, the dazzling whiteness, the grace of motion on the element of water, and the lofty freedom of flight in the element of air, combined with its incapacity to move with ease on the common element of earth, were features marking out this bird for high poetic associations;\* and a mystic symbolism would easily find in it an image of the Sun moving in resplendent majesty on the face of the heaven, and at evening and morning bathing his brightness in the baths of Ocean. It was but a

\* The peculiar configuration of the neck resembling a trumpet seems to have contributed to the expectation that it possessed the power of giving forth trumpet-like sounds (cf. *Lucr.* IV. 647). Servius (on *Virg. Æn.* VII. 700) quotes a statement as if from Pliny, to a similar effect: 'Cygnos ideo suavius canere, quia colla longa habent et inflexa; et necesse est eluctantem vocem per longum et flexuosum varias reddere modulationes.' Compare the interesting criticism of Sir Thomas Browne on the Swan-song, and the notes of his Editor (*Vulgar Errors* III. 27).

step to complete its investiture as the bird of Apollo (Cic. Tusc. I. 30) by ascribing to it the almost necessary accomplishment of the gift of song.\*

The origin of the notion of its melodiousness at death is due to the kindred fancy, that the poets, the servants of Apollo, as their locks grew whiter with age, while their voice became shrill (hence *argutus* as epithet of a bard) and their frame attenuated, were thereby undergoing transformation into swans.† Hence the soul of Orpheus (Pol. X. 620 A.), in passing into a new existence, is said to have chosen the life and form of a Swan. The earliest trace of the association of the Song of the Swan with the season of death, is found in the Orphic or Pythagorean Æschylus, where he speaks of the prophetess Cassandra as having sung her own funeral song : ἡ δέ τοι, Κύκνον εἶκην, Τὸν ὕστατον μέλψασα θανάσιμον γόον Κεῖται.‡

From the imaginings of the poets it is proper now to turn to the testimony of the ancient Naturalists. The name of Aristotle is found on the side of the poets, for he describes the birds as not only musical, but also as musical at death (ὑδικοί δέ (οἱ κύκνοι), καὶ

\* Very similar is the fancy of Nonnus (Dionys. II. 218), that in the rebellion of Typhaon Apollo disguised himself by transformation into a swan.

† Compare the Æschylean picture of the withered Phorciades : θηναῖαι κόραι Τρεῖς κύκν' ὁμορφοί (Prom. V. 795); also Euripides Herc. Fur. 110, ἡσὼν ἀοιδός, ὥστε πολλοὶ ὄρνις : and 630, κύκνος ὥς γέρωι ἀοιδὸς πολλὰ ἐκ γενύων κελαδῆσω.

‡ The hieroglyphic symbolism of Egypt contributed largely to develop this fancy. According to Horapollo (II. 39), the figure of the swan was the hieroglyphic for a musical old man : Γέροντα μουσικὸν βουλόμενοι σημήναι, κύκνον ζωγραφούσιν· οὗτος γάρ ἡδύτατον μέλος ᾄδει γηράσκων. Compare the fanciful imaginings of Horace (Od. II. 20, 9) regarding his own advancing years and advancing poetic fame.—Although there are no traces of such a symbolism in Homer, a preparation for its reception may be discerned in the beautiful simile in the third Iliad (l. 160), where the Trojan seniors, cheerful through shrivelled with age, are likened to merry chirping grasshoppers : with which compare the Anacreontic ode (43) to the τέτιξ as being ἀπαθής and ἀναίμωστος, and the Ovidian description (Met. II. 373) of the transformation of the Ligurian King Cyncus : 'Fox est tenuata viro, canaque capillos Dissimulat plumæ,' etc. The resemblance in sound between cāno and cānus seems to have given a farther verisimilitude to the notion, at all events in Latin Literature.

§ Among the more important allusions in aftertime to this notion are Ovid Heroid. VII. 1, Fasti II. 110; Martial XIII. 77; cf. Shakspeare, K. John V. 7; Othello V. 2; Passionate Pilgrim, XVII. 4; also Tennyson's 'Dying Swan.'

περὶ τὰς τελευτὰς μάλιστα ᾄδουσιν, Hist. Anim. IX. 12, 4). The majority of ancient authorities, however, is, with this exception, against the reality of the death-song of the Swan. Alexander of Myndus (quoted by Athenæus IX. 393 D.) tells us that he has followed sick swans in order to catch their dying strains, but in vain; Ælian (Var. Hist. I. 14) expresses disbelief; and Pliny (Hist. Nat. X. 32) observes: 'Olorum morte narratur flebilis cantus, falso, ut arbitror, aliquot experimentis.'

Among the Naturalists of modern times, while there is considerable dubiety as to the death-song,\* there is abundance of evidence as to the musical power of the Wild Swan (*Cygnus Musicus*),† which is in our time chiefly an inhabitant in the more solitary parts of the northern latitudes of the temperate zone. It was probably from such accounts of this bird as ancient travellers had brought home from the more Hyperborean regions, that any elements of fact were in old time derived, contemning the once common belief of the latent music in the Swan.‡

\* Oken affirms (Allgem. Natur. Gesch., Band VII. p. 482): 'It is not a groundless fable, what the old poets say, that the swan, when wounded, makes its voice heard like the peal of a silver bell.' Still stronger is the testimony of Erman (Travels in Siberia, transl. by Cooley, vol. II. p. 43): 'That the *cygnus olor*, when wounded, pours forth its last breath in clear and loud notes, is now known for certain.' Cuvier, however, rejected the death-song as a fable.

† 'Their cries are loud, trumpet-like, and when proceeding from a distance, clear, mellow, and resembling the sounds from a distant band of music. They are described as having a peculiarly exciting effect on the human mind, especially in desert regions, and to give rise to the most agreeable feelings. This I can well understand, having experienced the like, on seeing and hearing a flock of wild swans in the Hebrides.' Macgillivray, British Birds, vol. IV. 652. This description accords remarkably with the Hesiodic description of their note (μεγάλ' ἦ π υ ο ν, Sc. Herc. 316), and is in keeping with the lines of Euripides, who places their haunt in the outer ocean (Fr. Phææth. 34), πηγαῖς δ' ἐπ' Ὀκεανοῦ μελιβόας κύκρον ἄχεϊ. Compare the Virgilian picture of the flight of the whistling swans (Æn. VII. 700), where some of the critics find fault with them as not dying on the occasion of their song.—Other testimonies from modern Naturalists may be found in Tytler's Callimachus, p. 139; also Notes and Queries, vol. V. p. 108.

‡ Compare the legends regarding the Hyperborean Swans in Preller's Myth. (I. p. 157).

## NOTE P.

(PAGE 82.)

## ON THE PASSAGE REGARDING 'SOME DIVINE WORD.'

THE translation of this famous passage (85 D.) runs literally as follows :—

'Failing this, that is to say, if a man can neither find the truth by the exercise of his own faculties, nor learn it through the help of another, then having chosen that which is at all events the best and most irrefragable of Human Doctrines, he ought to embark thereon, like a mariner going to sea on a raft (in default of any better conveyance), and sail through life's voyage, that is to say, unless it were possible to proceed on one's way more securely and with less danger on some firmer vessel, or\* on some Divine Doctrine.'

A gradation of possible courses is here indicated, which may be thus described. If a man cannot reach the *terra firma* of ἐπιστήμη either by his own searching or by that of another (εὐρὺν ἢ μαθύν), let him trust himself to the best δοῖσθ† he can find among human

\* Heindorf found difficulty in accepting ἢ after ὀχλήματος in the sense of *sive*, 'or in other words,' its usual sense being *aut*, and therefore excluding one or other of two alternatives, instead of identifying them. The Zurich editors follow Heindorf and omit ἢ, making λόγου θείου stand in apposition to ὀχλήματος. The omission of ἢ is, however, scarcely justifiable in the face of all the MSS. and the version of Ficinus, in which it is rendered: 'si nequeat firmiori quodam vehiculo *vel* divino aliquo verbo tutius ac minori cum periculo tranare.' That the signification of ἢ is not so limited as Heindorf alleged, and that it answered to *sive* or *vel* as well as to *aut*, is manifest from the following passages, where it is clearly epexegetic: Æsch. Pers. 360, ἡρξεν μὲν ὦ δέσποινα, τοῦ παντός κακοῦ, φανεῖς ἀλᾶστωρ, ἢ κακὸς δαίμων ποθέν. Ib. 430, οἱ δ', ὥστε θύνηνους ἢ τιν' ἰχθύων βόλον . . . ἔπαιον. Soph. Phil. 934, ἐναίρων νεκρὸν ἢ καπνοῦ σκιάν.

† Compare the kindred lament of Simmias in 107 A. over human helplessness, which Socrates endeavoured to console by exhorting him to value the light which he has, even although but a glimmering.

doctrines, that is to say, if one could not get what is still better, (Θείου λόγου τις), some Divine Word to direct his way.

There are few passages of ancient literature, which in modern times have been the subject of so frequent reference as this, inasmuch as it has been justly appealed to as an expression, on the part of Plato himself, of longing for the 'more sure word' (βεβαίότερος λόγος, 2 Ep. Pet. I. 19) of a Revelation from God. To this view it is no objection to allege that the utterance of this '*Vox clamantis in Deserto*' happens to be put into the mouth of Simmias, and is not found in that of Socrates. The passage is one of such elaboration, and the idea it contains is dwelt on with so great emphasis, that the sympathy of Plato himself must be understood to go along with it.\* Such an inference receives strength from the consideration, that a feeling of the benefit or a presentiment of the possibility of a Divine Revelation is manifest in other parts of Platonic thought. Socrates takes it for granted as no strange thing that God should communicate with His creatures on the earth, in proof of which may be mentioned his intimations of his own belief in his δαιμόνιον or Divine voice : cf. also Xen. Mem. I. 1, 9. Compare also Pol. IX. 590 D., ἀμεινον παντί ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστώτων : Timæus 72 D., τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς . . . θεοῦ ἐνυμφήσαντος, τότε ἂν οὕτω μόνως διεισχυρίζοίμεθα.

In this point of view the comment of Olympiodorus is interesting, as indicating that in his time the passage was actually employed by Christians in the sense in which it has been naturally accepted. He asks, τίς ὁ ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ἀκινδυνότερος καὶ βεβαιότερος καὶ θεῖος λόγος ; οὐ δῆπου, ὡς φασιν, ὁ θεὸς ἐκ δόξης· δοξαστικὸς γὰρ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ εἰρημένος ἀντοπτικὸς νοῦς ὁ θεῖς τῷ ὄντι συνών,

\* H. Schmidt (Progr. p. 22, 1854) has therefore the following comment : 'The Divine Word is put in contrast with the above-mentioned human doctrine. Whether Plato had more immediately in view the then undivulged doctrines of the Mysteries, as some think, or whether he thought of a Divine Word perhaps at some time reaching humanity, the thought is clear. The lover of truth, he means to say, will strive to conquer the possession of truth, either by his own faculties or by the help of others, and will satisfy himself with such results until, through a higher and a divine revelation, an immediate contemplation of the truth is vouchsafed. To whom will not the thought naturally force itself home, that Plato shows himself here a Seer, and through a presentiment discerned that which the Fulness of time realised ?'

ὡς ἐν Φαίδρῳ. Although Olympiodorus thus wishes to identify this 'more excellent way' or *πρῶτον πλοῦς*, with that of a lofty Philosophy, and not of Religion, so as to render the passage not susceptible of a Christian application, he at the same time furnishes unconscious witness to what was the natural interpretation, by coupling as equivalent expressions *βεβαιότερος καὶ θεῖος λόγος*, thereby showing that *ἡ* in his time was naturally interpreted by *vel*, and that the *βεβαιότερον ὄχημα* which was desired was no other than the *θεῖος λόγος*.

With regard to the image\* employed in the passage, it is probable that there is a silent allusion to that part of the history of the 'Ancient Marinere' where he is represented as setting out in his roughly-constructed raft (*σχεδία*) from the isle of Calypso, in which, like the Soul forgetting itself in the entanglements of Sense, the hero has lain concealed. The raft is shattered to pieces, but, by the *divine* aid and direction of Leucothea, the hero is enabled to reach the shore. That this is the latent reference is farther borne out by the circumstance, that this part of the history of Ulysses is employed by Maximus Tyr. (Diss. XVI. 10) as an illustration of the saving power of Philosophy, which he represents as performing, when all other aids fail, the function of the goddess in the Odyssey.

## NOTE Q.

(PAGE 86.)

### EXPOSITION OF THE REASONING OF CEBES.

THE reasoning of Cebes may be presented in the following form :—

'Granted, O Socrates, that even the perishable body continues for some time longer or shorter after death, and that therefore the Soul, which is nobler than the Body, cannot be thought of as perishing immediately, does this prove the Soul's existence *for ever*? If we take the image of the Body as the vesture of the

\* Compare the similar imagery in 98 B. note, 99 D.; also Phileb. 14 A., and Legg. VII. 803 B., where Life is allegorised as a *voyage*. So Cicero (Tusc. I. 30) borrows the simile, '*tangquam in rate in mari immenso nostra vehitur oratio.*' Compare also the striking passage in Plutarch, Mor. 1103 E.



Soul, you may of course reason in favour of the greater probability of the nobler part surviving, just as one might say in the case of a weaver who has died, that it was natural to think of him as enjoying some sort of existence, when you could point in proof to the garment he had woven, still in good condition, and then ask, How could the more perishable be supposed to have the longer duration, the workman being greater than the work? But mark, O Socrates, what I say; it is not one garment merely, but a series of garments, which the workman in the course of his life has thrown aside, yet, as we see, decay has come before the last garment was worn through: may it not be that, while the man is not reckoned less noble than a piece of dress, although he may have left *one* garment behind him, after having worn out many, so the Soul may retain all her dignity over the Body, surviving many of those vestures with which she successively clothes herself, and yet fail to survive a certain one of these in the end? Or, admitting that the Soul may survive the last of these tabernacles in this world, how are we sure that among the tabernacles she successively builds for herself, there may not be a certain one that will survive her? How can any one be sure, when he is dying, that this is not the body in the case of which the catastrophe is destined to fall upon the Soul as well? May there not come a time when, in its passing from sheath to sheath, the fiery sword shall wear itself through before the latest sheath is decayed, and yet there would be no denying your principle that the sword is greater and nobler than the sheath?

This objection of Cebes, which was only the materialistic view of the more simple Simmias clothed in more subtle form, derived its force from the popular notions of Metempsychosis. It is chiefly interesting as being an anticipation of the dogma of the Stoics in after time, whose principle of the Metempsychosis of the Anima Mundi resulted in their well-known dogma of a limited Immortality. Compare the censure by Cicero of the dogma of the Stoics (Tusc. I. 31—32), where he speaks of them as going far to seek uneasiness: ‘M. Stoicos dico, qui aiunt animos manere, e corpore quum excesserint, sed non semper. A. Istos vero, qui, *quod tota in hac causa difficillimum est, suscipiant posse animum manere corpore vacantem*: illud autem, quod non modo facile ad credendum est, sed, eo concesso, quod volunt, consequens, id certe non dant, ut, quum diu permanserit, ne intreat. M. Bene reprehendis.’

## NOTE R.

(PAGE 103.)

## ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SOUL.

IN examining the hypothesis of the Soul considered as a 'Harmony,' Socrates is led to the conclusion that this view of its nature is inadequate to explain the phenomena of its relation to the Body. The conscious and self-regulating power, frequently called by the ancients τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, whereby the Soul shows its independence of the material frame, culminating in that characteristic of the Human Will called Liberty, Socrates discerns to be a principle of which it is impossible to render a reason on any theory of material organisation.\* This he illustrates by the quotation in 94 D. from the passage in the Odyssey, where Ulysses is represented as calming and controlling his emotions by a power superior to the emotions.

The sovereignty of the Mind, which is partly indicated in 80 A., and fully expounded in 94 B.—E. as a faculty of Divine Right, was a Socratic tenet, as is shown by Xen. Mem. IV. 3, 14 : ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῇ, ἣ εἶπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀθανάτων τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν. Its full elaboration, however, and especially its development as an argument for Immortality, are due to Plato.†

\* Lucretius (II. 257) found himself at a loss, with no other than material factors, to give any account of Volition, i.e., the action of a *free* cause : 'Unde est hæc, inquam, fatis avulsa Voluntas ?'—Compare Sir W. Hamilton's Lect. on Metaph. I. pp. 29, 164 : 'Man is not an organism ; he is an intelligence served by organs. They are his, not he.'

† Olympiodorus (p. 133) gives the following condensation of the grounds on which Plato rested the superiority of the Soul, as a distinct estate from the Body: they are chiefly drawn from Legg. III. 690 A.—C., Πῶς δεικνύται ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχουσα; ἡ κατὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ ἀξιώματα τὰ ἐν Νόμοις· καὶ γὰρ συννητιᾶ, καὶ εὐγενεστέρα ὥς ἀπὸ αἰτίας ἀκινήτου, καὶ πρεσβύτερα ὥς προϋπάρχουσα, καὶ δεσποτικώτερα ὥς κινούσα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερα ὥς συνέχουσα, καὶ φρονιμώτερα

The power possessed by the Human Mind, whereby it can externalise itself or project itself, so as to be for a time not only the Subject in passive consciousness, but also an Object, so to speak, external to itself—in other words, the power of holding silent soliloquy with itself, is worthy of regard as one of the chief prerogatives of this Sovereignty. From all that we can gather regarding the faculties of other creatures upon the earth, there is good ground for believing that Man is the only one which possesses this characteristic. The highest of the lower creation, even if admitted to possess the faculty of consciousness, possess only, so far as is known by us, a merely passive consciousness, which is simply receptive of sensations; for there is no evidence to induce us to believe that they possess the marvellous power of the human consciousness, *to be conscious that they are conscious*.\* Let it be granted that the dog or the elephant can *consciously* separate itself from the surrounding mass of objects, so as to attain the notion of the *Ego*, it does not follow that either of them has the power of transforming the *Ego* into *Tu*,† and thereby summoning itself to the judgment of its own bar, which power manifestly is a condition necessary to the exercise both of Reason in things intellectual, and

ὡς προβουλευομένη, καὶ ἐν τυχέστέρι ὡς λαχοῦσα, οὐ ληχθεῖσα.  
—Compare Sallust (Jug. I.), 'Dux atque *imperator* vitæ mortalium *Animus* est.'

\* Pascal's famous argument for the dignity of Man is founded on this simple power of reflection: 'Man is but a reed, the most feeble in nature; yes, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the Universe should rise in arms to crush him; a breath, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But now, even if it were the Universe that had crushed him, Man would still be greater than the Universe, for he *knows* that he is crushed, but of this the Universe knows nothing' (Pens. I. 4, 6).

† Among the more interesting Apostrophes in Greek Literature similar to the Homeric τέλαθι δὴ κραδίη are the following: Hesiod (Theog. 36) addresses himself Τύνη in stirring himself up to song; Archiloch. Fr. 58, Θυμέ, θύμ', ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε, Ἄναδέεε κ.τ.λ.; Theognis 1029, τόλμα, θυμέ, κακοῖσιν ὄμωσ' ἄτλητα πεπονθώς; Soph. Trach. 1280, ὦ ψυχὴ . . . ἀνάπνε βοήν, with the parody of Aristophanes on the language of resignation; Acharn. 456, ὦ θύμ', ἀνευ σκάνδικον ἐμπορευτῆα (cf. Equit. 1191). Compare another fragment of Archilochus quoted in Arist. Pol. VII. 7, 6; also that of Anaxandrides in Athenæm. XV. 688 B.; also Pindar, Pyth. III. 61; Frag. 89, Bergk.—As a modern parallel to the Homeric τέλαθι δὴ κραδίη may be quoted the soliloquy of Turenne to his shrinking body: 'You tremble, carcass, but I shall take you into places which you will like less.'

of Conscience in things moral. In point of fact, the Moral and Intellectual faculties in Man may be said to exist solely through this power of soliloquising, or subjecting one's self to study and examination; without this power Conscience could not judge, neither could Reflection exercise its function of self-introspection, and all progression, whether of the individual or of the race, would, apart from such a power, come to a perpetual end.

Closely allied to this power—whether it is called in matters of Morality Conscience, or in matters intellectual Self-consciousness—is that of Volition in matters of Action, or the self-determining power whereby man feels a freedom to choose, and is enabled to exhibit an energy of purpose after choice, which constitutes another prerogative of the Sovereignty of the Soul, but which any theory of *ἀρμονία* or organisation must fail to explain. In this regard, the very power of erring or sinning, that is, making a *wrong* free choice, is the evidence of Man's possessing a higher nature; whereas the lower creation,\* being provided with a uniform irresistible bias, to which is commonly given the name of Instinct, do not exercise the power of choice, and therefore are not subject to the tremendous possibility of committing sin and of feeling guilt, which is the necessary condition of the probationary culture of a moral being such as Man.

The dignity of these prerogatives is farther manifest in the circumstance that they render possible not only progression in the life both of the individual and of the race, but also that subordination of the present to the future which is the element of all nobleness, from the humblest act of self-denial up to the loftiest self-devoting martyrdom. This energetic power renders man other than a serf of the sod,† ‘glebæ adscriptus,’ and according to its exercise depends the measure in which each man may be said to have fulfilled the ideal of his being.

\* ‘The brute individual is nought but the concrete manifestation of the species: its essential destination is to represent and to preserve the species. The individual Man, on the other hand, is, in so far as personality is predicable concerning him, *more than simply* the concrete manifestation of the species; he is, as an individual, an End in himself (Selbstzweck) in the divine ordering of the world, and consequently to him, not merely to the species, is immortality assured.’ Julius Müller in Stud. u. Krit. 1835, p. 758.

† It is an interesting observation of Aristotle, that while each of the other Elements had its votaries among the philosophers, as claiming an

## NOTE S.

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## ON THE ASSEVERATION OF SOCRATES.

ἢ τὸν κύνα.

THIS peculiar form of oath—‘by the Dog’—occurs also in the mouth of Socrates in Apol. 22 A. and Pol. III. 399 E. Various attempts have been made in various directions to obtain a clue to the origin of this expression. Some have supposed that it was an asseveration on the part of Socrates by his faithful monitor or *δαίμονιον*, by which he thought himself to be attended in the investigation of truth, as a huntsman by his dog: others have considered it simply an appeal indicating sincerity, in compliment to the most faithful of the companions of Man (cf. Forster’s note on Apol. 22 A.). Whatever may have been the exact sense in which it was employed by Plato, it was in all probability an oath derived from the mysticism of Egypt, and like other oaths, was used long after any solemnity connected with it had disappeared—an inference which is supported by the fuller edition of it in the Gorgias 482 B., *μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν*.\*

identity with Soul, the Element of Earth alone had no supporters (de Anim. I. 3, 22).—‘I feel myself,’ says Coleridge (Lit. Rem. I. p. 372), ‘not the slave of nature (nature used here as *mundus sensibilis*) in the sense in which animals are. Not only my thoughts and affections extend to objects trans-natural, as Truth, Virtue, God; not only do my powers extend vastly beyond all those, which I could have derived from the instruments and organs with which nature has furnished me; but I can do what nature *per se* cannot. I ingraft, I raise heavy bodies above the clouds, and guide my course over ocean and through air. I alone am lord of fire and light; other creatures are but their alms-folk. And of all the so-called Elements—Water, Earth, Air, and all their compounds—I not merely subserve myself of them, but I employ them. Ergo, there is in me, or rather I am, a *præter-natural*, that is, a supersensuous thing; but what is not nature, why should it perish with nature? why lose the faculty of vision, because my spectacles are broken?’

\* The famous ordinance of the Cretan Rhadamanthys (Porphyry. de Abst. III. 16; Schol. Aristoph. Aves, 521) enjoining ‘an oath by the dog, the

In later times, when Greek polytheism had lost its hold on the mind of the nation, it was not unfrequently assumed that this oath, and others of a similar kind, were used by Socrates, not from any euphemistic reverence,\* but out of an ironical contempt for the popular gods (Lucian, *Vit. Auct.* 16). The Christian Fathers, in carrying on their struggle with Idolatry, naturally adopted this view; whence Tertullian (*Apol.* 14) affirms: ‘Taceo de philosophis, Socrate contentus, qui *in contumeliam deorum* quercum et hireum et canem dejerabat.’ This latter view, however, is opposed to the testimony of both Plato and Xenophon, who manifest an anxiety to guard against the suspicion of anything like irreverence on the part of Socrates towards the gods of his country. Whatever may have been the laxity of the Greeks in later times in playing with once solemn words (cf. Becker’s *Charicles*, p. 62), it is entirely inadmissible to suppose Socrates in earnest regarding the offering to Æsculapius (118 A.) and yet to be only irreverently jesting here.

## NOTE T.

(PAGE 136.)

### ON THE SEQUENCE OF THE REASONING IN THE FIFTH ARGUMENT.

THE course of the argumentation, from 100 B. to 106 E., does not run at first sight very smooth, and it has therefore been severely attacked both in ancient and modern times. Strato the Aristotelian, according to Olympiodorus (p. 150, 18), among other objections, argued

goose, and the ram,’ savours strongly of an Egyptian origin. The dog and ram remind one of Anubis and Ammon, and the *χηναλώπηξ* or goose of the Nile was, as we know from Herodotus (II. 72), one of the sacred birds of the Egyptians.—In Aristoph. *Vesp.* 83 (enacted as early as B.C. 422), *μὰ τὸν κύνα* appears as an oath in the mouth of a foreign slave.

\* This oath may be explained as a euphemistic appeal to Hades, on the Rhadamanthine principle of invoking, instead of Pluto himself, whose realm he was about to visit, the guardian at his gate. Porphyry (*de Abst.* III. 16) favours this explanation; cf. Scholium on Lucian (*Vit. Auct.* 16).

that a stone, as not admitting death (*ἀδεκτος θανάτου*), might be said to be *ἀθάνατος*, but it did not follow that it was therefore *ἀνώλεθρον*, and so with the Soul. To this it is a sufficient reply with Olympiodorus to say that the stone and Soul do not stand on the same footing regarding Death, because the stone is by its nature without that which is the distinguishing principle of the Soul—Life. Another of Strato's objections was that it was possible that the Soul could be said to resist the idea of Death only so long as it lived, and that, as a fire grows cold, so also Life might possibly die away from the Soul. The best method of anticipating this objection on Platonic principles, would have been the interweaving of the argument expounded in the *Phædrus* regarding the self-motive power of the Soul, which would have demonstrated that the Soul was not a passing phenomenon, but an essence and indestructible. This, however, Plato has not done, and the answer must be sought for in another way.—Tennemann (*Gesch. der Philos.* Bd. II. 364) however, and Kunhardt (*Platonis Phædo*, p. 67) repeat the objection of Strato, and allege that Plato reaches the conclusion of the Imperishableness of the Soul by a 'Machtspruch' or dictatorial assumption. To defend Plato against this charge H. Schmidt enters into an exposition of the whole argument, from which the following is condensed.

'Plato has shown (in 105 E.) that the term *ἀθάνατος* is predicable of the Soul as not admitting the notion of Death, just as *ἀνάρτιος* is predicable of the Triad as not admitting parity, and *ἄθερμος* of snow as not admitting warmth. He then argues, "If it were the case now that these negative attributes involved the negation of Perishableness in their subjects, then the Triad as *ἀνάρτιος*, the snow as *ἄθερμος*, and the Soul as *ἀθάνατος*, would each and all be imperishable. If, however, it is denied that there is any necessary connection between this conception (*τὸ ἀνώλεθρον*) and that of *ἀνάρτιον* or of *ἄθερμον*, we could not advance anything against such a negation; but, if it were admitted, then the result would follow that *ἀνώλεθρον* must be predicated of the Soul as well as of the others. If it is not admitted, then some other means must be found of connecting the idea of *τὸ ἀθάνατον* with *τὸ ἀνώλεθρον*." It is at this point that Tennemann and the objectors misunderstand the reasoning, the result of which is that they represent Plato as giving up the possibility of establishing the principle logically, and make him resort to a "Machtspruch." They

forget that it is the Socratising Plato that is here discoursing, not the categorically speaking Aristotle. The latter would have framed it thus: "Now that which is *ἀθάνατον* is necessarily also *ἀνώλεθρον*, for *ἀθάνατον* is the species of the genus *ἀνώλεθρον*: if *ἀθάνατον* is predicable of the Soul, so also is *ἀνώλεθρον*." Plato, however, makes Socrates follow the dialectic method, and only *suggests* the means whereby the interlocutor may draw the conclusion for himself: "the Soul is immortal, and it is impossible for it to perish; and we need not go far for the proof, for if that which is immortal were to perish, what would there be in the world exempt from the same fate?" 106 D. This result is confirmed by the words of Socrates thereafter: "That by universal consent imperishableness must be ascribed to God and to the Idea of Life, and whatsoever by its nature excludes the Idea of Death." Cebes having admitted this principle, Socrates then applies it to the Soul, as containing the idea of Life, and thus deduces its imperishableness also. In this way it is shown that Plato does not deal in hypothetical assumptions, but that, once the doctrine of Ideas is admitted, the course of the argument is naturally evolved without any *saltus*, such as is supposed, but according to the natural course of the dialectic method.' H. Schmidt *Commentar zu Pl. Phædon*, II. Hälfte, pp. 74—81.

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## NOTE U.

(PAGE 169.)

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### ON POISONING BY HEMLOCK.

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THE use of Hemlock as a mode of judicial death has occasionally been adduced as a proof of the humanity of the Athenian people. It was a punishment involving no revolting exposure or effusion of blood, and had the advantage of combining, as Grote (IX. p. 14, n.) observes, the minimum of pain with the minimum of indignity.\*

\* The praise for this humanity seems to belong only to Greeks of the Ionic race. The people of Ceos (*Æl. Var. Hist.* III. 37) and of Massilia



In this point of view it is not unworthy of notice that its employment seems to have been mainly parallel with the period which we are accustomed to regard as the brightest in Athenian history. The most prominent of those who suffered death by this means were Theramenes in B.C. 404, Socrates in B.C. 399, and Phocion with certain others in B.C. 317. That it was a familiar punishment about the time of the Peloponnesian war is manifest from the cruel joke of Aristophanes in the play of the 'Frogs' (l. 123) B.C. 405, and also from the statements of the experience of the officer in the Phædo (63 D., 116 C., E.; cf. Andocides de Pace, ch. 2; Lysias 394, 612).

As to the plant from which the famous poison (κώνειον) was procured there has been considerable dispute. The general opinion, however, is in favour of its derivation from the Spotted Hemlock or *Conium\* maculatum*, which, according to Sibthorp in his *Flora Græca*, is still found abundantly in many parts of the Peloponnesus, and especially 'between Athens and Megara'; whereas the *Cicuta virosa* and *Æthusa cynapium*, for which rival claims have been advanced, are said to be not now found in any part of the country.

Modern toxicologists find some difficulty as to some of the symptoms described in the Phædo as resulting from the potion. It is proper to remember, however, that Plato's diagnosis was not that of a physician, but of a historian relating the tale, and that too not from his own personal observation, but from the accounts of his friends; and it is also possible that the difference of a southern climate may affect the energy of the plant (Burnett's Botany, vol. II. p. 782). The description given by Plato is in the main in harmony with the results of Toxicology, according to which Hemlock is classed among the *sharply-narcotic* poisons, the effects of which show themselves in clogging the vital action and gradually seizing on the powers of motion and respiration. According to Dioscorides, convulsions were among its effects, and the expression ἐκινήθη in the Phædo is interpreted

(Val. Max. II. 6, 7) appear to be the only states that employed it besides the Athenians.

\* Cf. Hasselt's Handbuch der Giftelehre. I. p. 336.—According to Pliny (Hist. Nat. XXV. 95), it was from the seeds after trituration that the most powerful juice was wont to be extracted. He ascribes, however, a 'vis refrigeratoria' to the leaves as well as to the seeds.

as descriptive of some such symptom (Dr. Adama, Paulus Ægin. vol. II. p. 212).\*

It is worthy of remark that, although the obnoxious *κῶνειον* is freely spoken of by Xenophon (Hell. II. 3, 56), and by Plutarch (Phoc. 36), as well as once by Plato himself in the *Lysis* (219 E.), all the references to the poison in the *Phædo* are of a euphemistic kind. Nowhere are the contents of the cup more specifically indicated than by the *vox media*—namely, τὸ φάρμακον—which might signify the means of health as well as of death, as if for the purpose of implying that the cup of Hemlock was to Socrates, not the instrument of Death, but the medicine of Immortality.

## NOTE V.

(PAGE 169.)

### ON THE OFFERING OF THE COCK TO ÆSCULAPIUS.

VARIOUS and widely-differing views have been entertained regarding the import and purpose of the Last Word of Socrates, enjoining

\* Nicander (Alexipharm. 186) gives an elaborate description of the symptoms, among which the most notable are the chillness of the extremities, appearing also in the *Phædo*, and dizziness or vertigo, of which, however, Plato takes no notice. (From this last symptom the origin of the word is probably accounted for: viz., *κῶνος* a spiral cone). The direction of the executioner to walk about seems to imply that dizziness was not apprehended as among the effects of the poison. The recommendation to Socrates—'to walk about as long as he could'—seems to be explicable only as it would afford a kind of diversion to the thoughts, and diminish the risk of violent convulsions: otherwise it is inconsistent with the advice tendered in 63 D., prohibiting earnest talk or discourse. Both the one and the other would tend to increase the animal heat, and thereby produce the effect of wine (which Pliny (H. N. XIV. 7) says is the antidote to Hemlock), and prolong the struggle.—It is still more puzzling to find Tacitus (Annal. XV. 64) giving as a reason for the slowness of Seneca's death, that the Hemlock did not operate *because* his body was cold by the previous opening of the veins: 'Adlatum venenum hausit frustra: frigidus jam artus, et cluso corpore adversus vim veneni.'

his friend Crito to offer, in fulfilment of a debt or vow, a cock to Æsculapius.

Some have considered it a mere delirious utterance\* (Jortin, Remarks on Eccles. Hist. I. p. 78) on the part of Socrates, resulting from the operation of the poison. It is, however, difficult to conceive Plato as narrating with reverent circumstantiality the Last Word of his Master under such an impression. Others, such as Theodoret,† have sought for the import of the 'novissima verba' in a desire on the part of Socrates to keep himself right with regard to the religion of his country, and to show with his latest breath the falsity of the main count on which he had been condemned—viz., impiety towards the national gods. According to this view, as expressed by Theodoret, the act would be one of amiable hypocrisy on the part of Socrates, as if he wished to leave an impression on the minds of men different from that which his real belief regarding the gods would warrant.

The view, however, which seems to answer all the circumstances best, and which has received the greatest amount of favour, is that which regards the injunction of Socrates, not only as an act of homage to the national worship (cf. Xen. Mem. I. 3, 1), but also as intended to possess an allegorical meaning. It was a practice of patients recovering from a disease to acknowledge gratitude to Æsculapius by the offering of some sacrifice. This familiar rite Socrates turns into an allegory, and desires Crito to signify by such an offering his thanksgiving that his friend has now received in Death the cure of Life's long infirmity.‡

\* Compare the remarks of Warburton (Div. Leg. Book III. note D.) against such a view.

† ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι καὶ Σωκράτην . . . τὸν ἀλεκτρονῶνα θῦσαι κελεύσαι, ἵνα τὴν κατ' αὐτοῦ γεγενημένην διελέγξῃ γραφὴν κ.τ.λ. Theodoret, Curatio, VII. p. 897, Ed. Schulze.

‡ Compare the Æschylean fragment: ὦ θάνατε Παιῶν, μή μ' ἀτιμάσῃς μολεῖν: the 'double entendre' in σεσωσμένος in Soph. Aj. 692; the supplication 'Jovi Liberatori' on the lips of Seneca and Thræsea at death; the inscription 'Health' on the tomb of Theodosius III. (Gibbon, ch. 48); 'My long sickness Of health and living now begins to mend.' Shakespeare, Timon, V. 2.—It is scarcely worth while to call attention to the contemptuous representations given as to the meaning of the 'last word' of Socrates by Tertullian (Apol. ch. 46), and, what is more strange, by Origen (contr. Cels. VI. 6), who take occasion to speak in scorn of a religion which could find its consummation in the sacrifice of a cock. It would have

It is worthy of remark that the Bird of Day, like the worship of Æsculapius, with which it was associated, does not appear at a very early date either in the mythology or in the literary remains of Greece. Æsculapius in Homer is simply *ἰητρὸς ἀνύμων* 'a healer unblamed,' and has not received enrolment among the gods, to none of whom is the epithet *ἀνύμων* in Homer ever applied. His worship as a deity is undoubtedly one of the growths of the Orphic influence, and belongs in its origin to the period of the rise of the mystic cults of Demeter and Dionysus.

It forms one of the most remarkable among the minor proofs of the high antiquity of the Homeric poems, that, as remarked by Eustathius, p. 1479, 24, there is no allusion to cock-crow either in the Iliad or Odyssey.\* The proof is irresistible that this bird was then unknown in Greece and in Western Asia, otherwise a poet who had such an eye and ear for all natural sights and sounds would not have failed to find some place of honour to the herald of the Morn.† Though the bird is familiar enough by the time of the Peloponnesian war, the earliest allusion to its presence in Greece seems to be that in Theognis (l. 862), about B.C. 510. It is probable that it came westward with the extension of the Persian empire, and in Aristophanes (Aves 485) it is still denominated, from its eastern

been more just if they had acknowledged that the feeling of need or of *duty* (*ὀφείλομεν*) in a dying man to perform a vow, was, to a certain extent, evidence of the expectation of a future state.—As little worthy of notice, though for the opposite reason, is the ecstatic symbolising of Picus Mirandula (de Dignitate Hominis, p. 320), who connects together, as one huge symbolism signifying the awaking of the human spirit, the Pythagorean injunction *τρέφειν ἀλεκτρούνα* (cf Orelli Opusc. Philos. I p. 66); Ælian's ascription of a magic power to the Cock, which causes the lion to tremble (Nat. Anim. III. 31; Lucr. IV. 714); the awakening of repentance in the breast of St. Peter at the crowing of the Cock; and the offering of the same bird to the god of healing.

\* The same remark applies to the Old Testament Scriptures, in which there is no reference to cock-crow. The renderings of LXX. in Proverbs XXX. 31, and of the Vulgate in Job XXXVIII. 36 are mistranslations.

† The mention of cock-crow in the so-called Homeric Batrachomyomachia (l. 193) is one of the many internal evidences which bring down the date of that burlesque to the Attic, or at least to the Lyric period.—The story in Cic. Div. I. 34, regarding a prophecy by the mythic Trophonius, derived from the crowing of cocks, may be safely disregarded as unhistorical.

origin (Περσικὸν ὄρνις) the 'Peraian bird' (cf. Athenæ. IX. 374 D. ; XIV. 655 A.).

In ancient Art the Cock soon took its place as a symbol of the God of Day. Plutarch (Mor. 400 C.) refers to a painter who symbolised Morning by a figure of Apollo with a cock upon his hand (ὁ τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα ποιήσαν ἐπὶ τῆς χειρὸς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐωθινήν ὑπεδήλωσεν ὥραν).\* From its symbolical connection with Apollo—the conqueror of Night and of black serpent Pythons—the Cock came to figure as an emblem of Victory, for which end it was peculiarly adapted by its own pugnacious powers.†

From the worship of Apollo it naturally descended to that of the son of Apollo, Æsculapius,‡ who was supposed to execute in one of its departments the restorative function of the healing God. The deity of Health might naturally be disposed to delight in the bird whose office it was to announce the 'incense-breathing morn.'

The interest attached to the 'Bird of Dawning,' partly from its heralding the sun, partly from its erect victorious carriage, has extended, as is well known, from classic to modern times,§ and a multitude of superstitions has arisen associated with this bird,

\* Among the coins of Himera is one with the figure of a Cock—a kind of punning allusion to *ἡμέρα* (Eckhel's Doctr. Numm. vol. I. p. 214), or perhaps a remembrance of the great victory of B.C. 480 gained at Himera over the Carthaginians.

† Compare the prize-amphora in Müller's Denkmäler (vol. I. no. 92), in which there occurs a very early appropriation of the Cock as the symbol of struggle and victory.—Olympiodorus (p. 208), in descanting on the 'Last Word' of Socrates, quotes a certain oracle, 'that souls when being released ought to sing the pæan,' as if like the Cock crowing over victory. Compare the extraordinary legend in Saxo Grammaticus (Lib. I. p. 16) of the infernal journey of Hading under the guidance of the 'hemlock woman' (cicutarum gerula), who when baffled by an impassable wall, performed the following experiment: '*Galli caput, quem secum forte afferebat, abruptum, ultra moenium septa jactavit, statimque rediit, ales resumpti fidem spiraculi claro testabatur occentu.*' Thus it appears that in the northern, as well as the southern mythology, the bird of dawn was associated with the notion of Recovered Life.

‡ On coins of Epidaurus and Selinus the Cock figures as a direct emblem of Æsculapius.

§ Compare Pliny (N. H. X. 24) with the mediæval superstitions preserved in Shakspeare, Hamlet I. i; also Brand's Popular Antiquities (vol. II. p. 54).

greater in all probability than those connected with any other. There are even traces of the offering of the Cock to *Æsculapius*\* having descended in certain instances to modern times, long after every other fragment of the ancient mythology to which it belonged had passed away.

\* In the proceedings of the Antiquarian Society of Edinburgh (vol. IV.) will be found an interesting account by Dr. Arthur Mitchell of lingering superstitions in the Highlands of Scotland, among which is the Sacrifice of a Cock as the cure for certain diseases, especially for epilepsy.—Compare similar traces in the superstitions of certain parts of Germany: Grimm's *Deutsche Mythol.* pp. 615, 1124.

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